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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to diagnose and cure some of the sources of 
conceptual confusion in psychology. Both the concepts of creativity and insanity 
are used as examples of areas of concern to psychologists. Wittgenstein 
(1958,1969) suggests that in psychology theory and research are directed from 
confused conceptions of language resulting in a paralysis of understanding. It is by 
following Wittgenstein's articulation of the nature of philosophy, and by 
understanding the relationship between philosophy and psychology, that it is 
possible to disentangle the conceptual confusion and gain access to accurate 
theorising about insanity, creativity, and the relationship between the two 
phenomena. 
Cognitive science is criticised for perpetuating a mythology from which research is 
directed. Cognitive psychology relies on a misguided understanding of the nature 
of psychological predicates. Wittgenstein' s arguments against the thoughts 
embodied in the cognitivist doctrine are used to disable this attempt to account for 
psychological concepts generally and provide a background to address the errors 
contained within computational accounts of creativity. 
Social constructionists claim that they accurately represent the introduction of 
Wittgensteinian philosophy into psychology. There are several attempts made by 
constructionists to criticise cognitive science and present alternative research pro-
grammes for psychology. It is argued that social constructionists fail to present a 
convincing argument against cognitivism and furthermore misinterpret 
Wittgenstein's philosophy and so fail to introduce Wittgenstein's thoughts to psy-
chology. Theorising from a constructionist perspective about the concept of in-
sanity is used as an example to expose the types of error which result from misin-
terpreting Wittgenstein' s arguments. 
It is by contrast with these broad theoretical structures (both cognitive science and 
social constructionism) that the proper grammatical structure, at least from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective, for the concepts of insanity and creativity is devel-
oped. The relationship between grammar and evidence is explained against the 
background of argument in psychology relating to the study of creativity and 
insanity. Theoretical psychology is distinguished from philosophy with the 
recognition that philosophy provides conceptual clarification and psychology is 
involved with conceptual development. 
The relationship between empirical psychology and theoretical psychology is de-
scribed in contrast to the relationship between philosophy and theoretical psy-
chology. By describing Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy it is argued that 
Wittgenstein offered psychologists a resource which operates either to remove 
conceptual confusion or promote an overview to facilitate the correct employment 
ofterrns within theory. 
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Introduction 
"You may seek it with thimbles-and seek it with care; 
You may hunt it with forks and hope; 
You may threaten its life with a railway-share; 
You may charm it with smiles and soap-'" 
('That's exactly the method' the bellman bold. 
In hasty parenthesis cried, 
'That's exactly the way I have always been told. 
That the capture of snarks should be tried'.) 
Lewis Carroll (1876) 'The hunting of the snark'. 
When pursuing the fictitious 'snark' any method will do. Furthermore, the 
application of the method will not in itself reveal the absurdity of the task. 
Perhaps the crew aboard the ship would give up after exhaustion, 
frustration, or despair at the losses accrued as a result of their 
misadventure. Another voyage might be commissioned by the next 
generation of heroes who adopt the mythological tradition and the 
methods of their failed forebears. Successive generations may alter the 
methods and techniques but nevertheless still fail to accomplish the 
capture of the 'snark'. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical considerations for psychology can be 
summarised as an attempt to liberate us from engaging in nonsensical 
pursuits. Wittgenstein warns us, as we might warn the Bellman, that 
tradition is responsible for our being led astray. Like the crew who hunt the 
'snark' psychologists seek mythological and mysterious creations like 'ego', 
'information processing executives', 'pre-operational stages' 'intelligence' 
and so on. Wittgenstein set himself the task of expunging nonsense, 
brought 'into tradition by an entanglement within language, from 
philosophy and, in turn, psychology. 
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Several of Wittgenstein's arguments have had either a direct or indirect 
influence in psychology and psychological theory. Armstrong, Gleitman, 
and Gleitman (1983) report that the prototype view of definitions 
introduced into cognitive psychology: 
.. .is the family resemblance description, first alluded to by 
Wittgenstein (1953)1, though he might be surprised at some of its 
recent guises. Wittgenstein took as an important example the 
word I game' .... His analogy was to the structure of family 
resemblances. It is such a position that Rosch and her co-workers 
have adapted and refined, and brought into psychology through a 
series of compelling experimental demonstrations. (p. 269). 
Wittgenstein's arguments are not used to support this research, but merely 
provide the inspiration for experimental investigation. As such, it is really 
the empirical research, for example Rosch (1973), which is introduced into 
psychology, and not Wittgenstein's philosophical arguments. 
Indeed, Armstrong et aI, are wise to include the disclaimer that 
Wittgenstein might not accept the use of his analogy within experimental 
research: as if it had to be established empirically. Furthermore, 
philosophers have argued that from Wittgenstein's perspective the whole 
approach of cognitive psychology is misdirected. Chapter Two of this thesis 
will attempt to explain what Wittgenstein's objection to cognitive 
psychology might be. 
Hacker (1986) regards Wittgenstein/s 'private language argument' to be of 
crucial importance for psychology: 
The private language argument is, if correct, one of the most 
important philosophical insights achieved in this century. It is a 
criticism of the conception of mind which is not merely the 
dominant one in European philosophy, but it is also pervasive in 
our culture, in psychology, linguistics, and indeed in the 
reflections of most people who think about the nature of self-
consciousness and the mind. (p. 245). 
It is important to appreciate Hacker's claim that the private language 
argument is a philosophical insight of only indirect relevance to psychology 
by its criticism of a philosophical conception of mind. Wittgenstein's 
argument addresses the Cartesian conception of mind which is pervasive 
in psychology since, it is supposed, it orients psychological theory to a 
1 Wittgenstein (1953/1958) Philosophical Investigations London: 
Basil Blackwell. 
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particular conception of the nature of the 'mental'. Hacker's position relies 
on an unexplicated, but not unfounded, account of the relationship of 
philosophy to psychology. The assumption here is that psychological theory 
is often informed by, rather than contributes to, the philosophy of mind. 
Perhaps the best place to search for understanding the relationship between 
philosophy and psychology generally is to be found in the philosophy of 
science. Here too Wittgenstein's influence has been noted. Thomas Kuhn 
(1962) usesWittgensteinian ideas and terminology freely in his attempt to 
characterise the scientific method. Kuhn's ideas focus several of 
Wittgenstein's ideas at the nature of science. Hanson also credits influence 
to Wittgenstein. Peter Barker (1989 p. 97) states: 
... the "new philosophy of science II in the work of Toulmin (1953), 
Hanson (1958), Kuhn (1962), and Feyerabend (1965, 1970) ... these 
writers share two things: a conviction that the philosophy of 
science must be informed by the history of science, and an early 
exposure to the later Wittgenstein. 
The suggestion is that something in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein 
can enlighten us on how it is that we do science. Barker recognises this 
when he states: liThe founders of the only well-developed alternative to the 
logical empiricist philosophy of science, at least, recognized the potential 
importance of Wittgenstein's later work//(p. 97). But it is unwise to carry 
Wittgenstein's banner into the subdisciplines of philosophy as if it were to 
find a home in anyone area of concern. Wittgenstein's philosophy cuts 
across a great many traditional divisions such that it characterises not only 
a change in our perception of these various specialities but signals a 
complete reorientation to our consideration of philosophy generally. In this 
capacity it is necessary, in order to fully appreciate Wittgenstein's 
philosophy and its relation to psychology, to avoid the temptation of 
characterising the influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy on anyone 
particular speciality within philosophy which might bear some relevance to 
psychology. 
Wittgenstein warns us that unless we deal with our entanglement in 
language, or our philosophical puzzlement, we will engage an endless 
pursuit of the mythical creations of our language. Old problems will 
reappear in new guises-such as the Cartesian ontology within cognitive 
science. While it is often the case that Wittgenstein had explicit targets of 
his philosophical attack, he rarely identifies them-he held a broader aim. 
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Wittgenstein sought to teach us a method so that we could free ourselves 
from repeated puzzlements. Perhaps Wittgenstein deliberately obscured his 
philosophical targets in light of this aim since what is common to both the 
targets of his philosophical attack and those present in modern philosophy 
and psychology is a similar entanglement in language. While different 
outcomes result in the application of a conceptual confusion within 
modern psychological theory, the same mistaken 'moves' within our 
language-games are committed by both the targets of Wittgenstein's 
philosophical inquiry and those proposals which form the basis of this 
thesis. 
Chapter One identifies a tradition which was firmly criticised by 
Wittgenstein but lingers on in an orientation to psychology and 
philosophy. Frege's anti-psychologistic arguments are examined in order to 
demonstrate how it is often our initial assumptions which lead us astray. 
Some would regard philosophy as being grounded within universally 
applicable prescriptions concerning reasoning and justification. Psychology, 
as a science, is thought to be grounded within empirical inquiry. When 
common problems, such as the nature of reasoning, are encountered from 
these different orientations, the philosopher accuses the psychologist's 
methodological assumptions of being inappropriate for the task of 
revealing the nature of reasoning. The psychologist, or naturalistic 
, 
philosopher, accuses philosophy's methodological foundations of being 
inept-Quine (1969) argues that philosophy simply has not been able to 
reveal anything about the foundations of reasoning and suggests we should 
settle on psychology. The error, according to Wittgenstein, is a failure to 
appreciate the nature of philosophical problems: they arise out of a misuse 
of our language. Thus, for Wittgenstein, the debate over the correct 
orientation for inquiry into the nature of reasoning is symptomatic of 
confusion. Philosophy, like psychology, is capable of pursuing the 
mythical-there is no need to engage in the anti-psychologistic debate nor 
attempt to found the nature of philosophical inquiry once one recognis~s 
that philosophy and psychology are distinct practices which employ terms 
like 'reasoning' for different purposes. Wittgenstein reassures that the 
adoption of his orientation to philosophy should make such problems 
disappear. 
Chapter Two introduces Wittgenstein's conception of rules and rule-
following. The 'cognitive paradigm' in psychology is used as an example to 
illustrate how certain branches of inquiry in psychology are influenced by a 
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commitment to a confusion generated by a mistaken conception of the 
nature of psychological predicates. Like Frege, cognitivists neglect to deal 
with the philosophical problems contained within their initial 
assumptions about language, meaning, and understanding. The private 
language argument is often invoked by anti-cognitivists to reveal the error 
in cognitivists' commitments. However, it is argued that the conclusions of 
the private language argument are insufficient for the purpose of 
illuminating the cognitivists' mistake. Wittgenstein enables us to 
understand the mistake common to both the Cartesian ontology and that 
contained within all mechanistic accounts of understanding. The error is 
that of separating the normative nature of rules from what Wittgenstein 
regards as the internal relation to following a rule within a practice. 
One mistaken conclusion is often derived from the private language 
argument. It is sometimes held that Wittgenstein argued that an individual 
who developed in total isolation from a society would be logically 
. precluded from attaining a language. Put another way, the development of 
a language logically requires, along with contingently stable material 
objects, a shared social practice. This view is examined in contrast to the 
social constructionist perspective of social psychology. It is argued that 
Wittgenstein did not regard it as a logical requirement that the 
development of a language requires a shared social practice. The general 
point concerning the internal relation between rules and rule-following is 
reinforced with the point that nothing, not a society or shared social 
practice, mediates between a rule and an individual's understanding of its 
employment. 
The clarification of the point that society does not logically determine an 
individual's use of terms enables a more detailed examination of the 
nature of social ascriptions employed within psychology. The example of 
the concept of 'insanity' is introduced. Chapter Four examines a theoretical 
conception of insanity which views the ascription of insanity to be correctly 
applied to those who adopt rule-governed practices which are contingently 
unshared. Alternatively, the ascription of insanity is correctly applied to 
those who do not have a rule-governed practice. Both of these conceptions 
are rejected. The general aim is to reveal the logical character of the 
concepts of insanity and creativity to demonstrate how they might be 
legitimately employed within psychological theory. 
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Chapter Five introduces the technical use of the concept of 'grammar'. 
Wittgenstein regards a grammar to be constitutive of a shared way of acting. 
Our mutual adherence to grammatical rules constitutes the normative 
procedures involved in the use of theoretical expressions (A form of 
representation). Grammatical propositions are argued to licence empirical 
propositions. Different practices cannot be compared or clarified on the 
basis of empirical evidence since the gathering of empirical evidence is, in 
itself, a practice reliant on a grammar which constitutes a form of 
representation. 
Chapter Six introduces the idea that we are bound to a form of 
representation from which it is possible to interpret the actions of others. 
Divergent practices are intelligible only insofar as they can be 
comprehended by our own form of representation. The grammar of 
creativity is understood against the background of this claim. It is our form 
of representation which gives meaning and intelligibility to divergent 
practices: we use our own form of representation as the measure of the 
adequacy of alternative representations produced by the insane, bizarre, 
foreign and creative. 
It is sometimes held that Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a scientific 
psychology, or that in the light of Wittgenstein's radical developments in 
philosophy that a similar movement is required in modern psychology. 
Perhaps this perspective on the nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy and its 
relation to psychology is derived from the view held by Russell that 
philosophy provided a foundation for research in other disciplines, that 
philosophy was the 'Queen of the sciences'. For whatever reason it is held 
that Wittgenstein radically alters our perspective in psychology, it is a 
fundamental misinterpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Wittgenstein 
rejected the view that philosophy could provide a basis for investigation in 
the sciences. He maintained that so-called psychological phenomena are 
sometimes the illusions of grammar, the pursuit of which is symptomatic 
of an entanglement within our own conceptual language. Philosophical 
investigation of these entanglements can relieve scientific investigation of 
the motivation to pursue the mythical: but it does not radically alter the 
actual methods adopted in the pursuit. 
To examine the traditions which lead us astray it is necessary to step back 
from the context of modern mainstream psychology. The purpose of this 
investigation is not to find the 'psychological snark', nor to simply point 
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out the nonsensical nature of the pursuits of many in psychology. The task 
is to examine our traditions; and further, to show the nature and purpose 
of examining our traditional influences in psychology. 
If one supposes the voyage in pursuit of the mythical in psychology was 
commissioned fifty years ago then undoubtedly one must place Alan 
Turing on the boat. Turing ventured methods in mathematics which were 
adopted into current theorising in psychology under the banner of 
'cognitive science'. Perhaps, like the bellman in pursuit of the snark, the 
methods have lost their lineage over time: we fail to see how they arose, 
why they were developed, and the context in which they were originally 
employed. However it happened, Turing's work is credited as one of the 
founding influences for at least one area of modern psychological 
theorising. What is most surprising is that at exactly the time Turing 
ventured the proposals which were eventually introduced to psychology, 
Wittgenstein was campaigning that Turing's conception of mathematics is 
apt to mislead. Turing even attended Wittgenstein's lectures but abandoned 
them when he decided that there could be no common ground between 
Wittgenstein and himself since they could not agree to the significance of a 
contradiction within a system of mathematics (Monk, 1989 p. 422). 
Wittgenstein's warnings were ignored and the boat sailed. 
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Chapter One 
A Tradition of Division 
Wittgenstein's philosophy developed from his considerations of the nature 
of mathematics and logic. To most it might seem that philosophical 
problems concerning mathematics bear little relevance to the problems of 
psychology. Wittgenstein, like Frege before him, rejected all accounts of 
psychologism: the notion that, for example, " ... the law of Non-
contradiction reports the incompatibility of the mental state p with the 
mental state of believing not-p." (Baker, 1988 pp. 171-172). Frege, like 
Wittgenstein, was concerned with the foundations of logic. Both agreed 
that logical analysis is, " ... wholly independent of introspective psychology" 
(Hacker, 1986 p. 20). Frege's concern was to determine the foundations of 
logical necessity without recourse to an implicit conception of intuition: 
"For this purpose he considered that he had to circumscribe and formalise 
the sound proof procedures employed by mathematicians" (Baker and 
Hacker, 1984 p. 33). Wittgenstein (1958) turned his attention to the logical 
character of understanding in relation to his philosophical account of 
meaning and language. The sharp division between the psychological 
inquiry of understanding and the formal methods of logic produced by 
Frege was gradually eroded in Wittgenstein's later philosophical writings. 
Wittgenstein came to hold a more cautious approach to psychologism 
regarding: 
The opinion that the laws of logic are the expression of "thinking 
habits" is not as absurd as it seems." (MS XIV, p. 12 cited in 
Baker and Hacker, 1985 p. 317). 
Wittgenstein never endorsed an account of psychologism, he thought it 
was confused. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein adopted the position that the 
philosophical problems concerning the foundations of mathematics are 
similar to those of the foundations of scientific psychology-the nature of 
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both disciplines 'can be examined in similar ways. Thus, while both 
Wittgenstein and Frege recognised a gulf between the two forms of inquiry, 
and both maintained a division, it is Wittgenstein who recognised a bridge 
across the gap. 
Psychologism is a term that has been used pejoratively ever since Frege 
produced arguments which purportedly established that psychological 
considerations are irrelevant to philosophy. Frege was working within a 
well established tradition, his arguments exemplify the view that 
psychology is to be regarded as independent of philosophy; philosophy was 
to be viewed as independent of all science. Psychologism, according to Sober 
(1978): 
... denotes a family of views all tending to downplay or deny 
distinctions between epistemology and logic on the one hand and 
psychology on the other. (pp. 166-167). 
Mohanty (1982) offers us a distinction which suggests that psychologism 
comes in varying degrees: 
Weak logical psychologism holds the view that...psychological 
inquiry into actual human thought processes constitutes 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for inquiry into the 
foundation of logic. Strong logical psychologism considers logic 
to be a branch of psychology, the laws of logic to be descriptive 
laws of actual human thought processes and understands these 
laws as making assertions about mental events .... (p. 20). 
Positions which entail a psychologistic commitment tend towards 
understanding the nature of logic within a branch of psychology. 
Rationality, inference, and judgement become an aspect of some inquiry 
within psychology. 
There are, according to Aach (1990), four separate but related arguments 
presented by Frege and, in the same tradition, Husser!, against 
psychologism. Each of these arguments will be considered here but it 
should not be overlooked that the purpose of this discussion is to establish 
some of the reasons that psychological inquiry has been held to be 
fundamentally different from philosophical inquiry-that the former 
might be justified by recourse to the latter. It is commonly argued that Frege 
and Husserl presented an impoverished account of psychology which could 
not possibly anticipate the nature of the discipline today. Serious 
consideration of Frege's arguments against psychologism might be regarded 
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as anachronistic (Sober, 1978; Dummett, 1991). Furthermore, Wittgenstein's 
conception of the relationship between philosophy and psychology could 
never be placed under the banner of psychologism (Baker, 1984), indeed it is 
more accurately antithetical (Baker and Hacker, 1984 p. 62). Since the 
intention here is to illustrate an aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
perspective on psychology the present argument is not intended to endorse 
any form of psychologism. 
The reason for the present discussion comes from Wittgenstein: 
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it 
lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us 
inexorably. (PI §115). 
Aach (1990) describes the arguments against psychologism as presenting a 
bifurcation. Here the prevailing picture is either what Aach calls the 
'independence assumption': the view, "that logic is entirely independent of 
psychology, which has no relevance to the latter's foundations." (1990 p. 
315), or some other account of the nature of the necessary truths of logic: 
'nominalism', 'Platonism', or 'psychologism'. Wittgenstein addressed the 
debate concerning psychologism in an indirect way, by rejecting the initial 
assumption that the division described above is necessary, and considered a 
different question concerning both the foundations of psychological inquiry 
and those of mathematics. He considered psychologism to be confused and 
the arguments of Frege concerning that nature of the necessary truths of 
logic misdirected. Wittgenstein recognised that the basic error of the 
philosophy of psychology and similarly in the philosophy of mathematics 
was the assumption that all propositions are used descriptively. 
Wittgenstein's philosophy is an attempt to persuade us to abandon the 
assumptions we first adopt concerning the nature of our inquiry-to 
forestall attempts to ground it somehow initially (i.e by reference to bogus 
objects). Baker (1988 p. 163) reports: 
The terms 'Platonism', 'nominalism' and 'psychologism' flag 
different strategies for answering these questions [Questions 
concerning the nature of logical truths]. Wittgenstein addressed 
the quite different question of the role or function distinctive of 
propositions of logic, and he suggested that traditional 
philosophical controversies would be dissolved once one noticed 
that they took for granted, as Frege had, that the propositions of 
logic have the same kind of employment as empirical 
propositions. 
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The picture that holds us captive is the view that an investigation of the 
foundations of logic or mathematics is essentially different from the 
investigation of the foundations of psychology. It is this picture which 
flows directly as a result of regarding as acceptable the initial arguments for 
a division between psychology and philosophy. This division is persistent, 
it remains in a subtle form within attempts to justify philosophical 
methods in relation to such disciplines as psychology. 
The defence of the purity of logic 
Frege sought to defend the purity of the formal analysis by adopting a 
'common expedient' (Baker and Hacker, 1984 p. 40). Frege suggested that the 
psycho logicians had misrepresented the nature of the laws of logic by 
misrepresenting the objects of judgment as being dependent upon 
individual psychological variables. When psychologicians presented 
accounts of reasoning they carried a commitment to viewing the objects of 
judgement as being the psychological processes of individual reasoning. 
Thus the 'common expedient' adopted to defend formal analysis from the 
confounding influence of inquiry into individual reasoning was to separate 
the act of judging from the content of judgement: "The mental act was 
distinguished from the act itself." (Baker and Hacker, 1984 p. 40). 
Frege derived from this assumption the argument that the object of inquiry 
for the logician existed in mind-independent realm. Frege suggested that 
psychology was by definition the science of subjective ideas. It is the case, 
according to Frege, that everyone has a different idea, for example, of the 
number 'two'. Therefore the meaning ('Meaning' being a philosophical 
concept requiring analysis at a formal level) of 'two' cannot be that 
subjective idea. Thus Frege set about to establish a difference between the 
subjective and the objective. The subjective exists in the mind of an 
individual and cannot be the subject matter for philosophy which is the 
study of the objective idea which represents the same thing for all-this 
distinction " ... stands or falls with that between psychology and logic" (FA, p. 
37). 
Frege challenged the notion that the meaning of a term was the mental 
image that the term calls up in thought. (This view lingers on in certain 
forms of psychology particularly with cognitive psychologists who hold to a 
representational account of meaning or perception.) It may well be that 
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Frege's thesis was " ... supported by a number of bad arguments~"(Dummett, 
1981 p. 32), however it should not be overlooked that his motivation was to 
identify and clarify a conception of logic not to prohibit certain forms of 
inquiry in psychology. Notwithstanding this, Frege's programme required 
philosophical analysis to remove all references to psychological 
considerations, particularly any reference to the idea that a theory of 
meaning can be grounded in psychology. Psychology, according to Frege, 
focuses on the idiosyncratic whereas philosophy studies the objective. 
Frege did not present a direct attack on the nature of psychological inquiry; 
he argued against a particular claim made by psychologicians that thinking 
or inference is essentially a mental act. He was not even particularly 
interested in psychology (Aach, 1990). Nevertheless, Frege's bifurcation of 
the concept of grasping mind-independent sense from the psychological 
notion of subjective ideas had a wider impact. Far from simply defending a 
characterisation of the nature of the laws of logic the acceptance of his 
account of the nature of logic characterised psychological inquiry. 
For Frege the sense of an expression could be determined independent of 
any psychological considerations. Frege supported this Platonistic account 
of sense with a series of arguments directed against the psychologistic 
position and a number of truisms invoked to support his thesis. Sober 
(1978, p. 169) characterises Frege's argument: 
If communication is possible, the speakers of a language must 
associate the same, or nearly the same meanings with the terms 
they use. But the mental image that people associate with terms 
vary enormously from person to person. Images vary, but 
meanings cannot, so meanings are not mental images. 
Sober regards the premiss that "Images may vary, but meanings cannot" to 
be insufficient against the background of modern cognitive psychology. But 
this is an unfair interpretation of Frege's argument. Frege's argument was 
directed against the consequences of a fully considered psychologistic 
account of logic. A better representation of Frege's argument comes from 
Baker and Hacker (1984 p. 48-49): 
For what A would judge in judging that 2+2=4 would concern his 
ideas, and what B would judge in denying that 2+2=4 would 
concern his ideas, and there would be no common object of 
judgement at aIL.If communication is possible, .. .it must be 
possible for different people to think the same thing. But this is 
inconsistent with the claim that what we think is an idea, on the 
assumption that ideas are subjective ... 
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Or directly from Frege: If the number two really were a subjective idea then, 
.. .it would have straight away to be private to me only. Another 
man's idea is ex vi tennini, another idea. We should then have it 
might be many millions of twos on our hands. We should have 
to speak of my two and your two, of one two and all twos ... (FA, 
p.37). 
Frege conceived no problem with regarding psychology the science of the 
subjective-reasoning by elimination, it was his objective. Again, Frege had 
a particular programme which motivated the above argument. If one 
disregards the motivation for Frege's argument and treats the issue which 
prompted its inception into philosophy as anachronistic, one might treat 
his thesis, regarding the bifurcation of the content of judging and act of 
judging, to be an historical oddity. One might suppose that Frege adopted a 
'common expedient' to promote a particular characterisation of the 
relationship between philosophy and psychology. Then one is free to 
consider, in the same way that Frege considered the implications of 
psychologism, the implications of this bifurcation and dismiss his thesis as 
presenting an impoverished view of the nature of psychology. 
Frege considered it entirely correct to suppose that each individual has a 
different 'idea' of what the concept 'two' is. Quite the opposite impression is 
held plausible when arguing that everyone knows what, for example, 'red' 
is when they see it. We might suppose that everyone perceives a red rose in 
the same way (perhaps because of some evolutionary functional argument) 
but admit that, philosophically, it might be the case that someone might 
not experience a 'red' rose as red and perhaps they 'see' it as yellow-we 
regard it as possible in the same way that we know there are people who are 
colour-blind. For example, consider Giere (1985): 
From an evolutionary perspective, the subjective certainty is 
indeed causally connected with the more direct source of the 
reliability of such judgements, which lies in our evolved 
capacities fit interacting with the world. But the operation of 
these capacities is largely unrecorded in our conscious experience. 
Rationalist philosophers, on the other hand, focused on our 
more general subjective intuitions, such as, that space has three 
dimensions and that time exhibits a linear structure. These 
judgements seem to be built into the way we think. And indeed 
they are, for the aspects of the world relevant to our biological 
fitness have roughly that structure. (p. 340). 
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Giere (1985) embraces, perhaps without intention, Frege's conclusion that 
there is a division between the subjective and the objective but regards the 
division as unproblematic for the form of inquiry he promotes since he 
supposes that mental content is causally constrained-mental content is 
therefore not idiosyncratic. Giere (1985) offers a mechanistic account of the 
nature of mental content constrained by evolutionary processes. Clearly 
this view is characteristic of an account of psychologism, 'These judgements 
seem to be built in to the way we think', but is not subject to the criticism 
advanced by Frege that psychology, or in Giere's case naturalised 
philosophy of science, is the study of the subjective and idiosyncratic. Giere 
asserts that the subject matter of this naturalised version of philosophy is 
objective: made so by linking the subject matter of his inquiry to a 
theoretical conception of the nature of human reasoning. Thus, at first 
sight, the implication that psychology must address the subjective and 
idiosyncratic seems unfounded and Frege's argument suffers from relying 
on a narrow characterisation of the nature of psychology. 
Sober (1978 p. 186) argues: "The plausibility of psychologism depends in part 
on the correctness of this view of psychological theory." He regards a 
functionalist theory of mind as adequately defending a psychologistic 
position: 
The objects operated upon during these stages of processing will 
be representations which occur within a language or a 
nonlinguistic representational system. (p. 168). 
Sober (1978), like Giere, merely avoids Frege's claim that the objects of 
psychological inquiry are subjective and idiosyncratic. The problem with 
attending to Frege's arguments in this way is the failure to appreciate the 
target of Frege's attack. Sober addresses only the broader implications of the 
anti-psycho logistic arguments he does not recognise the explicit target of 
Frege's arguments-a psychologistic account of logic. 
Mohanty (1982) summaries this position: 
A functionalist theory of mind appears to avoid some of the 
pitfalls of the other, more common empiricist themes. A 
psycho logistic theory of logic, which makes use of such a theory 
of mind, avoids the two extremes of reductive physicalism and 
subjective mentalism. Most of the anti-psychologistic arguments, 
whether of Frege or of Hussert are directed against either of these 
two. It is easy to show that functionalism is immune to them. (p. 
31). 
However, as Mohanty argues: 
But as a theory of logic, in other words a new variety of logical 
psychologism, it is worthless, for the construction of the 
functional theory, like that of any theory qua theory, implies 
precisely the sort of logical concepts whose explanation the theory 
would be giving. While theanti-psychologistic arguments are 
rendered ineffective, we would no longer have what Husser! and 
Frege would have called a psycho logistic theory of logic. In fact, 
we would not have a theory of logic at alL (p. 31). 
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To defend psychology from the characterisation implicit within the 
acceptance of Frege's bifurcation of meaning concedes by default the 
argument which Frege sought to establish. Frege's 'bad arguments' present 
an impoverished account of psychology. But the defence of psychology 
from Frege's anti-psychologistic arguments addresses only the broader 
consequence of accepting the separation of the mental act of judging from 
the content of judging. The defence of psychology fails to address the actual 
problem which arises in the temptation to adopt Frege's 'common 
expediene. Wittgenstein requests that we examine what led us to regard 
such a division as being acceptable and what confusion might be entailed in 
its acceptance (see below). 
Frege, and later Husser!, considered carefully the implications of 
psychologism. A second argument against the plausibility of psychologism 
was developed. Suppose, we accepted Giere's account, or some other 
example (Behaviourism, Aach 1990, or Cognitive science, Sober 1978) as 
providing a means of avoiding the conclusion that psychology studies the 
subjective ideas of individuals which vary from individual to individual. 
Then, according to both Husser! and Frege a notion of 'truth' would be 
nonsensical. An understanding of truth would entail understanding the 
psychological processes which led to the belief that something was true. 
Frege asserts: 
Being true is different from being taken to be true, whether by 
one or many or everybody, and in no case is it to be reduced to it 
(BLA, p. 13). 
Of course, just because everyone might agree that the world is flat does not 
make it flat. But the general point here is that it does not follow from the 
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fact that everyone agrees about the truth of a proposition that the 
proposition is indeed true. Husserl went so far as to say that truth is: "one 
and the same, whether men, or non-men, angels or gods apprehend and 
judge it." (Husserll970, p.140 cited in Aach 1990 p. 317). But in what sense is 
it correct to say that something is true? Frege submits to: liThe question why 
and with what right we acknowledge a law of logic to be true, logic can 
answer only by reducing it to another law of logic. Where that is not 
possible, logic can give no answer." (BLA p. 15). Thus Frege begs the very 
question in issue, viz., can anything other than logic justify the use of, in 
this example, logic. The validity of his argument presupposes the system 
which the adherent of psychologism is free to reject. 
Despite the problems with the arguments of Frege and Husserl it is clear 
that a successful defence from the anti-psychologistic arguments, a plausible 
psychologism, must provide an account as to why the laws of logic are 
compelling but not submit to use of the concepts of truth or necessity which 
are incorporated within those logical systems. To do so would defeat the 
account of psychologism. The accusation is offered that the psychology of 
scientific reasoning would offer a view that: " .. .it is true that there is no 
absolute truth, which is a contradiction"(Aach, 1990 p. 318). 
Perhaps the first two arguments offered by Frege present no real difficulty 
for modern day psychology. A third argument, which does not rely on 
characterisation of psychology, is presented in the Introduction to the 
Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege warns: 
Never let us take a description of the ongm of an idea for a 
definition, or an account of the mental and physical conditions 
on which we become conscious of a proposition for a proof of it. 
A proposition may be thought, and again it may be true ... (FA, p. 
vi). 
Sober (1978) argues that positivist philosophers inherited from Frege the 
tradition that logical laws must be distinguished from causal laws. Logical 
necessity is not the description of the causes of an event (The acceptance of 
a conclusion) they are the means of justifying that conclusion. The logical 
positivists adopted this distinction and reasoning in their characterisation 
of science. Popper (1972 p. 31) writes: 
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing theory, seems 
to me neither to call for logical analysis nor be susceptible to it. 
The question of how it happens that a new idea occurs to a 
man-whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a 
scientific theory-may be of great interest to empirical 
psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific 
knowledge. The latter is concerned not with questions of fact 
(Kant's quid facti? ), but only with questions of justification or 
validity (Kant's quid ju1'is? ) ... 
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Popper suggests that in order to gain a conception of the process of science 
philosophers need not ever examine the concept of creativity, which he 
takes to represent the cause of a discovery; psychology is irrelevant to 
epistemology. He states: 
Accordingly I shall distinguish sharply between the process of 
conceiving a new idea, and the methods and results of examining 
it logically. As to the task of the logic of knowledge-in 
contradistinction to the psychology of knowledge-I shall 
proceed on the assumption that it consists solely in investigating 
the methods employed in those systematic tests to which every 
new idea must be subjected if it is to be seriously entertained. 
(1972 p. 31). 
Popper states his position on the concept of creativity clearly: 
My view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no 
such thing as a logical method of having a new idea, or a logical 
reconstruction of this process. My view may be expressed by 
saying that very discovery contains "an irrational element", or "a 
creative intuition," ... (1972 p. 32). 
Thus Popper's position suggests the study of creativity is purely concerned 
with the causal antecedents which promote the Platonic entities available 
for philosophical analysis. Popper relies on a characterisation of psychology, 
which if not a direct descendent from Frege's account of the nature of the 
foundations of logic, is akin to Frege's view in that it promotes a division 
between two forms of inquiry which suggests that a study of the 
foundations of one type of inquiry (logic or justification) is fundamentally 
different from the other (empirical investigation or psychology). The 
argument that empirical laws produce only an understanding of causal 
processes which promote an idea whereas logical laws are directed to how 
an idea is justified is distinct from the first two arguments in that it does 
not rely on any specific characterisation of psychological inquiry. The 
argument is stronger than the first two discussed since it does not present 
the view that psychology studies the subjective and idiosyncratic. 
The argument that the causal processes which lead to a discovery, or 
reasoning, are different from the acceptance of the discovery, or 
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justification of a proposition, extends to the fourth and final argument 
against psychologism. Both Frege and Husserl argued that the laws 
generated by empirical investigation, like psychology, are inexact whereas 
the laws of logic are universal and true. 
Husserl writes: 
The basic error of Psychologism consists, according to my view, in 
its obliteration of this fundamental distinction between pure and 
empirical generality, and in its misinterpretation of the pure laws 
of logic as empirical laws of psychology. (Husserl 1970, cited in 
Mohanty, 1982 p. 39). 
Logical laws are thought to be universal prescriptions not dependent upon 
any contingent state of affairs. Psychology, and all empirical science, merely 
studies empirical laws which arise from the consideration of states of 
affairs. Both Hussed and Frege-albeit less systematically than Husserl 
(Aach, 1990 p. 321), regarded this justification for the view that the 'laws of 
logic' could not be produced by empirical science. Thus a similar strategy is 
employed with that of the first two arguments. No longer is it the capacities 
of the individual which are precluded from producing the mind-
independent realm which contain the 'laws of logic' but the 'realm' which 
logic occupies is not even contingent upon anything capable of being 
apprehended by empirical science. 
Aach (1990 pp. 321-328) separates the anti-psychologistic arguments which 
depend on a conception of psychology'S subject matter as being subjective 
from those which distinguish logical laws from the products of an 
empirical science. The distinction is appropriate only to the extent that it is 
possible to assert from some theoretical perspective that psychology'S 
subject matter is not subjective. Frege and Husserl's first two arguments are 
ineffective against such proposals. However, as mentioned, Frege's 
arguments were directed against a full psychologistic account of reasoning, 
which as Mohanty (1982) points out is not contained within those doctrines 
which are purportedly immune from Frege's attack. What is common to all 
the arguments which Frege has presented is a commitment to a conception 
that logical laws are prescriptive, and the study of logic, a normative 
science. The separation of the mental act and the content of the mental act 
promotes the view that logic tells us what we ought to do rather than what 
we actually do. Thus as Goldman (1985 p. 310) summarises: 
Epistemology, even analytical epistemology, is interested in 
specifying rules or principles that prescribe, permit, or prohibit 
various intellectual attitudes or strategies. Furthermore, the 
specification of such rules or principles cannot fall within the 
province of psychology. Psychology is a factual or positive 
science, not a normative discipline. The selection of rules and 
principles belongs to a normative discipline. Bence, empirical 
psychology cannot supplant epistemology, and indeed has no 
relevance at all to this task of epistemology. 
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From Frege's perspective, the study of logic unlike the study of nature must 
be directed at its universal applicability. The third and fourth arguments 
above are directed at this point. Aach's distinction fails to enlighten the 
underlying commitments of Frege and Busserl's reasoning. 
Naturalised Philosophy of Science 
The arguments raised against psychologism are echoed within debate 
concerning 'naturalised philosophy of science'. Few philosophers who 
regard themselves as committed to a naturalised perspective of the 
philosophy of science make any explicit commitment to an account of 
psychologism. Nevertheless, in Chapter Eight Thagard (1989) is offered as 
an example of one with just such a commitment. It has been argued that 
Popper's distinction between the process of discovery and the context of 
discovery derives from the same perspective of the nature of philosophy 
that Frege held-Popper rejects naturalised accounts of science, Frege 
rejects naturalised accounts of logic. In the same way that the 
psychologician is free to reject the arguments which Frege promoted to 
defend his bifurcation, the naturalised philosopher of science defends a 
position from similar attacks, using familiar arguments. Peter Kosso (1991 
p. 349) states that: 
If there is any clear trend in current philosophy of science it is a 
trend to naturalization. More and more philosophers of science 
are advocating an empirical approach to epistemology, empirical 
in the sense that many epistemological questions are to be 
answered by the evidence of science. 
The idea that logic is the foundation to all knowledge claims, represented 
in the epistemological position of the logical positivists, was the subject 
attacked by Quine (1969). Although Quine's position has been readily 
adopted he owes the strength of his argument to history. After considering 
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the failures of certain epistemological programmes Quine (1969 p. 75) 
offers: 
The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence 
anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of 
the world. Why not just see how this construction really 
proceeds? Why not settle for psychology? 
The prevailing picture that develops is a debate concerning the proper 
orientation of philosophical inquiry and its relation to empirical 
investigation-here psychology. Quine advances a view that does away 
with traditional foundationalist conceptions of the nature of philosophical 
inquiry at the expense of doing away with philosophy altogether. Putnam 
(1982 p. 19) describes Quine's position as: 
... epistemological Eliminationism: we should just abandon the 
notions of justification, good reason, warranted assertion, etc., 
and reconstrue the notions of evidence (so that the evidence 
becomes the sensory stimulations that cause us to have the 
scientific beliefs we have). 
Putnam manoeuvres in the same way that Frege had in his orientation to 
the psychologicians. Recall that Frege maintained that a notion of 'truth' is 
undermined within the adherence to the psycho logicians' perspective on 
the nature of philosophical inquiry. Consider: 
If one abandons the notions of justification, rational acceptability, 
warranted assertability, right assertability, and the like, 
completely, then 'truth' goes as well. (Putnam, 1982 p. 20). 
And similarly with respect to the nature of the objects of philosophical 
inquiry Putnam continues in the Fregean tradition: 
We don't have an Archimedian point; we speak the language of a 
time and place; but the rightness and wrongness of what we say is 
not just for a time and a place. (Putnam, 1982 p. 21). 
The arguments produced to defend a characterisation of the nature of logic 
and logical inquiry seem to persist in new guises in a different debate. The 
material here is not meant to exhaust the arguments for or against the 
naturalisation of science. The purpose is to expose Wittgenstein's point (PI 
§115) that the confusions which arise in philosophy present pictures which 
repeat themselves across history and disciplines. The psychologicians' 
concerns are revived in a characterisation of the correct approach to 
epistemology and the philosophy of science. 
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The first line of defence against those who advocate naturalised versions of 
the philosophy of science is to accuse the adherents of this position of 
circular reasoning. The argument raised suggests that scientific methods 
cannot be turned to study science since the former presupposes the very 
thing that is the object of inquiry. Whether there is something paradoxical 
about a science studying science seems to presuppose a conception of 
science and more particularly a conception of psychology. Quine (p. 84) 
assures us: 
... but it is all right now that we have stopped dreaming of 
deducing science from sense data. We are after an understanding 
of science as an institution or process in the world, and we do not 
intend that understanding to be any better than the science which 
is its object. 
Mohanty (1982) accuses the psychologicians of question begging for the 
same reason. Any empirical investigation into the nature of logic will 
presuppose the adequacy of the theory on the basis of its logical structure-
The adequacy of the theory being the very thing that is under examination. 
Quine rejects the epistemological programmes that attempted to reveal the 
foundations of such things as the nature of mathematics for the same 
reason we might regard Frege's appeal to yet another rule of logic to explain 
logic as being inadequate-the infinite regress seems to be an intolerable 
consequence of adhering to a particular conception of the nature of logical 
entities. 
Common to Putnam (1982) and Frege's anti-psychologistic arguments is the 
assumption that philosophy is concerned with revealing the normative 
aspects of universal prescriptions which are held to be true independent of 
our grasping them. Baker and Hacker (1984) argue that any argument 
which could be described as an extension of Frege's thinking will contain a 
distinctive amalgam of Cartesianism and Platonism. Putnam's adherence 
to the view that 'rightness and wrongness' are transcendent of time and 
place carries the same confusion entailed within Frege's belief that logical 
laws are paradigmatically true across all time and space (discussed below). 
Frege's arguments linger as historical oddities regarded by Sober and others 
to be anachronistic against recent trends in psychology. Trends towards 
naturalisation in the philosophy of science, according to Kosso (1991) and 
Dedrick (1993), contain the same commitments and repeat the same 
arguments. Here the naturalisation of the philosophy of science threatens 
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to undermine the commitment held by some philosophers, for example 
Putnam, of the correct orientation to the nature of philosophical inquiry. 
Wittgenstein, Frege and Psychologism 
By adopting the 'common expedient' of separating the act of judging from 
the content of judging Frege maintained a tradition in philosophy 
inherited from Descartes and Locke (Baker and Hacker 1984 p. 47). Frege's 
characterisation of the division between logic and psychology relies on an 
account of the nature of judgeable-content. Frege thought it necessary to 
defend the non-psychological character of sense by holding that the content 
of judgements exist timelessly and independently of the individual. 
The objectivity of thoughts as the objects of these allegedly 
mental acts secured for him a beachhead for developing the 
science of logic independently of psychology. The Cartesian 
myths were left untouched within what seemed to be their 
proper psychological domain, while Frege, his flanks seemingly 
well-guarded against intrusion from psychologism, proceeded to 
develop his Platonistic fantasies. (Baker and Hacker, 1984 p. 60). 
Frege severed the relationship between meaning and understanding. He 
regarded that a proposition's sense was contained within the fact that it is 
communicable. The sense of a proposition is not psychological since this 
concedes the psychologicians' conclusion. Rather the agreement over the 
sense of an expression consists in an agreement over what conditions make 
the proposition true. The criteria agreed to in the acceptance and 
communicability of a proposition were independent of all psychological 
considerations in the mind-independent realm-The criteria were 
'imperceptible public entities' (Baker and hacker 1984 p. 61). Frege regarded 
Platonism to be the only alternative to psychologism by relying on the anti-
psychologistic argument that propositions refer to timeless abstract entities 
rather than to ideas. 
How is it that we arrived at a position in which we claim the laws of logic 
are true across all time and space without recourse to anyone apprehending 
them? For Wittgenstein confusion arises in the initial assumptions we 
make about the nature of the philosophical problem (PI§ 308). Wittgenstein 
explains by examining a law condemning a man to death (LFM, XX p. 197). 
For example, the law might be: 'If the man steals an apple then he is 
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sentenced to death'. Judges come to interpret the law either leniently, and 
therefore not carry out the sentence, or inexorably and follow the 
entailment from action to consequence. Then by disregarding the actual 
judgement passed by a court of law one holds that the law is fixed whether 
or not a man who steals an apple is actually sentenced to death by a judge-
the 'Law' still condemned him even though the judge did not: 
How does this picture come into our minds? We first draw a 
parallel in the expression used in speaking of the judge and in 
speaking of the law: we say "the judge condemns him" and also 
"the law condemns him". We then say of the law that it is 
inexorable-and then it seems as through the law were more 
inexorable than any judge-you cannot even imagine that the 
law should be lenient. (LFM, XX p. 199). 
The parallel drawn between the treatment of 'the law' and 'the judgement' 
is analogous to the 'common expedient' adopted by Frege in the separation 
of the act of judging and the content of a judgement. One ignores the 
connection between the public object and an individual's apprehension of 
that object: perhaps passing consideration of the issue to psychology. One 
treats 'The Law' as being different from that which is passed by judges 
within a social practice. This kind of treatment of 'logical objects' leads to 
what Wittgenstein describes as labelling the 'super-hardness' of the logical 
law. 
To describe something as rigid we require a comparison. Thus ordinary 
comparisons like comparing elastic with steel allow us a criterion for 
describing steel as rigid: steel does not stretch as much as elastic. The 
separation of the act of judging from the content of judgement tempts the 
confusion of drawing a comparison between the two pictures promoted in 
the use of the different expressions. The treatment of describing the laws of 
empirical science as being less exact than those of logic tempts one to draw a 
comparison between the different uses; noting that they are both laws 
requires the addition of the superlative to attach to the latter. Logical laws 
are 'super-hard' and inexorable compared to empirical laws. Then: 
... we are led by the parallel use of the pictures to a point where we 
are inclined to use a superlative. We then have to show the 
sources of this superlative, and that it doesn't come from the 
source the ordinary idea comes from. (LFM, XXI p. 199). 
Thus, for Wittgenstein, the mistake that promotes the Platonism in Frege's 
account is the initial division (Frege's expedient) between the foundations 
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of logic and the foundations of psychology. The temptation caused by 
promoting the division is to draw a comparison between the two forms of 
inquiry and attempt to find some defining criterion which supports the 
difference. We might mistakenly assume that logical laws must be 
compared to empirical laws on the basis of the division. Frege's 
characterisation of the purity of logic is maintained in contrast to the 
psychologicians' but is an illusory requirement of entertaining a 
comparison between two pictures of the nature of logical necessity: 
psychologism and Platonism. Thus Frege creates a mythological realm for 
his superlative description of logical entities to exist: Logical laws, being 
inexorable in comparison to empirical ones, exist in a mind-independent 
realm. 
By rejecting the division adopted by Frege as promoting illusory 
requirements for the explanation of logical necessity Wittgenstein freed 
himself, unlike Frege (Baker and Hacker 1984 pp. 59-61) to address the 
notions contained within the Cartesian conception of mind: 
Try not to think of understanding as a mental process at all.-For 
that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself; in 
what sort of case, in what kind of circumstance, do we say, "Now 
I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to 
me?- (PI § 154). 
By omission Frege accepts the Cartesian conception of the nature of 
subjectivity. Frege's position adheres, like the psychologicians, to the 
Cartesian conception that understanding is a mental process and therefore 
the proper domain of psychology. Baker and Hacker (1984 p. 61) argue that 
Frege's position contains: 
... a naive and incomprehensible conception of thinking: thinking 
is a mental process, necessarily involving mental object (images), 
in which we mysteriously come into contact with Platonic 
entities (thoughts or judgeable-contents). 
Frege could not reconcile the relationship between the objective and mind-
independent objects with a conception of understanding (Dummett 1991, 
Baker and Hacker 1984): 
Even granted that senses are not mind-dependent, still grasping a 
sense, or understanding a word or phrase, as expressing a sense, is 
surely a mental act, something that belongs within the province 
of psychology. (Dummett, 1991 p. 238). 
Similarly, Baker and Hacker (1984 p. 61) report: 
What is it to think the sense of a sentence?..to apprehend a 
number or a set, or to grasp the sense of a numeral or of the 
name of a set? Frege relegated the clarification of these mysteries 
to psychology ... and thereby justified his own neglect to resolve 
the perplexities generated by his Platonism. 
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Wittgenstein's answer is this is to restore the severed relation between 
meaning and understanding. In the same way one must treat 'the law'l 
ceteris paribus l as the practice of passing judgements. Hacker (1986 p. 73) 
comments that as early as Notes on Logic2 Wittgenstein suggested that the 
correlation of name and its meaning is psychological. Wittgenstein 
regarded the laws of logic to be constitutivel or defining features of, what 
we regard as thinkingl reasoningl and so on. Rather than viewing logic to 
be a normative science which offered universal prescriptions of how to 
think he regarded thinking to be internally related to the practices of using 
language. 
Wittgenstein explains in relation to the law of non-contradictionl rather 
than regarding a logical law as a universal prescription on how one should 
think (Wittgenstein rejects the initial assumption adopted by Frege)1 
Wittgenstein examines the way that it is used: 
We first learn a certain technique of using words. Then the most 
natural continuation for us is to eliminate certain sentences 
which we don't use-like contradiction. This hangs together with 
certain other techniques.(LFM, XXI p. 201). 
Wittgenstein offers the example of acting as a general and receIvmg 
contradictory reports regarding the size of the enemy. One envoy relates a 
story of 40 /000 troops and another 30/000 troops. In response to the 
contradictory claims it is possible to act in many different ways: ignoring 
one report as an exaggeration for instance. But the way of acting that 
follows from the reports determines whether the contradiction is 
understood: 
If I react by sayingl IIWelll there are 30/000 and there are 40/000111 
you would saYI IIWhat on earth do you mean?11 You might say, 
IISurely you can/t imagine there being 301000 and 40/000. 11 But this 
could be answered in all sorts of ways. I might even draw a 
2Wi (1961) G. H. von Wright and G. E. 
M. Anscornbe, trans. G. E.M. Anscornbe. Oxford: Blackwell 
picture of it-for instance a blurred picture, or a picture of 30,000 
here and 40,000 there.(LFM XXI, p. 201). 
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For Wittgenstein the laws of logic are constitutive of a way of acting-They 
are not prescriptive. By maintaining an internal relation between the 
meaning of a proposition and an individual's understanding of that 
proposition Wittgenstein regards the laws of logic to be definitive of what 
counts as thinking. Rather than being prescriptive-determining what 
counts as correct thinking-the so-called necessary truths are considered to 
be internally related to our concepts of thinking, understanding, reasoning, 
and so on. Thus: "Recognising the law of contradiction" would come to: 
acting in a certain way which we call "rational". (LFM, XXI p. 201). This 
conclusion in no way supports the psychologicians' claim that the sense of 
an expression is a matter for psychology. A common recognition of the law 
of contradiction is not a matter of some inner mental process that when 
expressed in language triggers a similar process in the mind of the hearer. 
One manifests one's understanding of the meaning of a proposition by 
employing it in ways which accord with shared practices of employment, 
against the background of human life and activity. (Hacker, 1986 p. 80). 
Conclusions 
Baker (1988) notes that Wittgenstein's later remarks on the philosophy of 
logic are not well understood. He adds that the material is "extensive, 
diffuse, sometimes poorly organised ... " (p. 112), a comment that 
Wittgenstein himself endorses in the preface to the Investigations. Most 
importantly, Baker adds that the connection between Frege and 
Wittgenstein is often poorly understood; some writers insist that Frege 
somehow anticipated the private language argument. Others suggest that 
Wittgenstein developed the ideas of Frege, to whom Wittgenstein gives 
credit. But Baker insists that to assume the relation between the Frege and 
Wittgenstein to be one of union and support is to be fundamentally 
misguided about the nature of Wittgenstein's works. Only by 
comprehending the subtle developments of Wittgenstein's thought, which 
challenged Frege's views of the philosophy of logic, can we understand the 
significance of the later writings to current philosophical practices. 
Of particular importance here is Hacker's (1986) conclusion that: 
What does signal a profound change between the Tractatus and 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy is not a shift in his conception of 
scepticism nor his view about the proper domain of 
epistemology. It is rather his realization that the particular form 
of anti-psychologism in logic which severs the concept of 
meaning from the concept of understanding and allocates the 
account of the latter to psychology is wholly misguided. (p. 80). 
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Wittgenstein's later philosophy contains a unique orientation of 
philosophy to psychology. It is true that this conception arose out of the 
errors which Wittgenstein recognised in his earlier work though it is not 
necessary, and only really distracting, to examine the anti-psychologism of 
the Tractatus. 3 The important conclusion is that the division promoted by 
Frege arose out of an initial division between psychology and philosophy 
which promoted a comparison of illusory objects of inquiry within both 
disciplines. By recognising that it is the initial division between the 
disciplines that misleads us Wittgenstein reoriented himself to the study of 
both logic and understanding. The bogus objects set up within the marriage 
of Cartesianism and Platonism, and their respective considerations within 
psychology and philosophy, betoken the confusions which are inherited 
within modern understandings of the relationship between psychology and 
philosophy. 
To appreciate the unique approach Wittgenstein offers it is necessary to 
regard his approach as indirect. Wittgenstein did not enter the traditional 
debate-he saw it as the source of confusion: 
I A proposition is a queer thing!' Here we have in germ the 
subliming of our whole account of logic. The tendency to assume 
a pure intermediary between the propositional signs and the 
facts. Or even try to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves.-
For our forms of expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from 
seeing that nothing out of the ordinary is involved, by sending us 
in the pursuit of chimeras. (PI §94). 
But care is needed in the light of this orientation. Wittgenstein recognised 
that the defence of the purity of logic was in itself the source of confusion. It 
set Frege in the pursuit of a mythical realm to accommodate his Platonistic 
logical entities. Wittgenstein's new orientation to the nature of logic has 
not only a profound impact on the nature of philosophy but on psychology 
as well. Hacker (1986 p. 80) footnotes: 
3 Wittgenstein,L. (1961) Traetatus logieo-philosophieus. tr D. F. 
Pears and B. F. Me Guiness. London: Routlege and Kegan Paul. 
One might say that Wittgenstein did not merely repudiate anti-
psychologism in logic (if that means the irrelevance to logic and 
logical relations of any psychological experiences or processes 
that accompany reasoning) but carried its banner into the 
heartland of psychology. For it is a deep error to conceive of 
understanding, meaning something, or thinking as essentially 
involving or requiring any mental acts, activities, processes or 
experiences. For these things are typically mere accompaniments 
of understanding, meaning and thinking. 
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Thus in psychology we are equally confused by the dominating picture 
which develops by adopting the Cartesian conception of the relationship 
between philosophy and psychology. If we separate philosophy from 
psychology we (Psychologists) can be led to equally nonsensical pursuits. In 
the following chapter it is argued that the cognitive orientation to 
psychology pursues a nonsensical task by failing to appreciate the logical 
character of the concept of 'thinking'. 
Popper, like Frege, abandons consideration of the logical character of the 
process of grasping the sense of a discovery, proposition, or creative act. The 
bifurcation of the mental act and the act itself presented by Frege continues 
in the same tradition within Popper's account of the philosophy of science. 
In particular Popper regards the study of creativity to be the task of 
psychology, he casts it off from philosophical consideration. In the same 
way that Wittgenstein reconciles the relationship between understanding, 
meaning and language by attending to the logical character of 
understanding and the use of expressions within a practice, it is possible to 
provide a Wittgensteinian analysis of 'creativity' in relation to its 
employment within psychology which demonstrates a radical divergence 
from traditional conceptions of the relationship philosophy has to 
psychology, or science generally. 
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Chapter Two 
Rules and Rule-Following 
Is there a 'why' in algorithm? 
When we learn to spell words we do not find anything unusual about 
learning the word 'spelling', we do not find it to be a higher order word that 
requires a different attention, nor do we find it a word that is fundamental 
in a sense that it must be understood before any spelling can commence. 
We learn to spell as a result of a complex social activity, involving 
instruction, correction, and explanation of error and success. In psychology 
there is a research programme which claims to advance explanation of 
psychological phenomena by reference to a set of rule-governed functions, 
computable algorithms, which with sufficient complexity could not only 
explain psychological states, but produce equivalents of psychological states 
in mechanisms known as 'Universal Turing machines'. We must look to 
the reasons why we follow rules, and the status of rules and rule-following 
in explanation. Once it is clear that rule-following is an activity much like 
spelling and rules merely like the words to be spelled, we will see that this 
explanation of psychological states in terms of algorithms or functional 
states is not simply wrong, but simple nonsense. Trying to explain the 
activity of rule-following by reference to another set of rules is conceptually 
inept. It places us in the same position as trying to comprehend spelling by 
understanding the word 'spelling'. 
Cognitive scientists endeavour to produce human abilities in artificial 
mechanisms, but only not human abilities like lifting an object, abilities of 
a fundamentally different sort. Cognitive scientists maintain that 
psychological processes such as perception, intelligence, and creativity can 
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be understood by analogy to the programming of a computer4• Psychological 
states, it is proposed, can be understood on the model of the 
hardware/ software distinction of a computer. Cognitive psychologists seek 
a different outcome. They seek to ultimately reduce explanation to a 
functional description of the causal processes grounded in 
neurophysiology. Perhaps cognitive psychologists concede the impossibility 
of us ever producing artificial intelligence because computers are not made 
of the right stuff. Some might concede that we might never know the 
actual physiological processes which support the functional descriptions of 
mental states-Haugeland (1981 p. 264) proposes this possibility but adds: 
Nevertheless, I suspect that many investigators would strongly 
resist such a suggestion, and would feel their work was not done 
until the reduction was complete. 
Whatever the reasons are that cognitive psychologists do not ally 
themselves to cognitive science they are not conceptual reasons. Whatever 
explanation is used to produce an account of psychological states, inner 
mental states, it is always at the bottom a causal account, or promises to be a 
causal account given further research or some extraordinary discovery in 
neurophysiology. Shanker (1991) argues: "To disclaim-on the grounds of 
neurophysiological ignorance-any knowledge of the relevant structures is 
not so much an evasion of duty as a confirmation of the mechanical picture 
which dominates here" (p. 73). These functional accounts of inner 
psychological states all have one thing in common: they have a conception 
of rule-following which suggests a logical compulsion to adhere to the rule. 
Rules, according to the 'cognitivists', by their very nature, must be obeyed, it 
is a rule that compels us to act, and a rule tells us whether we have acted in 
accordance or in conflict with a procedure. The 'mind' as an information-
processing system takes an input, operates according a set of rules, and 
produces the output behaviour. The definition of the psychological state is 
determined not only by the behaviour but reference to the input and the 
operations according to the rules. 
Block (1993) outlines the cognitive scientist's orientation to psychological 
phenomena with reference to the example of intelligence: 
4 r think it is no coincidence that such desirable qualities are 
sought out for the subj ect material of the discipline, to my 
knowledge nobody has tried to produce an insane computer-except 
Boden(1987), a programme that failed, and perhaps in science 
fiction. 
Intelligent capacities are understood via decomposition into a 
network of less intelligent capacities, ultimately grounded in 
totally mechanical capacities executed by primitive processors. 
(Block 1993, p. 820). 
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Functional states are regarded as capable of being 'computed' in a machine. 
Most importantly the actual causal instantiation of the functional state is 
supposedly irrelevant to the concerns of cognitive scientists: How the 
processor works is: " ... not a question for cognitive science to answer." 
(Block, 1993 p.820). Nevertheless, the ultimate grounding of the functional 
architecture is some causal process. 
The last intentional instantiation is in a primitive "machine 
language," so-called because that is the one which is finally 
reduced by physical instantiation. The real genius of computer 
science has been to design ever more sophisticated languages 
which can be compiled or intentionally instantiated in cruder 
existing languages. If it weren't for intentional instantiation, 
machines built of flip-flops and the like would hardly be 
candidates for artificial intelligence. (Haugeland, 1981 p. 263). 
Thus for cognitive scientists the reduction of 'complicated' 'functional 
states' to simple mechanical processes becomes their primary task. The 
removal from concern of the actual causal processes is thought to promote 
the correct orientation to revealing the nature of psychological phenomena. 
Imagine that Picasso was found to have produced his paintings by scattering 
tarot cards on the floor and that from this arrangement of cards he 
produced, according to some set of rules, the patterns which constitute his 
paintings 5. We take Picasso's art to be creative, but according to the 
hypothetical constraints they are imagined to be the product of an 
algorithm. Surely a computer could also follow the rules which Picasso 
followed, in this imaginary situation, to produce similar work. Cognitivists 
suppose that in reality some similar set of rules occurred within the mind 
of Picasso. The task of computer scientists and cognitive psychologists is to 
describe those rules in order to explain creative thought. But how does the 
tarot card system differ from the rules: that in order to paint we must mix 
colours and apply the brush to canvas? Is the activity of painting to be 
understood as the product of some inner mental process? No art teacher 
would explain the technique of applying paint to canvas in terms of mental 
processes. We are caught in a muddle when we suppose that the correct 
5 Jack Copeland is responsible for the content of the example. 
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place to search for an understanding of mental states is within the 
individuaL Wittgenstein's private language argument is thought to be able 
to free us from this type of philosophical error. However it will be argued 
that arguments directed against the cognitivists based solely on the 
conclusions of the private language argument will not succeed. 
Many opponents of the cognitivists admit to some influence from 
Wittgenstein's later writings, for example: Coulter (1973), (1979), (1982); 
Harre (1988), (1989a); Malcolm (1971); Shanker (1987, 1991); (Goldberg 1991); 
Hacker (1990) and Williams (1985). Wittgenstein's position will be dealt 
with directly in order to develop an account of rule-following-which will 
be used to identify the limitations of the constructionist doctrine (Chapter 
Four). It is the constructionists who rely on Wittgenstein's private language 
argument to support their identification of the meaningfulness of locating 
some mental states in social practices. Stuart Shanker (1991) suggests the 
Wittgensteinians, and presumably himself, are regarded as "field 
reactionaries"; partly because they react against theory construction within 
philosophy and partly because they refuse to share the 'excitemene of the 
'revolutionary times' within which such things as cognitive science have 
developed.(p. 67). Social constructionists definitely react against cognitive 
and mechanistic theses with a revolutionary fervour, particularly with 
reference to Wittgenstein and the private language argument. However, 
while many philosophical arguments can be picked out of their original 
context and employed in philosophical psychology, it is argued here that a 
serious error results in adopting this practice with the conclusions of 
Wittgenstein's private language argument. 
Rorty's defence against the Wittgensteinian Revolt. 
Richard Rorty (1977) advances the view that those objections against such 
psychological research programmes as cognitive science, based on the 
"Wittgensteinian revolt against traditional Cartesian notionsl/(p. 153) are 
misdirected largely because the several arguments which rely on 
Wittgenstein's arguments are conflated and confused. The arguments are, 
according to Rorty: " ... quite independent of one another, and of different 
worth" (p. 153). It will be argued that the arguments are not independent of 
one another; they form an alliance that is powerful indeed. Rorty quite 
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rightly points out, that the arguments are often presented independently 
from each other. 
It should seem surprising that any confusion might arise as to what 
Wittgenstein's objections were to the notion that psychological terms such 
as 'thinking' might be usefully regarded as processes capable of being 
modelled or instantiated in artificial mechanisms; Wittgenstein was quite 
explicit in his denial of this possibility: 
'Is it possible for a machine to think?' (Whether the action of this 
machine can be described and predicted by the laws of physics or, 
possibly, only by laws of a different kind applying to the 
behaviour of organisms). And the trouble which is expressed in 
this question is not really that we don't yet know a machine 
which could do the job. The question is not analogous to that 
which someone might have asked a hundred years ago: "Can a 
machine liquefy a gas?" The trouble is rather that the sentence, 'A 
machine thinks (perceives, wishes)' seems somehow nonsensical. 
It is as though we had asked" 'Has the number 3 a colour?' (BB. p. 
47). 
Wittgenstein's esoteric objection is directed at an altogether different 
question from that considered here. Whether a computer can literally think 
is different from whether psychology can be usefully informed by 
considering thinking in terms of the operations of a machine. 
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein's objection seems to cover both circumstances 
viz., it is nonsensical to consider, or explain, thinking in terms of the 
operations of a machine, a fortiori, it is nonsensical to suppose that a 
machine can think. 
Baker and Hacker (1985) ponder over the significance of Wittgenstein's 
dealings with the foundations of mathematics to philosophical psychology. 
Wittgenstein was well aware of Turing's work and debated several issues 
with Turing in a lecture series in 1939 (see Diamond 1976). Much of the 
work dealt with in this chapter comes from Wittgenstein's remarks which 
are either directly related to the foundations of mathematics, or direct 
comments on Turing's proposals. Baker and Hacker (1985) suggest that 
Wittgenstein relinquished his considerations of the philosophy of 
mathematics in the Philosophical Investigations, perhaps as they propose 
to: "regroup his forces in waging a single philosophical strategy"(p. 4). Of 
those who agree that the private language argument is important to 
psychology, and psychological theorising, few are willing to explore the 
relation between this argument and the background from which it 
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undoubtedly arose. As a result most attacks on cognitive science, based on 
Wittgenstein's work deal almost exclusively with Wittgenstein's dealings 
with the philosophy of mind. This manoeuvre constitutes the first line of 
attack in the alliance of arguments suggested by Rorty. Like Rorty it will be 
argued that this approach is insufficient. 
The 'No Private Language Argument' 
The details of the 'private language argument' will be explored in more 
depth together with a consideration of the doctrine of constructionism 
(Chapter Three). The purpose here is to examine Rorty's proposed strategy 
for avoiding the issues that the argument raises. Rorty states the argument 
as: 
... traditional psychology has assumed that we can identify mental 
entities apart from the behaviour and circumstances attendant 
upon them-as if we could simply introspect and christen the 
occupants of the mental arena. Once we realise that such 
christening is impossible and that it is not introspectible qualia 
which make something count as a thought or a belief or a 
recognition, we see that there is nothing inner to investigate. (p. 
153). 
Harre (1989a) suggests that psychology should adopt a dual ontology to deal 
with mental concepts which does not include anything 'inner' or 'mental'. 
That ontology would include everything physiologicat the on-goings of the 
brain, and everything social, such that all mental acts would be 
characterised within the social events in which they occur. Harre's 
conception of psychology (examined in the next chapter) typifies the 
account which Rorty seeks to undermine. 
What if there is no 'mental inner' which literally exists? What if Harre's 
suggested ontology is the correct ontology for psychology? What is wrong, 
in principle, with developing models of the mind based on computer 
analogies? Coulter (1982) dismisses, without argument, this proposal: 
They scarcely have the status of "holding devices', constructs 
which are meant as place holders until we have a better 
neurology to offer to the behavioural sciences ... (p. 7). 
Perhaps, to return to my example, cognitive scientists can provide an 
explanation of the rules which Picasso followed in his mind, it does not 
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matter what the mind actually consists of as Haugeland (1988) has 
suggested. This type of objection is Rorty's proposed defence for avoiding 
the issues that the private language argument raises for future 
psychological research. Rorty's criticism, informed by the history of science, 
is that we can benefit from these models without commitment to any 
ontology: 
No geneticist became disenchanted with the notion of a gene 
simply because DNA was a long time coming, and psychologists' 
faith in physicalism could doubtless endure centuries of similar 
waiting ... (1977 p. 156). 
Rorty argues that we can continue with the computer analogy and assume, 
for now, that 'thinking' can be understood against the background of the 
analogy. This argument might be discounted by being mindful of several 
failures in the history of science. For every successful model that has 
informed science there has been the predecessor which led 'astray' the 
thought of the time. Perhaps the model of physicalism is as misguided as 
phlogiston or alchemy. One might insist as Coulter (1982) does that certain 
claims really are intended as as ontologicaL However the problem 
becomes:/I ... we are ultimately left playing an exegetical game without really 
knowing the rules ... " (Coulter, 1982 p. 7). Furthermore the exegetical game 
is not novel, as Shanker (1991 pp. 69-70) usefully informs in relation to a 
now defunked cybernetic programme for psychology: 
There is of course nothing to stop one from introducing a 
technical notion of 'cybernetic purpose' by which will be 
understood the state of equilibrium that the feedback 
mechanisms of a homeostatic system are designed or have 
evolved to maintain. But, as with the case of radical 
behaviourist theories, if the logico-grammatical distinction 
between purposive behaviour and causal sequences is 
undermined, the result is not a 'new understanding' of but, 
rather, the abandonment of the notion of (intentional) action 
and the creation of yet another misleading homonym. 
A common criticism of arguments of the eliminative materialist 
persuasion is that reducing the meaning of psychological predicates to 
purely physical terms fails to capture or explain the way these intentional 
terms are used at present. Cognitivist's respond that there are levels of 
explanation, different levels at which the same behaviour can be described, 
and as such, there is no assumption that their technical notions need to 
account for present use of intentional concepts and as 
41 
such," .... philosophical objections which dwell on the logical grammar of 
ordinary mechanical versus intentional concepts are simply vacuous 
appeals to semantic inertia" (Shanker, 1991 p. 71). 
For now we will entertain the idea that modelling psychological processes 
on the computer analogy could be regarded as pragmatically useful. We are 
better informed of the Wittgensteinian objection by addressing the issue 
that Rorty himself suggests: 
... the 'no private language' argument and any similar line of 
argument against the possibility of interior ostention does 
nothing to impede any imaginable program of research in 
psychology. It would do so only if one could infer from a doctrine 
about how psychological terms got their meaning something 
about the non-physical character of the entities mentioned in 
psychological theories (in some stronger sense of 'non-physical' 
than simply 'psychological as opposed to physiological'). (p. 156) 
(Emphasis mine.) 
Rorty's criticism of the 'no private language arguments' and his proposed 
strategy for avoiding his own criticism, (That we can say something about 
the non-physical nature of psychological predicates.), undermines his 
previous commitment to the idea that the various Wittgensteinian 
arguments are independent of each other. Wittgenstein, again, is quite 
explicit in his characterisation of the meaning of psychological predicates: 
One of the most dangerous ideas for a philosopher is, oddly 
enough, that we think with our heads or in our heads. (Z §605). 
The idea of thinking as a process in the head, in a completely 
enclosed space, gives him something occult. (Z §606). 
Is thinking a specific organic process of the mind, so to speak-as 
it were chewing and digesting in the mind? Can we replace it by 
an inorganic process that fulfils the same end, as it were use a 
prosthetic apparatus for thinking? How should we have to 
imagine a prosthetic organ of thought? (Z §607). 
But if thinking consists only in writing or speaking, why 
shouldn't a machine do it? 
Could it be in pain? 
It is a travesty of the truth to say 'Thinking is an activity of our 
mind, as writing is of the hand' (PG §64). 
, 
Wittgenstein would surely object to the notion that anything can be gained 
by considering 'thinking' to mean a physical activity of the brain. As Harre 
(1988) has recognised the commitment to physicalism manifests itself with 
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ontological commitments derived from, or akin to, Cartesian dualism. It is 
this underlying commitment to Cartesian dualism that is subject to attack 
in the private language argument. The rejection of this philosophical 
heritage accompanies any commitment to a 'no private language 
argument'. (The arguments all derive their importance from a particular 
conception of the nature of the relation between a rule and its extension. 
Both the private language argument, and the 'meaning as use' argument 
connect directly to this basic argument). 
The above is obviously insufficient to show just exactly why Wittgenstein 
objects to supposing that the meaning of psychological concepts like 
'thinking' can be related to the physical mechanisms of the brain, or for that 
matter a machine. However it does point to the fact that those various 
Wittgensteinian arguments offered by those who would reject particular 
characterisations of psychology, such as cognitive science, are not presented, 
or need not be presented, in isolation from other Wittgensteinian 
arguments. To carve up, and consider independently, the Wittgensteinian 
objections is to do an injustice to the scope and force of the Wittgensteinian 
attack-it allows Cognitivists to defer consideration of the criticism by 
forcing it to another area of inquiry: in this case the philosophy of science 
(Whether or not the adoption of ontological commitments is necessary for 
scientific endeavours). Nevertheless, those writers who focus almost 
exclusively on the Wittgensteinian arguments which deal with the 
philosophy of mind would be wise to consider the manoeuvre employed by 
Rorty on this occasion. 
To respond to Rorty's challenge we must ask: why is it that the meaning of 
a term like 'thinking' cannot usefully be regarded as the on-goings of the 
brain, or the functioning of a physical system such as the circuitry of a 
modern day computer? The argument will deal with the concept of 
calculation as being a species of activity related to the concept of 'thinking'. 
Wittgenstein's strategy to avoid the proposals which encompass the 
cognitivist or mechanistic thesis involves meeting them on common 
ground. Wittgenstein will not even concede that a machine literally can 
, calculate'. 
The famous private language argument is thought to be the highlight of 
the Investigations as far as psychologists are concerned. If correct it 
repudiates a philosophy of mind and therefore promises to constrain and 
control various theorising in psychology. It is the Cartesian ontology, 
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separation of the mind and body, which is the most obvious philosophy 
covered by the Wittgensteinian attack. This Cartesian ontology is a II disease 
of thought" according to Hacker (1986 p. 246) He states: 
It is important to note that the most adamant anti-Cartesians 
such as central-state materialists or computational functionalists 
harbour this infection in subtle and not easily detectable forms. 
But Rorty's objection, and a typical defence from computational 
functionalists, is that these cognitive scientists can use the model of the 
hardware/software distinction and the functional description of mind, to 
advance theory in psychology without needing to fit the model into some 
ontology of separating mind and body. If the ontology is really necessary 
then some day it will be produced. Who really cares what Wittgenstein had 
to say about 'pains' and Robinson Crusoe on an island? Rorty states: 
.. .its is hard to see the relevance of the point to psychological 
research. Still, it must be admitted that Ryle and Malcolm, among 
others, have thought it relevant, and have concluded from this 
argument alone that there is something dubious about looking 
for 'psychological mechanisms'. (p. 154). 
Rorty's insistence that the private language argument cannot defeat those 
claims made by cognitive psychologists stands. Even if one is committed to 
the idea that it makes no sense to define psychological predicates by interior 
ostention, this is insufficient to discount the claim that a psychological 
state, such as 'thinking', can be usefully modelled in a machine. The 
constructionists would argue that psychological predicates obtain meaning 
only within a social context, or perhaps a 'form of life', and that the 
meaning of psychological terms should be derived from their use in a social 
context. They suggest that it makes no sense to locate the reference of a term 
like 'thinking' within the individual. It simply makes no sense to look for a 
'mental inner'. The cognitivists can disagree. As mere place-holders 
awaiting ontological verification from neurophysiology their models are 
potentially useful, they help us organise our conceptions of how we process 
information. There is nothing upsetting in attributing the concept of 
'thought' to objects. I can say that my car has, II A mind of its own" (This is 
not a senseless claim), without any disturbance to our use of language. I 
have not said something as odd as, "I can produce a the proof of a 
heptagon." (This is a senseless claim, since one cannot divide 360" by 7 
evenly) The cognitivist's would assert that they can operationalise their 
conception of thought, as with the Turing test, and await an outcome. The 
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cognitivist's can deny that they are locating thought within the individual. 
Those who use the private language argument against the cognitivists 
cannot produce an a priori reason to dismiss the cognitivists' proposals and 
must simply beg to differ. 
Harre (1988) as an example of the 'No private language argument' 
Harre (1988) argues against the artificial intelligence (AI) programme using 
Wittgensteinian arguments. Harre criticises the cognitivists in order to 
gain a contrast to support his proposed research strategy for psychology. 
Harre is almost unique in his application of these arguments, only Coulter 
(To my knowledge) is also motivated in this direction. But Harre (1988) 
relies on an unexplicated account of the notion of a 'form of life' which has 
consequences for his later dealings with the methodology of psychology. 
Harre adopts the Hintikkas' (1986) expression of "physiognomic language 
game". For example, 'pain' is naturally expressed by certain behaviours. 
When in pain it is natural to wince, cry out, grit one's teeth and grasp the 
affected area to make oneself more comfortable. Such behaviours are also 
associated with verbal activities and it is these verbal reports which are 
covered by the notion of 'physiognomic language games'. The verbal 
reports should be considered in the same way as the natural expressions of 
pain. It is almost inconceivable that an individual might not express pain 
behaviour when in real pain, or worse, cry out claiming joy and salvation 
whilst suffering from a heart attack. Although such situations may occur, it 
is hard to understand how we could have a conception of pain without 
pain relating this concept of pain to the natural expressions of pain6. (This 
notion is explored at length in Chapter Four). It is because we have natural 
expressions of pain that we obtain a grammar of the word pain. If there 
were no natural expressions we might not have any use for the concept of 
pain. At least the language-game would be radically different. Harre states 
"We could say roughly that a sensation word could have a meaning, that is 
6 Suppose through some ailment or genetic disorder the person did 
not feel pain. A nail through the arm would not lead to any 
natural expression, but of course the person is not in pain. If 
the person is in pain then there will be the natural expression 
of pain. For now we ignore the idea that someone might feign 
injury for some purpose and assume that the natural expressions 
of pain are linked causally to the individual's sensation of 
pain. 
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a conventional use, only if there were such natural expressions." (p. 
107).(Emphasis mine.) 
According to Harre, linguistic behaviours replace, or accompany natural 
expressions. Words are used as part of the natural expression of a particular 
sensation: "Thus saying,"'I've a maddening itch', could come to serve as a 
natural expression of itching as good as scratching and writhing." Either the 
action or the avowal serves as an expression internally related to the 
feeling. Our sensation language is what enables us to consider and discuss 
our personal sensations, it is the language (broadly conceived) which is 
available to us as investigators of subjective states. Harre (1988 p. 108) states: 
... the Wittgenstein account of the conditions under which the 
sentence could be used meaningfully by a being absolutely 
requires the existence of physiognomic language games in the 
course of which the above sentence comes to be substituted for or 
supplements the natural expression of the feelings. What would 
be the natural expression of pain, ecstasy, aching, a tickle and so 
on for a PC? (Emphasis mine). 
But surely it is appropriate to ask: what is the natural expression of thought, 
creativity, consciousness, or cognition? Harre surely misdirects his attack 
against the cognitive scientists. No cognitive scientist, that I am aware of, 
has ever made the claim that 'pain' can be modelled in a computer system. 
(Gunderson 1985 calls such things "program-resistent"). Whilst there is 
pain and the sensation of pain, natural expressions of pain like groaning, 
wincing and so on, there are no equivalent natural expressions for thought. 
The causal relation between pain and natural expressions of pain is not 
present in many activities targeted by cognitivists. As Pears (1988) points 
out: 
Speaking a language, unlike writhing in pain, is an artificial 
accomplishment with standards of correctness which have to be 
learned and maintained. (p. 333). 
The natural expressions of pain behaviour allow us to suppose that pain is 
present in an individual. It surely is inconceivable that someone who has 
sliced their leg off with a chainsaw, and manifest the symptoms normally 
accompanying pain, could not be in pain. The necessity here is related to 
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the causal link between the lesion and the sensation7. However, the correct 
result in a statistics exam-which I might take to be a criterion for 
attributing 'thought'-does not allow us to infer that the individual knows 
something about statistics (The person may have cheated from his 
neighbour). Wittgenstein is quite clear: 
Misleading parallel: the expression of pain is a cry-the 
expression of thought, a proposition. 
As if the purpose of the proposition were to convey to one 
person how it is with another: only, so to speak, in his thinking 
part not his stomach. (PI§ 317). 
There is no natural expression of one's aptitude in a statistics examination 
(There is a public expression of aptitude but it is not natural ). In the former 
case the natural connection (a condition of our physiology) between pain 
and pain behaviour allows us to make the inference with certainty. In the 
latter case there is no such certainty. 
A cognitivist interested in creativity would dismiss Harre's considerations 
as irrelevant. There is no natural expression of creativity. But Harre claims: 
If I am right in thus dichotomising his [Wittgenstein's] ontology 
for the mind there is no place for a mental substance, and, as I 
shall show, it puts paid to any form of AI. (p. 105). 
Harre might be right with his supposed ontology, it will be argued that he 
is, but his argument thus far is unconvincing. The fact that some sensation 
states have natural expressions unavailable to a computer by any means 
which is scientifically enlightening8 does not defeat the claims made by 
cognitivists. They can simply ignore those psychological phenomena which 
have such physiological accompaniments. Few cognitive scientists would 
be so bold as to suppose that everything that a psychologist can turn his or 
her attention to can be explained by their doctrine. 
7 I could imagine someone who would not cry out from a lesion, 
even from such a traumatic experience as having one's leg chopped 
off. A genetic disorder might be the reason, or perhaps some 
disease. What I cannot imagine is someone in pain showing 
absolutely no sign of discomfort. 
8 It is possible of course to provide a computer with a 'pain 
sensor' that has the causal equivalents of pain in a human being. 
But this is unilluminating for we would know all about pain 
before we modelled it on the computer. The point of the 
cognitivist doctrine is to explain things functionally without 
recourse to the 'hardware level'. 
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Harre's argument decomposes into a variant of the 'no private language 
argument' which Rorty claims will not defeat the cognitivists. Harre 
presents a weak attack because he relies entirely on the private language 
argument and a corollary of that argument concerning natural expressions 
such as pain behaviour. Harre (1988) states: 
We understand each other's English words because we share a 
form of life, and in particular we share more or less the same 
repertoire of natural expressions of feeling, just because they are 
natural. It seems that on this ground alone the use of the AI 
model cannot be based on the assumption of a common use of 
English between ourselves and our Pc. (1988 p. 109)(Emphasis 
mine). 
It will be explained why it is that a computer cannot follow rules in the 
same way we can and therefore not participate in our form of life. But 
Harre leaves this untouched and does not explore why it is that a computer 
cannot engage in our form of life-except in the very limited sense that a 
computer has not the physiological properties that allow for it to usefully 
engage in a physiognomic language game. (It makes no sense to suppose 
that a computer can engage in a physiognomic language game). Harre slides 
from considering these limited cases to all cases of human 'forms of life', 
including 'thinking'. Harre arrives at the point where he asserts the 'no 
private language argument': 
If we are to bring people and machines together under the 
concept of thinking it can be only one way. The people's concept 
of data, etc, must be shown to be ontologically identical with the 
physicist's machine concept of oriented magnetic fields. But this 
identity cannot be seriously proposed since the symbolic entities 
of human thought become such through their use in a human 
form of life, not through any particular physical properties that 
make them fit for processing. (p. 114). 
But Harre's use of 'form of life' here is not clear. Why can a computer not 
participate in a form of life (excluding those forms of life covered by 
physiognomic language games)? In what way are those 'symbolic entities' 
not fit for processing? How does 'processing' relate to a 'form of life'? 
According to Wittgenstein the connection between rules and rule-
following is logical not causal (I will explain this further shortly). We 
participate in forms of life and therefore engage in rule-following activities 
which are determined by the normative criteria that encompass that 
activity. Any suggestion that we can understand psychological states by 
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comparing the programme or functional state of a machine to those 
normatively defined activities is simply nonsense. In the former case rule-
following is causal, in the later it is defined normatively. Nevertheless, 
Harre has not made this connection and so he presents an unconvincing 
attack on the cognitivists. 
It can be seen that there is much confusion concerning the status of the 
private language argument when applied to psychology to the extent that it 
is often considered irrelevant to psychology. Indeed when the private 
language argument is used as the sole basis on which criticism of 
psychological theorising is advanced the attacks are easily ignored. 
A more forceful argument can be derived from considering Wittgenstein's 
account of rules and rule-following. Wittgenstein's earlier work in 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics forces us to question the 
underlying structure of the Investigations. It is argued here that the private 
language argument is a corollary of a broader argument, not the pinnacle of 
Wittgenstein's dealings with the philosophy of mind. 
The Later Wittgenstein's account of Rules and-Rule following 
Here Wittgenstein is followed closely. The reason for this will become 
apparent when social constructionism and the implications of rule-
following within that doctrine are considered in Chapter Four. This notion 
of rule-following taken from Wittgenstein will show why some 
constructionists have not adopted a full account of the Wittgensteinian 
arguments and also show how they represent the notion of the correctness 
of a rule as being transcendental to rule-following contained within a social 
practice. Rules are considered central to the constructionist doctrine. 
Conversational rules, linguistic conventions and moral and social 
prescriptions are all considered essential to determining the nature of any 
particular psychological question. It is essential that an understanding of 
rules and rule-following be developed. 
The goal of Wittgenstein's early work was to find the essence of any 
possible language. Wittgenstein shifted his ideas gradually from first 
considering language to be a calculus of hidden rules; language operated 
according to a system of rules, and any possible language must have this 
logical structure. Wittgenstein at one time compared language to a game of 
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chess but abandoned this analogy when he realised the limitations of 
comparing language to a calculus. Wittgenstein accepted many errors in his 
original conception of language, and settled on viewing language as 
a:" ... many-faceted rule-governed activity or set of activities" (Baker and 
Hacker 1985 p.38)(This is dealt with again in later chapters). Language, 
according to Wittgenstein, can be compared to pla:ying a game according to 
certain rules. The task of philosophy is to clarify the nature of those rules. It 
can be no surprise that an understanding of rules and rule-following is 
fundamental to Wittgenstein's analysis of language. The point, for now, is 
that Wittgenstein's conception of rule-following has a long history of 
considering many alternatives, and should be seen in contrast to the 
original consideration of rules as they are formulated within a calculus. 
The first, and essential, point from Wittgenstein is that adherence to rules 
and rule-following are different. The fact that it is possible to construct a 
rule to accord with a given regularity of human behaviour does not entail 
that the individual under observation is following a rule. Consider: 
There might be a cave-man who produced regular sequences of 
marks for himself. He amused himself, e.g., by drawing on the 
wall of the cave: 
or 
But he is not following the general expression of a rule. And 
when we say that he acts in a regular way that is not because we 
can form such an expression. (RFM VI, §41). 
We must not be inclined to think that because we accord with a rule we are 
necessarily following a rule. We do not follow a rule just because we accord 
with it. When we follow a rule we do so because of the rule. The relation 
between a rule and rule-following is not accidental. But what does the 
because mean here? Wittgenstein's objection to presenting the notion that 
a computer can think should be seen against this background, he wants to 
deny that an outcome of an algorithm which is causally determined can be 
taken to mean 'following a rule'. We may suppose that a computer follows 
a rule because it accords with some regularity but this does not entail that it 
is literally following a rule. 
Ultimately it is argued that the concepts of 'thinking' and 'rule-following' 
can only be considered as normative activities. Thus the connection to the 
problem which initially frustrated Wittgenstein: logic is not fundamental 
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or independent, it does not stand above language. In the sense that we are 
guided by logic and we are governed by normative procedures we are also 
guided by normative procedures when we engage in other activities, such 
as thinking. 
The private language argument relies, in part, on a distinction between 
following a rule and being under the impression that one is following a 
rule. Wittgenstein remarks: 
Are the rules of the private language impressions of rules?-
The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the 
impression of a balance. (PI§ 259). 
Even if we sincerely believe that we are following a rule it may be the case 
that we are not following a rule. We cannot look inwardly to know what 
accords with a rule; rule-following is a normative procedure it requires 
independent verification from a public context. 
... hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is 
obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey 
a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule 
would be the same thing as obeying it. (PI§ 202). 
The private language argument will be dealt with further, in Chapter 
Three, but for now it is appropriate to consider the private language 
argument to be an extension of what Wittgenstein had to say on rules and 
rule-following. The Wittgensteinian objection to the notion of a computer 
thinking cannot be justly served by the consideration that 'thinking' is a 
normative term derived from a complex set of essentially social practices in 
which a computer could never engage. While the private language 
argument is often used in an attempt to persuade us of this point it fails 
because it is presented without the supporting arguments which 
Wittgenstein laid down in his previous works. 
To suppose that someone is following a rule it is necessary to examine the 
circumstances in which we can attribute to someone or something that they 
are indeed following a rule. 
If one of a pair of chimpanzees once scratched the figure 1--1 in 
the earth and thereupon the other the series 1 -- 1 1 -- 1 etc., the first 
would not have given a rule nor would the other be following it, 
whatever else went on at the same time in the mind of the two 
of them. 
If however there were observed, e.g., the phenomenon of a kind 
of instruction, of shewing how and of imitation, of lucky and 
misfiring attempts, or reward and punishment and the like; if at 
length the one who had been so trained put figures which he had 
never seen before one after another in a sequence as in the first 
example, then we should probably say that one chimpanzee was 
writing rules down, and the other was following them. (RFM VI, 
§42). 
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According to Wittgenstein rule-following must take place within a context 
of learning to apply rules, making mistakes, being able to explain the use of 
those rules, by reference to those rules, when questioned. These capacities 
amount to an agent having an ability, or the often quoted "mastery of a 
technique" (PI§ 150). Wittgenstein wants us to accept that the meaning of a 
term is manifest in how we use the term. To understand a term is to use it 
correctly and be able to explain that use to others. Most important is the 
idea that we are able to explain action, or our use of a term, with reference 
to the rules for its application. An explanation of the use of a term is bound 
within the rules for the application of that term, within a practice. My 
adherence to a rule, is internally related to the explanation I give for 
following the rule. 
But how does an explanation of a rule determine the complex use of an 
expression-for any rule can be variously interpreted? Cognitive scientists 
want to say that following certain rules can lead to understanding; I 
understand because I followed the correct rules. They want to say that 
'thinking' can be used in a way in which the explanation of the use of the 
term is through an account of rule-following which is contradictory to that 
which Wittgenstein presents. But if the meaning of a term is its use within 
a practice, how does an explanation of that use within a practice determine 
meaning? How would this discount the possibility that thinking might 
mean the operations of a computer? 
A Dog in the Park 
Suppose I am intending to walk my dog in the park. As I enter the park I 
come across a not so unfamiliar sign which states: "All dogs in the park 
must be controlled." I wish to comply with the sign, noting the five 
hundred dollar fine which accompanies any breach of park regulations. But 
my willingness to comply is disturbed by the philosophical insight that it is 
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entirely ambiguous as what 'controlled' actually means in this situation. 
The request would be clear if the council had written: /I All dogs must be 
kept on a leash at all times." Surely the dog would then be controlled. 
Whilst my dog could be leashed, I remain firm in my conviction that my 
aging, tired, dog would be perfectly controlled if let off the leash provided I 
kept an eye on her at all times. I believe the dog will respond to my whistle 
and return in the event that some other person with a dog in the park 
enters my vicinity. (My dog reacts in an aggressive manner towards other 
animals.) The question of interest is whether I am in fact following the rule 
that 'all dogs must be controlled in the park'. What entitles me to interpret 
the ambiguous term 'controlled'? What counts as not following the rule? I 
believe that I am following the rule but suppose the dog runs off, does not 
respond to my whistle, and savagely attacks a small poodle. Could it then be 
said that I was following the rule? 
To relate rule-following to understanding it must be accepted that my 
reasons for my actions are related to my interpretation of "controlled". I 
believe that my dog is controlled when unleashed so this becomes an 
explanation for my action. Suppose that a park official finds me walking the 
dog and inquires whether I am aware of the sign. My explanation would 
involve my explaining that I believe my dog to be 'controlled'. I whistle and 
my dog dutifully returns. I have demonstrated my understanding of 
'controlled' to the official and this entails my reason for my action (Le. 
having the dog unleashed). 
Nothing in my understanding or interpretation of the sign causes me to 
behave in the way I have. I could just as easily have interpreted the sign to 
mean that I must have the dog on a leash at all times. Even then it is open 
to interpretation as to whether my dog is controlled. Suppose my dog 
breaks free from my hold, and with leash trailing it pursues a small poodle 
with the vigour that accompanies the instincts of a large dog. The point 
here is that a rule does not stand above both my action and my 
interpretation of the sign. I am not forced to comply with the sign by my 
interpretation, and the rule, in this case the sign, does not determine what 
actions accord and conflict with it. 
Baker and Hacker (1990) write: 
A being can only be said to be following a rule in the context of a 
complex practice involving actual and potential normative 
activities of justifying, noticing mistakes and correcting them by 
reference to the relevant rule, criticising deviations from the 
rule, and, if called upon, explaining an action as being in accord 
with the rule or teaching others want counts as following a rule. 
(Emphasis mine).(p. 165). 
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It should be obvious that in my example I could be convinced by the park 
official that 'controlled' really means 'on a leash'. Suppose I completely 
misread the sign (suppose I was German and not familiar with English but 
followed the customary practices of my home town.) Once informed that 
the sign really means:" All dogs must be on a leash." I should comply at 
once by correcting my mistake. 
To foreshadow later discussions of creativity I have placed emphasis in the 
preceding quotation concerning a particular circumstance which can arise. 
Suppose that the park official and I disagree as to the meaning of 
"controlled". I maintain that my dog is perfectly controlled off the leash but 
he insists that large dogs should always be leashed to protect the odd 
straying miniature poodle. I refuse to comply with his request to leash my 
dog and as a consequence I am summoned before a local magistrate. I am to 
face a charge of breaching park regulations, s(4): Failure to have a dog 
controlled in the park. 
The magistrate remarks that never before has she been called upon to 
decide such an issue as whether an unleashed dog is 'controlled'.9 But my 
apparent breach of park regulations is defended with a brilliant argument 
from my lawyer who convinces the judge that my unleashed dog was 
indeed controlled. My lawyer's argument rests almost entirely on the point 
that it was unfair of the park official to discriminate large dog owners from 
small dog owners in the interpretation of the word 'controlled': as no other 
dog was actually injured there was no evidence to believe anything but that 
my dog was indeed 'controlled'. Within the narrow realm of legal social 
practice my lawyer's argument has convinced others (The park official and 
all others who have the same problem) what 'following the rule' in this 
situation amounts to. 
The point is not to show the applicability of a Wittgensteinian account of 
rule-following to legal practices, but to demonstrate breaches of standard 
interpretations can be defended successfully in such a way as to change the 
social practice. Wittgenstein made a similar point in relation to logical 
9 The form of the issue in question is often dealt with 
by judges by legislation and precedent. 
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proofs. Baker and Hacker (1985 p. 6) report: "A proof establishes internal 
relations; it connects concepts and thereby contributes to their identity. It 
creates essence by extending grammar. Proofs and calculations are thus 
radically unlike experiments (empirical verification)." Later a conception of 
creativity will be defended based on this analogy and show how theory can 
alter our conception of scientific evidence (Chapter Five pp. 183-192). 
Returning to the question of what Wittgenstein means when he suggests 
that the question "Can a machine think?" is somehow nonsensical and that 
'thinking' is something non-physical. Wittgenstein asks: 
What sort of machine? One constructed of the usual materials-
or a super machine? Are you not confusing the hardness of a rule 
with the hardness of a material? (RFM II, §88 p.110). 
A calculus or an algorithm which guides a computer is not the same as the 
rules which guide and govern human behaviour. The reference to the 
hardness of a rule is meant to expose this point. It is a mistake to consider 
that a formula or a general expression of a mathematical rule causes an 
individual to follow a mathematical series (In the same way that my 
interpretation of the sign in my example does not cause me to accord with 
the sign's prescriptions). Any rule or formula is underdetermined by what 
may accord with it. For example, any continuation of the series, a, 2, 4, 6, ... , 
will, on some interpretation accord with the series. So it cannot be the case 
that my understanding the formula n=n+2 causes the response 8, la, 12, ... , 
for any other continuation is logically equivalent (PI§ 151). What makes my 
continuation of the series correct is the context in which that continuation 
is used. My continuation has meaning to others by its use in a practice, my 
explanation of the continuation might refer to the formula n=n+2, but the 
formula is not an explanation of why I am correct with my continuation of 
the sequence. 
The algorithms, or potential algorithms, which are used to support 
functional descriptions, or the efficacy of functional descriptions, of mental 
states, rely on an account of rule-following which cannot be supported by 
the account of understanding which Wittgenstein develops. How can the 
computer which is caused to respond to the rules of an algorithm explain 
its action in accordance with normatively defined rules? The computer's 
actions are determined by the algorithm, it must follow the rules. The state 
of the machine is causally determined by the 'material hardness' of the 
mechanistic procedures it follows which are, on Wittgenstein's account, 
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fundamentally different from the reasons which I invoke to explain my 
actions which are determined by a logical (internal) connection with the 
criteria which accord with them (The logical determination is 'harder', 
fundamentally different from, the material determinant of a machine). I 
explain my actions not according to the causal determinants of my 
neurophysiology but with reference to the normatively defined rules which 
I interpret within a social practice. A computer must explain its actions 
with reference to its programme. Put another way, functionalists explain 
actions, and psychological states, according to an algorithm or programme. 
Suppose though that we change our conception of thinking within our 
social practice, as Wittgenstein must allow. Suppose that the cognitivists act 
like the lawyer in my example and attempt to provide an explanation of the 
meaning of thinking, this time not to a judge but to an intellectual 
community, in terms of algorithms, or perhaps 'C fibre firing' in the neo-
cortex. And this is surely what they are trying to do! Cognitivists can insist 
that we change our conception of the meaning of thinking so that it accords 
with their research programme. No argument based solely on the 
conclusions of private language argument will defeat this line of reasoning. 
Even given the conclusions of the private language argument: the 
suggestion that 'thinking' does not refer to the action of pointing to 'an 
inner state', this will not remove the cognitivists' right to demonstrate an 
alternative. But if the cognitivists are to pursue this programme and 
attempt to change, I should say demonstrate, the meaning of 'thinking', or 
any other psychological predicate, they must adopt per hypothesis the 
account of rule-following that Wittgenstein suggests. And this is precisely 
what they cannot do! 
A cognitivist inclined to the view that the meaning of a psychological term, 
like thinking, can be expressed in terms of a neurophysiological state, 
perhaps 'C-fibre Firing', cannot concede that we may all change our use of 
the term 'thinking'. This would involve an unexplicated account of the 
reasons why we come to normatively define 'thinking' as 'C-fibre firing'. 
An attempt to avoid Wittgenstein's argument in this way concedes his 
conclusion. 
To undermine the legitimate 'move' made by those who would defend the 
claim that the mental can be modelled on the machine analogy 
Wittgenstein enters the game that his opponent plays. Wittgenstein first 
objects that 'thinking' is normatively defined by characterising the internal 
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relations between meaning, thinking and understanding. The cognitivist, 
not persuaded by the fact that we do not use thinking in the way he or she 
proposes suggests that it is possible in the future that 'thinking' will be 
defined in the way desired: that is, refer to some inner causal process. 
Wittgenstein leaves open the possibility that language might change since 
normative practices, by their very nature, must be allowed to change across 
history and cultures. But the suggestion by the cognitivist that the concept 
of 'thinking' might change across time does not address the underlying 
features of language which Wittgenstein presents-it concedes that 
something other than a causal process promotes a change in our language. 
The Imove' relies on the normative nature of language, which 
Wittgenstein represents, to avoid the criticism. And as Wittgenstein is 
quick to point out this is an illegitimate move: a nonsensical claim which 
promotes nonsensical pursuits. 
Understanding a rule takes place against the background of normative 
activities which are absent in the case of a machine. Whilst a computer can 
'play' chess, it surely lacks any understanding of concepts such as 'winning'. 
Whilst it is the case that a computer can win against an opponent, the 
concept of winning incorporates a number of situations which the 
computer do~s not experience: winning in different circumstances, 
accepting congratulations, complimenting the opponent on their game and 
many other imaginable circumstances besides. A chess computer can win at 
chess l but not possess the concept of winning. 
What if everything in our experience were made available to the 
computer? Surely what is lacking in the computer analogy is all the rules 
which it can learn through experience. The problem with this conception is 
that it requires severing the internal relation between a rule and its 
extension. On this account agreement with a rule would be those things 
which satisfied it in experience. Wittgenstein regards the relation between a 
rule and the criteria that satisfies it to be logical not contingent on some 
experience. Thus, when discussing such things as one's intentions, if my 
intention is to jump in the air then 'jumping in the air/, i.e that leaving 
the ground by action of one's legs, satisfies the intention not the actual 
experience which follows from my intention. 
I believe Russell's theory amounts to the following: if I give 
someone an order and I am happy with what he does, then he 
has carried out my order. (If I wanted to eat an apple l and 
someone punched me in the stomach, taking away my appetite, 
then it was this punch that I originally intended.) (Philosophical 
Remarks § 63 cited in Shanker, 1989 p. 75). 
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If we only learned as a result of experience what was in accord with the 
rule, in this case a command, then whatever event occurred would have to 
be deemed the meaning of that command or the nature of that desire. 
Indeed as Shanker (1989 p. 75) usefully adds, it is only due to the internal 
relation between a rule and the criteria that satisfy it that: 
.. .it makes sense to speak of disobeying an order, failing to act on 
one's intentions, satisfying one's desires or attaining one's 
goals-and knowing when one has done so." 
By abandoning the internal relation between grasping a rule and 
understanding the criteria which accord with the rule one disrupts the 
normative nature of the meaning of psychological predicates. By treating 
psychological predicates as referring to causal processes one is tempted to 
treat 'breaking rules' as a 'breakdown of the machine'. (This picture prevails 
in clinical psychology and psychiatry where the search continues to 
understand the nature of breaches of normatively defined moral rules in 
terms of causal processes.-see Chapter Four). 
Wittgenstein directly attacks the view that a computer might literally 
calculate by considering the context in which it makes sense to speak of 
calcula tion: 
Does a calculating machine calculate? 
Imagine that a calculating machine comes into existence by 
accident; now someone accidentally presses its knobs (or an 
animal walks over it) and it calculates the product of 25 X 20. 
I want to say: it is essential to mathematics that its signs are also 
employed in mufti. (RFM IV, §2, p. 133). 
Essential to the understanding of the product is some social1o context in 
which it is interpreted. It is only within this social context that it makes 
sense to talk of calculation. The symbols of mathematics have sense only 
through their use in a social practice. Time is a concept which has meaning, 
10 The distinction between public criteria and social criteria is 
fully investigated in Chapter Three. It is slightly misleading to 
suggest that some social context is essential-but a desire for 
clarity prevails here. 
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not because the earth spins on its axis in relation to the sun, but because we 
are there to observe the phenomena and make use of the regularity. 
Consider the student who instead of working through all that is necessary 
to test his understanding of statistics, sneaks a portable computer into the 
examination. The rules that the student follows to achieve the correct 
results are not those which demonstrate an understanding of statistics (For 
the student cannot explain his actions for achieving the correct result by 
reference to the procedures for determining the answer; he can only explain 
his rules for the use of the computer). One might want to say that the 
student could follow the rules which the computer follows quite 
mechanically, by rote learning, and therefore demonstrate the correct 
requirements for passing the examination; the computer here just saves the 
ordeal of learning by rote the rules and inferences necessary. We could still 
say that the student knows nothing of statistics and cannot explain the 
various rules of inference for gaining the correct results. (A discussion of 
the Chinese room argument is begging here, but for now it remains 
wanting-cf RFM, IV §3 p. 133). 
Wittgenstein asks us to consider calculating devices which occur in nature 
in impenetrable caskets (RFM IV, §4, p. 131). Suppose people use them like 
the student in my example to calculate, but know nothing of calculation. 
These people, Wittgenstein insists, are experimenting when they operate 
the devices. Baker and Hacker (1990 p. 166) suggest that these people could 
make predictions as a result of their experimentation, but no matter how 
accurate these turn out to be, they could not calculate with the device any 
more than one can calculate with a crystal ball. The rules of mathematics 
are absent in Wittgenstein's thought experiment. Without the justification 
provided by a context in which those rules are interpreted and understood 
the displays on the imaginary machines are meaningless. Although one 
might imagine that they could gain meaning to the society. Suppose they 
decided the fate of criminals by the last number which appeared on the 
display after random input and some operation. But then the calculations 
of the machine would not be calculations in the sense we use calculations 
for there is no explanation of the product of the numbers by reference to the 
rules followed to produce that number. The numbers might gain meaning 
but I calculation' would not. 
Being forced by the rules of a programme to derive an answer is not 
calculating. The outcome is not normative, it is causal. What makes the 
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answers correct is their use in a context outside of mathematics. The 
statistics examination requires the correct answers, and the examiner 
determines whether the answers are correct or not. viz., not the calculating 
machine. Consider: 
'We are calculating only when there is a must behind the result.' 
But suppose we don't know this must, is it contained in the 
calculations all the same? Or are we not calculating, if we do it 
quite naively? 
How about the following: You aren't calculating if, when you get 
now this, now that result, and cannot find a mistake, you accept 
this and say: this simply shows that certain circumstances which 
are still unknown have an influence on the result. 
This might be expressed: if calculation reveals a causal 
connection to you, then you are not calculating. 
Our children are not only given practice in calculation but are 
also trained to adopt a particular attitude towards a mistake in 
calculating, towards a departure from the norm. 
What I am saying comes to this, that mathematics is normative. 
But "Norm" does not mean the same thing as "ideal".(RFM V, 
§42, p. 190). 
A machine cannot be used to make a calculation independently of the 
human conventions for assessing the results. 
Maybe we are not required to know reasons behind our inference, maybe 
we just achieve the correct result by force of habit. Often we appear to 
calculate mechanically, say by just responding "thirty-six" to the question, 
"What are four nines?" Wittgenstein's comments on machine calculation 
come to the point which is undoubtedly the most essential to grasp for 
further considerations on the nature of psychological inquiry and the 
mistake of the cognitivists. Rather enigmatically Wittgenstein remarks: 
'If calculating looks like the action of a machine, it is the human 
being doing the calculation that is the machine' (RFM III, §20, p. 
119). 
The fact that we can learn by rote, act like a machine, should not be 
confused with true understanding which is demonstrated in appraising, 
reappraising, making and correcting mistakes, etc. We can follow rules 
mechanically but something that follows rules mechanically is not literally 
calculating, or following a rule, even the human being who has no public 
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context for the results to be applied. (as in the private language argument). 
Wittgenstein states: 
One follows the rule mechanically. Hence one compares it with a 
mechanism. "Mechanical"-that means: without thinking. But 
entirely without thinking? Without reflecting. (RFM VII, §60, 
cited in Shanker, 1987, p. 640). (emphasis in the original). 
Hacker (1990) directs this point against Turing (1950), the subject of 
Wittgenstein's attack, and suggests Turing: "conflated a human who is, as it 
were, a calculating machine with a human calculating mechanically." (p. 
169). The point can be extended further to suppose that a whole tradition 
in psychology, that of cognitive psychology, has conflated interpretation of 
psychological predicates which may be viewed mechanically with 
explanation based on the positivist tradition of viewing explanation 
'mechanically'. (This is the point I will return to in Chapter Eight and 
largely the issue discussed in Chapter One, viz. that logic should not be seen 
as foundational.) 
Rorty maintains that in order to establish a cogent argument against the 
cognitive scientists we need to show that psychological predicates mean 
something non-physical. Wittgenstein argues that calculation is non-
physical, rule-following is not causal but normative. Following a rule is not 
causally determined. The relation between a rule and following a rule is 
logical not causal. 'Non-causal' here means 'non-physical'. The physicalist'S 
commitment to causal/functional descriptions makes 'thinking' 
inexplicable except in those limited operations where we have: "structures 
rigid and permanent enough to be computable". (Harre, 1988 p. 114). But 
what is enlightening about knowing the rules for mathematical inference 
and demonstrating that they can be achieved by a computer? Harre 
continues: "One wonders whether there is anything in this corner that is 
not already comprehended by that part of mathematics that has these 
general characteristics./I (1988 p. 114). 
Rorty's challenge has been met. If 'thinking' is operationalised for the 
purposes of the cognitive scientists we can only gain a small and 
unilluminating account of 'thinking' in psychology. That account of 
thinking is limited to those rigid situations when we follow an algorithm, a 
set of rules, or a technique, that is, when we calculate mechanically. But it 
makes no sense to say that one reconsiders mechanically, ponders 
mechanically, or reflects mechanically. 'Thinking' does not mean operating 
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according to an algorithm, it gains its meaning elsewhere. Cognitive 
scientists will never gain an understanding of 'thinking' no matter how 
they operationalise the concept, no matter how big or how powerful the 
computers become, no matter what algorithm they produce, because it 
makes no sense to say that a computer follows a rule, thinks, feels, or is 
conscious. Cognitive scientists entertain a philosophically unviable faith in 
their waiting for Rorty's 'psychological DNA'. 
The infinite regress argument 
The 'infinite regress' argument suggests that there is something within 
Wittgensteinian philosophy which will not allow for the idea of 
postulating entities within the mind with the same capacities of those we 
seek to explain (Kenny 1984). The problems contained in explaining the 
relation between an individual and the world are carried over to the 
postulated mental entity and its relation to the real world, so that nothing 
is explained. 
Rorty maintains that this argument is independent of the 'no private 
language argument'. Malcolm, the subject of Rorty's attack, does not 
explicitly refer to Wittgenstein's comments on rules and rule-following. 
Nevertheless the connection is clear and its relation to the private language 
argument important, as we shall discover in the next chapter. 
If we imagine that our ability to understand that forty-seven plus three is 
equal to fifty, by postulating a mechanism within the individual which has 
the ability to add, then we run into a problem which Barker' (1990) calls, the 
'saliency issue'. Suppose that I have a subroutine within my 'mind' which 
serves the function of addition. How do I know when to apply the 
particular function? Never mind the idea that rule-following has no 
application here, that we cannot literally follow a rule privately. What is 
always required when positing a rule is a further rule used to explain the 
application of the first rule. No rule determines its own use, any suggestion 
that this can occur leads us directly to the position which Wittgenstein 
argued against, which plagued traditional epistemology, and leads to the 
problems which are inherent in Frege's conception of logic. (examined in 
Chapter One). 
Malcolm (1971 p. 391) presents these saliency issues differently: 
If we say that the way in which a person knows that something in 
front of him is a dog is by seeing that the creature 'fits' his Idea of 
a dog, then we need to ask, "How does he know that this is an 
example of fitting?" Does he not need a second-order Idea which 
shows him what it is like for something to fit an Idea? That is, 
will he not need a model of fitting? 
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Kenny (1988 pp. 127-136) calls the form of argument which Malcolm attacks, 
'The homunculus fallacy'. Kenny calls the argument a fallacy because he 
suggests that those who use the argument make a move from true 
premisses to false conclusions. Fodor (1986 p. 129) discusses the problem 
openly: 
Since functionalism licences the individuation of states by 
reference to their causal role, it appears to allow a trivial 
explanation of any event E, that is, it appears to allow a trivial 
explanation of any observed event E-causer ... In psychology this 
kind of question begging often takes the form of theories that in 
effect postulate homunculi with the selfsame intellectual 
capacities the theorist set out to explain ... The burden of the 
accusation is not untruth but triviality. 
Fodor goes on to suggest that the way to avoid the charge of triviality is to 
only postulate functional descriptions of 'E-causers' which are possible 
operations of Turing machines (Hopefully by now it is perspicuous that this 
restriction is not helpful at all). Kenny warns us that problems arise out of 
considering such arguments to be usefut even in the sense of being 
pedagogically useful in the way Rorty has suggested. Wittgenstein was 
forever warning us of the way our use of language can lead us astray so that 
we assert nonsense in the disguise of theory or philosophy. Kenny states: 
"One danger, then, of the homunculus fallacy is that in problems 
concerning perception and kindred matters it conceals what is left to be 
explained." (p. 127). 
We are led astray by positing the homunculus Fallacy because we make a 
category error. According to Kenny, to contain information is to be in a 
certain state, whereas to know something is to possess a certain capacity. 
Kenny asserts that knowledge is a capacity, pace Fodor and others-who 
would suggest that knowledge of a particular can be described as a state. 
This category difference is important here only because constructionists, 
examined in the next chapter, follow this account directly to the view that 
psychology is better served by viewing a human being as the possessor of 
certain capacities arising out of their physiological constitution. 
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Constructionists maintain that capacities are best interpreted within a social 
context. Harre (1989a) makes particular use of the concept of a 'skill' which 
he suggests serves to bridge the gap between the physiological and the 
social. The importance of the homunculus fallacy is that it points to 
alternative considerations of the nature of psychological inquiry into 
mental states. Functionalists can avoid the argument by simply denying 
that there is anything circular in their line of reasoning by asserting that 
somehow there will be a causal account of their hypothetical mechanisms 
either at a neurological level, or, as in Fodor's case, by suggesting that we 
already have an idea of what can do the job, viz., universal Turing 
machines. 
One might leap to the opinion that an argument against the cognitivists 
based on rules and rule-following is too strong, it destroys any hope of an 
empirical psychology, and leads us to the conclusions of Malcolm and 
others (d. Williams 1985). But the destruction of the 'mental inner' does 
not disrupt empirical psychology, just that version of empirical psychology 
which would suppose that models of mental functioning are meaningful. 
Wittgenstein warns against this error through his imaginary interlocutor: 
"But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? 
Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the 
rule." (PI§ 198). 
Those cognitivist's who wish to postulate rules for the determination of 
behaviour and explanation of particular psychological states can respond to 
the Wittgensteinians by asserting that they have gone too far. The 
imaginary interlocutor makes this point to Wittgenstein. On Wittgenstein's 
account of rules, nothing counts as a rule to guide behaviour. The notion of 
a rule and the explanation of those things which guide behaviour are now 
impossible according to the conceptions of rules and rule-following which 
have been presented. Wittgenstein replies: 
That is not what we ought to say, but rather: any interpretation 
still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot 
give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not 
determine meaning. (PI§ 198) (Emphasis mine). 
Shanker (1991 p. 76) asserts that we must distinguish between two senses of 
the word 'determines'. The causal sense of the word 'determines' and the 
grammatical necessity encompassed in the internal relation between a rule 
and its normatively defined criteria. What I commit myself to when I grasp 
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the internal relation between a rule and its criteria, and use this to form an 
intention to act in a particular way as a justification of my action, is the 
criteria which define whether my action is correct or incorrect according to 
the rule. I do not commit myself to an action on the basis of my 
interpretation. In the example of walking the dog this was illustrated by 
pointing out that I could completely misunderstand the sign. My 
interpretation is a justification for my action; it is not the reason I acted. 
Shanker argues that we confuse the logico-grammatical connection 
between intention and action with a temporal relation. Thus we fail to 
distinguish between a rule of grammar and its application. It is the action 
which satisfies the intention; just as the criteria for a rule satisfy the rule. 
So, for example, if I intend to accord with the sign in the park, it will be my 
actions, not my interpretation of the sign, nor my intentions, which satisfy 
whether or not the normative prescriptions have been adhered to. The 
approach adopted by the cognitivists is to turn this view around 
completely. They suppose that my intentions which cause my actions: The 
antecedents conditions (My viewing a sign) produce a functional state (My 
intention to keep my dog controlled) to produce an action (Keeping the dog 
on the leash). But forming an intention to act in a particular way in no way 
encompasses the cause of that action. " ... an agent's forming the intention 
to <I> no more brought about his <I>ing than his learning the rules of chess 
brought about his playing the game." (Shanker, 1991 p. 78). Further, the 
reason for forming the intention, in my example to obey the law and avoid 
a fine, cannot be said to cause my action. Reasons only justify an action, as 
demonstrated by the legal conflict in the example. 
So, according to Wittgenstein, we must look to the context in which a rule 
is applied to determine what is in accord and what is in conflict with that 
rule. This context is discussed by Coulter (1982) in his attack on the 
cognitivists. Like Harre, Coulter is committed to the notion that cognition 
is a social/public event appropriately analysed within the social practices in 
which it arises. Coulter suggests that cognitive psychology fails to consider 
this social context and that: " ... the de-reification of the field opens up the 
contested territory to sociocultural and ethnomethdological analysis."(p. 4). 
Coulter maintains that 'Turing machine functionalists', like Fodor and 
Dennett, do not distinguish between behaviour which is causally 
determined by the state of a machine and those behaviours which humans 
engage in that are determined, partly defined, or at least interpreted, within 
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the environmental circumstances which surround that behaviour. Coulter 
seems to be. getting to the point drawn from Wittgenstein about the 
normative nature of calculation. But he makes no reference to those 
Wittgensteinian arguments and therefore makes his point contingent on 
there being 'non-calculable contextual particulars'. Coulter (1982 p. 10) 
states: 
If, as seems to be the case, non-enumerable contextual particulars, 
enter into the (defeasible) constitution of some series of 
behavioural events as an 'action' of a specifiable sort (e.g. 
'pronouncing the numbers "four fifteen"', contrasted with: 
'telling someone the time', contrasted with, e.g., 'warning 
someone of their lateness for an appointment'), then the goal of 
developing such algorithms for 'actions' would appear to be 
misconceived. (There may well be 'conventions' of normative 
sorts, but these are not algorithmic). 
Something more is needed than simply saying that some things cannot be 
computed. Context may be interpreted, processed and reacted to by a 
computer with some suitable sensory apparatus and sufficient 
programming. The point that needs to be made is that this processing of 
information is not 'calculation' in the same sense that we apply the term 
calculation to someone who derives the product of two numbers. It is not 
that a computer cannot cope with contextual particulars, it is simply that 
you and I cope with contextual particulars in ways which are to be 
understood differently from the processing of information in a machine. 
The point needs to be made that if a computer were to be made to react 
appropriately to all contextual particulars then its functioning would no 
longer provide the basis for an analogy to psychological processes. Since it 
makes no sense to suppose that a computer operates in the same way that 
we do when performing tasks like calculation, because' calculation' must be 
understood within the context in which it is used (Because of its normative 
nature). And in order for the computer to react to those contextual 
particulars we would necessarily require an understanding of the context in 
which it would react, either to interpret the response as correct or to design 
the correct response, then the analogy between the computer's functional 
states and functional descriptions of psychological states is empty. The 
performance of an algorithm, even if it accords with socially maintained 
normative prescriptions, provides no model of 'thinking'. The mechanism 
is a aid which facilitates thinking and does not replace thought, or provide 
a model of thought in itself. We gain an understanding of the 
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appropriateness of actions within a context, not from the causal 
determinants of that action. (Unless we require a causal account of action 
referring specifically to neurophysiology-which would eliminate those 
mental models posited by the functionalists). 
Conclusions 
Functional descriptions of mental states employed by the cognitivists 
adhere to an inappropriate account of rule-following which forces a 
commitment to causal descriptions of mental processes. Malcolm (1971), 
and others, suggest that this causal account of mental processes entails 
ontological commitments which are akin to a form of dualism, or the 
Cartesian conception of mind. Wittgenstein's private language argument is 
thought to be able to dismiss this line of argument by the cognitivists 
because it repudiates the Cartesian conception of mind. Rorty maintains, 
and his argument has been supported, that the 'no private language 
argument' (which without the supporting arguments concerning rules and 
rule-following) will not reveal what is wrong with a cognitivist's claim that 
it is useful to form an analogy between computer functioning and 
psychological functioning. No ontological commitment is necessary, and 
there is no a priori reason to suggest that there need be such a commitment. 
However, to avoid the charge levelled against them the cognitivists must 
maintain that they are producing models of the mind which are in some 
sense pedagogically useful. They must abandon any ontological claims in 
favour of promissory notes which offer the assurance that in the future, 
based on their models, neurophysiology will make the ontological claims 
which link their models to the functioning of the brain. 
Coulter, Harre, Malcolm, Shanker and Kenny all maintain that there is 
something wrong with this faith in waiting for some connection to be 
established between the models of inner processes and the physicalist 
philosophy. In general, anti-cognitivists maintain that psychological 
processes are to be examined within an appropriate public context. It is from 
this context that psychological terms gain their meaning. Furthermore, they 
suggest that no ontology will link brain states to models of mental processes 
because it makes no sense to talk of a 'mental inner'. The alternative is to 
consider that psychological states occur as a result of our physiological 
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capacities but are to be understood as expressions of those physiological 
capacities within a public context. 
It has been suggested that the anti-cognitivist arguments amount to no 
more than an alternative position, one which is agreed with, but which is 
insufficient to show what is misguided about the cognitivist's research 
programme. The necessary arguments are available in the Wittgensteinian 
literature, almost directly from Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein 
anticipated the problems that might occur with supposing that it is possible 
to attribute psychological concepts to machines but restricted his arguments 
to counter the claims made by Turing regarding a conception of the nature 
of calculation. 
The question for the anti-cognitivists now becomes: what is wrong in 
principle with developing models of mental states based on the computer 
analogy? The answer taken from Wittgenstein is that it is nonsense to 
adopt an account of calculation that makes calculation a species of causal 
processes. Wittgenstein's account of rules and rule-following allows us to 
see why it is that causal account of psychological process, or the models of 
the mind, are inappropriate. Fodor and the others simply assert nonsense 
(What is meant by nonsense will be made clear) in the disguise of 
philosophy. 
If cognitive science and cognitive psychology are truly asserting nonsense 
then what of their successes? Is the only avenue open to us that which the 
constructionists suggest? Perhaps the constructionists fare no better than 
their counterparts. In Chapter Four it is argued that constructionism 
mistakes the Wittgensteinian points and get us no further than the 
cognitivists with their proposed research programmes. Chapter Eight 
attempts to show that the traditional methodological assumptions and 
practices of cognitive psychologists are useful with reference to Thagard's 
(1989) account of scientific creativity. There is no contradiction here: the 
results of cognitive psychology may not be pedagogically useful but the 
practices they employed in obtaining the results may well be. 
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Chapter Three 
The 'Third Realm' 
The Private language Argument: An unbreakable code 
Cryptology is the study of secret writing, especially for the purposes of 
decryptment-the 'breaking' or 'reading' of secret correspondence by a third 
party. The attempt to produce an unbreakable code is vital for the 
communication of secret correspondence between parties, especially in a 
time of war. An example of a code system which is of particular interest to 
this investigation is that of the Enigma machine cipher which was used by 
the Germans in World War Two. Turing's involvement in the 
development of machines to read the Enigma code is famous. The necessity 
to produce complex machines, created by the complexity of the Enigma 
code, is undoubtedly what propelled us into the computer age and 
eventually led to such things as cognitive science. 
The 'private language argument' (PI §243-265) is directed against the idea 
that a person could follow a private rule, and in doing so could have a 
language which in principle, as one consequence, no-one else could 
understand. The aim of cryptologists is to produce a language which is 
indecipherable to those for whom it is not intended; to produce a language 
which no-one else, other than those to for whom it is intended, could 
possibly understand. There is some usefulness in exploring the private 
language argument, social constructionism, Frege's arguments and 
cognitive science using an example drawn from cryptology. It will be 
shown, that despite widespread misunderstanding, Wittgenstein was not 
against the notion of an individual following a code privately (he argued 
against the intelligibility of a 'private code'). The point of the private 
language argument is to expose the absurdity of the private language, that it 
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is not a language, that in principle, not even the speaker of the private 
language could understand the rules for the use of terms. Nevertheless, 
some social constructionists would deny the intelligibility of the idea of 
following a code privately-developed in isolation from society. In this 
belief, it will be argued, they are mistaken. 
The private language argument has been interpreted in two rival ways. 
Kripke (1982) and Malcolm (1988, following Kripke 1982, pp. 154-191) argue 
that the argument identifies the impossibility of an individual establishing 
the meaning of sensation term without the aid of other people. Hacker 
(1986, 1990), and Baker and Hacker (1984), argue that what is absent in the 
case of the genuine private linguist is any means of establishing the stability 
of the referent of the sensation term, viz. the private language has no 
features of a genuine language at all. Pears (1988 p. 372) argues that there are 
two ways to stabilise the use of words in language: appeal to other people 
and calibration against physical objects. Depending on one's interpretation 
of the private language argument (Werhane, 1989, p. 134 recognises four 
versions of the 'community view of language' akin to Kripke's 
interpretation) one will give priority to one or other of these conditions, 
pace Wittgenstein who made no attempt to assess the relative importance 
of either (Pears 1988, p.372). Pears adds further that: 
... the second deficiency would make the first one inevitable, 
because the only way to get into a position to seek confirmation 
from other people is to establish communication with them 
through the physical world. But the first deficiency would not 
make the second one inevitable, because it is possible to imagine 
an intelligent wolf-child exploiting physical objects to set up a 
language for his own use without the help provided by the 
typical human family. (1988 p. 362). 
The problem is not the interpretation of Wittgenstein so much as the 
uptake of so-called Wittgensteinian arguments within psychology-one 
can argue independently that a community view of language is incoherent 
(Werhane 1989). Both the 'rival' interpretations find expression within 
psychology, particularly within the doctrine of social constructionism. The 
important point is the consequence that Pears addresses. If Wittgenstein's 
private language argument is thought to establish the necessity of 
consensual judgement then it rules out the possibility of an individual 
producing a language-game in the absence of a community. In the next 
chapter in will be demonstrated that such an interpretation distorts 
Wittgenstein's contribution to our understanding of the concept of 
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'insanity'. Since it will be argued that we must consider the creative and the 
insane as 'autonomous individuals' capable of developing a language-game 
without appeal to community standards of correctness, it is the second 
interpretation (Hacker's 1986, 1990 interpretation) of the 'private language 
argument' which must be followed. Frege's arguments against 
psychologism are reintroduced to illustrate that what is distorted within the 
claim that consensual agreement is a prerequisite for language is the 
internal relationship between a rule and its extension. It is the preservation 
of the internal relation, discussed in the previous chapter, which underlies 
Hacker's (1990) interpretation of the private language argument. 
Hacker outlines the problem clearly: 
It is sometimes thought that the point of Wittgenstein's 
argument is to prove that a language is essentially the shared 
property of a multiplicity of speakers, or that a neonate Crusoe 
could not use a language since he couldn't (without extra insular 
aid) distinguish seeming to follow a rule from following a rule. 
This is mistaken. Far from suggesting that a language is always a 
social activity involving rules that only a social institution can 
provide, Wittgenstein had no objection to following a rule 
privately (in solitude), but only to following a 'private' rule, i.e. a 
rule which no one else could in principle understand or follow. 
(Emphasis in the original). (1986 pp. 252-253). 
In Chapter Five a conception of creativity will be developed which relies on 
the acceptance of the idea that an individual can follow a private rule. 
From this position the argument is presented that the concept of insanity is 
ascribed to those who break the rules of society in which they reside. It 
needs to be established that an individual is not logically prevented from 
creating a 'language-game' which is unshared or even a totally new 
language despite their belonging to a society. Kripke's (1982) 'rule 
scepticism' relies on an argument which suggests that the novel application 
of a rule is precluded without appeal to others. Such concerns are dissolved 
when Wittgenstein's private language argument is presented according to 
Hacker's interpretation (Baker and Hacker, 1984a, pp. 88-97). 
There are many forms of argument which might be encompassed by the 
title 'social constructionism', It is not assumed that all forms of the 
doctrine will be accommodated within the criticism that will be presented. 
Only one particular idea is the subject of criticism, an idea that Harre (1992 
pp. 154-155) claims is common to all versions: 
The one shared thesis is this: all psychological phenomena and 
the beings in which they are realized are produced discursively. 
Since there could be no being which is both atomic and capable of 
the intentional use of symbols, the discursive thesis entails a 
sociality thesis. All action meaningful as acts, that is, action 
which is capable of sustaining some psychological phenomenon 
such as remembering or deciding, is joint action. (Emphasis 
mine). 
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It is Wittgenstein who allegedly provides the support for the supposition: 
" ... there could be no being which is both atomic and capable of the 
intentional use of symbols."(Harre 1992, pp. 154-155). Just what 'atomic' 
means will be made clear by discussing at length what Wittgenstein meant 
by 'private' in the private language argument. From the outset it is 
important to note that the intention of this criticism of social 
constructionism is for one purpose only, viz., it will be argued that a 
creative individual is an 'atomic' individual who is capable of the 
intentional use of symbols. Taken baldly the statement " ... there could be no 
being which is both atomic and capable of the intentional use of 
symbols"(Harre 1992, pp. 154-155) is ambiguous since it does not reveal 
what it is that prevents the intentional use of symbols. An individual who 
is separated from society is 'atomic' in the sense that consensual 
judgements are no longer available as a resource to stabilise that 
individual's language use. And, an individual is 'atomic' if the physical 
world is no longer available in the same capacity. It is this latter 
interpretation which Harre intends. Harre (1989) recognises the importance 
of Wittgenstein's insight that the logical relations between meaning, 
language and understanding do not entail the requirement that language 
must be acquired within a social setting. Harre distinguishes between 
language being publicly acquired and being socially maintained: 
As Wittgenstein (1953) showed, language is such that it must be 
publicly acquired and the normativity of it uses socially sustained 
by collectively citable rules and conventions (p. 166). 
That language must be only publicly acquired indicates Harre's 
commitment to Hacker's view that what is logically precluded in 
Wittgenstein's private language argument is the features of the physical 
world. A solitary language user can (logically) acquire the intentional use of 
symbols in the absence of a society-but the genuine private linguist 
cannot. If this interpretation is adhered to it limits the sociality thesis. 
Wittgenstein's private language argument cannot be used to assert that all 
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language is maintained socially because it leaves open the possibility of a 
language developed in isolation from other people or a language which is 
created without the influence of other people: a code followed privately vis-
a-vis a 'private code'. 
Harre's thesis regarding joint action defines the sociality thesis in a way 
which differs from those constructionists who would rule out the 
possibility of an individual using language in isolation. A language which 
is publicly acquired relies only on stable public exemplars which could be 
features of the physical world. Individual 'joint action' can mean that an 
individual applies language to his own actions but there must be 
something external to the action which stabilises usages. Thus Pears' 
suggestion that an individual can exploit contingently stable features of the 
material world features in Harre's version of Wittgenstein's importance 
within the social constructionist doctrine. Such possibilities as neonate 
Crusoes, or Wolf-children pose no conceptual problems within the version 
of social constructionism which Harre proposes. 
Pears (1988 pp. 334-335) questions whether the case of an intelligent wolf-
child has any bearing on the private language argument. Pears (1988) points 
out that Wittgenstein's attitude to such a case is enigmatic, perhaps because 
he thought such a case would be too marginal in relation to our normal 
acquisition of languagell . However, Pears ventures the conditional that if it 
was Wittgenstein's view that a wolf-child could not develop a language it 
would be because Wittgenstein believed " ... that nothing that it was 
logically possible for him to do would count as devising and using a 
language." (p. 335). In presenting the issue in this way Pears equivocates 
between the 'rival' interpretations of the private language argument. If one 
adopts Hacker's interpretation then the intelligent wolf-child poses no 
conceptual problem whatsoever. (Baker and Hacker, 1985, pp. 243-244). Only 
the interpretation that Wittgenstein regarded consensual agreement to be 
absent in the case of the private linguist avails itself to the implication that 
the wolf-child is logically precluded from obtaining a language. 
11 Pears (1988 p. 334) remarks in relation to a wolf-child 
setting up his own language, "In Philosophical Investigations 
Wittgenstein certainly never says that he could do this." Baker 
and Hacker (1984 p. 41) point out that in Wittgenstein's 
notebooks he explicitly discusses that a Robinson Crusoe could 
use a language and we would be able to determine such(MS 124, pp. 
213 and 211). The point is that such cases pose no conceptual 
problems whatsoever which presumably is the reason the case is 
not discussed in the final version. Pears recognises these points 
later at p. 373. 
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Indeed it is not wrong to assert the thesis that learning a language 
absolutely requires a community. When stated as an empirical thesis it 
stands in need only of some evidential counter-example for it to be 
challenged. Nothing of the sort will be provided here. The philosophical 
claim that language necessarily requires a community will be challenged 
only to the extent that it is not the conclusion to be drawn from the private 
language argument (see Werhane, 1989 for the arguments against the 
community view of language in philosophy). The purpose of this chapter is 
to expose the extent to which Wittgenstein's private language argument 
can be misinterpreted in theory within psychology. In particular, 
undoubtedly due to flourishing alternative interpretations of the private 
language argument, confusion has developed within psychology as to how 
Wittgenstein should be accommodated. When the case of the wolf-child is 
extended into theorising within psychology Pears' equivocation seems 
justified for it is the case that wolf-children do not develop anything which 
we can consider to be a language. It is the temptation to seek some 
justification for this fact within Wittgenstein's philosophy and extend the 
case to 'atomic' individuals generally that must be undermined in the 
following argument. 
From Wittgenstein to the Sociality Thesis and the temptation to the 'Third 
realm' 
Social constructionists take from Wittgenstein the view that the meaning 
of a mental state term is held independent of the private object it is 
sometimes thought to denote. A mental state term does not gain its 
meaning by reference to some inner mental object. This is one conclusion 
that can be drawn from Wittgenstein's private language argument. It 
follows from the acceptance of this conclusion that it makes no sense to 
locate the referents of mental state terms within the individual's 'mind' or 
some other 'entity' correlated with it. There is however a commitment 
attached with the acceptance of this conclusion to Wittgenstein's private 
language argument. The argument draws on the preceding hundred 
sections of the Philosophical Investigations concerning rules and rule 
following (discussed in Chapter Two): 
[The private language argument] does, however, build upon 
previous conceptual clarifications. Hence it is important to locate 
it correctly within the argumentative strategy of the book. The 
preceding hundred sections (§§143-242) are concerned with a 
variety of themes about following rules. (Hacker, 1986 p. 247). 
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While the present argument concedes that social constructionists have, 
broadly, accepted without error the idea that our psychological predicates do 
not attach themselves to some hidden mental entity, it is the consequences 
of the commitment they have to Wittgenstein's private language argument 
which is of concern. What sneaks along with the refutation of the 
Augustinian picture of language (and the acceptance of Wittgenstein 
private language argument) is the notion of 'nonsense', or at least 
'unintelligibility'-that the private language is unintelligible or that a 
philosophical position which asserts a private language is nonsensical. 
Equivocation between the 'rival interpretations' of Wittgenstein's 
argument disguises this commitment since on either interpretation it will 
follow that psychological predicates do not acquire their meaning by 
reference to some inner state. Wittgenstein uses the notion of 'nonsense' in 
a technical way, developed from his conception of rule-following 
(Discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six). The argument which follows 
concerns whether these commitments are adhered to; it is not intended to 
undermine the valuable contribution social constructionists have offered 
by introducing the importance of the conclusions that a psychological 
predicate does not refer to some hidden mental entity. 
The Enigma Lesson 
Enigma was a mechanical cipher system which scrambled an input into a 
senseless coded message. Deciphering Enigma messages required an 
equivalent machine that, if it was placed at the exact same starting position 
of the Enigma machine that encrypted the message, it would be able to 
covert the code back to plain text. Unlike a 'direct standard alphabet', which 
converts the same symbol for a text symbol every time, Enigma had 17,576 
different initial starting positions which would make the enciphering 
different practically every time. In fact the Germans decided that this range 
of possibilities was too low and so added several features to the military 
machines which increased the number of initial settings considerably. Each 
successive pressing of a letter would be coded to a different letter. For 
example 'banana' might be encoded within a direct standard alphabet which 
moved the letters three places (Ceasar's code) to 'edqdqd' but under the 
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Enigma code the encoding might resemble 'fhizxc'. Standard statistical 
techniques which compared the frequency of the symbols coded to the fre-
quency of letters used in the text language were impotent against such a 
complex code. The code could not be broken simply by intercepting the 
coded sequences. 
An analogy may be drawn between the coding system which operated 
within the Enigma machine and that of the hidden operations supposed by 
some to operate behind human language. The Enigma code was broken by 
determining the operations of the internal workings of the machine. A 
German U-Boat surrendered to the allies the secret workings of the 
machine. The rotors inside which manipulated the input revealed the 
manipulations of the enciphering, but the difficulty was then how to de-
termine the initial settings of the machine. The Enigma code was 
eventually easily read with the help of a computer system (Colossus) which 
ran through the different combinations which comprised the possible 
starting positions of the Enigma machine. The coded transmissions of the 
operator settings, which informed the receiver of the code how to configure 
their machine, were broken by the polish mathematician Marian Rajewski 
and a similar technique was used by Turing necessitated by developments 
in the sophistication of the code. The endeavours of cognitive science can 
be likened to the struggle of interpreting and understanding the 'secret 
code' which we all unknowingly possess. The suggestion is that what 
precedes our speech and actions is really just a complicated code to be 
broken like Enigma. Leiber (1991) writes of the Enigma lesson: 
From the masses of these patterns one could determine what this 
architecture and system were, as a kind of black-box exercise. But 
this exercise was only possible because of the much more 
complex, dense, and irremovable pattern of redundancies in 
natural language, in the plain text German that was enciphered 
and deciphered by the Enigma Machine. If we analyse the formal 
patterns of redundancies in a natural language, we may hope to 
discover much, at a purely formal levet about the linguistic 
architecture of the human mind/brain that enciphers and 
deciphers such richly textured transmissions. (p. 131). 
Leiber is wrong to suppose that the intercepted messages provided a key to 
the structure of the internal workings of the machine. The Polish 
mathematicians who worked on and eventually broke the Enigma code 
knew of the internal mechanisms of the Enigma machine from 
commercial models of the machine and later captured machines 
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themselves. The Germans anticipated that their machines would be cap-
tured but considered this irrelevant; to decode a message one still required 
the daily keys for the machine's operation. Leiber misleads us by proposing 
the conclusion, based on the historical analogy, that the task of breaking the 
'human-enigma-code' is purely a 'black-box' affair. Leiber (1991) further 
misleads us with: 
If Turing could determine the functional innards of the Enigma 
Machine through the analysis of the patterns in its transmissions 
(speeded by an electronic computing system), why should we not 
expect a much richer enlightenment in the determination of a 
most basic portion of our functional innards, our basic 
endpherment, our day and message settings?(p. 131). 
While the philosophical consequences of Leiber's proposal are unchanged it 
is worth pointing out that Turing did not determine the functional innards 
of the Enigma machine by the interception of transmissions. It was in fact 
Marian Rajewski who first broke the code (Kozaczuk 1984). Turing's 
contribution to the task was the creation of a sophisticated machine to run 
through all the possible settings of the Enigma Machine. The Enigma code 
was not broken by mathematics alone. The task was facilitated by in-
telligence and espionage. The idea that the functional architecture of the 
Enigma machine was determined (By Turing!) by intercepted messages is 
historically inaccurate and philosophically misleading. 
Nevertheless, Leiber's philosophical suggestion remains: we are 
(metaphorically) just complicated Enigma Machines. The Enigma 
machine's code was broken, similarly our inner mental code will also be 
understood. Neurophysiologists will tell us the internal workings and 
logicians and computer scientists will tell us the code sequence. A bigger 
and better computer system, a 'grand Colossus', will break that code. But 
perhaps there is no code or hidden mental language? What really are the 
'redundancies' in our natural languages? The idea that the terms of our 
natural languages can be described at a purely formal level, either by a 
computer programme or a formal logic, is the mistaken view of language 
espoused by Frege which Wittgenstein rejected in his later work. 
Wittgenstein's private language argument will help persuade us that this 
picture of searching for a mental inner, a code that precedes our language 
and action, is based on some fundamental misconceptions about language, 
meaning, and understanding (Hacker 1986). 
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In Chapter One the independence of logic was considered and Frege's 
arguments dealt with in some detail, the notion of psychologism was 
presented and the implications for considering logic to be foundational 
were discussed. According to Sober (1978), Frege's argument runs 
something like the following: 
If communication is to be possible the speakers of a language 
must associate the same, or nearly the same, meanings with 
terms used in language. 
Mental images are logically private, I cannot know what image 
you associate with the number 2 and you cannot know what 
image I associate with the number 2 since we are logically 
separate. 
Mental images that people associate with terms vary enormously 
from person to person. ' 
Images, or mental representations, may vary but meamngs 
cannot. 
Meanings are not mental images. 
For purposes of illustration let us assume that the task of psychology is 
analogous to that of breaking the Enigma code as Leiber would have it. 
Suppose that there is some mental operations which are equivalent to the 
scrambling of the input presented to the Enigma machine. Suppose that 
you and I are just complicated Enigma machines that process information 
in an extremely complex way which cannot be understood purely on the 
basis of the interception of information-the behaviour of the 'machine'. 
An equivalent argument to Frege's might be presented: 
A code which is scrambled according to possibilities will not be 
understood without the person receiving the transmission 
having the correct initial settings of the machine. Understanding 
requires the sender and the receiver to have the same settings on 
the Enigma machine. 
But I cannot know your method of encoding and you cannot 
know mine since we are in separate locations (Say I am in France 
and you are in Germany). 
Each person enciphers things differently. There is no way I can 
know your machine's initial starting position and you cannot 
know mine. 
Therefore, because we do understand each other (In normal 
circumstances), it must be the case that the meaning of our 
language is not corrupted by any inner mental code. Meaning is 
completely unrelated to all the manipulations of our mental 
apparatus. 
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If it is possible to cash out the analogy between code breaking and cognitive 
science then Frege's argument might deal quite a convincing blow against 
the cognitivists-it sets up the view that the objects of inquiry are those 
Platonistic public entities, pace the cognitivists who must include the actual 
state of the machine in their functionalist descriptions. It has already been 
conceded that Frege's position is " ... supported by a number of bad 
arguments."(Dummett, 1981 p. 32). Nevertheless, the confusion 
promulgated by the division between the object of inquiry for logic and 
psychology was identified as arising from the initial division itself. 
Functionalist theories incorporate this initial division, rather than 
addressing it as Wittgenstein does, conceding to the Cartesian ontology as 
Frege did and thus expose themselves to Frege's argument (see Chapter One 
pp. 16-24, and 27-34). 
The 'no private language argument' presented in Chapter Two was rejected 
as insufficient to reveal what is wrong with cognitivist accounts of the 
nature and meaning of psychological predicates. It was argued that the 'no 
private language' argument (as presented by Malcolm 1971) relies on, in 
Malcolm's case, an unexplicated account of rules and rule-following which 
reveals the contrast between the rules being used causally and rules being 
used normatively. Again, the interpretation of Wittgenstein's private 
language argument which suggests that what is precluded is the idea of an 
individual developing a rule in isolation, reveals that psychological 
predicates do not refer to some hidden mental inner, but it does not expose, 
in exactly the same way that Frege's argument does not expose, what is 
unintelligible with the cognitivist thesis (or in Frege's case the error of 
psychologism). Frege, according to Wittgenstein, severed the internal 
relationship between language, meaning, and understanding. Without 
attending to Wittgenstein's restoration of the relationships between 
language, meaning and understanding, one distorts Wittgenstein's 
philosophical insight and applies it in a way which tempts confusion: in 
Frege's case the adoption of Platonism. One might, as is indicated by those 
who would reject the notion of an individual following a rule privately, be 
tempted to accept the argument that there is no inner mental referent for 
psychological predicates so it must be that the referents of psychological 
terms exists independently of the individual. Since what is thought to be 
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conspicuous in the private language argument is the absence of appeal to 
other people to stabilise language use, it is mistakenly believed that 
Wittgenstein endorsed the view that consensual judgement is necessary for 
the use of language. But, on this mistaken view, consensual judgement 
operates in the same way that Frege's Platonism operates: it places a 'third 
thing' between a rule and its extension and severs the internal relation-It 
places the correctness of the rule in the hands of the community. 
Frege wanted to ensure that logic was independent of all psychological 
considerations. Frege's argument is unconvincing for the several reasons 
examined in Chapter One but its importance historically cannot be 
overlooked. Baker and Hacker comment: 
Frege's onslaught upon psychologicians with respect to objects of 
judgement is a model of an effective polemic, but not a paradigm 
of penetrating philosophical criticism. (1984 p. 49). 
Frege held that the content of judgement is not the same as the mental act 
of judging and thinking (The 'common expedient'). This can be likened to 
the coded message which has a meaning independent of the encryption. To 
separate the subject matter of logic, which was the meaning or sense of a 
proposition, from that of psychology, Frege developed an account of 'ideas' 
as subjective entities-Thus characterising the objects of psychological 
inquiry within the mistaken confines of the Cartesian doctrine. 
On Frege's view, three features of ideas are proposed. Firstly, ideas are 
existent-dependent to a bearer. An idea only exists because someone has an 
idea. An idea, unlike a meaning, depends upon an individual possessing 
that idea. Secondly, ideas are privately owned and unshareable. Frege held 
that we all possess our ideas and that my idea of something, say the colour 
red, is completely different from someone else's conception of the colour 
red."I can no more have your idea than you can have my pain." (Baker and 
Hacker, 1984 p. 46). I cannot communicate my idea of red to you since I 
could never know that we were discussing the same thing. Public things, 
such as smiles and sneezes, are indications of ideas to an external observer. 
The private nature of ideas does not exclude the possibility of the 
qualitative identity of ideas. Nevertheless, and thirdly, ideas are 
epistemically private. Only the bearer of an idea knows its nature and 
characteristics. Therefore it is possible, according to Frege, to know what 
state a person is in by examining the public features which are related to a 
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particular state, but the nature of 'ideas' is wholly incommunicable. (Baker 
and Hacker, 1984 p. 49). 
Imagine if the allies in World War Two had to comprehend a totally new 
language instead of a German language code. We might concede that the 
functioning of the actual apparatus is irrelevant to the meaning of the 
message. However, the possibility of breaking a code assumes that broken 
code will be intelligible. What made the broken Enigma code intelligible 
was the fact that all the messages were scrambled German. By regarding the 
meaning of the message to be some abstract entity ignores the logical 
requirement that its intelligibility (the ability to grasp that meaning) occurs 
against a presupposed practice: In the Enigma example, the German 
language. A pre-arranged codeword for some operation would still be 
unintelligible. The codeword 'picador' is perfectly intelligible as meaning 'a 
mounted bullfighter with a lance', but when it is given some new meaning, 
say of some secret military operation, its decryption would still leave one 
guessing its acquired meaning. If the Germans had used some completely 
new language the allies would never have understood their intercepted 
messages at all. 
Social Constructionists, when they make claims that an individual's grasp 
of language is determined by a society (Armon-Jones, 1986 p. 33) are in an 
analogous position to that of the allies in assuming that behind their 
interpretation of social events there is a social reality in which everything 
deciphered will make sense: without the assumption that the deciphered 
text was standard German the point of the decryptment would be lost. 
Deciphered text was compared with the criterion of the German language. 
While constructionists generally agree that the operations of the 'Human 
Enigma machine' are irrelevant to the meaning of psychological predicates 
some premiss their argument against the background that meaning of 
terms are intelligible only within a social context: language use makes sense 
only against the criterion of appeal to consensual judgement. But an 
individual's act of understanding is not, on Wittgenstein's view, 
determined by anything (see Chapter Two pp. 51-61). 
By adopting the view that Wittgenstein's private language argument 
precludes language use in the absence of consensual agreement the 
temptation remains to create a distinction between understanding as a 
mental process and understanding being manifest in an individual's 
accordance with consensual agreement. In Chapter One it was argued that it 
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was just such a manoeuvre that Wittgenstein sought to undermine. The 
symptom of such a confusion was, in Frege's case, the adoption of 
Platonism. The symptom here is the belief that consensual agreement 
prescribes what is and is not correct language use: that society determines 
the meaning of psychological predicates, that language use necessarily 
involves appeal to others, and that and individual cannot, logically, acquire 
a language in the absence of a community. 
Hacker's criticism of the 'incommunicability argument'. 
The following is an attempt to defend the importance of an argument 
Harre (1988) presents against a criticism which Hacker (1990) produces 
while recognising that the argument has the potential to mislead one to 
positing the view rejected above. It will be labelled the 'incommunicability 
argument' for convenience since it relies on the implication that the 
private language argument is incommunicable. The purpose of the 
following argument is to offer an account of how one might be tempted to 
the position that Wittgenstein ruled out the possibility of a language 
developed in isolation but, perhaps more importantly, to reveal just how 
far we can take the implications of the private language argument within 
psychology. It should be recognised that what is important for philosophers 
when interpreting Wittgenstein's arguments will be different from what is 
of importance for theorists within psychology. 
Harre (1988), in opposing the cognitivist doctrine, states: 
A first principle of Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology is 
that we must hang on to the fact that we can and do converse 
easily with one another about our private bodily feelings. These 
feelings are logically inexperiencible by anyone else since among 
the criteria for their individuation is the requirement that they 
be the feelings that I feel. I can no more sneeze your sneezes than 
I can feel your pains. So, in the well known Wittgensteinian way 
of putting such matters, the statement 'I cannot feel your feelings 
nor you feel mine' is a grammatical and not an empirical 
observation. (p. 106). (Italics mine). 
Harre continues: 
If we think that the meaning of a word is determined by and only 
by that which it denotes, and sensation words denote logically 
private feelings, the only person who could know what he or she 
meant by his or her use of the word 'tickle' would be the current 
speaker. (1988 p. 106). 
Harre concludes: 
It follows that a public conversation about such feelings is 
impossible since literally I could never know what your words 
meant, nor you what I meant by mine .... There would be no way 
in which I could have acquired them in some stable and rule 
provoking way; 'rule provoking' since failure on my part to use 
words according to local conventions calls forth the disciplinary 
citation of a rule by my instructors. (1988 p. 106). 
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Hacker (1990) is critical of the this way of presenting the private language 
argument. Hacker's concern is not that the above argument is the wrong 
interpretation of Wittgenstein. Rather, Hacker maintains that the 
argument is redundant and misleading. Any inclusion of a premiss 
regarding the incommunicability of the private language is on Hacker's 
interpretation a redundant exercise: 
... Wittgenstein spends hardly any time on the issue of 
incommunicability, taking that to be perspicuous, and focuses 
primarily on the question of the conceivability of a radically 
private language. (p. 96). 
Notwithstanding this, Hacker concedes that it is correct to argue: 
A radically private language is not a means of interpersonal 
comm unica tion. 
The language I speak is a means of interpersonal 
comm unica tion. 
Therefore, the language I speak is not a radically private one. (p. 
96). 
The reason why Hacker maintains that the incommunicability of the 
private language argument is perspicuous is explained with reference to the 
ear Her concerns regarding rules and rule-following: 
The moot question for a private language is not so much 
whether others can understand, but whether one understands 
oneself-indeed whether there is anything to understand at 
all ... .If it is logically impossible for anyone else to understand, 
must it not also be logically impossible for oneself to 
understand? For then does it not follow that there is actually 
nothing to understand? (p. 21). 
83 
Recall that in Chapter Two it was explained that understanding is 
internally related to the ability to follow a rule. One demonstrates one's 
understanding of a rule by applying that rule according to a set of 
normative criteria. If there are no normative criteria for the application of a 
rule then it follows, in Wittgenstein's account, that there can be no genuine 
understanding. The point of the private language argument, according to 
Hacker, is to expose that there are no genuine rules to follow in the case of 
the genuine private linguist. It is then consistent with Wittgenstein's 
strategy to take as perspicuous that neither the private linguist nor anyone 
else could understand that 'language' since it would not be a language at all. 
Thus for Hacker the issue of the incommunicability of the private language 
is irrelevant. 
Hacker (1990) does not suggest that stating the logical implications of the 
private language argument is incorrect. However, Hacker claims that 
representing the private language argument as being concerning with 
communicability distorts Wittgenstein's philosophical method. 
Introducing the implication that the radically private language is 
incommunicable is 'unhelpful' according to Hacker, since it does not reveal 
the pressures to attend to a philosophical perspective which will commit 
the errors inherent within view which suggest that private experience is 
the foundation of our epistemic claims. Harre discharges this responsibility 
in two ways. First, his claim "There would be no way way in which I could 
have acquired them in some stable and rule provoking way" settles any 
concern that what is primary to the private language argument is that it 
identifies that the genuine private linguist has no rules to follow. Second, 
Harre presents the argument to attack the cognitivist claims about rule-
following within the computer analogy to psychological states. 
In what way might Harre's interpretation of the private language argument 
be misleading? The problem according to Hacker enters when one is forced 
to consider the first premiss: " ... the statement 'I cannot feel your feelings 
nor you mine' is a grammatical and not an empirical observation." (p.106). 
This premiss supports the implication that "1 could never know what your 
words meant, nor you what I meant by mine ... ". Again, this conclusion 
invokes the implication of the private language argument, viz., that it is 
not communicable and is reliant on the acceptance that, "There would be 
no way in which I could have acquired them [words and meanings] in 
some stable and rule provoking way." (p.106). 
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Hacker questions whether the premiss "I cannot feel your pains nor you 
mine" contributes to Wittgenstein's argument at all: 
'Another person cannot have my pains': once the mistaken 
claim that two people cannot have the same pain is unmasked, 
the primary interest in this proposition lapses. Nevertheless, 
one may still wonder whether some grammatical truth does not 
lurk behind it. (p. 84). (Emphasis mine). 
Harre (1988) clearly is making the claim as a grammatical and not an 
empirical or metaphysical proposition. Hacker regards this as making 'scant 
sense' (p. 84). Importantly; the truths which Hacker concedes can be 
'squeezed out' of this proposition are all that Harre requires for the defence 
of his position. Hacker concedes that four truths can be drawn from the 
premiss. 
Firstly, the premiss, 'I cannot feel your pains and you mine', when treated 
as a grammatical proposition, can be used to indicate the asymmetry 
.between being aware of one's own pains and being aware of another's pains. 
When I claim, say to a doctor, 'I am aware of a dull throbbing pain in my 
head' I make a claim which means, in Wittgenstein's account, roughly the 
same as 'I have a headache'. The doctor's awareness of my pain does not 
mean that he has a headache. Hacker (1990 p. 86) remarks that the 
temptation to confuse a grammatical truth with a metaphysical thesis will 
lead one easily to the misguided position of asserting, "I can't be aware of 
another person's pains in the same way as I am aware of my own". (p. 86). 
(see below). But, as will be revealed, it makes no sense to suppose that I 
have any direct knowledge or awareness of my own pains-I am in pain, 
and that is all. It does make sense to say that I do not perceive my own pain 
but perceive his: I learn that someone else is in pain but I do not learn that I 
am in pain. Harre (1989) exploits this fully: 
... to say "I am in pain" is not to make an empirical statement 
about myself on the basis of experiential evidence. The 
statement, as uttered, is part of the expression of pain. It replaces 
or supplements groaning, writhing, rubbing the spot where I was 
struck and so on. It is an avowal not an assertion. (p. 178) 
(emphasis mine). 
Secondly, and similarly, it is also true that the premiss, 'I cannot feel your 
pains nor you mine' will lead to truth that my pain is manifest in my 
behaviour and not anyone else's. If I groan, writhe, and rub a spot struck 
then it is my pain that is being displayed. Another person's pain-behaviour 
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does not indicate the pain I have. Thirdly, the acceptance of the claim 
allows one to state without the implication that an empirical observation is 
necessary that there is no such thing as feeling the pain in another person's 
body. Finally, and equally related to all the above, the pain I have does not 
belong to me. 'My pain' is 'The pain I have'. One can exploit the 
grammatical truth that I cannot have another's pains to reveal the 
senselessness of the metaphysical claim that models such things as pains on 
physical objects. Physical objects can be shared, discarded, sold, transferred 
to another, and so on. But another cannot have my pain; the pain I have 
cannot be discarded, sold, or transferred to another, so unlike physical 
objects the pains I have cannot belong to me. 
Harre's motivation for presenting the private language argument in this 
way is to provide an alternative to the temptation of positing a 
metaphysical thesis about the nature and meaning of psychological 
predicates. Notwithstanding this, Hacker (1990) still supposes that the 
argument, as presented, runs perilously close to committing the error that 
the private language argument seeks to expose. Again, the reason Hacker 
gives is that the introduction of a discussion of the incommunicability of 
the genuine private language does not expose what it is that is 
fundamentally flawed with the private language. Hacker explains: 
... Wittgenstein's concern in this strand in the web of arguments 
is not whether one person alone could or could not talk of his 
experiences in an unshared language, but whether all of us, in 
our normal social setting, can be conceived to be following rules 
constituted by mere association of a word and a mental object or 
by private ostensive definitions. And private ostensive 
definitions are not ostensive definitions which other people do 
not happen to know about, but putative definitions (rules) which 
cannot be communicated to other people. It is such rules which 
were presupposed as the foundations of our common public 
languages by the mainstream of philosophy. And it is by showing 
that there can be no such rules, that representational idealism 
(and contemporary 'cognitive representationalism'), classical 
British idealism, phenomenalism, and solipsism can be shown to 
be philosophical chimeras. (p. 19) (Emphasis mine). 
According to Hacker (1990) if one is to expose the error of another 
philosophical position using the private language argument one must 
make perspicuous what precludes the private linguist from following a 
rule. Nevertheless, Hacker (1990) must submit that the acceptance of the 
implications of the argument contribute to what is later described as 'the 
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positive function' of Wittgensteinian philosophy (Chapter Eight pp. 235-
245). Harre (1988) is, by Hacker's admission, not wrong in presenting the 
argument the way he does. The motivation for presenting the private 
language argument in this way must be in recognition of its disabling 
effects on philosophical alternatives which postulate a view that private 
experiences form the basis of our understanding of psychological predicates. 
But the premiss 'I cannot feel your pains nor you mine' even stated as a 
grammatical truth does not reveal this. While Harre makes no error in 
presenting the argument in the way does, he tempts confusion concerning 
the structure of the private language argument. Others who mistakenly 
conclude that the private language argument logically precludes an 
individual following a rule, learning a language in isolation from a society, 
or developing a language followed privately, stray from the intention of the 
private language argument. As Hacker points out: "It is but a short step 
from grammatical platitudes to metaphysical theses, and from there to 
perdition." (p. 22). The following is one way in which such steps might be 
taken, when one strays from the grammatical truth and its implications 
addressed by Harre, into the 'minefield of metaphysics'. 
Incommunicabilty and the temptation to metaphysics. 
It needs to be made clear what Wittgenstein meant by the notion of 
'private'. There are two dimensions which Wittgenstein explores in order 
to criticise: epistemic privacy and privacy of ownership. Hacker (1986 p. 221) 
makes clear the distinction between these two forms of privacy: "something 
is epistemically private for a person if only he can know it; it is private in 
the second sense if, in principle, only he can have it." 
Suppose a German general decides to scramble some information using an 
Enigma machine. The encrypted information is not intended to be sent by 
radio transmission to anyone else. The encryption is of some plans for the 
movement of troops. The information is so sensitive that the general does 
not want the information to be read by anyone other than himself-he has 
a poor memory so must write down his thoughts. The information is for 
the general's private use. The general selects a key, a setting of the machine, 
and encodes his plans. The original plans are destroyed so that all that 
remains is a scrambled garble of typed script, and the mental note of the key 
settings known only to the general. Now we have the two senses of privacy. 
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Firstly, only the general can know the meaning of the scrambled plans-
not because he remembers the original documentation but because only he 
can decode the message (Epistemic privacy). Secondly, ex hypothesi, only 
the general possesses the key to decode the message (Privacy of ownership). 
When our understanding of privacy so far conceived is extended to cover 
psychological states the problems are uncovered. Hacker (1990 p. 94) states: 
It is important to note from the outset that both these forms of 
privacy are bogus ... In so far as it is true that sensations are 
private, it does not follow that you cannot have the same pain as 
I have. Nor does it follow that you cannot know whether I am 
really in pain, what my pain is like, or whether I see red when I 
look at a ripe tomato. 
It is wrong to rule out the possibility of a shared language on the basis of 
these forms of privacy. When Frege insists that "I can no more have your 
ideas than you can have my pain" he makes a metaphysical claim about the 
impossibility of sharing an inner states. But Frege makes the same mistake 
as the imaginary general makes in supposing his encrypted code is 
'private'-the allies could in principle break the code and decipher his 
messages. It simply does not follow from either epistemic privacy or 
privacy of ownership that communication is logically impossible. 
Harre is correct in asserting that Wittgenstein would cast statements 
regarding the privacy of mental states into the realm of the grammatical. 
Wittgenstein remarks at PI §248 'The proposition "Sensations are private" 
is comparable to: "One plays patience by oneself"', It surely is a grammatical 
regularity. 
Harre's grammatical recommendation does not provide the basis for the 
claim that "I could never know what you meant by your words, nor you 
what I meant by mine"(1988 p. 106). The statement 'I cannot have another's 
pain' is not a statement about the limitations of my abilities but a 
grammatical rule which excludes certain statements from our language. 
The acceptance of such a statement, on its own, does not produce a barrier 
for knowledge of another's subjective states. It does not follow from the 
grammatical recommendation that the statement "I can have your pains" is 
senseless that knowledge of another person's subjective states is impossible. 
Wittgenstein draws out the difference between an empirical proposition 
and an a priori proposition (A grammatical rule). The negation of an 
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empirical proposition is a possible state of affairs but the negation of a 
grammatical proposition is nonsense. If Harre is making a metaphysical 
claim then what he says makes sense and so does the opposite. For instance, 
It is true that I cannot feel your pains nor you mine. Conversely, it is not 
the case that I cannot feel your pains nor you mine (i.e I can feel your 
pains). To make the metaphysical claim the opposite assertion must make 
sense. To make the claim that 'I cannot have your pains nor you mine' it 
must be the case that it makes sense to suppose that 'I can have your pains 
and you can have mine'. If this later claim makes no sense then the former 
claim collapses into a grammatical recommendation because the 
metaphysician cannot say what is metaphysically prevented from 
occurring. 
The statement 'The enigma code is unbreakable' is radically different from 
'2+2=4'. The negation of the statement 'the Enigma code is unbreakable' is 
'the eJ;"ligma code can be broken', which makes sense. Whereas the negation 
of 2+2=4 is ~(2+2=4), which is senseless. Therefore to make the 
metaphysical claim 'I cannot have your pains nor you mine' the 
metaphysician must accept that it makes sense to suppose that two people 
can have the same pain. But Harre insists that his statement is a 
grammatical regularity so he must deny that two people can metaphysically 
have the same pain and accept that the statement 'I can feel your pains' is 
senseless. 
If it is to be denied that two people can (metaphysically) have the same pain 
then the statement, "I cannot feel your feeling nor you mine' becomes a 
grammatical recommendation. Harre is quite clear that he is making the 
claim as a grammatical recommendation. But the problem then becomes 
just how to avoid denying that two people who have an injection in the 
left elbow have the same pain. The statement 'I have the same pain as 
him', if it is to be a grammatical recommendation, must be as senseless as 
the claim ~(2+2=4). Harre must now provide some criterion which justifies 
us in saying that two people with pain caused by the same event (not 
necessarily the same event although such a case is imaginable), who report 
the same phenomenal characteristics, of the same intensity and in same 
place do not have same pain. We often do say, and it is not obviously 
nonsense, that we have the same pain but this is ruled out by Harre's 
recommendation: to be a statement of grammar the negation of the claim 'I 
cannot have the same pains as you' must be senseless. 
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Wittgenstein suggests that is misleading to suppose that 'I feel my pain'. It 
misleads us into believing that it makes sense to distinguish between pains 
on the basis of ownership, i.e. my pain is the pain that belongs to me. 
However I can own or possess an individual physical object but I cannot 
possess my own pain. Wittgenstein asks what justifies the metaphysical 
claim that I feel my pain. Suppose that 'I feel my pain' is a metaphysical 
assumption. Can we imagine the opposite? Could we be in pain and not 
know that we are? It makes sense to suppose that one knows oneself to be 
in pain only if one can imagine the opposite but it makes no sense to 
suppose that one can feel a pain and not know about it. Therefore the 
difference between feeling a pain and knowing that one feels a pain is a 
distinction without a difference and consequently not a criterion for the 
individuation of pain. Hacker (1990) writes: "Someone else can have the 
same pain, i.e a pain with just those characteristics. What he cannot have is 
the pain that belongs to me, but then neither can I!" (p. 83). 
If you have a pain in your left elbow and I have a pain in my left elbow, 
caused by an injection for instance, someone might present the idea that we 
have the same pain but not numerically identical pains since my pain is in 
my body and your pain is in your body. Like the numerically distinct 
Enigma machines, the pains in our elbows, it might be argued, are 
numerically distinct pains. But like the similarity of the Enigma machines 
it makes sense to suppose that we can communicate about this experience. 
The problem with the assertion "you cannot have an identical pain to me" 
is with the concept 'identical': 
I have seen a person in a discussion on this subject strike himself 
on the breast and say: "But surely another person can't have 
THIS pain!"-The answer to this is that one does not define a 
criterion of identity by emphatic stressing of the word "this". 
Rather, what the emphasis does is to suggest the case in which 
we are conversant with such a criterion of identity, but have to be 
reminded of it. (PI §2S3). 
It makes sense to distinguish between two numerically distinct Enigma 
machines because they are in different places, built of different materials, 
have different serial numbers and so on. Despite this, for the purposes of 
communication the Enigma machines must be the same in construction 
and daily key settings: nothing about the physical uniqueness of an Enigma 
machine prevents its use in communication. We distinguish pain 
according to a different set of criteria: intensity, the place in occurs, and 
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phenomenal characteristics. These criteria do not lend themselves to the 
application of concepts like 'identity' in the way that physical object do. 
Emphasis of the word 'this' does not tell us what individuates pain but 
sends us in a mythological search for some inner criterion in which pains 
are individuated by belonging to the individual. 
The problem is with the temptation to separate inner expenences from 
experiences of the public world. Wittgenstein asks us to consider what it is 
that makes us form a criterion of identity for physical objects and then 
suggests that this identity does not provide the basis for the individuation 
of subjective states: 
In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it 
is also possible for us both to have the same pain. (And it would 
also be imaginable for two people to feel pain in the same-not 
just the corresponding-place. That might be the case with 
Siamese twin for instance.) (PI§ 253). 
It is but a short step from, 'I cannot have the same pains as you' to a thesis 
that implies that I own or possess my experiences. Two people can possess 
two different Enigma machines. Two people can jointly possess one 
Enigma machine. But two Enigma machines which are used for the 
purposes of communication are the same both in construction and in their 
daily settings; but they are two, numerically distinct, Enigma machines-
each individually possessed. We can, in the case of physical objects, 
differentiate the items picked out by reference to spatial location, or by 
reference to ownership. Possession of an Enigma machine does distinguish 
its uniqueness. The similarity of two Enigma machines, for the purposes of 
communication is not undermined by the fact that there are two 
numerically distinct Enigma machines. But does the fact that we 
distinguish between the uniqueness of physical objects according to their 
physical location extend to the case of 'pains'? Surely A's pain is in his 
distinct body, B's pain is in his distinct body (Hacker 1990 p. 49), and since 
they communicate meaningfully about 'pain' it must be that pains are like 
the 'Enigma machine' in the sense that they are numerically distinct but 
qualitatively the same for the purposes of communication. 
Hacker (1990) explains that two different language-games are being crossed 
when one compares the language of physical objects with that of 'pains'. 
Hacker (1990 p. 49) gives the example:"The expression 'a pain in the leg' has 
a quite different grammar from 'a pin in the leg' even though both 
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determine locations./t The pain I experience is not 'in' my leg in the same 
sense that a pin is in my leg. A pin my be removed and transferred to 
another location but when the pain is removed, by some anaesthetic, it 
does no go elsewhere despite it no longer being in my leg. If I have 
toothache upon biting an apple the pain is in my tooth and my tooth is in 
the apple but the pain is not in the apple but the filling in my tooth is both 
in my tooth and, when biting into the apple, the filling is in the apple. 
Again, the pin that is in my leg can be perceived but the pain in my leg 
cannot. Even if the pin were swallowed it would be in my stomach in a 
different sense than the pain I have in my stomach. One might operate and 
find the pin but one will not find the pain. Similarly, Hacker offers the 
example that, pains, unlike physical objects, occupy a location in a different 
sense than physical objects since physical objects can be smaller or larger 
than the place they occupy-in the latter case the object is, at best, half in, 
and half out, of its container (Hacker 1990. p. 49). But the pain in my finger 
cannot be said to be smaller or larger than my finger. Hacker offers the 
example with the intention of demonstrating that there are further 
qualities of physical objects which do not lend themselves to experiences 
such as pains. Perhaps such an example does not elaborate on the point 
above since it depends what one takes the pain to be the 'container'. If, in 
reply to a doctor's inquiry, I stated that I felt pain in my finger which 
extended to my hand then it could be said that the pain I have is larger 
(more extensive) than just my finger; if the pain was in my middle knuckle 
then the pain is smaller than my finger. This does not undermine the 
general point that the pain I have is not in my leg in the same sense that a 
pin is in my leg. And indeed /t ... we should be suspicious of the claim that 
since A's pain is in his foot and B's pain is in his foot, therefore their pains 
are in different places" (Hacker, 1990, p. 50). Unlike the Enigma machines, 
the distinction between qualitative and numerically distinct objects used to 
premiss an argument about what is communicated is not applicable to 
pains if that distinction is based on the metaphysical presupposition that 
each person's pains are differentiated by spatial location. 
The ownership of pain is not a property of pain and also not a criterion for 
its individuation. It makes no sense to suppose that what makes my pain 
different from your pain is the fact that I own my pain. I cannot convince 
you that the brass in my set of keys is different from the brass in your keys 
simply by asserting that my brass keys are my keys. Similarly it make no 
sense to suppose that my experiences belong to me, for belonging, as in 
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ownership, is not applicable to private states. I am in pain and that is all. 
The pains that I experience cannot be given away, discarded, or sold. 
Hacker concedes that there is one situation in which there is a thin 
analogue between the numerical identification of objects and that of 
experiences. When a doctor performs the procedure known as triage in a 
emergency room he or she must identify the number and extent of injuries 
of each patient. If a patient has multiple injuries then it is correct to say that 
the patient has two or more pains: for example, one as a result of a broken 
leg and one as a result of a lacerated hand. "We may grant this; for in so far 
as we count pains, difference of location in the subjects body implies 
another pain" (1990 p. 53). Presumably the same would apply for injuries 
with distinguishable causes: a protruding broken leg and the resultant 
laceration would be considered two different injuries requiring different 
attention. Nevertheless, the point does not extend to the number of people 
in the emergency room. It may be true that there are five people in the 
room with different injuries, different intensity of pains, different causes, 
locations and seriousness but there are not five, or more, pains in the 
room. Since the pains are not in the room at all. There are five people in 
the emergency room, in pain. Pains are countable but countability is 
restricted to persons. (Hacker 1990, p. 53). Pains cannot be distinguished by 
virtue of the fact that they can be counted. 
There might be a context in which it does make sense to suppose that 
someone else's qualitative subjective experiences are the same as my own. 
Such a context surrounds our use of phrases such as "he has the same 
build", "she has the same colour hair", or "she has her mother's 
eyes"(Hacker 1990). The context for the application of sameness is that the 
features picked out are identifiable and their connection apparent (Perhaps 
a causal connection for the identity). 
The 'fact' that our use of the word 'pain' does not typically have a criterion 
for the connection between pains of different people does not preclude the 
possibility that their might be circumstances in which a connection might 
occur. Imagine that a friend of yours is bitten by a poisonous snake. The 
venom is slow acting in his circulatory system and causing him 
considerable pain as the venom takes hold. The doctors do everything they 
can to support your friend but decide that he is weakening, a stronger 
person would live but your friend will die without a blood transfusion. 
You find it hard to imagine the suffering and the pain he experiences, but 
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the expressions of agony tell you he is indeed in pain. Fortunately you are 
the same blood type as your friend. The doctors, at your request, link you 
together so that your blood systems are intertwined by a machine. With the 
venom diluted between two people survival of both is ensured. But as the 
venom take hold within your blood system you exclaim, "now I have his 
pain!" (i.e the same pain). The context for the criterion of similarity is 
established. You do not assert nonsense when you make your exclamation. 
You have the same intensity pain, in the same place (Not in your friend's 
body: but as argued above pains cannot be distinguished according to their 
spatial location within an individual's body-PI§253), and report the same 
phenomenal characteristics. The causal connection between your pains and 
your friends pains is established. You cannot sensibly say that the pains are 
different because they are your pains, you own them, they belong to you or 
because they are in a different spatial location-in this situation is is not 
nonsense to say that you have the same pain. 
We can say that we have the same pain. If two people both receive an 
injection in the elbow we can apply the concept of 'sameness'. Two people 
have pain in the same place, of the same intensity, and report the same 
phenomenal characteristics-they have the same pain. Hacker (1990 p. 51) 
insists 
Consequently, it is wrong to say that two people cannot 
(metaphysically!) have a pain in the same place, and mistakenly 
infer that two people cannot have the same pain because their 
pains must be in different places. 
There is still the temptation according to Hacker is to produce an artifactual 
distinction between qualitative identity of pains and numerical identity of 
pains. The temptation arises from the inclusion of the premiss regarded the 
incommunicability of the private language argument. Recall: "I could 
never know what your words meant nor you mine". If the negation of the 
first premiss is acceptable on the presupposition of some metaphysical 
distinction between qualitative and numerically distinct pains, (i.e I can 
have his pains) then nothing prevents the incommunicability and the 
argument is unconvincing. It is only by accepting some criterion for the 
separation of individual pains that one can premiss the 'incommunicability 
argument'. Without some distinction between 'pains' which are mine and 
that feature of pains that can be shared the claim "I cannot feel your pains 
nor you mine" militates against the proposition, "I have the same pain as 
him". But, if one regards the proposition, "I cannot feel his pains" as a 
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grammatical proposition its negation should, at least from Wittgenstein's 
position, make no sense. But, according to Hacker (1990) the statement, "I 
have the same pain as him" is not obviously nonsense: I can exploit such 
features as the location, intensity, phenomenal characteristics, antecedent 
causes, and so on, to claim that two people have the same pain. So the 
temptation remains to provide some distinction between the pains which 
are qualitatively identical but numerically distinct. 
Frege, guided by his adoption of 'the common expedient', separated each 
person's thoughts as being numerically distinct whilst conceding that they 
could be qualitatively the same. Hacker will not allow such a distinction to 
apply: 
Two people with migraine may suffer in exactly the same way, 
viz. both have a splitting headache. And then we say that they 
have the same pain. Is it then numerically the same? No-it is 
neither numerically the same nor qualitatively the same. That 
distinction belongs to the domain of physical objects and has no 
application here. The question 'Whose pain?' is answered by 
identifying the person who manifests pain. The question 'What 
pain? is answered by specifying the intensity, phenomenal 
characteristics, and location of pain as indicated by the sufferer. 
And two people who suffer from the same illness may indeed 
have the same pain, just as two chairs may have the same 
colour. (Hacker, 1990 pp. 52-53). 
Recall Wittgenstein's argument presented in Chapter One. Wittgenstein 
explains that the source of confusion entailed within the two positions of 
logicism and psychologism is apparent in seeking a criterion for 
comparison of the two alternatives. By separating the mental act from the 
mental content one is tempted to draw comparison between the two 
position and give priority to one or the other. Of particular concern to 
Wittgenstein was the natural temptation to sublime logic-to seek out a 
third realm for the logical entities to occupy. Such a temptation operates 
here according to Hacker and for the same reasons. It is tautologically true 
that sensations are private and thus correct to declare that, 'I cannot feel his 
feelings nor he mine', and it is also true that one can say, without making a 
nonsensical claim, that, 'I can have the same pains as him', therefore it is 
tempting to seek out a distinction and to give priority to either one of these 
positions. 
Hacker (1990 p. 53) states: 
Labouring under the illusion that two people cannot have 
identical pains, sense impressions, or feelings, but only exactly 
similar ones, we may, like Frege, hasten to ensure that two 
people can have, think, or entertain identical thoughts. For we 
may argue, if discourse is to be intelligible, surely what A thinks 
must be communicable to B; it must be possible for B to grasp the 
very same thought that A entertains. 
Consider Harre's conclusion: 
We must start with the plain fact that public conversations about 
logically private feelings are possible, and for the unassailable 
reason that they do actually occur. But the considerations above 
set out the conditions under which it would be impossible for 
them to occur. So one or both of the conjuncts that make up 
those conditions must be false. Either the meaning of a feeling or 
sensation word is not determined by that which it is used by a 
speaker to refer to, or sensation words are not used to refer to 
private and subjective feelings, or both. Since we do talk about 
our feelings we could not be happy rejecting the idea that those 
words are used to refer to what we plainly take them to denote. 
So it must be the denotational (or referential) account of their 
meaning that has to be rejected. (1988 p. 106). 
95 
Hacker insists that such a conclusion is redundant and motivated by a 
condition which is in itself illusory. We are tempted into the debate 
concerning the communicability of private states by treating seriously the 
distinction between qualitative and numerical identity. It tempts us, 
although Harre clearly does not fall to this temptation as Hacker must 
concede, to draw a comparison, based on some metaphysical 
presupposition, between qualitatively and numerically identical thoughts, 
experiences and so on. Such a temptation leads to the position of Frege: 
It is incoherent in as much as it would only make sense to talk of 
different people thinking the numerically identical thought if it 
made sense to talk of them thinking qualitatively identical, but 
numerically distinct, thoughts. But it does not; for that 
distinction, which applies to the domain of objects, no more has 
application to thoughts than it does to experiences. It is 
redundant, since the apparent difficulty this manoeuvre was 
designed to meet is itself illusory. Frege was right to deny the 
psychologicians' thesis that different people's thoughts can at best 
be qualitatively identical, but misguided to think that the only 
alternative is to reify thoughts in order to ensure the possibility 
of the numerical identity of different people's thoughts. (pp. 53-
54). 
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Hacker maintains that presenting the argument in the way Harre does 
tempts confusion but concedes that it is not wrong for it to be presented in 
the way it is. Harre does not consider that the only alternative is to reify 
thoughts. Importantly Harre includes the qualification that, "There would 
be no way in which I could have acquired them in some stable and rule 
provoking way."(p. 106) which on Hacker's view serves the dual purpose of 
exposing what is incoherent in the genuine private language and exposes 
the consequence that it is incommunicable. Thus the escape from the 
position that Frege offers is for Harre to produce an alternative which does 
not place the meaning of psychological predicates in some 'third realm'. 
Those who stray to the thesis that language use necessarily involves appeal 
to other persons depart from Harre's path here. When they assert that 
language use is determined by society they sever the relation between a rule 
and its extension in the same way that Frege does. 
Hacker (1990 p. 53) continues: 
Hence it is tempting to insist, as Frege did, that thoughts are like 
experiences in not being perceptible objects in the physical world, 
but unlike them in not being subjective objects in the inner 
world that is private to each subject of experience. Like objects in 
the physical world they need an owner. They are objective, 
independent existences, like substances, only not spatio-
temporal. And one may even go so far as to postulate a 'third 
realm' for them to exist in together with numbers and other 
abstract objects. 
The 'third realm' for the constructionists is language determined by society. 
Society provides the objective, but not spatio-temporally objective, realm in 
which our psychological world I exists'. Because we all belong to a society 
and speak a language, communicate our thoughts, the ownership of our 
thoughts is manifest in our ability to speak a language. Our skill in 
communication is what allows us the ascription of having thoughts, 
feelings, and so on. In as much as some of this might be conceded as being 
broadly Wittgensteinian it is not Wittgenstein's argument, nor would he 
support the argument on which these conclusions rest. Constructionists 
who posit this 'third realm', that language, broadly conceived, determines 
our psychological reality within its shared use in communication, must 
abandon considerations of an unshared language-i.e thoughts which do 
not arise out of a shared use of communication-they would be 
meaningless. 
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Hacker accepts that the statement "I cannot feel your pains nor you mine" 
can be stated without error as a grammatical statement. But Hacker 
admonishes attempts to distinguish this statement from its, prima facie, 
negation: "I can feel the same pains as you". The negation of "I cannot feel 
your pains nor you mine" is "I can feel your pains and you mine" and 
Hacker hastens to ensure that attempts to disqualify this latter statement are 
nonsensical. But surely there must be room for such a distinction within 
Hacker's argument. If one concedes that Harre's claim is indeed a 
grammatical claim, as Harre clearly states, then the consequence is that the 
negation should make no sense-but Hacker claims otherwise "I have the 
same pain as him" does make sense to Hacker. This would not be 
problematic-an inconsistency with Wittgenstein's claim that the negation 
of a grammatical claim makes no sense-if one did seek out some 
distinction: say that of qualitative and numerical identity of pains. Hacker 
rules out this manoeuvre. But Hacker only dismisses this manoeuvre 
when it is presented as an empirical, super-empirical or metaphysical 
distinction. Hacker's argument is effective only in the sense that it exhausts 
all attempts to provide a distinction between qualitative and numerical 
identity of pains. 
However, Hacker clearly cannot exhaust all possibilities because the 
acceptance of both propositions ('I cannot feel your feelings', and 'I can feel 
the same feelings as you') as grammatical propositions, when they 
superficially contradict each other, is inconsistent-Hacker must admit that 
some distinction applies in order to accept that it makes sense to claim "I 
have the same pain as him". Hacker admits as much above with his 
concession to Frege that he was right to suggest that different person's pains 
can at best be qualitatively identicaL 
If Harre is not tempted to distinguish between qualitative and numerical 
identity of pains on the basis of some metaphysical presupposition then 
Hacker's previous argument is ineffective-he has not established what is 
misleading about the inclusion of a discussion of the incommunicability of 
the private language argument premissed on the grammatical truth that 'I 
cannot feel you pains nor you mine'. The implication: "I could never know 
what your words meant, nor you what I meant by mine." would follow 
from the first premiss regarding the grammar of sensation terms. The only 
problems which can be recognised as correct in Hacker's admonishment of 
the 'implication of incommunicability' so far is that such an argument 
tempts the inclusion of a metaphysical distinction between qualitative and 
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numerically distinct sensations, and so on. And this obscures the internal 
relation between meaning, language and understanding. 
Hacker (1990) never fully recognises the presented inconsistency. 
Nevertheless, none of above considerations should undermine Hacker's 
argument that the incommunicability of the private language argument 
can be derived from the recognition that the genuine private linguist 
cannot use his putative definitions in a regular and rule-governed manner 
since they are not definitions at alL Nor should the above undermine the 
arguments presented by Hacker against those who would posit some 
metaphysical or superempirical distinction between qualitative and 
numerical identity of such things as pains-for example, Frege. And that 
this presentation of the private language argument tempts confusion. But it 
does leave open the interpretation that the private language argument 
consists of two arguments which interlock together as both Pears (1988) and 
Harre (1988) suggest. Nevertheless, Hacker will not concede the point 
lightly. Hacker still insists that the 'incommunicability argument' distorts 
Wittgenstein's philosophical method. 
Reductio Ad Absurdum: 
The distortion of Wittgenstein's philosophical method 
Pears (1988) argues that the private language argument can be (it certainly 
has been) regarded as a reasonably separate argument within the text of the 
Philosophical Investigations (p. 328). While he acknowledges its place 
within the text he goes further to add: 
Indeed, the argument must have a certain independence, because 
it is a reductio ad absurdum, and it is essential to such arguments 
that the thesis under attack should be clearly formulated, and 
that all its premisses be unequivocally identified. (p. 329). 
In Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, Wittgenstein's philosophical method is 
outlined. In particular Wittgenstein rejects the idea that he can establish the 
falsity of any other argument (Truth and falsity belong to the propositions 
of natural science. Philosophical propositions present questions concerning 
sense). Rather, Wittgenstein's philosophical method relies on establishing 
that his target posits a position which is nonsensical: 
The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, 
for a game, and that than when we follow the rules, things do 
not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were 
entangled in our own rules. (PI§ 125). 
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For Wittgenstein the task of the philosophy is to expose the confusions 
which lead us to a nonsensical position. It is true generally, and not just a 
characteristic of the private language argument, that Wittgenstein seeks to 
establish the senselessness of other philosophical positions. The benefit that 
can be gained by describing the private language argument as an 
independent reductio ad absurdum is that it points out an aspect of 
Wittgenstein's philosophical method. However, does describing the private 
language argument as a reductio ad absurdum capture the complexities of 
Wittgenstein's method? 
Hacker's argument that the 'incommunicability argument' is misleading 
and redundant must be considered against the assumption that he disagrees 
at this point. Hacker differs from both Pears (1988) and Harre (1988) in a 
fundamental way. Hacker (1990) accepts Pear's characterisation of the 
private language argument with the qualification that: 
The refutation of the supposition of the possibility of a private 
language is, in a loose sense, a reductio ad absurdum of an array 
of deep presuppositions. (1990 p. 21) (Emphasis mine). 
Hacker (1990) regards the 'implication of incommunicability' to be a 
redundant argument which does not elucidate the complexities of 
Wittgenstein's method and distorts Wittgenstein's argument. But could the 
'incommunicability argument' be presented as an independent reductio ad 
absurdum given recognition that the required distinction, between 
qualitative and numerical pains, experiences and so on, is presented as a 
grammatical distinction and not an empirical, or metaphysical 
presupposition? It is important to note here that Harre (1988) suggests that 
the structure of the argument is that of Modus Tollens-Hacker's only 
argument against such a presentation is that it is redundant-not wrong. 
There can be no doubt that Harre is trying to persuade us of the 
incorrectness of the premise: 1/... the meaning of a word is determined by 
and only by that which it denotes, and sensation words denote logically 
private feelings ... " (p. 106). The argument that Harr~ presents is of the form 
Modus Tollens,. since the conditional contains the consequent that " ... the 
only person who could know what he or she meant by his or her use of the 
word 'tickle' would be the current speaker./I, which we take to be false, it 
follows that the antecedent is false also. If it is conceded that Hacker's 
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previous argument poses a substantial problem (With the recognition that 
it is not incorrect) for the argument presented in this way (because it does 
not, in itself, reveal why we reject the consequent) then perhaps it might be 
revived by stronger and more powerful argument of the reductio ad 
absurdum. The point here is whether or not the argument can be saved 
from Hacker's criticism by presenting it within a different, and purportedly 
more powerful (Lemmon 1965), structure. 
Wittgenstein makes special mention of the method of arguing referred to 
as reductio ad absurdum in Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. 
"The puzzle arises because one regards a contradiction as a sign 
that something is wrong."-There is a particular mathematical 
method of reductio ad absurdum, which we might call "avoiding 
a contradiction". In this method one shows a contradiction and 
then shows the way from it. But this doesn't mean that a 
contradiction is a sort of deviL 
One may say, "From a contradiction everything would follow." 
The reply to that is: Well then don't draw any conclusion from a 
contradiction; make that a rule. You might put it: There is always 
time to deal with a contradiction when we get to it. When we get 
to it, shouldn't we simply say, "This is no use-and we won't 
draw any conclusions from it"? (LFM, XXI, p. 209). 
The contradiction in issue is presented within Harre's conclusion. The 
initial conditions set up within the 'incommunicability argument' lead to a 
contradiction. We do speak a shared language but this is seemingly 
impossible under the conditions described: 
We must start with the plain fact that public conversations about 
logically private feelings are possible, and for the unassailable 
reason that they do actually occur. But the considerations above 
set out the conditions under which it would be impossible for 
them to occur. So one or both of the conjuncts that make up 
those conditions must be false. Either the meaning of a feeling or 
sensation word is not determined by that which it is used by a 
speaker to refer to, or sensation words are not used to refer to 
private and subjective feelings, or both. Since we do talk about 
our feelings we could not be happy rejecting the idea that those 
words are used to refer to what we plainly take them to denote. 
So it must be the denotational (or referential) account of their 
meaning that has to be rejected. (Harre, 1988 p. 106). 
Reductio ad absurdum type arguments rely on the recognition that the 
conclusion is false or absurd. Importantly, one must recognise that the 
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argument is valid: that the conclusion follows logically from the premisses. 
The acceptance of the absurdity of the conclusion invites one to scrutinise 
the premisses in order to reject at least one of them. 
Frege offers us a reductio ad absurdum concerning the incommunicability 
of private states. (It differs from the structure of Harre's argument in an 
important way). Backer and Hacker offer Frege's argument: 
'[I]f everyone had the right to understand by this name ["one"] 
whatever he pleased, then the same sentence about one would 
would mean different things for different people-such 
sentences would have no common content' (FA, i) Consequently, 
'if the number two were an idea, then it would straight away to 
be private to me only. Another man's ideas is, ex vi termini, 
another idea. We should then have to speak of my two and your 
two, of one two and all twos' (FA, §27). Yet in spite of this endless 
proliferation of objects which the psycho logician considers to be 
the proper objects of mathematical investigation, it would be 
impossible to prove that the number of natural numbers is 
infinite (FA,§27; RH,334)! And no shared and intersubjectively 
testable judgments could be formulated at all! The derivation of 
these consequences Frege viewed as a reductio ad absurdum of 
the psychologistic thesis that the contents of mathematical 
expressions are uniformly ideas. (Baker and Hacker, 1984 p. 52) . 
.. 
If one were to abandon the modus tollens structure which Harre (1988) 
presents and offer the 'incommunicability argument' in the form of a 
reductio ad absurdum one would differ from Frege's argument, as already 
indicated, in the important sense that one would present the premiss 'I 
cannot feel your pains nor you mine' (Harre, 1988 p.106) as a grammatical 
claim as opposed to the metaphysical claim that Hacker (1990) argues 
against. 
There are two consequences of accepting the invitation to scrutinise the 
premisses of the argument given the absurdity which is apparent with the 
contradictory conclusion. One may recognise that one or other of the above 
premisses is false-in particular, the premiss " .. the meaning of a sensation 
term is established by reference to an inner private object."(p. 106). The 
alternative representation of the argument is to dismiss as the premiss as 
nonsensical. 
Wittgenstein warns us against presenting such statements as limitations 
about what can and cannot (Metaphysically) be achieved: 
Do not say 'one cannot', but say instead: 'it doesn't exist in this 
game'. Not: 'one can't castle in draughts' but 'there is no castling 
in draughts'; and instead of 'I can't exhibit my sensation' 'in the 
use of the word "sensation" there is no such thing as exhibiting 
what one has got.' (Z §134). 
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Consequently, The objection is not whether I can have the same pain 
metaphysically and more importantly Wittgenstein's argument does not 
establish that such claims are false. But, ceteris paribus, it is senseless to 
suppose I can have his pain. The statement is ruled out by the way we use 
our language. 
Wittgenstein states: 
Again you must not forget that" A contradiction doesn't make 
sense" does not mean that the sense of a contraction is 
nonsense.-We exclude contradictions from language; we have 
no clear-cut use for them. (RPP, II, 290). 
There is a temptation to replace the conditions of truth and falsity with 
sense and senselessness: since such and such makes sense it follows that it 
must be nonsense to assert such and such. But Wittgenstein's method is 
distorted within this reasoning. Clearly Wittgenstein's method will not 
avail itself to describing the premisses of an argument as simply false (LFM, 
XI, p.102). Harre (1988) should not have described either of the conjoined 
premisses as 'false' (p. 106) since this implies that the required distinction 
between qualitatively and numerically distinct pains is an empirical or 
metaphysical distinction (something which could be established as true): 
alternatively he is wrong to suppose that he uses the premiss, 'I cannot feel 
your pains nor you mine' as a grammatical proposition. But what if the 
condition " .. the meaning of a sensation term is established by reference to 
an inner private object. "(p. 106) is rejected as senseless within the reductio 
ad absurdum? 
Wittgenstein, again, issues a warning (RPM, IV, 28, p. 147): 
We can always imagine proof by reductio ad absurdum used in 
argument with someone who puts forward a non-mathematical 
assertion (e.g. that he has seen a checkmate with such and such 
pieces) which can be mathematically refuted. 
The difficulty which is felt in connexion with reductio ad 
absurdum in mathematics is this: what goes on in this proof? 
Something mathematically absurd, and hence unmathematical? 
How-one would like to ask-can one so much as assume the 
mathematically absurd at all? That I can assume what is 
physically false and reduce it ad absurdum gives me no difficulty. 
But how to think the-so to speak-unthinkable?! 
What an indirect proof says, however, is: "If you want this then 
you cannot assume that: for only the opposite of what you do not 
want would be combinable with that". 
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In Harre's argument one is not entitled to scrutinise either of the first two 
premisses: both, it is conceded, are grammatical truths. That, "I cannot feel 
your pains and you cannot feel mine" is constitutive of our language games 
concerning sensation terms. Harre uses the premiss in the same way that 
one would when introducing the premiss that certain pieces cannot be 
combined to obtain a checkmate in chess. The problem for Wittgenstein is 
that when one issues the statement that a 'king and a knight cannot 
produce a checkmate' one is stating a claim about what constitutes the rules 
of chess. To claim otherwise is to alter the rules of chess somehow: giving 
the knight, for example, some hitherto unknown capacity within the game 
or perhaps conflating a stalemate with a checkmate. The proof which is 
supposed to convince one follows logically from the rules which make up 
the game. But in order to provide the reductio ad absurdum argument one 
must assume that it does make sense for one to produce a checkmate with a 
knight and a king. Such an assumption will make the mathematical proof 
useless since one would no longer have the basis for the logical 
implication-one would no longer be arguing about the game of chess but a 
game which is similar which allowed a knight and king to produce a 
checkmate. 
Similarly, Harre's argument relies on the grammatical claim that "I cannot 
feel your pains nor you mine". To repeat, such a claim is a grammatical 
truth not an empirical observation-it is constitutive of the grammar of 
our sensation terms that we speak of them being distinguishable by 
reference to persons. Harre's argument is reliant upon the conditional, "If 
we think that the meaning of a word is determined by and only by that 
which it denotes, and sensation words denote logically private feelings, the 
only person who could know what he or she meant by his or her use of the 
word 'tickle' would be the current speaker."(p. 106). It is the claim that 
sensation words denote logically private feelings which is in dispute. By 
logical implication from, 'I cannot feel your pains nor you mine' the absurd 
conclusion is reached, 'The only person who would know what they meant 
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by the use of their sensation terms would be the current speaker'. Such a 
conclusion precludes communication and thus doubles the absurdity. 
Recall Wittgenstein's remark: 'The proposition "Sensations are private" is 
comparable to: "One plays patience by oneself'"(PI §248). The claim 'I cannot 
feel your pains nor you mine' follows by implication, when considered as a 
grammatical proposition, against the background that our sensation terms 
acquire their meaning through their use within a particular language-
game. But in the reductio ad absurdum argument one must treat as sensible 
the claim, 'I can refer to my logically private feelings' in order to establish 
the senselessness of the premiss. But it does not follow that, 'I cannot feel 
your feelings nor you mine' when one is forced to consider an altered 
language-game. Thus, in order to establish the reductio, one must step 
outside the original language-game in which the grammatical claim, "I 
cannot feel your feelings nor you mine' belongs. The mathematical proof of 
the claim, 'I cannot checkmate the opposition with a knight and a king' 
follows only when one is considering the game of chess. If someone offers a 
claim which does not accord with the rules of chess we should simple point 
this out and remind him of the rules. This accords with what Hacker (1990) 
takes as the basic purpose of the private language argument-viz, to expose 
that the genuine private linguist has no rules to follow and that 
philosophical positions which assume that private experience is the 
bedrock of our language entangle themselves within their own rules in 
assuming that there any features of a language present within their 
presuppositions. Pears (1988) concurs: 
... any interpretation of the private language argument will 
remain incomplete until it has told us what exactly indicates 
commitment to the unacceptable theory. The abstract reductive 
argument needs to be connected with actual examples of 
philosophical theorising (p. 350). 
The alternative is to argue over what the real rules are: in the game of 
chess, the ones which allow a checkmate with a knight and king and the 
ones which do not. And this situation, as will be explained in later chapters, 
is not characteristic of Wittgenstein's method-(Chapter Six pp. 177-183). 
It can only be assumed that what Hacker finds problematic with the claim "I 
cannot feel your feelings nor you mine' is what it actually does within the 
'incommunicability argument'. Wittgenstein's suggestion 'for only the 
opposite of what you do not want to abandon would be combinable with 
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that' can be explained with reference to the concern over the supposed 
distinction between the qualitative and numerical identity of pains. We are 
tempted by the form of the propositions 'I can feel the same pain as him' 
and "I cannot feel his pain" to treat them as opposites in the reductio 
argument. But there is a difference between 'I can feel his pain' and 'I can 
feel the same pain as him' as must be admitted by both Hacker (1990) and 
Harre (1988). Since if one or other, or both, operate as a grammatical claim 
then they cannot be opposites-there must be some distinction in the way 
they are used (This is what allows Hacker concession that the 
'incommunicability argument' is not wrong). By exploiting this similarity 
in form we might be tempted to argue the 'incommunicability argument' 
by reductio ad absurdum. As Wittgenstein points out he has no difficulty 
with this type of argument provided that it used to establish what is 
physically false, but the grammatical claim cannot be used in this way. So 
the 'incommunicability argument' would not be saved from Hacker's 
criticism by presenting it within this different format. 
Hacker (1990) regards the 'incommunicability argument' as redundant and 
misleading. When the required distinction between qualitative and 
numerical identity of pain, for example, is premissed on the presupposition 
of some metaphysical argument the argument distorts the internal 
relations between language, meaning and understanding. When the 
required distinction is presented as a grammatical distinction, within the 
structure of a modus tollens Hacker (1990) argues that presenting the 
consequence of incommunicability is not wrong (and therefore not 
redundant), just misleading. If the argument were adjusted to the more 
powerful argument of the reductio ad absurdum then Wittgenstein's 
method is distorted-it tempts one to treat the required distinction between 
the pains I have and that aspect of pains which can be shared as being based 
on some metaphysical distinction or the premiss which is supposed to lead 
to the contradictory result serves no purpose. Hacker (1990) suggests that 
the consequence of incommunicability is derived by implication from the 
conclusion that the genuine private linguist cannot use his naming 
relation in a regular and rule-governed way-that the private language is 
not a language and is, " ... but a phantasmagoria of philosophy." (Hacker 
1990, p. 97). 
Thus Harre's version of the private language argument is poised delicately 
at limits of where Wittgenstein finishes and where others, such as those 
constructionists who would posit the 'third realm' of language use being 
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'determined by society', venture boldly ahead only to be lost. Harre (1988) 
runs perilously close to interpreting the private language argument in a 
way which would distort Wittgenstein's intention and his method. 
However, Harre's purpose, as indicated previously, is to offer an alternative 
framework for psychology which is informed by Wittgenstein's philosophy. 
If Hacker concedes that the 'implication of incommunicability' is not wrong 
and that certain truths can be 'squeezed out' of the premiss 'I cannot feel 
your pains nor your mine' then he should recognise also that such 
arguments when presented within psychology are lessons which do indeed 
belong to Wittgenstein's legacy. It must be conceded that such argument 
have the potential to mislead. Nevertheless, unless one ventures forward 
and posits the external relation between language and understanding (That 
understanding is manifest in demonstrating one's grasp Frege's Platonic 
entities in communication, or that understanding is manifest in the 
demonstration of one's accordance with the rules of determined by society) 
the presentation of the 'incommunicability argument' presents no 
conceptual problem. 
Both Hacker (1990) and Harre (1988) recognise that the private language 
argument has been misinterpreted by those who would rule out the 
possibility of an individual developing a rule in isolation-which is a 
symptom of severing the internal relation between language and 
understanding. Hacker (1990) is too quick to admonish the 
'incommunicability argument', despite this being one route to positing the 
'third realm', since it appears to have some contribution within psychology. 
Harre (1988) should recognise that the argument has the potential to 
mislead, particularly in the light of those constructionists who do stray to 
the posit the external relation (Especially when such a claims as 'There 
could be no individual who is atomic and capable of the intentional use of 
symbols' is presented in an ambiguous way.) With these concessions made 
it is appropriate to examine the private language argument as it is 
presented by Hacker (1986, 1990) since the one, trivial, concern which might 
be still levelled is that the 'incommunicability argument' is still not the 
'real' private language argument. 
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Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. 
Consider the German general again. Imagine that he is captured along with 
his scrambled message by the French underground resistance. Suppose that 
you are the interrogator and you wish to know the meaning of the 
scrambled sets of letters in the dossier you are given. The generat who has 
honestly forgotten the exact details of the troop movements, explains that 
the letters mean particular configurations of an Enigma machine. The 
letters along with the key to the code, mean particular states of the 
machine. This explanation is frustrating. It is the unintelligibility of such 
an explanation that Wittgenstein attacks with his private language 
argument. 
Hacker (1990 pp. 94-95) explains: 
The consequence of incommunicability, however flows 
perspicuously from the further assumption that names of 
experiences (in the requisite sense) are given a meaning, i.e are 
explained, by reference to the items they name, and from the 
misleading principle that to understand such names is to know 
what they stand for. (Emphasis in the original). 
The German general is trivially correct in explaining that his coded script 
stands for operations of the Enigma machine, but this tells us nothing 
about what 'standing for' consists of. The general does not explain anything 
about troop movements by his explanation. In the same way when 
philosophers and psychologists suppose that the meaning of a sensation is 
that which it names, i.e a 'state' of the 'Human-Enigma machine' they 
commit themselves to an explanation of psychological states which is 
equally unintelligible. Deciphering the text, given the key and an 
equivalent Enigma machine, does not tell you what a codeword 'picador' 
means-there is no rule for the application of the concept. The text is 
intelligible only against the background of the German language-rules for 
the use of the terms. But the German language is not part of the machine. 
The German language is the background which provides the intelligibility 
of encryptment and decryptment in this example. Similarly in the case of 
the genuine private linguist there are no rules for the application of 
naming relations. We should not be misled into believing that the German 
language, socially maintained, is the 'objective' criterion for the application 
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of rules for the use of words. The codeword 'picador' has meaning only in 
the sense that it is attached to a practice, in this case the title of some 
military operation. If we thought the German language held the answer to 
the meaning of this term we would think that the intercepted transmis-
sions were about Spanish bullfighters. 
Wittgenstein does not focus on the consequence of a private language-
that it is not a language at all and is incommunicable. This is important for 
the considerations in Chapter Two. It was claimed that Wittgenstein's 
private language argument was a result of the application of a broader 
argument concerning rules and rule-following. Wittgenstein draws 
attention to whether or not the private linguist himself would be able to 
understand a language which is private-one that no one else in principle 
could understand, whether the private linguist himself could follow a 
private rule. In exposing that the private linguist could not understand his 
own private language Wittgenstein explicitly addresses the notion of rule-
following which was presented in Chapter Two. 
Wittgenstein's private language argument occurs at §243-315 of 
Philosophical Investigations. It starts: 
A human being can encourage himself, give orders, obey, blame 
and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. 
We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in a 
monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to 
themselves.-An explorer who watched them and listened to 
their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. 
(This would enable him to predict these people's actions 
correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and 
decisions.) 
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could 
write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences-his 
feelings, moods and the rest-for his private use?-Well, can't we 
do so in our ordinary language?-But that is not what I mean. 
The individual words of this language are to refer to that which 
can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate 
private sensation. So another person cannot understand the 
language. (PI §243). 
It has been suggested that it is a mistake to assume that language is 
necessarily a shared phenomenon. Wittgenstein here presents us with the 
soliloquist who follows a language in solitude, the Robinson Crusoe who 
without extra-insular aid creates his own language in private (Hacker 1986). 
109 
This soliloquist does not represent what is meant by a private language. 
Wittgenstein's identification of a genuine private language is explained in 
the second paragraph of §243. Three features are clear. Firstly, the words of 
the private language refer only to that which can be known by the speaker 
(Epistemic privacy). Secondly, the words of the language refer to the 
speaker's own immediate sensations; only the speaker possesses the 
referents of his sensation words, nobody else could possibly have them 
(Privacy of ownership). Thirdly, as a consequence of epistemic privacy and 
privacy of ownership, another person could not possibly understand the 
language (Hacker, 1986 p. 254). 
In Chapter Two the notion of following a rule was discussed at length in 
consideration of following a sign in a park. It was suggested that following a 
rule required a normative context in which the application of that rule 
would make sense. It might seem obvious that rules which govern our 
civil behaviour, such as park regulations, are normative in the nature 
described-I must learn the practices and customs of my society in order to 
know how to accord with the rules under which it operates. But in the case 
of internal states, sensations and the like, we suppose that we know what it 
means to be in that state because of our personal experience. Once I know 
that the word 'pain' is associated with the pain I experience upon some 
injury then I know what pain is. It might seem the most natural of 
suppositions that I know what pain is simply by interior ostensive 
definition (pointing inwardly: an ostensive definition is one in which 
objects are pointed out providing the criteria for the predicate). But similar 
to the view that it is natural to suppose that rule-following in mathematics 
is independent of normative considerations (That the truths of logic are 
true whether anybody considers them or not) it is a mistake to suppose that 
rule-following has any sense when employing an interior ostensive 
definition. 
When the allies deciphered the transmission of the Enigma code the 
scrambled letters made sense against the background of the German 
language. This background provides the intelligibility of the encrypted 
information. What a coded message signified was only intelligible because 
the German language provided the context in which the decryptment made 
sense. Naming things requires a context. A code (A 'naming' relation 
between symbols and text) represents a language only because the sender 
and receiver comprehend that language. According to Wittgenstein such a 
context surrounds our use of sensation terms. There is a stability in our 
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application of the sensation named in the language game that we employ. 
Our naming of colours, for instance, requires that our judgement of colour 
sample be consistent. We, generally, take a green object to be called green 
because the world is such, and our perceptual capacities such that there is 
consistency for the application of the concept. Without this background our 
communication about such things as colours would be as pointless as 
enciphering German text for transmission to someone would did not 
understand German. The problem considered in the private language 
argument is whether this consistency in judgement can apply to an 
individual who names his own internal state. 
Consider the dog in the park example again. A person can be in doubt as to 
the meaning of such a sign. But could person doubt their own internal 
'sign'? Surely I cannot be in doubt as to the meaning of a sensation term, 
my internal states determine the meaning. What I mean by pain, for 
example, is the sensation I name with the label 'pain'. Surely if I name my 
experience with a symbol, say N, then I know what N means. But this is 
confused according to Wittgenstein, for in this situation there is no rule-
following, no naming, no genuine features of a language at all. 
If I was in doubt whether my actions are in accord with the rule offered by 
the park sign I can point to the park sign and offer an explanation of my 
action on the basis of my interpretation of the meaning of that sign. But my 
private sensation, which I name N, is radically different from that of the 
sign in the park. I cannot point to my own sensation to offer some 
justification for the symbol I attach to it. (Notice here it is not that another 
person cannot point to my internal state-I cannot point to it!) 
Suppose that I walk the dog further into the park and wonder whether my 
actions are still in accord with the park sign. I must call to mind the park 
sign, if I remember it to accord with my interpretation, then my actions are 
justified to the extent that my interpretation of the sign is still being 
adhered to. Notice here that it is not my memory of the sign that justifies 
my action. I might remember the sign incorrectly. Whether or not I am 
acting in accord with the sign is governed by the conventions which sur-
round the customs of walking a dog in the park-the sign itself does not 
determine what is and is not in accord with the sign. We might like to say 
that when I label my internal state 'N', I just remember the sensation that 
'N' signifies-my memory of the sensation justifies my use of the label 'N'. 
But in the case of the symbol 'N' being uttered as the result of some 
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memory nothing represents a rule for the use of 'N'. The social practice 
which surround park regulations provide the criterion of correctness for 
what is and is not in accord with a rule (Remember that even if I was 
cautious and leashed the dog there is still the possibility of the dog running 
off and my actions not being in accord with the sign's prescriptions). But in 
the case of the private linguist the 'practice' of applying the symbol 'N' to a 
sensation state is, according to Wittgenstein, nothing but an idle ceremony, 
for nothing justifies the application of 'N' to a sensation state-there is no 
criterion of correctness for the application of 'N'. 
Surely my memory provides the criterion of correctness. Whether or not 
'N' applies to a particular sensation state is determined by the memory. But 
here we are in the same situation as considering that my leashed dog is 
'controlled' (see Chapter Two p. 51). The park sign does not determine what 
is and is not in accord with it, neither does my memory of a particular 
sensation state determine whether or not my memory is or is not correctly 
represented by 'N'. It is often assumed that Witfgenstein was addressing the 
fallibility of memory but this is not so. A sensation state does not provide 
the basis for the application of the naming symbol 'N' because in order for 
'N' to correctly apply to the sensation state a further rule justifying the 
relation of 'N' to the sensation is required. But there is no such rule here! 
To remember the sensation correctly is not the same as remembering that 
'N' stands for the sensation. Consequently my pointing inwardly to a 
mental state to justify my use of the symbol 'N' presupposes that in my 
action of pointing I correctly grasp the meaning of 'N' in order for 'N' to be 
represented. What looks like a justification for the use of 'N' is no justifi-
cation at all. 
Wittgenstein regards 'mental object' as irrelevant to considerations of the 
meaning of mental state terms. The 'private exemplar' is not the 
foundation on which to build our knowledge and understanding of mental 
states. The private linguist cannot understand his use of symbols in a 
regular and rule governed way. The problem for the private linguist is not 
that the conception of language he employs is incommunicable, but that it 
is not conceivable. The private language is not a language at all. Any philo-
sophical, or psychological strategy which accounts for the meaning of 
psychological terms in this way is inherently confused. 
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The Dog in the Park meets the Beetle in the Box. 
It would seem, if Wittgenstein is correct, that our language is not founded 
on our private mental samples. The constructionists who adhere to the 
sociality thesis recognise the importance of this. Surely 'mental samples' 
become irrelevant to our understanding of psychological states. 
Wittgenstein explores this at length: 
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his 
own casel-Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: 
we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and 
everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his 
beetle.-Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have 
something different in his box. One might even imagine such a 
thing constantly changing.-But suppose the word 'beetle' had a 
use in these people's language?-If so it would not be used as the 
name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the 
language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might 
even be empty.- No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in 
the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. 
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of 
sensation and model of 'object and designation' the object drops 
out of consideration as irrelevant.(PI§ 293). 
If it were the case that we referred to the 'beetle' then, if communication is 
possible, the referring to the inner experience is a redundant exercise-like 
the wheel which is not attached to the mechanism. If we did refer to the 
inner state, the 'beetle', then communication would be impossible-not 
because speakers would never know whether they were referring to the 
same thing (as those who posit the incommunicability argument would 
suggest) but because each private linguist could not use their naming 
relation in a stable and rule-governed way. 
So what conclusion can be drawn from all of this? Perhaps Wittgenstein is 
endorsing a kind of behaviourism. Note that behaviourism was, 
historically, the first attempt by psychology to avoid the arguments of Frege 
and is claimed by Kosso (1991) to adequately overcome the problems which 
were outlined by Frege's theory of ideas. (see Chapter One). Wittgenstein 
conveys his thoughts on this through the use of his imaginary interlocutor: 
Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at 
bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is 
a fiction?-If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical 
fiction. (PI §307). 
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Social Constructionist's adopt an ontology for which there is no 
Wittgensteinian objection. Wittgenstein's private language argument is not 
an attempt to show that the only useful way to continue psychology is to 
abandon attempts to detail the nature of mental states. Wittgenstein has 
tried to persuade us that our investigations into such things as 
psychological states can be led astray by misrepresenting the grammar of 
mental state terms. The mistake exposed by the private language argument 
is that of representing the meaning of a mental state term to be that which 
we feel, that we can define what it is to be in pain by interior ostensive 
definition. We may mistakenly undertake an investigation of the 'mental' 
with this confused grammar. By misrepresenting the nature of the 
meaning of our terms we might look for some mental structure to support 
our naIve conception of the nature of psychological entities. None of this 
should be taken to endorse behaviourism. Wittgenstein's target is often 
reported to be the Cartesian conception of the mind. Insofar as the private 
language argument does present what many would suggest is an 
insurmountable obstacle for modern theorists who adopt a Cartesian 
ontology, to focus on this aspect of the private language argument is to 
unduly give consideration to one aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy. 
Can we say anything about the nature of mental states? Is the purpose of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy to tell us what can be said about mental states 
and how we should go about it? Consider: 
We are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept 
(e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word. So it may 
look as if we were doing Nominalism. Nominalists make the 
mistake of interpreting all words as names, and so of not really 
describing their use, but only, so to speak, giving a paper draft on 
such a description. (PI §383). 
Like the Nominalists, Social constructionists often deny the existence of 
anything which can be said to represent a psychological concept like for 
example 'fear'. They do not deny that fear has some ontological realisation 
within human physiology, but deny that we are misled into believing we 
have the correct concept of 'fear' if we believe it to be a private internal 
mental, or physiological, process: those who would assert that 'thinking' is 
a matter of 'information processing' might be said to present a 'paper draft' 
of the concept of 'thinking.' 
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Wittgenstein explicitly denies that the conclusion of the private language 
argument is to rule out mental processes: 
Why should I deny that there is a mental process? But "There 
has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering ... " 
means nothing more than: "I have just remembered ... ". To deny 
the mental process would mean to deny the remembering; to 
deny that anyone ever remembers anything. (PI§ 306). 
Rather than viewing the private language argument as being directed 
against the idea of ruling out the mental inner we should see that it is a 
consequence of a particular orientation to the mental inner which is 
denied. The private language argument follows directly from the 
repudiation of the Cartesian conception of the nature of the mental, but: 
"We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us 
here."(PI§ 304). It is not the 'mental inner' that is denied but: 
The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the 
idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the 
same purpose: to convey thoughts-which may be about houses, 
pains, good and evil, or anything else you please. (PI§ 304). 
As outlined in Chapter One, Frege severed the relationship between 
meaning and understanding by adopting the division between the 
apprehension of the object of judgement and the content of the judgement 
itself. This division made it necessary for Frege to regard thinking to be a 
mental process and the proper domain of psychology. This led Frege to 
view the sense of an expression to be contained by its communicability. The 
sense of an expression is objectively discoverable in language: sense is 
contained by reference to those objective 'Platonistic objects'. That each 
person understands one another is contained in their agreement over the 
conditions which make a proposition true. But, as has been presented, this 
left Frege with the mysterious connection of " ... how one could grasp a 
sense, and in particular a thought, otherwise than as the sense of some 
expression, the thought expressed by some sentence. (Dummett, 1989 p. 
317). 
Crusoe's Language: the exploitation of the stable material exemplars. 
Baker and Hacker (1985) agree that it is a fundamental mistake to insert 
between a rule and its extension the common agreement of a community. 
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The relation between a rule and its extension is internal as indicated in 
Chapter Two. It is a mistake to postulate some third 'entity' (the third 
realm) to support the application of a rule. Baker and Hacker indicate the 
error which pervades much of the social constructionism: 
These construals of Wittgenstein's concern with human 
agreement about rules, uses of language, and concept-formation 
correctly grasp that the concept of general consensus in 
definitions, judgements and actions plays an important role in 
his thought. But they take it at the wrong level of generality 
(trying to insert it between a rule and its extension), locate it 
wrongly (taking it to be a constituent of the concept defined by a 
certain rule, rather than as part of the framework within which a 
language-game is played) and draw the incorrect conclusion from 
it (that an unshared language, language-game or rule is an 
absurdity). (Baker and Hacker, 1985 p. 243). 
We do in fact share our language within a social setting. Perhaps 
psychology need not concern itself with the philosophical problems which 
arise out of such imaginable circumstances as a neonate Crusoe and the 
like? It is true that we should orient ourselves to psychological concepts 
with the recognition that many concepts have necessarily social conditions 
of performance. Harre's (1989a pp. 442-444) conception of 'skill' and its role 
in bridging the gap between the physiological and social makes the point: 
... the concept of a skill includes both the grounding requirement 
and the requirement that an individual who possesses the skill 
can demonstrate some suitable actions that meet the socially 
defined criteria for adequate performance. (pp. 442-443). 
However, by taking the Wittgensteinian position at the wrong level of 
generality some constructionists form a mistaken conception of normative 
concepts. The problem is not that there are not concepts which properly 
enter into psychology which have social criteria for performance but how 
one introduces Wittgenstein's arguments about these concepts-whether 
Wittgenstein's arguments prohibit the use of non-socially defined 
meanings. 
An individual in isolation from society becomes a great problem for some 
social constructionists. The private language argument is no help to them 
because it does not exclude the possibility of an individual following a rule 
in private. But a version of the sociality thesis relies on this exclusion and 
maintains that all psychologically meaningful acts necessarily must be 
collective. It would seem that, from Wittgenstein's perspective, an 
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individual is capable of being autonomous, that is, isolated from society, 
and capable of the intentional use of symbols. There is nothing 
conceptually awry in the notion that Crusoe follows a daily routine, written 
in a diary, which ends with setting his fishing net. Crusoe thinks that he 
has followed his routine until the morning when he discovers that the 
night before he had not completed his task and therefore had not acted in 
accord with his set of rules. Pears (1988 p. 366) calls this' calibration on 
standard objects' and points out that it is a precondition of such a practice 
that the natural world is stable, that the objects picked out as criteria for the 
practice do not change from one day to the next. (see Chapter Four, pp. 137-
143). 
Do we interpret these imaginable cases of Crusoe on an island through our 
own conception of rules and rule following? Are we placing our 
interpretation of the actions of our solitary into our accounts of rules-
much like the the situation of the caveman who produces a regular 
sequence on the cave wall?(see Chapter Two, p. 48). Just because we can 
form a rule to fit with a given regularity does not mean that the action is 
rule-governed. Wittgenstein suggests that we drop the assumptions of 
understanding the language of the solitary language uses and recognising 
his daily actions with our own, and analyse whether they will make a 
difference to our being able to interpret the regularities as indeed rule 
governed. The crucial question is whether or not someone else could 
master the language of a solitary individual not whether they do. As Pears 
puts it: "The fact that, if someone else had arrived on the scene, he could 
have shared the language, does nothing to show that the original stabilizer, 
standard physical objects, was not previously sufficient by itself." (ct. Baker 
and Hacker, 1984a p. 79). 
Suppose instead of discovering Robinson Crusoe on an island we discover 
a solitary Martian who has crash landed in the New Hebrides on a deserted 
island. The Martian's language is extremely complex and 'he' does things 
which are extremely odd such as drinking vast quantities of sea water. The 
Martian is sufficiently similar to us in that he makes verbal noises which 
are associated with his actions. It might be extremely difficult for us to learn 
the Martian's language, and his actions might seem extremely bizarre to us 
as observers but in principle we can discover the rule-governed nature of 
his use of language which coincides with his regular behaviour. If we were 
patient enough we could indeed learn the Martian's language. The 'facts', 
that he is isolated and persists with rituals which are extremely odd, do 
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nothing to impede the possibility of him acquiring and using a language in 
a rule-governed way and us understanding that language. 
What constitutes a genuine rule? There are several qualifications required 
to the above example. To determine whether or not the Martian is indeed 
following a rule which he understands it is necessary for him to be aware of 
the rule which he uses. The observer might determine this through the 
utterances of the Martian or by reference to an activity which is rule-
governed such as playing a game with shells or sticks. The rule-governed 
activity must be sufficiently complex to be given the ascription of being 
rule-governed. Slugs probably follow a series of events with an apparent 
regularity but it does not constitute a rule governed activity because our 
concept of rule-governed will not stretch to such behaviours. The 
determination of whether a slug follows rules does not depend on whether 
the slug is aware of its activities we simply will not accept that a slugs be-
haviour, however regular, is complex enough to be considered a rule-
governed activity. The question of whether or not someone is following a 
rule can only be answered in relation to the practice of applying the rule. 
An external observer must determine what constitutes what is and is not in 
accord with the rule. This presupposes that the observer can determine the 
internal relation between the rule and what accords with it-both terms of 
the internal relation are necessary. It must be possible to determine the rule 
and its extension: what accords and what does not accord with the rule. The 
determination of the criteria for the correctness of a rule-governed activity 
are found in the practice of applying the rule. In principle any genuine rule-
governed activity will be discoverable on the basis of the public practice 
which determines the criterion of correctness. 
A language can be an unshared language. But to be a genuine language the 
language must have those features of a language which make it rule-
governed. To be a rule-governed language requires a technique for the 
application of terms within the language. That technique must be public. 
Because the technique must be public, note the absence of this public 
technique in a genuine private language, it is in principle possible that the 
language practiced privately can be discovered and used by others. But to be 
public does not necessarily mean that it must be a shared language. Only 
the possibility of it being a shared language is necessary. 
118 
Concl usions 
The privacy considered in the private language argument is the absence of a 
public (not social) criterion which enables the regular use of the terms of a 
language in a rule-governed way. The least of the flaws of a genuine private 
language is its incommunicability. An attempt to premiss an argument 
about the incommunicability of a genuine private language by considering 
the possibility of a private language misconstrues Wittgenstein's point that 
a genuine private language is inconceivable. The point of the private 
language argument is to rule out the possibility that the meaning of 
psychological terms is determined by private ostensive definition. I cannot 
point inwardly to know what the word pain means. I do not prick myself 
with a pin to reassure myself that I have the correct meaning of the term 
pain when you use it. A solitary individual can be in pain and use the term, 
or its equivalent, in a rule-governed way. Robinson Crusoe would know 
that he has used the term correctly by reference to his natural behaviour 
upon lesion. All that is required is a practice, not necessarily a social 
practice, patently absent in the case of the genuine private linguist. 
It was argued in Chapter Two that the 'no private language argument' 
could do nothing to impede the cognitivist programme. Those 
constructionists, such as Coulter, who attack the cognitivist using different 
variations of the sociality thesis, err in their interpretation of Wittgenstein. 
The source of error is the postulation of a third realm to justify the relation 
between a rule and what accords with a rule. Wittgenstein is widely 
misinterpreted on the importance of public criteria for the use and 
maintenance of language. Wittgenstein insists that a rule-governed activity 
must have some practice which is public to provide a criterion of 
correctness for the application of a rule-but this practice need not be a 
social practice. An 'atomic' individual, one separated from society, can have 
a public practice. 
Cognitive science, indirectly, also entertains a mythological inquiry into the 
nature of the relation between a rule and its extension-postulating the 
relation to be causal. The difficulty for the doctrine has been addressed in 
Chapter Two. Wittgensteinian's private language argument illustrates the 
irrelevance of the 'private state' to understanding of concepts such as 
thinking, feeling, and so on. Leiber (1991) would have us pursue an 
irrelevant task with his assumption that there is something behind our 
language. Social constructionists adopt a dual ontology, which is 
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appropriate given consideration to Wittgenstein, ruling out any search for 
an understanding the 'mental', 'information processing' or 'consciousness' 
by addressing physiological structures or functional descriptions of 'mental 
processes' . 
Frege maintains that the relation between a rule and its extension is 
paradigmatic. The laws of logic are as they are and must be this way across 
all time and space whether anyone is available to comprehend them or not. 
Some constructionists maintain that society provides the justification for 
our use of language and from this regularity the source and maintenance of 
our psychological states. These construals of Wittgenstein within social 
constructionism make the same mistake as Frege, which Wittgenstein 
specifically set out to dissolve, they place a 'thing' (a paradigmatic way of 
being or a society) between a rule and what counts as being in accord with 
this rule. 
It is true that a private language conceived by Harre is incommunicable but 
this was not Wittgenstein's primary concern. Hacker (1986, 1990) notes that 
Wittgenstein devotes little attention to this consequence of the private 
language, and instead focuses on the conceivability of the radically private 
language. That question is not: "What happens if we commit ourselves to a 
view of language which is radically private?" But: "Is a radically private 
language conceivable?" Wittgenstein attacks the notion that a radically 
private language is unintelligible not that it is incommunicable. The 'no 
private language argument' presented in Chapter Two argues along these 
lines but commits the error that it makes sense to consider a private 
language. To suppose that there is such a thing as a private language is an 
error. Coulter (1973) employs this line of argument in his consideration of 
insanity, viz., that insanity literally is a private language by virtue of the 
fact that no one else can understand the use of the terms an insane person 
produces. (a view that will be dealt with at length in the next Chapter). But, 
as Hacker (1990) puts it: " ... there is no such thing, in this sense, as a private 
language-it is but a phantasmagoria of philosophy." (p. 97). 
The intention of this chapter was never to demolish the claims of the 
Social Constructionists but to prepare some place for the concepts of 
insanity and creativity within that doctrine. The ontology of Social 
constructionism is accepted. An interpretation of the sociality thesis is what 
must be dismissed. If the 'sociality thesis' is interpreted as being derived 
from the claim that, " ... there could be no being which is both atomic and 
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capable of the intentional use of symbols ... ", as Harre (1992 pp. 154-152) 
claims, and this is interpreted as ruling out the possibility of an individual 
developing a language in the absence of a community, then the 
forthcoming considerations of the concepts of creativity and insanity 
cannot be said to be compatible with the constructionist doctrine. It will be 
argued that this version of social constructionism cannot account for the 
concept of insanity, nor can it account for creativity because an individual 
who is either insane or creative, or both, breaks the practices of the society 
in which he or she resides. In adopting different practices the individual is 
isolated from the society in which he or she resides as much as Robinson 
Crusoe was isolated from England. The crucial point is that the form these 
new practices acquire is relative to the society from which they arise. The 
isolated individual develops new practices, meaning, and thought from the 
background from which the individual was isolated (Unlike a genuine 
neonate Crusoe). There is nothing in the private language argument to 
prevent this sort of privacy, despite what some social constructionists 
might claim. Society does not determine the meaning of psychological 
terms or the psychological character of an individual, although it does plays 
an important role. 
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Chapter Four 
Wonderland 
Autonomous Individuals 
In Chapter Three it was decided that the central premiss of social 
constructionism is at odds with the philosophy of Wittgenstein-an 
'atomic' individual, e.g. a neonate Crusoe, is capable, according to 
Wittgenstein, of the intentional use of symbols. A neonate Crusoe is not 
logically prevented from creating and using his own language. However, it 
is no real criticism of the social constructionist doctrine that its adherents 
make a claim which Wittgenstein does not support. The criticism might 
have an impact on those constructionists who claim Wittgenstein supports 
their view but even then the argument of Chapter Three addresses only 
one of the premisses of the social constructionist doctrine and leaves the 
conclusions untouched. What then is the problem declaring an 'atomic' 
individual incapable of language? 
One might dismiss the problem from psychology by asserting that there are 
no neonate Crusoes; genuine 'atomic individuals' simply do not exist. 
However the concern here with atomic individuals is not empirical: wolf-
children do not appear to obtain a language. Whether or not a neonate 
Robinson Crusoe exists, or could develop a language, should not be 
mistaken as an empirical question. The concern of this argument is not 
speculation about the capacities of socially isolated individuals. 
Nevertheless, despite their apparent silence, 'atomic individuals', if they 
exist, are not logically prevented from creating their own language (see 
Chapter Three). The argument turns on the notion of what an 'atomic' 
individual is exactly-the problem is conceptual. Clearly a neonate Crusoe, 
despite being a philosophical fiction and of no relevance to psychology 
directly, is atomic in every relevant sense of the word. But are there people 
who are 'atomic' in some relevant sense, who are not philosophical 
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fictions, who are ignored by a psychological research programme which 
views shared language as the basic psychological phenomenon?(Harre, 
1989 p. 187). 
To forestall any confusion which might arise from continuing with the 
criticised term 'atomic' it will be replaced with the term 'autonomous'. In 
particular it is important to extract what is essential to the notion of 
'neonate' as it has been used in Chapter Three. The example of the 'neonate 
Crusoe' is introduced to forestall any attempt to sever the internal relations 
between following a rule, a practice, and an understanding of the criteria 
which accord with the fulfilment of that practice. It is tempting to introduce 
the fact that we learn from others into our understanding of the logical 
requirements of language use. The example of the neonate Crusoe is 
intended to preclude all societal considerations from being introduced to 
the argument so that the logical requirements of language lay clear to view 
(Those developed in Chapter Two). Thus discussion of 'autonomous 
individuals' is really just reference to Wittgenstein's philosophical insight 
that a rule and its extension are internally related, that one's ability to 
follow a rule is manifest in one's employment of that rule within a practice. 
Furthermore, nothing mediates between a rule and its extension. An 
autonomous individual is not simply a soliloquist, since this refers only to 
one's ability to speak to oneself in the absence of a community. Chapters 
Two and Three reveal the utter irrelevance of a community, or anything 
else, to the logical relations between thinking, meaning and understanding. 
Thus 'autonomous individuals' are those who participate in unshared 
language-games no matter how they are brought about. 
From a philosophical standpoint considerations of a neonate Crusoe's 
capacities are irrelevant for that line of inquiry is thought to produce 
nothing interesting to philosophy. Consider Baker and Hacker's (1985 pp. 
243-244) claim: 
It is just because unshared (as opposed to unshareable) concepts, 
rules, language-games are not conceptually awry that they are 
essentially uninteresting. Robinson Crusoe or the last Mohican 
make good fiction, but pose no deep philosophical problems of 
any kind ... 
Baker and Hacker argue that philosophical problems arise out of the 
"entanglements in our understanding of the conceptual articulations of our 
languages." (1984 p. 244). On Wittgenstein's view of philosophy, 
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philosophical problems arise only when there is an entanglement within 
language-when we make a mistake about the employment of our terms. 
But despite Baker and Hacker's reassurance, they direct their assertion 
against those philosophers (d. Malcolm, 1988) who would suppose that 
something philosophically interesting is obtained by the mistaken view 
that a language absolutely requires a social context. Once it is established 
that this is not the correct conclusion to be drawn from the private 
language argument one might no longer be confused. However the 
conclusion that unshared language..:.games are essentially uninteresting 
presents a limited perspective on the function of philosophy-(To be 
further examined in Chapters Seven and Eight where it is argued that the 
attainment of philosophical clarity, a surview, is of critical importance to 
psychology) . 
Social constructionists seem liberated by those of this philosophical 
perspective. If we disregard neonate Crusoes as being philosophical fictions· 
and assume that we all do engage in shared social practices, and that all 
conceptual confusions arise within these shared social practices, then the 
conclusion that a neonate Crusoe has the potential to develop and use a 
language is trivial and unimportant. Baker and Hacker's claim, and its 
importance to the conceptual issue identified in psychology, rests on two 
assumptions. Firstly, they assume that there really are no 'autonomous' 
individuals-nothing equivalent to a neonate Crusoe that might be 
relevant to psychology. Secondly, what is relevant to psychology, more 
accurately, theoretical psychology, is assumed to be the same as what is 
relevant to philosophy. 
If there are people who develop unshared languages, concepts, or rules, 
then their capacities or potential capacities are indeed philosophically 
'uninteresting'. The potential capacities of an individual who has an 
unshared language-game will not be solved by examining the 'conceptual 
articulations of our language'. But the investigation of these potentials is 
not an empirical search, to be undertaken by the researching psychologist; a 
psychologist might investigate the capacities of the individual: whether or 
not wolf-children develop a language. The task of studying the potentials 
of autonomous individuals, given that they do exists, belongs to theoretical 
psychology. 
Are there people who are autonomous in the relevant sense of possessing 
unshared language-games, concepts, or rules? Obviously those who create 
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new concepts have, for a short time at least, an unshared concept, rule, or 
language. It is a logical requirement of a novel practice that it is unshared. 
Similarly those who are unintelligible to us because they seem to employ 
concepts in ways in which we are unwilling to accept (share) are also 
candidates. The concepts of 'creativity' and 'insanity' become the lens 
through which we can gain a clear picture of the relationship between 
philosophy and psychology. Social constructionists join Baker and Hacker 
in believing that autonomous individuals are 'essentially uninteresting'. 
The task then is to show how it is that social constructionists, like Harre 
(1989) and Coulter (1973), go wrong in believing that: 
.. .language is such that it must be publicly acquired and the 
normativity of its uses socially sustained by collectively citable 
rules and conventions.(Harre, 1989 p. 168). 
It is true that language must be publicly acquired if that means that to be a 
language at all it must acquire meaning through employment in a practice. 
However, must it be socially sustained? Fischer (1990 p. 284) goes as far as 
saying that an individual's insanity may result from, " ... the possibility that 
socially deviant rules will be internalised". On this view, the insane person 
manifests some predetermined form of deviance which occupies the status 
of 'rule' in some part of society. But it has already be argued that an 
individual's understanding of a rule is not determined by anything: not a 
society, a causal process in the head, divine inspiration, and so on. Various 
forms of social constructionism are at present the most popular attempts to 
introduce Wittgenstein's philosophy, and his conception of philosophical 
psychology into psychology generally. By examining the concept of 
'insanity' it is hoped that a clear view of what is important from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective, when examining psychological terms, will be 
developed. 
Central to the task ahead is to gain an understanding of the concept of 
'intelligibility'. What makes a practice intelligible, or at least potentially 
intelligible is that it is indeed a practice. This should be clear from the 
considerations set out in Chapter Three where it was seen that a genuine 
private language is unintelligible and therefore not a practice, or not a 
language at all. Also considered were the necessary preconditions for an 
observer to declare an action rule-governed as opposed to a regularity on to 
which we impose a rule. What makes a practice genuine is that it is rule-
governed; there is an internal relation between a rule and what accords and 
conflicts with a rule. This need not be a social practice, although almost all 
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interesting practices are social practices. That non-social practices can occur 
has been established in Chapter Three. What makes a practice 
unintelligible is that it is not a practice at all, viz., that it is not rule-
governed. 
A summary of the pieces of the puzzle so far might be helpful. To expose 
the mistakes of social constructionism it is necessary to examine how 
Coulter (1973) fails to adequately explain the concept of insanity (an 
example of a concept that refers to autonomous individuals). Since social 
constructionists purport to offer an account of how Wittgenstein's 
philosophy should operate in psychology and it has been argued in Chapter 
Three that this is sometimes mistaken, by exposing the misinterpretation of 
Wittgenstein in the application of his philosophical thought to the concepts 
of creativity and insanity we can rid social constructionism of an error 
which impedes a clear conception of Wittgenstein's view of the 
relationship of philosophy to psychology. Underlying an understanding of 
the concepts of insanity and creativity is the concept of 'unintelligibility'. By 
examining Wittgenstein's thought on the limits of intelligibility in 0 n 
Certainty (1969) it is possible to outline the essential features of the concept 
of creativity from a Wittgensteinian perspective which is to be contrasted 
against a social constructionist perspective. The aim here is to extend the 
social constructionist doctrine not defeat it. 
Baker and Hacker (1985) suppose that philosophically there is nothing 
conceptually awry with a neonate Crusoe developing a language and 
therefore there is no philosophical problem, no conceptual confusion, or 
misunderstanding in our language concerning neonate Crusoes. But social 
constructionists provide the problem for investigation in psychology since 
they assert that an autonomous individual cannot, as a matter of fact, have 
a language. So, if we remove the idea that neonate Crusoes are simply 
philosophical fictions, and suppose that autonomous individuals do exist 
in the relevant sense of being individuals who follow a language privately, 
then within psychology there is conceptual confusion. The intention of the 
following argument is to expose the conceptual articulations of Coulter's 
social constructionism and his account of insanity as nonsense. This will 
enable a contrasting account of a conceptual development in psychology by 
advancing a theory of creativity built out of a study of the grammar of the 
concept of insanity. 
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Patent Nonsense to latent nonsense and back again 
Public ignorance of insanity is perhaps the reason behind philosophical 
assertions that what lies beyond sensible thought is madness. Only 
children are excused for engaging in frivolous thought. The 'stupid' are 
punished by the 'intelligent' who cling to the security of acquired 
knowledge and methods of reasoning which no one has been able to 
explain. One philosopher, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (1827-1898), explored 
the nature of madness through the medium of childrens' books. Although 
he was a serious logician who contributed to the fields of mathematics and 
symbolic logic, he is best known for his stories which were penned under 
the pseudonym 'Lewis Carroll'-the most famous of all his works is Alice's 
Adventures in Wonderland. 
In the introduction to The basic laws of Arithmetic, Frege (1964 reprinted 
translation) questions what it would be like for us to encounter beings who 
thought in ways which were contradictory to the way we think. In Alice's 
Adventures in Wonderland Alice encounters the Cheshire cat, among 
others, and she is placed in exactly the situation which Frege describes. 
Alice must decide what to make of the strange beings she encounters who 
engage in peculiar practices. Frege's option, although I am sure he did not 
have the Cheshire cat in mind, is to declare the beings mad:/lTheir thinking 
would appear to us as a hitherto unknown type of madness./I(BLA, p. xvi). 
Carroll presents mad characters (The march hare and the mad hatter) but it 
is the Cheshire cat who brings out the significance of the madness theme in 
the book and forces us to question the sense of insanity in a 'mad world'. 
Wittgenstein comments on Frege's introduction to the Grundgesetze der 
Arithmatik: 
" ... here we have a hitherto unknown kind of insanity"-but he 
never said what this 'insanity' would really be like." (RFM I, §151, 
p.44). 
Of the three logicians the most useful insight into what it might be like to 
encounter beings who thought in ways contradictory to our own comes 
from a child's story book. Frege's unwillingness to consider what madness 
is like is noted by Wittgenstein as an error, but it is Carroll who actively 
explores the notion of madness, perhaps not accidentally in a medium 
where the frivolous is acceptable. 
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Wonderland is an insane world where everyday events and principles 
which we take for granted are subverted into chaos and confusion (most 
notable is the concept of time-a grammatical regularity). Alice's encounter 
with the Cheshire cat offers the reader the opportunity for an explanation 
of the sense of Wonderland. The Cheshire cat informs Alice that, " ... we're 
all mad here. I'm mad. You're mad."{p. 78). Frege's assertion is the same 
as the cat's: viz., if we abandon our conceptual system of logic then surely 
nothing but madness remains. In Wonderland there is only a semblence of 
our ordinary practices so it is supposed only madness remains. Frege's 
appeal to the foundation of sense and logic might seem acceptable given 
this line of reasoning. For if one enters Wonderland, as Alice did, then 
surely one is mad. But such appeals are unwarranted. Consider Alice's 
reply: "How do you know I'm mad?" (p. 79). Which is equivalent to 
Wittgenstein's query: what would this 'insanity' really be like? The cat's 
reply is: "You must be or you wouldn't have come here." (p. 79). The cat is 
forced to employ an argument based on the syntactical form of the words 
used in his syllogism. The cat's argument is valid but meaningless-for it 
does not inform Alice what madness is, just that one criterion of madness 
is being in Wonderland. The narrator asserts: "Alice didn't think that 
proved it at all."{p. 79). 
Philosophical Investigations is littered with allusions to Lewis Carroll's 
writings. That Wittgenstein read and drew from the stories of Alice is 
unquestionable (Pitcher 1967). (There are explicit references to Lewis Carroll 
in Philosophical Investigations at PI §13 and on p. 198.) Both authors 
probed the nature of nonsense, but Wittgenstein held a radically different 
conception of the purpose of nonsense from Carroll. Wittgenstein's 
philosophy is devoted to clearing up misconceptions of philosophical 
thought which are entertained because they are superficially sensible but on 
closer examination are nonsense. Whereas Carroll held a different view. 
Pitcher (1967 p. 335) makes the point: 
Carroll turned his back on reality and led us happily into his 
(wonderful) world of myth and fantasy. Wittgenstein, being a 
philosopher, exerted all his efforts to drag us back to reality from 
the (horrible) world of myth and fantasy ... The same terrain that is 
the playground for Carroll, is the battlefield for Wittgenstein. 
That is why, although standing very close to one another, they 
may appear to the superficial eye to be worlds apart. 
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It is the 'terrain' (a grammar) that we must explore to develop an 
understanding on the concept of insanity and from that an understanding 
of the concept of creativity. The idea that insanity lies beyond a practice is 
mistaken. The word 'beyond' carries with it the relativism which will be 
rejected. Frege inserts a paradigmatic way of being, that logic is true across 
all time and space, between a rule and it extension. To follow a rule is to 
accord with the basic truths of logic-the truths of logic prescribe sense 
rather than being constitutive of what is sensible. It follows from this that 
what lies outside logic is unintelligible (nonsense) and since insanity is 
considered unintelligible it follows that insanity must be represented as 
being 'outside', or 'beyond' logic. But because Frege misrepresents the 
relation between a rule and its extension, he mistakes the nature of the 
concept of insanity. Social constructionists sometimes make a similar 
mistake, which should be clear from Chapter Three. Therefore the 
similarity between the following account of insanity from Coulter (1973) 
and Frege's reasoning should be of no surprise. 
Against the Social Construction of Insanity 
In Chapter Three the fundamental principle of social constructionism was 
criticised in respect of its relation to the philosophy of Wittgenstein. If 
social constructionists assert that society necessarily creates the norms 
which we all follow then they cannot lend support from Wittgenstein. The 
problem is one of separating 'context' from 'social context' and essentially 
this is the problem will occupy the rest of this thesis. 
To Coulter (1973), and social constructionism generally, the significance of 
unshared language-games could not be greater. Far from being 
philosophically uninteresting, unshared language-games are a great threat 
to the thesis of social constructionism. Coulter has tangled with a concept 
with seems to represent an unshared language-game, that of insanity. The 
possibility of an unshared language-game undermines the thesis that 
language is an essentially shared phenomenon created and maintained 
intersubjectively. If an insane person has an unintelligible or contradictory 
way of thinking, best represented by those phenomena we call delusions 
and hallucinations, then they do not conform to the social consensus. If 
someone were to claim that he could see with X-ray vision, despite all 
evidence to the contrary, we might say that he has abandoned the normal 
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conventions surrounding the use of the word 'seeing'. When Coulter 
claims that an insane person who is hallucinating is not a 'competent 
perceiver' he points to the fact that an insane person seems to abandon the 
social consensus (see below). The insane person has his own personal use 
of the word 'seeing'. According to social constructionism an unshared 
language-game is unintelligible-autonomous individuals are logically 
prevented from creating a language. If the insane individual operates 
ou tside the social consensus he would, according to social constructionism, 
be participating in an unshared language-game. Consequently those who 
are unintelligible to anyone else are insane by virtue not only of their 
unintelligibility to other people but also by the fact that they supposedly 
participate in an unintelligible practice, viz an unshared language-game. 
Coulter's version of social constructionism misrepresents the relation 
between a rule and its extension which he exploits when considering the 
concept of insanity. Coulter explains the illusory impossibility of an 
unshared language by regarding those who do not share the assumed 
logical requirement of language, that is conformity to social norms, by 
adopting a common expedient. Reasoning by elimination he regards all 
those who share the practice to be intelligible and sane and declares those 
who fall outside the social consensus unintelligible and insane. 
Coulter's (1973) account of insanity deals with the notion of an 
hallucination by appealing to socially prescribed conventions. To be a 
competent perceiver, according to Coulter, one must accept those 
conventions prescribed by society: 
This involves mastery of a stock of concepts; one could not 
perceive a table without the concept of a 'table', although one 
could certainly see something if one could see at all. Recognition 
of 'correct' or 'adequate' perception, then, is tied to a recognition 
of the social distribution of knowledge.(p. 115). 
But this type of reasoning leads us to question what possessing the' correct' 
or 'adequate' concept consists of. Coulter is mindful of not searching for 
some inner mysterious process to explain what an hallucination consists of 
but fails to adequately distinguish between 'seeing' and 'perceiving': 
Only someone trained in elementary botany could see a stamen; 
only someone trained in elementary physiology could see the 
fibula of a skeleton ... (p. 115)(italics mine). 
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Coulter's previous distinction between 'perceiving' and 'seeing' is vacuous 
and should now be treated with suspicion. The claim that 'correct 
perception' is a social process but 'seeing' is a physiological process is empty 
if no reasonable argument is presented for a distinction. The claim made by 
a schizophrenic that he can see a pink and grey striped rhinoceros running 
towards him will not be explained by saying that he is not a competent 
perceiver but sees very well indeed-suppose that nothing he sees can be 
understood by his assessors. (see below Chapter Five p. 174). 
Coulter runs into difficulty at every turn in his attempt to offer an account 
of what a 'correct' perception consists of. Coulter appeals to society as the 
final determinant for what is 'correct' in the same way Frege appeals to the 
basic axioms of logic. In Chapter Three it was argued that it is a mistake to 
place a 'third thing' between a rule and its extension. Here society 
determines whether or not a perception is 'correct' or 'adequate'. With the 
same reasoning as Frege, Coulter places insanity in the realm of the 
unintelligible. And, that which lies beyond what is sensible (determined by 
society) must be unintelligible. Therefore insanity, which is an 
unintelligible way of thinking, lies beyond our socially defined 'correct' or 
'adequate' ways of thinking. 
Coulter turns to Wittgenstein to support his conception of insanity. In 
particular he draws from Wittgenstein's last work On certainty, a collection 
of notes, presented as a separate topic, published after his death but accepted 
as not being a finished 'polished' work (Anscombe & von Wright, 1969 p. 
vie). Wittgenstein addresses many issues within this work, most 
obviously the epistemological issues and propositions which have the form 
"I know .... "(Morawetz, 1978 p. 1). Such issues have a direct bearing on the 
topics of creativity and insanity. Coulter relies on this work to support his 
general claim that insanity is a social ascription. But, as has been 
mentioned previously, it is a mistake to take Wittgenstein's arguments in 
isolation from what he deals with in other works-especially in this case 
where his work was 'unfinished'. Wittgenstein's On Certainty is a separate 
topic in one sense but it lends heavily on his previous works. In Chapter 
Three it was suggested that a general mistake of social constructionism was 
to insert society between a rule and its extension. Coulter's account of the 
concept of insanity serves to illustrate the misinterpretation of 
Wittgenstein and the mistake of social constructionism generally. 
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Coulter (1973 p. 137) appeals to the socially maintained conventions which 
provide the standard from which we can recognise legitimate doubting: 
We learn our natural language and factual beliefs pari passu, and 
together with that we find the socially sanctified areas of 
legitimate doubting ... If we are in a position where we find 
someone apparently doubting something which we find (and 
claim others would also find) no grounds for doubting (e. g., the 
existence of hands at the ends of his arms), then we may treat 
such signs of doubt as 'signs of defect'-the apparent doubter is 
not after all doubting, but is stupid, joking, pretending or 
insane ... Collective authority establishes the credentials for 
beliefs. This is true also of knowledge: 'knowledge is in the end 
based on acknowledgement'[C. §154]' as Wittgenstein put 
it.(Emphasis in original). 
What we take to be knowledge must be assessed against the practice of 
science within our culture. Those who abandon our techniques and 
practices, or perhaps never acquired them, we find unintelligible but this is 
not necessarily a 'sign of defect'. Wittgenstein was trying to explain that the 
certainty of a proposition like, "This is a hand" (Made by someone looking 
at his own hand) comes from a practice in which it makes no sense to doubt 
such things. Coulter falls within a variation of the Fregean reasoning 
which asserts that what lies beyond legitimate reasoning (either logic, or in 
Coulter case, social prescribed practices) is insanity, or some other defect. 
For example, consider Coulter's claim: 
These people, whether they believe that they are God, a machine, 
a corpse, or a many headed hydra, appear to us to operate quite 
outside the bounds of our system of verification and are 
therefore candidates for the ascription of insanity.(p. 
136)(Emphasis mine). 
On Coulter's view, similar to that of Frege's in essence, what lies beyond a 
particular practice (social practice) might be insanity. Coulter claims that 
Wittgenstein supports this idea by suggesting that what makes an assertion 
unintelligible is that it lies beyond our community standards. But, in the 
way Coulter uses this claim, it is a twist of Wittgenstein's point. The point 
to be drawn from Wittgenstein is that within our practice, or our culture, 
there is nothing, for example, which allows us to be mistaken about the 
existence of hands at the ends of our arms. It makes no sense to doubt the 
existence of your hand when looking at your own hand because there do 
not exist any criteria for doubting. There is no practice of doubting such 
things as whether there really are hands at the end of my arms when I look 
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at them or a floor beneath my feet when I open the door and walk out. 
Consequently, the application of doubt in this circumstance is 
nonsensical-that is, it has no use. To have a doubt it must be possible to be 
mistaken. But in ordinary circumstances there can be no mistake in the 
judgement that I have a hand when looking at my hand. The certainty 
which accompanies the observation that, "This is a hand" (when looking at 
a hand) comes from our practice in which nothing counts as a mistake in 
this circumstance. The claim "I don't have a hand" when looking at my 
hand is not a mistake but is unintelligible; we simply do not know what to 
make of such a proposition. 
Although it might be possible to be mistaken about such things in unusual 
circumstances. Consider a person who claims to feel his hand when it has 
in fact been amputated. He might claim to feel his hand and we would say 
that his experience of a 'phantom limb' is mistaken and provide evidence 
of his mistake (get the amputee to look to where he thinks his hand is). But 
in the case where a normal individual states he does not have a hand, 
when looking at his hand, an error is not made for we have no way to 
expose the error. The normal person is not mistaken but unintelligible; we 
simply do not know what he means. Furthermore it is impossible to know 
what would convince a normal person otherwise. What would count as 
criteria to expose what we take to be his 'mistaken' belief? We might 
declare the person crazy if they persisted, but we could not declare them 
mistaken. 
Morawetz (1978) draws on Wittgenstein's (1969) discussion of the nature of 
empirical propositions to gain an understanding of Wittgenstein's 
references to 'mental disturbance'. Wittgenstein held that not all empirical 
propositions are testable. There are propositions which take the form of an 
empirical question about which we cannot be mistaken. Some empirical 
propositions are not ordinarily tested and those who do seem to question 
these types of propositions might be candidates for the ascription of 'mental 
disturbance'. Empirical propositions take the form of an hypothesis which 
are testable against experience. However some empirical propositions are 
not testable and are to be contrasted against genuine hypotheses.12 
12 Wittgenstein mentions that he is inclined to 'fight windmills' 
in the expression of this idea. It does seem odd to suggest that 
empirical propositions are not testable given the meaning of the 
term empirical. Nevertheless the point is made clear in the 
context of the argument. 
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Consider the proposition, "The bathroom mirror will accurately reflect my 
image". Wittgenstein would deny that this is an empirical proposition. But 
it is conceivable that the mirror could twist, break, steam-up, or get dirty so 
that it does not reflect an accurate image. Surely then the statement, "The 
bathroom mirror will accurately reflect my image" is an empirical 
proposition; the proposition can be true or false and assessed by experience. 
Morawetz explains three reasons for Wittgenstein's claim. First, the 
proposition is not a genuine hypothesis because, "hypotheses are 
intentionally offered to account for disparate experiences and tested by new 
experience." (Morawetz, 1978 p. 39). Second, and related to the above, the 
proposition is hardly worth testing. We are not so vain as to wonder about 
the accuracy of a mirror in everyday life, but might be moved to question 
the accuracy of a mirror when searching the galaxy through a telescope. It is 
the circumstances which surround a proposition which make it a genuine 
hypothesis rather than a matter of everyday life. It is the context 
surrounding the employment of a proposition that makes a proposition 
interesting. Consider: 
What I am aiming at is also found in the difference between the 
casual observation III know that that's a ... ", as it might be used in 
everyday life, and the same utterance when a philosopher makes 
it. (C. §406). 
Wittgenstein's assertions here are similar to those which are argued for in 
Chapter Seven concerning the difference of a term used in everyday life 
and in psychology. The contexts which surround the use of a term in 
psychology and those used in everyday life are different. 
Third, and most important, in everyday circumstances the accuracy of my 
bathroom mirror is not a matter for testing but matter held fast in testing 
other propositions. The certainty that accompanies recognition of myself in 
the mirror is determined by my not doubting the accuracy of the mirror, it 
is, as it were, held fast in connection with all my other beliefs. I do not test 
the accuracy of the mirror to gain recognition of my image but I might 
recognise my image by the use of a mirror. Wittgenstein uses a different 
example to make the same point. He held that one does not determine 
one's own name by reading the name addressed on the letters in one's 
mailbox. However we determine whether the letters in our mailbox are 
our own by reading the name addressed on the letters. 
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Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine that I can awake one morning with no 
memory of who I am (the amnesia might be caused by some drug or a blow 
to the head) and like a detective searching for clues to piece together a 
crime, I might stare into the mirror only to see a stranger's face and wonder 
about the accuracy of the mirror. I might resort to reading my addressed 
letters to at least gain an impression of who I am. Clearly a context can 
change so that what seems like a matter which is held fast in the testing of 
other propositions becomes the subject of testing itself. Whether an 
hypothesis is a genuine empirical proposition is determined by the context 
in which it is used and its intended purpose. Nevertheless we still confront 
the problem that it seems that any 'non-empirical' proposition, what 
Morawetz terms 'methodological propositions' (A notion he gets from 
Wittgenstein which can be replaced with the notion of 'grammatical 
propositions'), can be turned into a genuine hypothesis given imaginable 
circumstances (a point which I will return to). 
The point to get clear is that some propositions are held fast within a 
language-game and are essentially untested and untestable. What counts as 
an empirical proposition must be considered against the background in 
which it is applied. To test anything requires a background from which the 
testing is intelligible. There are several qualifications to this conclusion 
which will be developed in Chapters Five and Six. What should be clear 
from Chapter One is that Wittgenstein would reject the idea that the 
principles of logic form the background from which all other things can be 
assessed. Most important is the notion that, on Wittgenstein's view, some 
empirical propositions cannot be tested, we cannot be mistaken about them, 
they are simply part of our practices and form the background from which 
other things are assessed. 
Throughout On Certainty Wittgenstein mentions conditions in which we 
might give an ascription of madness, insanity, or 'mental disturbance'.(c. 
§71, §73, §155, §271, §223, §420). Morawetz draws on Wittgenstein's 
presented distinction between a mistake and a mental disturbance. As 
mentioned previously, there are some situations in which a proposition 
has the form in which it is unintelligible because we cannot conceive of any 
possible mistake that could be made by the speaker or there are no grounds 
for which a mistake is possible. In the case where an amputee complains of 
a 'phantom limb' we can anticipate and correct the mistake: there are 
grounds for the mistake and evidence which proves the mistaken person's 
error. But in the case of the normal person who claims not to have a hand, 
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when looking at his own hand, we, II cannot understand the relation of the 
speaker to his error."(Morawetz, 1978 p. 40). Furthermore, we do not know 
what would be a test to prove this person's error-for it is not a genuine 
error at alL 
Morawetz concludes that when Wittgenstein uses the concept of mental 
disturbance he indicates that the person has some defect (p. 42). This seems 
to be in line with Coulter's claim. Wittgenstein's purpose was not to expose 
the nature of the concept of mental disturbance beyond the insight that 
some statements made by individuals which promote disagreement are not 
mistakes, because they are untestable and nothing is available to either 
understand or expose the mistake. We are left guessing what Wittgenstein 
would truly characterise as mental disturbance. It is important to realise 
that Wittgenstein uses these terms collectively to indicate the 
unintelligibility of a claim or action; his purpose was to identify the 
grammar of statements surrounding the use of terms like "I know that's 
a .... " and his use of terms like 'mental disturbance' are all related to that 
task. 
Morawetz, by relying on the distinction between testable hypotheses 
(empirical propositions) and non-testable hypotheses (methodological 
propositions), asks the question: "Can mental disturbance be manifest by 
the denial of what I have called "methodological propositions", for 
example, a denial that objects exist or that they continue in existence 
unperceived?" (1978 p. 42). However Morawetz does not answer his own 
question, (nor could he without changing the purpose of his investigation) 
instead he offers us the useful observation that: "Such claims may, 
diagnostically, be important metaphors for the patients self-conception or 
self-orientation to the world. But it is not clear that they are, except in an 
attenuated sense, beliefs or claims at all."(1978 p. 42). The second claim will 
be addressed shortly. 
It is necessary to examine Morawetz's first claim to attack Coulter's 
conception of insanity. The observation that the insane do not hold 
genuine beliefs or make genuine claims will be explained in contrast to 
Coulter's account of insanity. At first sight Morawetz might seem to 
support Coulter's claim that the insane operate, 'outside our system of 
verification', since Morawetz presents the view that 'methodological 
propositions' like, "This is a hand"(when looking at a hand) seem 
indubitable, roughly, because they are held fast within our social practice. 
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But to interpret Morawetz in this way is to offend against the delicate way 
he presents his question and misrepresents his contribution to the 
interpretation of Wittgenstein. 
Methodological Propositions 
Morawetz declares that 'mental disturbance' might be indicated by denying 
"methodological propositions". A methodological proposition is 
contrasted with an empirical proposition. We can be mistaken about an 
empirical proposition but because 'methodological propositions' form part 
of the background upon which our beliefs and claims are made they cannot 
be doubted, they do not obtain certainty, but in normal circumstances doubt 
is excluded as unintelligible, which makes the ascription of a mistake to the 
person who denies the methodological proposition equally unintelligible. 
Can an ascription of insanity be given as the result of the denial of 
'methodological propositions'? Of course! But the denial of a proposition 
like, "I have no reflection in a mirror", is not in itself indicative of insanity. 
Consider the case of a patient described by Kolb (1968 p. 379-380, cited in 
Szasz 1987, p. 285) where a 'typical catatonic schizophrenic' claimed that 
someone was after him and blaming him for the death of another man. He 
claimed he had been poisoned. His behaviour was unmanageable, he 
would break into fits of laughter for no apparent reason and would shout 
and remain noisy for periods of time. Eventually he was committed. This 
'insane' person had symptoms which were verifiable; his poisoning could 
be tested and his supposed harassment observed. The claim 'I have been 
poisoned' is a matter for tesing not the denial of a methodological 
proposition. But to further complicate this case the man claimed to have 
visions but would not describe them to anyone. 
The claim to have had visions might be considered in reference to 
Morawetz's question. If the man observed things which were such that we 
could not say he was simply mistaken or offer some other explanation for 
his behaviour, such as the taking of hallucinogenic drugs, then we would, 
as Morawetz's declares, not understand the "relation between the person 
and his error"(p. 40) (Although it is not clear that one can make an 'error' 
about a 'methodological proposition'-see below). But this does not 
characterise insanity. What is clear is that the person who hallucinated 
(without the other symptoms) would be unintelligible (This is poorly 
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expressed, the behaviour would be intelligible as an hallucination, but the 
proposition per se would be unintelligible). But surely, in the above case, 
other things are important, such as his behaviour and feelings of 
persecution, which are not the denial of 'methodological propositions' in 
the way Morawetz describes. Such things surround the ascription of 
insanity and cannot be ignored. Thus, while we might label someone 
insane because they deny methodological propositions it is not an 
observation which gets us any closer to a theoretical understanding of the 
concept of insanity. 
Morawetz might seem to offer little help in exposing Coulter's error. 
Nevertheless, despite Morawetz's somewhat weak attempt to offer an 
account of mental disturbance he does point us in the right direction. The 
denial of a methodological proposition leads to a person being 
unintelligible. It is necessary to understand the conditions in which a 
statement is unintelligible-although it might seem obvious already given 
the conditions offered in Chapter Two. Nevertheless by gaining a clear 
grasp of what Wittgenstein had to say about such matters it is possible to 
clearly see how Coulter goes wrong, and how to clear this type of confusion. 
Shared Rules and Social Consensus 
Throughout chapters Two and Three the idea was presented that the 
relation between a rule and its extension is internaL To understand a rule is 
to know what accords and conflicts with that rule (Chapter Two). Social 
agreement is not a necessary requirement for the formation of rules 
(Chapter Three). To understand a rule is to know what accords and conflicts 
with the rule, nothing mediates between a rule and its extension. There is 
no need to place anything between a rule and its extension. For an 
individual to be intelligible, or have a language, he must participate in a 
practice. To communicate effectively he must share a practice with other 
individuals. To communicate then it must be possible to share" a practice; in 
principle any practice is shareable by virtue of the fact that it is independent 
of the individual. The private language argument (described in Chapter 
Three) shows the unintelligibility of an unshareable practice. The 'rules' 
'followed' in a genuine private language are logically private and 
unshareable and hence are not rules at all. 
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The fact that we do share a language and communicate indicates that we 
share common practices. However, Baker and Hacker (1985) explain that, 
"painting the frame on to the canvas."(p. 234), including normality 
conditions or the background on which a language-game is played into an 
explanation of the language-game, is the result of multiple confusions 
about Wittgenstein's arguments relating to common agreement in the 
application of concepts and definitions. There are several features of our 
shared practices which are often included, mistakenly, in our explanations 
of the intelligibility of our communication or the unintelligibility of 
communications with other things (Humans, martians or animals) that 
need to be explained. 
The important idea that must be preserved is that the relation between a 
rule and what accords with a rule is an internal relation. The fact that we 
have common agreement over what accords with a rule does not make that 
agreement part of the explanation of what the correct application of a rule 
consists of. To put common agreement into an explanation of what it is for 
a rule to be correct misrepresents Wittgenstein's arguments and leads to the 
confusions detailed in Chapter Three. 
Coulter asserts that community consensus forms the basis from which we 
can describe legitimate doubting. 'Correct' perceptions and 'legitimate' 
doubting are determined by societal agreement. It is by contrast to 
community standards that the insane become candidates for the the 
ascription of insanity. The standards shared by the community provide the 
basis for the correct application of a rule. But Coulter gets the 
Wittgensteinian point completely backwards. Coulter's claim that we form 
shared agreement on what counts as legitimate doubting is addressed by 
Wittgenstein on the very first page of On certainty: 
From it seeming to me-or to everyone-to be so, it doesn't 
follow that it is so. 
What we can ask is whether it makes sense to doubt it. (c. §2). 
and again at C. §289: 
"We are quite sure of it" does not mean just that every single 
person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which 
is bound together by science and education. 
What makes an instance of a shared rule 'correct', or in accord with the 
rule, is not that we all agree on its application and misapplication but the 
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fact that it is a shared rule at all requires that we agree on the criteria for its 
application. Science and education are systems of shared rules (each has a 
'grammar') and our certainty and ability to doubt is contained within those 
systems. Since we share the grammar we share the certainty derived from 
that grammar. The point is subtle and difficult to grasp but essential to 
expose Coulter's mistake, and the mistake of social constructionism 
generally. 
To have a shared rule is to agree on what accords with a rule. We agree 
that we stop at red traffic lights and go on green lights but our agreement 
does not make the criteria for the rule 'correct'. To know a rule is to know 
what accords and conflicts with a rule. To know the rule, 'Stop at a red 
light' is to know that not stopping at a red light is breaking the rule and 
stopping is in accord with the rule. Coulter's interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's argument suggests that what determines whether one 
knows how to accord with the rule is socially determined: I know that 
claiming a mirror does not reflect my image is absurd because others 
inform me of the norms surrounding the correctness of my statements. For 
example, Biologists inform each other of the correct referent (criterion) of 
the use of the word 'stamen'. Thus only biologists, or someone similarly 
trained, knows the referent (criterion) of the word 'stamen'. But if the 
internal relation between a rule and its extension is preserved then to 
understand a rule at all is to know what accords and conflicts with that rule 
(Chapter Two). An individual who knows the road rules will know that 
stopping at a red light is correct. The fact that others would agree with him 
is irrelevant. In the same way a neonate Crusoe can know what is that 
correct application of a rule, an individual in society knows what is in 
accord with a rule and what is not if he knows the rule. And to be a rule at 
all requires a practice in which there is a criterion for the application of the 
rule (see Chapter Three). But an individual who knows a shared rule 
knows the criteria for its correct application by virtue of knowing the rule, 
not because everyone else would agree with that criteria-they agree by 
virtue of sharing the rule. 
If we did not have social agreement over traffic regulations chaos and 
disorder would intervene. It is true that shared understanding is necessary 
for shared practices. There are some preconditions to a shared 
understanding. It must be that we can all recognise red lights, know that 
they mean to stop, and that our ability or consensus does not change from 
one day to the next or at random intervals across a day. If it were the case 
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that any of these background preconditions did not obtain we would not be 
able to have shared rules at all. But the fact that the world is stable so that 
we see red light consistently, that physiologically nearly everyone can 
distinguish colours, and that by consensus we have all agree to stop at a red 
light does nothing to undermine the internal relation between a rule and 
its extension. To know the rules governing traffic behaviour is also to 
know the criteria concerning such things as traffic lights. The correct 
employment of these rules presupposes certain abilities and background 
preconditions. These features of our language-games are the background 
upon which the game is played. Wittgenstein referred to these 
'preconditions' as a 'form of life'. Consider: 
"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true 
and false?"-It is what human beings say is true and false; and 
they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in 
opinions but in form of life. (PI §241). 
But because the term 'form of life' is little understood the 'preconditions' 
will be dealt with individually. 
Lewis Carroll exploits the stability that obtains in the natural world and the 
background preconditions which are necessary for the employment of our 
concepts to make nonsense by removing those preconditions in 
Wonderland. Our normal understanding of events and our descriptions 
are lost m a world of chaos and confusion. Consider Wittgenstein's 
remark: 
'It is as if our concepts involved a scaffolding of facts. ' 
That would presumably mean: If you imagine certain facts 
otherwise, describe them otherwise, than the what they are, 
then you can no longer imagine the application of certain 
concepts, because the rules for their application have no 
analogue in the new circumstances. (Z §350). 
Lewis Carroll's 'nonsense' is obtained by removing the applicability of the 
rules for the use of words-removing facts, background conditions, or 
applying a rule in an inappropriate circumstance. We can understand the 
words, but not their application. Carroll manages to tease and torment us 
within his own created domain. It is the contrast between our application 
of terms and those which obtain in Carroll's nonsense that make the 
writing nonsense which is intelligible (In the same sense that a mistake is 
intelligible) in contrast to the nonsense produced by the babblings of a child. 
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Croquet is a game played according to certain rules. A wooden mallet is 
used to hit a ball through iron hoops in order to hit a peg. The course is set 
out and the winner is the first to complete the course. But in Wonderland 
the game of Croquet is obscured almost beyond recognition. Alice, talking 
to the now rather helpful Cheshire cat, points to some problems with the 
Wonderland version of 'Croquet': 
"I don't think they play at all fairly," Alice began, in rather a 
complaining tone, "and they all quarrel so dreadfully one ca'n't 
hear oneself speak-and they don't seem to have any rules in 
particular: at least, if there are, nobody attends to them-and 
you've no idea how confusing it is all the things being alive: for 
instance, there's the arch I've got to go through next walking at 
the other end of the ground-and I should have croqueted the 
Queen's hedgehog just now, only it ran away when it saw mine 
coming" (1971 p. 103). 
Of course a game with no rules is not a game at all. But suppose the 
difficulty of the 'game' in which Alice is engaged is due to the creatures 
running around. The' game' would not be a game of croquet because 
croquet contains the rules like, 'hitting the opposition ball is a rewarded by 
another turn'. We simply could not play croquet if the arches disappeared 
or the ball had a 'mind of its own'. Nevertheless, the rules of croquet do 
not include such conditions as, 'the arches will not run off or disappear'. 
These conditions are necessary preconditions to play the game of Croquet; 
without these preconditions it makes no sense that one can play Croquet; it 
would be like playing cricket with a basket ball. 
Wittgenstein refers to a number of examples to make the same point. 
Baker and Hacker (1985 p. 229) identify three. First, if colours changed at 
random so that we could never see the same object as the same colour we 
would have no use for colour terms at all. Second, if whenever we placed 
the same object on a scale it grew or shrank in mass, we would have no use 
for scales, no need for measuring weight-There would be no 'weight' to 
measure: not because there would be, metaphysically, no 'weight' to 
measure but because the purpose of the task of measuring would have been 
lost. Third, our clocks generally agree within a certain range, if this 
agreement did not occur, the idea of measuring time would be empty. The 
consistency obtained in our measurements is related to the 'stability of the 
world' which facilitates the employment of measuring techniques but does 
not explain them or enter into explanations of why those techniques are 
'correct'. To know the correct time is not to know that my watch normally 
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gives me the correct time; but the fact that my watch normally gives me the 
correct time enables me to know the correct time. 
Misunderstanding the nature of our normative concepts can lead to many 
confusions. In psychology, for instance, there are those who claim to be 
able to raise the intelligence (not to be confused with IQ score) of 
individuals by educating them within certain programmes. How would we 
measure an increase? Intelligence tests are designed to identify a stable and 
fixed characteristic of the individual regardless of their education. There 
would be no point in creating a test for intelligence or designing the 
construct of intelligence if it fluctuated from one day to the next. To assess 
whether intelligence can be increased we cannot employ standard 
intelligence tests for they are designed to measure a stable characteristic of 
the individual. In order to say whether intelligence can be increased by 
some programme of training we would be required to change the concept 
and our ways of measuring the concept so that the concept allowed for a 
change through education. But now we would no longer be measuring an 
increase in the construct we first set out to assess. Programmes designed to 
promote intelligence cannot employ standard intelligence tests to assess 
their effectiveness. The usefulness of psychometric tests is derived from 
the preconditions which surround the formation of the development of 
psychological constructs. A claim that intelligence can be increased by some 
educational programme is not a debate about the validity of intelligence 
tests but a challenge to the nature of the psychological construct and the 
preconditions which are necessary for psychometric tests. The claim that 
"an increase in intelligence possible through an educational programme" 
is nonsense because there is no longer any criteria to establish what an 
increase consists of; the idea of measuring the 'increase' has no application. 
In the same way the stability of the natural world forms a background upon 
which our language-games are played, so does social consensus. The 
stability of the world, our shared discriminatory capacities and potentials, 
and belonging to a society all facilitate the building of conceptual structures, 
or grammars. In the same way that the rules of Croquet are built upon the 
presupposition that the arches will not run off, we build our shared rules 
on the presuppositions of our biological capacities and shared 
understanding of rules, amongst other things. 
In our society we regulate the flow of road traffic by the use of traffic lights. 
But suppose that instead of the three lights, which are customary, we had 
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only one light which changed colour by the use of a coloured filter. 
Suppose also that half of the population were completely colour blind. 
Chaos and disorder would disrupt the regular flow of traffic. Half of the 
population would be incapable of determining whether they should go or 
not, they could not follow the rule. Similarly if our population could not 
agree that green means go and red means stop, if half the population 
stopped on green and the other half on red, then we would not have a 
regulation for traffic at all; chaos and disorder would intervene. It is a 
logical requirement of road regulations that we all agree on their 
application. Without agreement there would be no shared rule. However a 
traffic regulation is not made correct because we all agree on a particular 
rule; if we did not agree it would not be a rule at all-the purpose of traffic 
regulation would be lost. 
We might like to say that someone is insane by virtue of the fact that we all 
agree that he displays symptoms which we declare to be representative of 
insanity, and that the ascription is correct because we all agree. Consider 
Wittgenstein's response to such a belief: 
I, L.W., believe, am sure, that my friend hasn't sawdust in his 
body or his head, even though I have no direct evidence of my 
senses to the contrary. I am sure, by reason of what has been said 
to me, of what I have read, and of my experience. To have doubts 
about it would seem to me madness-of course, this is also in 
agreement with other people; but I agree with them. (c. §281). 
So despite Coulter's assurance that Wittgenstein endorses the view that we 
form a collective knowledge which seems to contrast the intelligible against 
the unintelligible we can see that Wittgenstein's point was more subtle. 
Shared rules provide the background for intelligible communication, but 
agreement over shared rules is not part of the explanation of intelligibility, 
and more interesting, unintelligibility in relation to the symptoms of 
insanity. The fact that we might all agree on what is intelligible does not 
make those things agreed upon 'correct' or 'adequate' in contrast to what is 
considered 'deviant' and 'insane'. Agreement over a rule is a precondition 
for employment of certain social rules; it is not a logical requirement of 
language use that we agree with others. The following sections explore this 
conclusion in greater detail. 
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Unintelligibility on Trial 
Unintelligibility arises when there is a circumstance in which a rule is 
unshared or, as in the case of the genuine private language, the rule is 
unshareable. That there is the possibility of unshared rules (not 
unshareable rules) leads us to the possibility of having encounters with 
unintelligible persons. The difference between an unshared rule and one 
that is unshareable is the difference between a potentially intelligible 
language, or system of rules, and the genuine private language. A neonate 
Crusoe is potentially intelligible by virtue of the fact that he has a language 
based on practice which is external to him.(see Chapter Three, pp. 114-115). 
We have seen that it is a mistake to consider that there is such a thing as a 
genuine 'private language'. Wittgenstein (1969) uses the ascriptions: 
'mental disturbance', 'deranged', 'crazy', 'mad', 'out of his wits', and 'insane' 
to characterise those persons who, to use Morawetz's term, deny 
methodological propositions-those who are not mistaken, or in error, but 
are unintelligible. Wittgenstein slides out of a difficult situation by the use 
of these terms. If the private language is unintelligible (By virtue of being 
logically unshareable) and those who deny methodological propositions are 
'unintelligible', then perhaps, to be consistent, Wittgenstein would need to 
suggest that 'mental disturbance' is a 'genuine private language'. 
Wittgenstein does not actually describe the private language as being 
'unintelligible', Hacker (1986) does so: 
as long as the concepts of sensation or experience are conceived to 
be determined by a 'private' rule involving a 'private' sample, 
this is unintelligible. (p. 265). 
And indirectly: 
The supposition of the intelligibility of a person's following such 
rules lies at the heart of idealism and solipsism. If Wittgenstein's 
argument is correct the deep and ineradicable flaws of these 
philosophical pictures have at last been definitively brought to 
light.(p. 272). 
If one continues with this interpretation of Wittgenstein's position one 
arrives at a impasse with regards to Wittgenstein's use of the terms 
'madness' and the like in On Certainty. Suppose we accept that the genuine 
private linguist is 'unintelligible' to himself by virtue of not having any 
genuine rule for the application of his terms. Wittgenstein labels, at least 
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some of the time, those who deny methodological propositions 'mad' and 
by this it is meant that they are not mistaken, in error, and so on but are 
unintelligible. One might continue, the insane, on this line of reasoning, 
are insane because they do not have any genuine rules for the application 
of their terms, thus they are unintelligible. Alternatively, we can declare 
the insane person's assertions 'potentially intelligible' and declare 
Wittgenstein's use of his ascriptions of mental disturbance in On Certainty 
incomplete; he cannot say that someone who denies a methodological 
proposition is unintelligible. We might say that such a person is initially 
incomprehensible but not logically unintelligible. But if we are to regard 
the insane as genuinely unintelligible, without resorting to describing them 
as possessing a genuine private language, we must preserve the notion that 
they are following rules privately which cannot be shared. Is there any 
room for a conception of insanity within the conditions so far described by 
Wittgenstein's philosophy? It is significant that Wittgenstein does not 
describe the private language as simply unintelligible as Hacker does at 
convenience. But surely 'following rules privately which cannot be shared' 
is a 'private language' in the way Wittgenstein described (see Chapter 
Three). But this is not so for there is, at least, one other option which is left 
open. That is that the concept of insanity characterises those who break the 
rules laid down by a particular community. 
For any rule there is the possibility of breaking that rule. If I made up my 
own rules privately, as a neonate Crusoe could possible do, then breaking 
my own rules carries, trivially, no social consequence. But shared rules 
carry with them commitments such as shared judgements over the criteria 
for the rule. We share what counts as for and against the rule. If we did 
not share agreement over rules, what counts for them, and against them, 
then there would be no shared rule. Depending on the function of the 
shared rule, breaking the rule will provoke various social consequences. 
Wearing green socks with a dinner suit probably will not induce much 
social reaction. But standing on the top of a building and declaring that one 
can fly without any mechanical apparatus will probably bring out the fire 
brigade and other emergency services. Morawetz identifies the significance 
of methodological propositions to our shared social practice by contrasting 
them to empirical propositions. It is the significance we impart to 
methodological propositions, the importance they play in our shared 
language-games, which tempts us to declare someone insane for using 
words in such a way as to deny the proposition. But, as was illustrated in 
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the case of the paranoid schizophrenic earlier, the denial of a 
methodological proposition does not in itself constitute a characterisation 
of the conceptual grounds for the ascription of insanity. 
It has been argued that a person who is insane is unintelligible. To be 
unintelligible is to follow a rule privately: at least, following a private rule 
is sufficient to produce unintelligibility. Conversely, to be intelligible to one 
another we must share judgement over the criteria which accord with the 
shared rule. But private rules are potentially intelligible since if they are 
genuine rules then they can in principle be learnt by others. But to avoid 
calling the insane unintelligible by declaring them to possess a genuine 
private language-which is as we have seen a phantasmagoria of 
philosophy-it is suggested that the insane break rules. But by breaking 
rules it seems impossible, upon first impression, to be following a rule-
even privately. 
Suppose an individual who belongs to a particular community breaks the 
rule that:"We accurately see our image in the mirror" by asserting that 
"That image is not me" when looking into a mirror, or if the possibility 
that plastic surgery is considered, "I have no reflection", despite general 
agreement to the contrary. The individual who breaks the rule is also 
following a rule. An individual who knows the rule also (logically) knows 
what counts against the rule. Thus, by adopting what conflicts with the rule 
instead of what accords with the rule his statement is an instance of 
breaking the rule. The individual merely adopts the criteria which counts 
against a particular rule and refuses to accept the criteria which others 
accept. In doing so the individual is following a rule privately 
(individually) which is unshared and more importantly, if a society is to 
maintain its shared intelligible rule, it is also unshareable; but not logically 
unshareable-thus the difference between this description of insanity and a 
genuine private language. The society could (logically) adjust the shared 
practice to accord with that of the 'insane' individual. Therefore the 
requirements for unintelligibility are maintained without offending against 
the description of the 'private language' as being unintelligible. 
The consequences of this conceptual difference between rules followed 
privately which are unshareable (but not logically unshareable) and 
Wittgenstein's description of the unintelligibility of the private language 
are of critical importance for further considerations of the concept of 
'creativity', progress in science, and social change. There are wider 
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implications of regarding the ascription of insanity to characterise those 
who break the shared rules of a social practice. The notion of an 
autonomous individual developed in Chapter Three characterises all those 
who do not participate in a shared social practice because they engage in 
unshared practices. Within the broader category of autonomous 
individuals both the concepts of 'insanity' and 'creativity' are subsumed. 
But the concept of 'creativity' must be distinguished from the concept of 
'insanity'-they have different uses-while the similarity between them 
preserved. The above argument characterises the concept 'insanity' to be 
correctly ascribed to those who stand independent of society in a way 
radically different from Coulter's view. The insane do not simply operate 
outside our community's shared practice. It is a requirement of the concept 
of insanity that the ascription is given to those who have been aware of the 
rules of our social practices. This sort of dependency extends to the creative. 
A person who changes our orientation to medicine and reveals a cure for 
cancer is creative. The anthropologist who finds a lost tribe who have the 
cure for cancer has made a discovery.13 Both are noble achievements but 
the only the former is creative (This is examined again in later chapters). Of 
course, while there are similarities between the concepts of insanity and 
creativity revealed by examining the general notion of autonomous 
individuals there are also differences. We cannot regard the creative as 
simply breaking the rules of a shared social practice, although this might 
happen, since then the creative would be logically unintelligible (see 
below). 
The concept of insanity can be understood as an individual's reaction 
against the shared rules of a society. In the same way a thief is one who 
breaks the rule 'thou shalt not steal' the insane break fundamental rules 
which bind a community. In a society where all property is communal 
there is no such thing as theft. The concept of 'theft' is tied to the concept of 
'property'. But to have a community at all is to have shared rules. If 
insanity is considered as a reaction against shared rules it follows we could 
never rid ourselves of insanity without ridding ourselves of community. 
Wittgenstein was well aware that this obtains: 
If in the midst of life we are in death, so in sanity we are 
surrounded by madness. (RFM, IV, §53 p. 157). 
13 If this seems unconvincing suppose that martians land and give 
us the cure for cancer-there would be no new discovery at all on 
the part of an 
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So by representing the concept of insanity as the breaking of fundamental 
rules which are unintelligible because they cannot be shared it is possible to 
understand that intelligible (sane) and unintelligible (in this sense, the 
insane) are two sides of the same coin. The notion of insanity is intimately 
tied to a community, a practice, or set of shared rules (which produce our 
notion of intelligibility). It is presumed that it is for this reason that 
Wittgenstein addresses the mad, crazy, and mentally disturbed, in 0 n 
Certainty, where he discusses at length the qualities and requirements of 
shared practices. 
In medieval times an individual could hardly believe that they had a 
micro-chip inserted into their brain by Soviet spies which projected their 
thoughts to all around them although it might have been possible to 
believe the same result occurred by the interference of a witch. The shared 
understanding of propositions which surround the terms 'micro-chip', and 
'Soviet', were unavailable (They were not shared by any society in medieval 
times) and so the possibility of breaking these rules also does not obtain. 
Consequently the form that insanity takes is relative to the rules available 
(shared) in a particular society. 
Wittgenstein discusses the intelligibility of unshared rules in reference to 
primitive tribes (Discussed at length in the next chapter). They, for 
instance, might suppose that the ghosts of their ancestors inhabit the living 
and talk to them to provide inspiration for ways of acting. Our society does 
not accept such explanations and therefore find the explanations of the 
tribespeoples' actions unintelligible. Perhaps we would even declare such 
explanations of actions as indications of madness since they explain all 
their actions with reference to ghosts speaking to them and such assertions 
are taken as being a symptom of schizophrenia (auditory hallucinations). 
But for a tribe it might form a part of their culture, religion, self-perception 
and so on. Their society shares this belief. In the primitive tribe it might be 
considered madness to suppose that the individual was responsible for 
their ways of acting since it is the ghosts which are responsible for all action. 
While we find the explanation unintelligible we could hardly declare the 
whole tribe insane. That this set of practices is contingently unshared (with 
us) makes it 'initially unintelligible', but it is possible for us to learn the 
practices and customs of other tribes-their language-games are not 
impenetrable and so are logically, at least, potentially intelligible (And open 
to rejection, see Chapter Five), But if tomorrow I read in the newspaper that 
an individual raised in our society is committed to a psychiatric institution, 
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after declaring that all his actions were really guided by the ghosts inside his 
head, I· would not be surprised at all-the individual's explanation is 
unintelligible. The same action (The declarations about the ghosts) which 
lies 'beyond' our community's shared practices, since they are both 
contingently unshared, is in one case potentially intelligible and in the 
other, prima facie, not potentially intelligible. For it to become intelligible 
society would need to change its conception of auditory reports, 
responsibility, and so on, to be commensurate with that of the 'insane' 
person. 
Surely the above examples endorse Coulter's account of the nature of 
insanity; insanity is relative to community standards. However, for 
Coulter, not only is the person from our community unintelligible, so are 
those from different cultures. Both a travelling tribe member, and the bona 
fide schizophrenic with auditory hallucinations, operate beyond our 
cultural practice. On Coulter's account someone, like Galileo, could be 
considered a candidate for the ascription of insanity for being ahead of their 
time since he, for a time, had, a 'different system of verification'. But more 
generally and most importantly, if a person is insane because they have a 
different system of verification which is outside our own then they are 
potentially intelligible. This would not only offend against our use of the 
term, because we suppose that insanity is represented by irrationality, 
unintelligibility, and so on, but it would also offend against Wittgenstein's 
philosophical dealings with unintelligibility in On Certainty, from which 
Coulter claims philosophical support. The reason why Coulter makes this 
mistake is because he is committed to the social constructionist doctrine 
which misrepresents Wittgenstein's arguments relating to shared rules and 
social agreement. 
Fischer (1990) compounds confusion relating to the concept of insanity and 
its use within Wittgenstein's writing. Like Coulter (1973), Fischer regards 
the concept of insanity as representing those who lie beyond the standards 
of a shared practice but insists that: 
If we comprehend insanity as a changed grammar, as a changed 
picture of the world to which a coordinate form of life 
corresponds, then we can recognize the internal logic of lunacy. 
Also, the language of the lunatic and lunatic reality are related to 
each other recursively, so that the reality of the lunatic is as full 
of verification for him as ours is for us .... Accordingly, the 
thinking of the lunatic is not wrong but different. (p. 283). 
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But Fischer fails to deal adequately with the notion and use of 
'unintelligibility'. We cannot declare those who lie outside our system of 
verification 'insane'. It is tempting to follow Fischer in believing that 
something is revealed about the insane person's system of verification by 
virtue of it being potentially intelligible because it falls outside our system 
of verification. But then the concept of insanity drops out of the picture, we 
would no longer talking about the insane as Wittgenstein makes clear: 
What should we say if we found people who made judgments 
contrary to our logical propositions? What should we say if we 
found people who did not recognize our logical laws a priori, but 
arrived at them by a lengthy process of induction? Or if we even 
found people who did not recognize our laws of logic at all and 
who made logical propositions opposite to ours? He [Frege] says, 
"I should say 'Here we have a new kind of madness'-whereas 
the psychological logician could only say 'Here's a new kind of 
logic'. (LFM, XXI, p. 202). 
Wittgenstein offers us two examples of practices which are contradictory to 
our own. The first concerns wood sellers who instead of selling wood 
according to the usual methods of calculating adopt the rule of measuring 
the length and breadth of a pile but not its height. "The rule is to pay 
according to the product of length and breadth"(LFM, p. 202). By adjusting 
the dimensions of the pile one is able to manipulate the price. The same 
amount of wood spread over a greater area of ground costs more according 
to the woodseller. Under this condition Wittgenstein comments that the 
Woodsellers might say "Welt he's buying more now, so he must pay 
more"(LFM, p. 202) and declares that: "We might call this a kind of logical 
madness. But there is nothing wrong with giving wood away. So what is 
wrong with this? We might say, "This is how they do it." (LFM, p. 202). 
The second example makes the point more precisely. Different, and 
divergent, practices (Further examined in Chapter Six) remain initially 
unintelligible to us but are not logically impenetrable. Thus of people who 
operate beyond our system of mathematics, who divide nine by three and 
get four, we do not call mad, on Wittgenstein's account; "What should we 
then say? 'We cannot understand them.fI'(LFM, p. 203). Thus we cannot on 
Wittgenstein's account declare someone mad for simply failing to 
understand their practice. Furthermore there is nothing wrong with their 
practice, save that it contradicts our own. Far from drawing the conclusion 
that both Coulter and Fischer draw, Wittgenstein regards it as an error to 
present different practices as being anything more than practices we do not 
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understand-Even if those practices contradict such things as logic which 
we are tempted to consider as basic to all our practices (as Frege considered 
see Chapter One pp. 16-24). 
Social constructionists provide an attractive way of looking at psychological 
concepts. For the concept of insanity and many others, are necessarily social 
phenomenon, to be understood against a particular social background. But 
they make the mistake of placing the correctness of an ascription, or rule, in 
the hands of the community. The point, concerning the concept of 
insanity, is that without a community we could not make an ascription of 
insanity-It is not; fa community makes an ascrip tion of insanity'. The 
shared practices of a community do not prescribe the correctness of a rule 
they are constitutive of what counts as the rule in a particular circumstance. 
A confusion which might arise is that of placing any causal components 
into this conceptual description of the the form of insanity. No claim has 
yet been made as to why insanity occurs. The claim that insanity cannot be 
removed from a community is a logical claim about the form of the concept 
not a causal claim about the impossibility of finding a cure to all forms of 
deviance (Not that I would expect one). 
Consider Morawetz's second observation regarding the denial of 
methodological propositions: " .. .it is not clear that they are, except in an 
attenuated sense, beliefs or claims at all."(1978 p. 42). The insane produce 
symptoms, such as delusions and hallucinations, which appear to be 
systems of beliefs. But on the view presented, they do not produce a new 
system of verification, pace Coulter and Fischer, they break the rules of the 
system of verification which the rest of us share. It follows that 
hallucinations are not genuine belief claims since belief claims are what are 
shared by the rest of the community-remembering that to make a belief 
claim one requires that certain other propositions are held fast. This 
requirement is undermined in the case of the insane who, it is suggested, 
break those propositions which allow (Are logical preconditions for) the 
shared practice to make belief claims. 
Morawetz's claim is correct in the sense that various other forms of 
systematised beliefs, say for example those of a foreign culture, may be 
unintelligible to us (That we fly to the moon and back in our dreams, C. 
§106), but are still belief claims. And we would not consider these beliefs 
representative of insanity simply because they are unintelligible-they are 
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potential intelligible and therefore not insane but simply different. 
Delusions, manifest in the denial of methodological propositions, may well 
be presented as belief claims, but in contrast to what is accepted by a 
community they are not belief claims-we can be mistaken about beliefs 
but not methodological propositions. The action of breaking a 
methodological proposition is unintelligible to the shared practice and 
furthermore not a genuine belief claim because it undermines the 
precondition that to make a belief claim a grammatical proposition must be 
held without doubt. But Morawetz's observation, even if it is accepted, does 
not help gain a clearer understanding of the concept of insanity since a 
methodological proposition can be denied and be presented as a genuine 
belief claim. So, for example, Galileo can claim that the earth moves as a 
genuine belief despite the fact that an overwhelming number of people in 
his time believed the complete opposite (The same idea was presented with 
regard to having amnesia and reading one's mail to find one's identity). 
Morawetz cannot characterise the concept of insanity by including the 
additional requirement that the denial of a methodological proposition 
must not be presented as a belief claim. It is possible to deny a 
methodological proposition and make a genuine belief claim without 
bringing the ascription of insanity, as Galileo achieved. 
Metaphor, Analogy, and Nonsense: 
When does the rule stretch to breaking point? 
To contrast what might be described as 'mental disturbance' Wittgenstein 
introduces a notion of 'the reasonable man'. To be reasonable is to follow 
the shared rules of a social group without breaking the rules; to abide by 
community standards. But nothing said so far has suggested that because 
we have a shared rule we must abide by that rule. Nothing logically 
prevents me breaking a rule, I can deny any scientific fact. But as 
Wittgenstein remarks: 
Thus we should not call anybody reasonable who believed 
something despite of scientific evidence. (c. §324). 
Within our culture we argue based on scientific evidence. For instance, we 
generally accept that the earth moves around the sun in an annual cycle, 
that the earth is round and that something called gravity keeps us from 
falling off. I would not take someone seriously if he asserted that the earth 
was centre of the universe around which all other things revolved, not 
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because I have special access to the scientific evidence, or even understand 
it, but because I believe the authority of textbooks which tell me that this 
claim is not so. The belief that the earth is the third planet in the 
heliocentric system is ingrained into the shared practice of science-it is 
reasonable to follow these sources. Nevertheless, there was a time when 
the remark, "The earth moves" was considered offensive to a set of 
community standards and beliefs-all evidence was thought to suggest 
otherwise. To suggest that the earth moves was considered the denial of 
what Morawetz would describe as a methodological proposition, an 
indubitable truth not subject to testing by experience, part of our whole 
system of assessing things, part of our 'form of life' (In Chapter Five this is 
referred to as a 'Form of representation'). 
But we do not always agree over the rule. And yet it has been suggested that 
we must agree on the application of the rule to be intelligible to one 
another and to declare the unintelligible mad. Galileo disagreed with the 
established tradition in the church that God, " .. .laid the foundation of the 
earth, that it should not be removed for ever." (Psalm 104: cited in 
Gingerich 1982 p. 119). He clearly broke away from the established tradition 
by asserting that the Copernican system of the planets was indeed true. The 
Church tried to persuade Galileo to present his argument as hypothesis 
rather than fact (Gingerich 1982) but despite their efforts Galileo insisted 
that his observations proved the Copernican system. 
Consider Gingerich's (1982) summary of Galileo's position: 
Galileo defended the Copernican system by a series of ingenious 
arguments, many of them based on his new telescopic 
observations. From a modern point of view Galileo's defence 
seems immediately compelling, but when he presented his ideas, 
there was as yet no observational proof of the new cosmology, 
and even he remarked that he could not admire those who 
adopted the heliocentric system in spite of the evidence of their 
senses. (p. 119). 
But Galileo treated the proposition, 'the earth does not move' as an 
empirical proposition and his observations of the phases of Venus through 
his telescope provided the impetus for him make the claim as fact rather 
than hypothesis. Does that evidence produce grounds for changing the rule 
held in the seventeenth century, that the earth is the centre does not move 
and the planets revolve around the sun? Most importantly how does 
Galileo's assertion differ from those presented by the insane? If the belief, 
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held in the seventeenth century, that 'the earth does not move' accurately 
represents Morawetz's conception of a methodological proposition, it is not 
suggested that it does, then surely Morawetz would have to submit that 
Galileo was a candidate for the ascription of insanity. But what does this 
candidacy consist of? Wittgenstein is willing to declare that someone might 
be crazy for denying the certainty that accompanies a mathematical 
calculation (c. §217). But he is also willing to exclude a prima facie absurdity 
from the ascription given the context that one is philosophising (C. §467) 
despite the suggestion that, without any particular reason, the presentation 
of irrelevant material is indicative of insanity(C. §468). Surely, tomorrow, I 
can make the assertion: "the earth is flat and unmoving", perhaps in 
reference to a piece of land upon which I want to build. Nothing about the 
proposition per se makes it unintelligible. 
So this Wittgensteinian approach seems to lose all its force. What good is it 
to suggest that there are undoubtable propositions (Methodological 
propositions) if in a different context, or across changing historical periods, 
what was once considered an indubitable truth, say that the earth does not 
move, becomes an empirical proposition, subject to doubt and testing like 
the most tentative theories for which we presently seek verification? Can I 
say that the denial of any proposition will be intelligible given some 
interpretation, perhaps based on some evidence not yet presented, as with 
the case with Galileo? 
The objection to Wittgenstein's position is strong. Morawetz presents the 
argument differently: 
... no p is such that one can think of all circumstances in which p 
might be relevant. If this is so, one can never be in a position to 
claim that there will be no circumstances in which p is dubitable. 
P may simply be such that the speaker cannot readily describe a 
context of dubitability. And not only this: I (as speaker) am not 
even entitled to claim with certainty that the presen t 
circumstances are not (for reasons which I fail to realize) the very 
ones in which p ought to be doubted. (p. 104). 
If any proposition can become an empirical proposition given some context 
then it is possible that I can be mistaken about a particular claim. If all 
assertions can be considered mistaken, given some context, rather than 
unintelligible, then nothing really counts as unintelligible. Consequently, 
nothing would legitimately count as insanity. For some imaginable context 
will make any proposition intelligible. Those statements which seem to be 
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beyond doubt, unmistakable, like "This is a hand (When looking at my 
hand) are subject to doubt depending on the context. The result is that the 
concept of insanity, on this view, could not be used to refer to those who 
are unintelligible. Notwithstanding that if this argument is accepted we 
must reject Wittgenstein's account of doubt and certainty, we must also 
accept that nothing counts as an unintelligible proposition. Everything 
about this approach seems to fall apart. 
A convenient summary of what has been presented and the problem IS 
provided by Wolgast (1985): 
Wittgenstein puzzled over Moore's truisms because they were 
propositions whose certainty rested neither on evidence nor 
upon a grammatical ground. They appeared to fall between the 
traditional classes of empirical and a priori.. .. they appear to be 
empirical yet play the role of a priori propositions; their position 
in our language is similar to a priori propositions, yet they are 
capable of change and one can imagine a language where their 
position is quite different. Thus they are like propositions which 
state contingent facts and express beliefs ... What is the nature of 
these propositions then? ... It is in answer to this question that 
Wittgenstein turns our attention away from the propositions and 
speaks instead of a form of life (p. 515). 
A proposition like: "The earth moves" in the seventeenth century might be 
considered as the denial of what was then a methodological proposition. 
But the fact that nowadays we consider the opposite assertion: "The earth 
does move" a methodological proposition brings us a problem concerning 
what is and what is not intelligible to a particular community. To deny a 
methodological proposition is to behave in an unintelligible way. But in a 
different context or time the denial of the same proposition is not 
unintelligible. How is it possible to have the certainty about propositions 
such that we can make an ascription of insanity to those who deny them 
and accept that by some creative process our language-games change? 
Consider Coulter's view: 
We constantly construct, affirm and enforce a collective 
authority intersubjectively. This anthropocentrism is expressed 
in the phrase: 'our whole system of verification'. We sustain it; it 
does not sustain itself through us. But we cannot drop it at will 
and adopt something else in its place. It is humanly constructed 
and therefore conventional, but not arbitrary. (any more than 
our 'humaness' could be said to be arbitrary). When one of us 
does appear to jettison that system by believing something which 
we find wholly untenable, either because there are no grounds 
that could make sense to us as grounds for that belief, or because 
one cannot believe that on those grounds, or because there are 
reasonable, or 'good enough' grounds for believing the contrary, 
then we confront the possibility of tolerating more than one 
system of verification, or adequacy criteria, or sustaining ours to 
the detriment of the other. (p. 135). 
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What is it to jettison a system of verification? Did Copernicus jettison a 
system of verification when he rejected the Ptolemaic system of the 
movement of the planets? What is wrong with tolerating more than one 
system of verification? 
Social constructionists might hold the context as fixed. If every statement 
depends on the context in which it is asserted for its intelligibility, then 
what is important is the context. Therefore we should study practices and 
the employment of language in those practices to assess the limits of 
intelligibility. But the anomaly for social constructionism is the fact that 
language-games change over time. It follows that from a social 
constructionist perspective it would be impossible to explain creativity 
without running into the errors similar to those which are present in 
Coulter's account of insanity. 
We must return to the argument presented in Chapter Two when the 
suggestion that any rule can be justified on some interpretation was 
attacked. Wittgenstein is criticised by his imaginary interlocutor: 
"But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? 
Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the 
rule."- (PI §198). 
And Wittgenstein's answer: 
That is not what we ought to say, but rather: any interpretation 
still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot 
give it support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine 
meaning. (PI §198). 
And by way of reminder: 
"Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the 
rule?"-
Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule-say a sign 
post-got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there 
here?-
Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in 
a particular way, and now I do so react to it. 
But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has 
come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-
by-the sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have further 
indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there 
exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom. (PI §198). 
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It has already been explained what rule-following consists of (see Chapter 
Two), and the end point was that rule-following required a practice. Now 
we seem to confront the possibility that shared customs and practices 
change across time and are open to various interpretations. Or a practice 
may not be shared or followed at all. The result is that the same arguments 
that Wittgenstein's imaginary interlocutor invokes can be presented here. 
The assertion that "I cannot see myself in the mirror" cannot be taken to be 
an indication of insanity, since on some interpretation it will make sense. 
Or, there is really no clear understanding of the concept of insanity, no one 
can be declared insane, since the concept of insanity can be variously 
interpreted across different cultures and times, so that in one culture a 
person is sane and in another insane. 
It is most important to correctly grasp Wittgenstein's response: 
Interpretations do not by themselves determine meaning. (This has been 
examined in Chapter Two, p. 63). Wittgenstein punishes the suggestion 
that interpretations determine meaning, or the variability of 
interpretations makes meaning impossible: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by 
a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord 
with a the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to 
accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with 
it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (PI. 
§201). 
The suggestion that shared rules require certain preconditions, such as 
shared biological capacities, a stable world, and agreement over criteria has 
already been explained. Without general agreement there cannot be a 
shared rule. Those who wish to pursue the argument that any assertion can 
be interpreted as intelligible in some context undermine this requirement 
making shared rules impossible. Consequently, given the supposition that 
everything can be made intelligible upon some interpretation, an ascription 
of insanity would be impossible-everyone would be unintelligible to each 
another not only the 'insane'. If any interpretation of the rule is acceptable 
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then acceptance of the rule is irrelevant: there simply would be no shared 
rule. If any interpretation of the rule is acceptable then there is no point in 
having the rule at all. 
Alice's Trap 
Carroll explores the idea that some standard, a custom or convention, is 
necessary from which insanity can be assessed. Carroll plays with the 
concept that madness has no meaning in Wonderland and exposes the idea 
that any interpretation of a rule is intelligible is nonsense. Carroll's patent 
nonsense provides a convenient example to expose Coulter's latent 
nonsense. Alice asks the Cheshire cat how he knows that he is mad. The 
answer is clever: 
"To begin with", said the Cat, "a dog's not mad. You grant that?" 
(p.79). 
"Well, then," the cat went on, "you see a dog growls when it's 
angry, and wags its tail when it's pleased. Now I growl when I'm 
pleased, and wag my tail when I'm angry. Therefore I'm mad." (p. 
79). 
Alice exposes the weakness in the otherwise perfectly valid argument. "II 
call it purring, not growling,' said Alice."(p. 79). The reply forces us to 
question who has the correct standard. For if the eat's conception of purring 
is accepted by Alice then she must at least concede that his argument is 
valid. But the Cat's reply to this is equally damaging to Alice/s argument: 
'''Call it what you like," said the Cat." (p. 79). Alice has a dilemma for if she 
really does call the concept of 'purring' anything she likes then she has no 
way to assess whether the cat's argument is convincing. But the cat's 
argument is that by removing any common practice, or meaning, between 
the insane and the assessor (Himself and a dog or Alice) then he can be 
legitimately described as insane. Alice must reject his argument about 
insanity (else accept via the previous argument that she too is insane) but 
in order to do so she must accept that there is no common agreement 
between them on the concept of 'purring'-in doing so the Cat successfully 
tricks Alice into tacitly agreeing with his argument. Any objection to the 
Cat's argument will fall to the same reply. This trap is not easy to avoid. 
The way out is show that the trap is a illusion of grammar, part of the 
senselessness of Wonderland itself. 
159 
Wittgenstein's general strategy for overcoming a paradox was to expose the 
senselessness of the paradox (PI§ 125). Wittgenstein often offers the 
solution to such problems in ways which seem to support the idea that 
exposing a paradox is useful but this is an error. To expose something as 
paradoxical is to entertain nonsense-much like Alice does. To expose 
something as nonsense is an advance. 
"If my memory deceives me here it can deceive me everywhere." 
If I don't know that, how do I know if my words mean what I 
believe they mean?(C. §506). 
"If this deceives me, what does 'deceive' mean any more?"(C. 
§507). 
If one were to doubt everything, or believe that nothing stands as a 
background for certainty then one could not be deceived. For my memory 
to deceive me there must be true memories, memories which I can rely on. 
If I do not know that I have true memories I cannot know that my 
memories can be deceived. Similarly, if I do not know that I have false 
memories the idea that my memory can deceive me is nonsense. The 
concept of deception has no meaning here. Thus the seemingly paradoxical 
situation, in which if one wishes to doubt everything one must have 
certainty, is not paradoxical but nonsensical. 
Similarly with the concept of insanity, one must presuppose the sense of 
the concept, presuppose a practice of distinguishing between the insane and 
the sane, to employ it as the Cheshire cat does. His ability to determine his 
own madness is derived from the assertion that a dog's actions do not 
represent insanity. (An assertion which he does not allow Alice to 
question). But herein lies the nonsense of the seemingly paradoxical 
situation (If Alice agrees with the eat's argument then she is mad, if she 
disagrees then she is also mad). 
Suppose instead of encountering Alice the Cat meets a dog. The dog, as is 
common in Wonderland, questions the Cat, asking for some criterion on 
which to assess the Cat's madness (and her own). The Cat cannot employ 
his argument at all for he would defeat his purpose to call the dog sane and 
then assert the difference in practices makes himself mad. The very same 
difference applies to the dog. Either the Cat is mad, or the dog is mad, but 
not both-and more importantly, nothing stands as a criterion to 
distinguish which of the two creatures is mad. 
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While the Cat's definition of madness might apply to Alice, for she does 
have a different system of verification (what she calls purring the Cat calls 
growling), it could not be used to justify the assertion that "We are all mad 
here", Alice's acceptance of the Cat's criteria (the standard of the dog) is 
imported from a her 'above-ground' world-it does not belong to 
Wonderland (If she had not accepted this criterion from the start she would 
not have fallen into the trap). Whether Alice is insane then depends on the 
difference between her system of verification and the Cat's. But this is 
senseless for the difference is shared in exactly the same way as when a dog 
encounters the Cat. Nothing in Wonderland is available to determine the 
meaning of insanity-there is no practice of distinguishing the mad from 
the sane. For on the Cat's own argument everyone in Wonderland would 
have a different system of verification, there is therefore no shared rule, no 
one way of acting which represents insanity, for the application of the 
concept in Wonderland. Without a community, without shared rules it is 
impossible to give an ascription of insanity; without contrast to sanity, or 
what is intelligible, insanity has no meaning-there can be no criteria for 
the use of the term, no shared agreement as to what insanity means. If the 
concept of insanity is taken as simply being a 'different system of 
verification', as Coulter would have it, then it is senseless; there is no rule 
for the application of the concept. 
Suppose all the inhabitants of Wonderland support the Cat's argument, 
they say collectively "We are all mad here" and declare Alice mad. Their 
reasoning (slightly simplified for emphasis) would, on the Cat's argument, 
be justified by the argument: If you are here you are the same as us (i.e mad) 
and to be mad you must be different from us. If insanity is represented as 
being 'outside' a system of verification, or a comparison between different 
systems of verification, then it is senseless. Nothing determines the 
application of the concept for a difference between parties is a shared 
phenomenon. 
Conclusions 
Coulter (1973) clearly has difficulty in explaining the relation between 
different systems of verification and insanity. Upon encountering a 
different system of verification, say a foreign tribe, we might encounter an 
initially incomprehensible set of beliefs. But Coulter cannot declare another 
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tribe insane-this would offend against the use of the word (I have argued 
that a tribe is potentially intelligible and an insane persons assertions are 
not. I presume from this argument it is clear that we could not really give 
an ascription of insanity to everyone in a different society)14. So Coulter 
fails to provide some criteria with which we can separate the initially 
incomprehensible from the unintelligible and insane. However, if we 
exclude this as an oversight there is still the problem of deciding why it is 
that an individual in society is declared insane on the basis of a difference 
in a system of verification because any difference is shared between the 
ascriber and the person labelled. Consider: 
Even a proposition like this one, that I am now living in 
England, has these two sides: it is not a mistake-but on the other 
hand, what do I know of England? Can't my judgement go all to 
pieces? 
Would it not be possible that people came into my room and 
declared the opposite?-even gave me prdofs of it, so that I 
suddenly stood there like a madman alone among people who 
were all normal, or a normal person alone among madmen? 
Might I not then suffer doubts about what present seems the 
furtherest remove from doubt?(C. §420). 
Wittgenstein alludes to the fact that any proposition which might seem to 
be a methodological proposition can be turned into an empirical 
proposition and then be subject to doubt. Because Coulter requires a fixed 
and stable context in which everything can be assessed, an unchanging 
society from which to gain a 'correct' interpretation, he cannot account for a 
change in the social context and cannot provide an account of insanity 
(Similar reasoning would exclude an account of creativity). Notice that in 
his example Wittgenstein does not declare himself mad nor the other 
people that offer proofs. The denial of a methodological proposition is in 
itself an insufficient description of the nature of the concept of insanity 
(Morawetz makes this error). And further, a difference in beliefs, even the 
denial of a methodological proposition, cannot be used as an indication of 
who is mad. There is no rule, and therefore no criterion, for the application 
of the concept of insanity taken in the way Coulter suggests. Without any 
14 I can imagine a cult group with individuals combined by common 
beliefs who break away from society giving a similar 
ascription to an individual we declare insane. The argument 
rests on the insane following a rule which is 
unintelligible to a society. It is conceivable that a social 
group can operate in the same way-but not a social group that we 
first encounter because they have not had access to understanding 
our rules in order to break them. 
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rule for its application the description of its use has no use and is therefore 
nonsense. 
Clearly the 'terrain' is not covered by declaring the insane to be those who 
adopt a different system of verification or fall outside our own. Coulter's 
idea makes sense only given an unchanging context in which can appeal to 
community standards which are fixed and unchanging. But Wittgenstein's 
insights go far beyond an appeal to a paradigmatic way of behaving. 
Wittgenstein was well aware of ever-changing nature of our language and 
practices. Coulter misinterprets Wittgenstein's points about the role of 
agreement and the nature of certainty and doubt. However, we still have 
no clear indication as to how a practice, or a form of life, provides us with a 
position in which some things are certain and some subject to doubt against 
this changing background in which what was once certain becomes 
dubitable. It is with this problem in mind that the following discussion of 
the concept of creativity is provided. By taking Morawetz's suggestion 
seriously, that the insane do not produce genuine belief claims, and 
following Wolgast's guidance that Wittgenstein leads us away from 
discussing the form of the propositions, drawing our attention instead to a 
form of life, we can resolve the issues that have confused Coulter's account 
of the nature of insanity and provide a description of the terrain upon 
which both the ascriptions of insanity and creativity are given. 
Speculation about the rules for our ascription of insanity is unnecessary to 
the purpose of this thesis. It would be an exhausting, and pointless, task to 
survey all the possible rules for the ascription of insanity. In limited 
contexts some study is undertaken to reveal what characteristics of the 
insane are important to gain a legal ascription of insanity. We are fooled by 
the common characteristics of our communities into believing that 
insanity is a universal ascription not relative to the community or context 
and this is complicated by the nature of the concept itself; for to have a 
community is to have the potential to break rules in ways which promote 
the ascription of deviance of some form, be it insanity or 'upsetting the 
Gods'. 
The idea that the insane 'break rules' is a conceptual tool. It is not an 
observation. The charge of triviality might be levelled against this approach 
by those who would require a distinction to be drawn between insanity and 
other forms of deviance such as crime. But declaring that the insane break 
the rules of shared social practice does not offer a general theory of the 
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nature of the insanity ascription (Chapters Seven and Eight provide the 
rationale for this). Taken as an observation the argument is as pointless as 
the suggestion that criminals are those who break the law. 
With the descriptions of logically unshareable language games, unshared 
language-games, and unshareable language games complete, it is possible to 
describe the form of the concept of creativity. It should be considered in 
much the same way that insanity is considered: the creative, and here what 
is meant by creative is the scientifically creative, break shared rules. The 
conceptual difference between the insane and the creative is that the insane 
follow unshareable rules (If the community is to maintain its shared rule it 
must reject the one which the insane person promotes-the 'if' is not a 
contingent feature of a society but a necessary precondition), whereas the 
creative follow initially unshared rules which are subsequently adopted by 
the community. The difference between the insane and the creative from 
this perspective is obvious. The creative break rules but become intelligible. 
They are intelligible because society adjusts its practices in favour of those 
the creative individual presents. Thus the creative should be understood in 
relation to the effect they have on our shared practices; they promote 
change in our shared practices in contrast to the insane that cannot logically 
be declared insane if they promoted a shift in a shared social practice so that 
their contingently unshared rule was shared. 
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Chapter Five 
Reconciling Method and Problem 
Cora Diamond (1989) in a series of essays dedicated to Rush Rhees 
remembers his remark, "Wittgenstein wanted the two books read together. 
But this has not helped people to see that the investigations is a book on 
the philosophy of logic; it has led many ... to read the Tractatus as a theory of 
knowledge." (p. 37 Rhees, cited in Diamond, 1989 p. 13). Psychologists, and 
philosophers of psychology, are inclined to forget that Wittgenstein was 
interested in the foundations of logic and mathematics. Wittgenstein saw a 
parallel with his investigation into the nature of mathematics and that 
which delves into the nature of psychological investigation (i.e Part II 
Philosophical Investigations). Wittgenstein did of course offer critical 
investigation into many psychological concerns but this did not necessarily 
contain anything resembling that which Harre (1989) calls a 
'Wittgensteinian programme'; in the same way Wittgenstein did not offer a 
new programme for mathematics. The idea that Wittgenstein did not 
'discard' the practices of mathematics is important (crucial), when taken 
along with the view that there is some parallel between psychology and 
mathematics, if Wittgenstein's thoughts on psychology are not to be 
regarded as "nihilistic" or "pessimistic" as Williams (1985) believes. 
Conceptual confusion operates within psychology. It has been shown that 
cognitive scientists confuse the nature of psychological terms, treating them 
as causal, or functional, properties of the 'mind' or brain. Social 
constructionists fail to present the Wittgensteinian arguments correctly and 
subsequently present accounts of psychological terms, like insanity, in ways 
which Wittgenstein would argue against. To get between these two 
misguided accounts of psychological terms, assuming that there is some 
value in the attempt to find this mysterious parallel which Wittgenstein 
refers to between the investigation of psychological concepts and those of 
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mathematics, the connection between the concepts of insanity and 
creativity developed in Chapter Four will be assumed. 
Three examples will guide this plunge into the obscure relation between 
mathematics and psychology. The first concerns Szasz's (1987) insistence 
that feigned insanity is the same as real insanity and this provides good 
reason to disregard the efforts of psychiatry to identify and cure 'imaginary 
illnesses'. Second, Schachter's (1971) empirical research on the physiological 
correlates of psychopathy is offered as an example of how experimental 
research cannot resolve conceptual confusion and merely perpetuates its 
destructive effect on psychological investigation. Third, research on the 
incidence of insanity among the creative is presented which can be placed 
within a certain understanding of creativity-in particular one which is in 
accord with the grammatical relation the concept of creativity has with the 
concept of insanity. It might seem as if these examples could only be given a 
relation by some complicated theory. Nevertheless it is Wittgenstein's 
. analysis which provides tracks upon which we now run. These concerns 
serve only as illustration to the wider implications of his thought. 
Criteria, Grammar, and Method. 
(a) Confusion in Psychiatry 
Rosenhan (1972) sent eight subjects, mainly his students, to psychiatric 
institutions with the instructions to feign insanity to gain admission and 
then to act sane in order to obtain release. To achieve the task of gaining 
admission the subjects reported to psychiatrists that they were suffering 
auditory hallucinations. All eight were admitted, all but one with the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia. None of the subjects were suspected as 
malingerers by the mental health professionals within the institutions 
despite the real patients in the institutions recognising a difference between 
the behaviour of these pseudo-patients and themselves. Eventually all the 
subjects were released, but in all cases with the status of being 'in 
remission' . 
Szasz (1987) asserts that all that Rosenhan has established is that it is easy to 
deceive people. He further points out that: 
Usually the simulation of schizophrenia is simply the prodromal 
phase of genuine illness .... The majority of such patients will be 
suffering from early stages of genuine psychosis and should be 
managed accordingly (Hay, cited in Szasz, 1987 p.172). 
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Szasz (1987) argues that 'insanity' is a role. Playing the role of Hamlet (His 
example) is no different from the feigning the role of Hamlet. Faking 
insanity is no different from being insane since insanity is not literally a 
thing to be copied. There can be a Picasso painting and copy, but the word 
'insanity' denotes something fundamentally different from those which 'A 
Picasso' denote. Knowing those rules to break in order to be labelled insane 
are obvious. Anyone with this intention can pick up a copy of the DSM-III-
R15 and become as expert as a schoolboy fooling his mother, at fooling the 
clinicians. But does deception operate here? 
Szasz suggests that there is no such thing as feigned insanity. Yet Rosenhan 
offers an opposite position which Szasz dismisses with the idea that, "To 
me it proves only that it is easy to deceive people, especially when they 
want to be deceived." (1987 p. 183). But on Szasz's conception of insanity it 
was not possible that Rosenhan's students deceived the psychiatrists since 
insanity is something which cannot be feigned. Szasz rejects Rosenhan's 
evidence at the expense of contradicting his own claim that 'feigned 
insanity is meaningless'. 
Szasz's contradiction is indicative of conceptual confusion. Szasz offers the 
view that insanity is simply a role. Conceptualised as a role insanity does 
not require verification of feigned or real insanity. Szasz fits the term 
'insanity' into a grammar in which' deception' has no place. The practice of 
acting, or playing a role, is simply deception of one form or another. The 
attractiveness of Szasz's position comes from the nonsensical position that 
you cannot deceive another that you are deceiving them. 
So what role does deception play in our language game relating to first 
person psychological utterances? The grammatical clarification of the 
concept of insanity in Chapter Four does not differentiate between those 
who deceive and those who do not. What good is such a clarification if it 
has no impact on the application of psychology or psychiatry? In a different 
context Fogelin (1987) points out: 
Being angry is not just a matter of saying "I am angry," for, 
obviously one can say this without being angry. Even if we 
15 American Psychiatric Association 
Statistical manual of mental disorders 
American Psychiatric Association. 
(1987) Diagnostic and 
(3rd edition) Washington: 
extend the pattern of behaviour to include the rich repertoire of 
angry behaviour (anger-behaviour),' we can imagine this taking 
place on a stage and therefore not suppose that we are dealing 
with genuine anger. These facts reinforce the idea that the 
behaviour of an angry person is merely the outward 
manifestation of his anger within, for, without an appeal to such 
an underlying cause, how can we distinguish between behaviour 
that genuinely expresses anger from behaviour that only seems 
to express anger? (p. 189). 
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It is often the case in psychiatry that mental illness is defined in terms of 
physiological conditions; treatments are designed on this basis with certain 
diagnoses indicating certain treatment schedules. Psychiatric diagnosis does 
not indicate a cause to the mental condition but relies on there being a 
cause in order to remove the problem of having to justify a diagnosis 
which makes no distinction between those who feign insanity or those who 
are truly insane. The diagnosis of schizophrenia does not indicate a cause 
for the condition-unlike the diagnosis of a broken leg which offers the 
cause, (The fact that the leg is broken) of the signs and symptoms the 
patient experiences (pain, swelling, lack of mobility, etc). If the view that 
psychiatrists hold is rejected: that some causal process distinguishes 
madness from feigned madness (since this contradicts the arguments of 
chapters Two, Three and Four), and Szasz's argument that madness cannot 
be distinguished from feigned madness is dismissed as nonsensical or 
contradictory, then what criterion distinguishes insanity and feigned 
insanity? 
Fogelin (1987 p. 189-190) continues: 
Wittgenstein's answer to this question, and to all questions of 
this kind, is that we do not draw such a distinction by going 
behind the phenomena, but instead, we place the phenomena in 
a broader setting. That the behaviour takes place on a stage does 
not set a problem for drawing this distinction between real and 
feigned anger, for, as everyone knows, this is precisely the kind of 
fact we appeal to in deciding whether a person is angry or not. 
But this answer is unsatisfactory for it makes it seem that in order to 
distinguish real anger from feigned anger, or real madness from feigned 
madness, all one requires is the knowledge, derived from some broader 
setting somehow, that someone is not acting in a deceptive way. Even if 
Fogelin's answer is accepted it seems that he avoids the problem that Szasz 
identifies. The problem is precisely that psychiatrists do not use the word 
'schizophrenia' in a way which distinguishes feigned symptoms from real 
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symptoms. Given the argument that psychiatrists cannot distinguish 
between feigned insanity and real insanity by any other means (say some 
causal factor) then it would appear Szasz's argument stands: the word 
'insanity' is not used in such a way that there is a distinction between real 
and feigned insanity. Therefore (simply put) 'insanity' does not refer to a 
real thing. Fogelin points out that we can distinguish between real and 
feigned anger by attending to the context in which the behaviour is 
expressed. Szasz's argument is that there is no context in which insanity can 
be distinguished from feigned insanity. Szasz maintains that psychiatrists 
conceptualise insanity wrongly, it should be conceptualised as a role. 
What Szasz points out is an inability on the part of psychiatrists not a 
misuse of grammar. The criteria for assertions like, "He is angry, in pain, 
or insane" specify the use of these terms and do not determine the meaning 
of the terms (Chapter Four, pp. 156-158). Being insane obviously does not 
mean 'hears voices inside his head' since Rosenhan (1972) demonstrates 
correctly, although trivially, pace Szasz (1987), that insanity can be feigned, 
or at least that it is possible to lie about certain criteria for the ascription of 
schizophrenia. Hacker (1986) argues: 
.. although A's clutching his swollen jaw and groaning are criteria 
for A's having toothache, 'A has toothache' does not mean 'A 
clutches his jaw and groans'. Rather specifying the verifying 
criteria does not give the meaning of the proposition but 
determines the meaning, i.e the use or grammar, of the 
proposition in question. (p. 308). 
But Hacker's explanation is unsatisfactory. Since it has been argued that the 
relationship between a rule and its criteria is internal it would seem 
necessary to suppose that a person who applies the ascription of: 'A has a 
toothache' in the circumstance that 'A clutches his swollen jaw and groans', 
has the correct employment (Given that clutching a swollen jaw and 
groaning are correct indications of toothache) of this ascription and 
therefore understands the meaning of the term. The general point here is 
that specifying the criteria in relation to some rule demonstrates only one's 
understanding of that rule and does not determine whether one's use is in 
fact correct. One might be duped by a con-artist, or misdiagnose a condition. 
Relatedly, widespread disagreement over the criteria for a rule, or way of 
acting, for example giving the ascription of insanity, represents 
disagreements over the shared definition of terms-disagreements in 
understanding of the phenomena. 
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The agreed upon criteria for the diagnostic label of schizophrenia are laid 
down in the DSM-III-R. Whether the labels 'insane', or 'schizophrenic', are 
used correctly is determined by the conventions adopted by psychiatrists 
and others. Whether those conventions are correct, in some deep sense, is 
not examined by empirical evidence, like Rosenhan's experiment, nor can 
they removed or replaced by adopting a new mythology (set of 
conventions) like the one's Szasz proposes. 
Wittgenstein examined those propositions which seem immutable, those 
of mathematics, and logic, which seem to remove the confusion which is 
introduced by accepting that our conventions change over time. 
Mathematicians do not argue over basic calculations they all agree without 
argument to a method of doing addition (PI§ 240). It is by comparison to 
these seemingly immutable propositions that it will be clear why the 
conventions of psychiatry are difficult to remove and that they are 
conventions not susceptible to evidential challenge. 
Wittgenstein distinguishes between rules of grammar and empirical 
propositions by testing whether the negation of the proposition makes 
sense (i.e has a use). In Chapter Three it was claimed that a proposition of 
mathematics like makes sense whereas ~(2+2=4) (It is not the case 
that 2+2=4) makes no sense. Similarly 2+3=4 is a false proposition whereas 
2+3*4 is true. Wittgenstein argued that we are confused by a similarity in 
the form of these propositions and are tempted to suppose that the false 
propositions of mathematics are still mathematical propositions. False 
propositions serve no role in mathematics, they have no use, and are 
therefore not mathematical propositions at all. The grammar of 
mathematics allows certain propositions and excludes others, which is why 
we can call 2+3=4 false-it is really nonsense. Similarly the false notion that 
the internal angles of a triangle add to 130" has no use and is therefore 
nonsense. But a statement like, "There is a pyramid" can be true or false. 
Empirical propositions are unlike grammatical truths in that their 
negation, (e.g That is not a pyramid) makes sense: has a use-to distinguish 
between pyramids and other objects. Similarly, as was indicated in Chapter 
Four, it makes no sense to deny a methodological propositioni the denial 
has no use in the conventional grammar of society-that one might 
demonstrate a use, as Galileo did, is always a possibility. Methodological 
propositions and the grammatical rules of mathematics share the feature 
that their negations have no use. There are no criteria or rules for the 
application of the negation of these propositions, for grammatical 
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propositions are indeed rules set down in a practice to describe the 
employment of other concepts. 
The rule set down in the practice of psychiatry that (loosely) 'hearing voices 
inside one's head is an indication of madness' can be described as a 
grammatical rule. The claim, "Rosenhan hears voices inside his head" is an 
empirical proposition which is either true or false. The first proposition 
licenses the ascription of madness given certain contingent matters of fact. 
The second statement is a proposition about certain states of affairs. The 
claim, "It is not the case that hearing voices inside one's head is an 
indication of madness" would make no sense to a psychiatrist who adheres 
to the tradition that this is a common symptom of schizophrenia. The 
claim, "It is not the case that hearing voices inside one's head is an 
indication of madness" is not part of the grammar of psychiatric 
classification and like the claim, "The internal angles of a triangle sum to 
130°" has no use and is therefore nonsensical. Whereas the claim, 
"Rosenhan does not hear voices inside his head" is perfectly acceptable. The 
fact that psychiatrists have difficulty in verifying the authenticity of 
reported symptoms does not undermine the set of rules, or practices, they 
adopt in giving a diagnosis. What Szasz points to, and Rosenhan confirms, 
is an inability, not a confused grammar at all. Szasz's characterisation of 
madness as a role is an attempt to offer another rule for the characterisation 
of madness, the usefulness of which has not been clearly demonstrated. 
(Szasz's conceptualisation and the traditional practice are in direct 
conflict-This type of conflict will be examined in the next chapter). 
One might be sympathetic to Szasz's overall aim of elaborating the myths 
which comprise the practices of psychiatry. Some of those myths have been 
dealt with already: that psychological constructs point to some imaginary 
inner thing, as schizophrenia does to disease, or that psychological 
constructs point to entirely social constructed 'events': that schizophrenia is 
merely a problem of coping in society. Despite some sympathy with Szasz's 
position it is the wrong way to penetrate the misunderstandings offered by 
a grammar: in this case the grammar of ascribing mental illness. 
(b) Experimental methods and conceptual confusion 
Turing thinks that he and I are using the word "experiment" in 
two different ways. But I want to show that this is wrong. That is 
to say, I think that if I could make myself quite clear, then Turing 
would give up saying that in mathematics we make experiments. 
If I could arrange in their proper order certain well-known facts, 
then it would become clear that Turing and I are not using the 
word "experiment" differently. 
You might say, "how is it possible that there should be a 
misunderstanding so very hard to remove?" 
It can be explained partly by a difference of education. 
Partly by a quotation from Hilbert: "No one is going to turn us 
out of the paradise which Cantor has created." 
I would say, "I wouldn't dream of trying to drive anyone out of 
this paradise." I would try to do something quite different: I 
would try to show you that it is not a paradise-so that you'll 
leave on your own accord. I would say, "You're welcome to this; 
just look about you." (LFM, XI pp. 102-103). 
Mathematics and the Autonomy of Grammar 
171 
Wittgenstein's disagreement with Turing centres on the use of the word 
'experiment'. Wittgenstein held that experimentation has no use within 
mathematics because mathematics is a grammar composed of rules for the 
manipulation of statements. The result of the calculation 456+22 is not 
decided by experimentation: 456+22=478 is part of the grammar of 
mathematics. The rules and practice of mathematics stipulate that 
456+22=478 is a true statement whereas 456+22=234 is a false statement. But 
there are those disposed to the view that we determine the rules of 
mathematics by correspondence with certain truths that occur through the 
use of these rules. For instance, if I give you 5 oranges and then 3 
watermelons and ask you to tell much fruit you have you will correctly tell 
me that you have 8 pieces of fruit-somehow this use makes the rule 
5+3=8 correct. (Perhaps the 'fact' that schizophrenics often hear voices 
'inside their heads' somehow justifies the rule laid down in the DSM-III-R.) 
But, it has already been argued in Chapter Four, the fact that we use 
mathematics in this way fixes only the meaning of the rule 5+3=8, it does 
not determine that the rule contained in the expression is correct. In 
Chapter Four an argument relating to traffic lights was used to make the 
same point. (One might now see how it is that Wittgenstein's analysis of 
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the foundations of mathematics influenced all his other work and how it 
might be applied.) Similarly, the rules expressed in the practice of psychiatry 
are not determined to be 'correct' by examining what they mean or how 
they are used; or incorrect by determining that there is some ambiguity or 
lack of clarity in there use. 
There is a temptation to model the truth of arithmetical equations on 
empirical propositions. We are tempted to take the certainty that the earth 
goes around the sun as similar to the veracity of the mathematical 
proposition 2+2=4. (Baker and Hacker, 1985 p. 292). Scepticism can then be 
introduced to mathematics. Hallucinations and the like might interfere 
with the certainty of contingent matters of fact and similarly, because 
mistake. can occur in mathematics, we might suppose that we are mistaken 
in believing that 12x12=144. Or perhaps some numbers are so large that we 
will never know what the result of their combination might be. 
Wittgenstein sets up the problem differently: 
Suppose I asked Wisdom to multiply two very large numbers, 
and later ask him what the result was. He says, "I had such an 
awful headache, I don't know really, but I got so-and-so." You 
might say, "There you are. We have now got the result of an 
experiment made under the wrong conditions." 
But if he says, "This was what I got"-this is not the 
mathematical proposition. How do we pass from this to the 
mathematical proposition: "So-and-so times so-and-so is so-and-
so"? It has been said; "It's a question of general consensus." There 
is something true in this. Only-what is it that we agree to? Do 
we agree to the mathematical proposition, or do we agree in 
getting this result? These are entirely different. (LFM, XI p. 106). 
Again one should see the parallel between the treatment of these issues and 
those of Chapter Four. Social consensus does not operate to make a 
particular answer correct. What we agree to, what we share, is a method of 
calculation-a way of doing mathematics-from which it follows that the 
result is correct in terms of the rules we agree to. Similarly, we agree to a 
form of life in making empirical judgements, measuring, road regulations 
and so on . Those who react against that form of life might be declared 
insane. It is because mathematics is part of our form of life, and indeed 
occupies a central position, that Wittgenstein declares those who do not 
believe the result of a mathematical calculation mad. (c. §217). 
Suppose it were the case that 12x12=143. Perhaps everyone got it wrong. 
Wittgenstein declares that it would be irrelevant. The result of the 
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calculation is of no consequence since what is important is that everyone 
shares the method (grammar) not whether they agree on the results of that 
method. Indeed, "There is no such thing as a wrong or false method of 
representation" (Baker and Hacker, 1985 p. 293). That a method of 
calculation is contradictory to our own does not make it wrong, pace Frege 
who declared beings who thought like this insane, but, of course, we would 
find such a system initially unintelligible. Baker and Hacker continue: 
If such people[Those who believe 12x12=143] almost always found 
that when they had a dozen groups of a dozen there were 144, 
they might thank the Gods for always giving them a gift, or they 
might have a theory about spontaneous generation, or they 
might attribute magical properties to 12 sets of a dozen. But their 
calculating techniques would not be wrong . It would not be false 
to the facts, since it is not responsible to the facts. Rather it is a 
measure of what constitutes a fact. (p. 293). 
Once again we must return to a previous argument. Why does 
mathematics seem to get it right, why does it accord with the facts? We 
consistently calculate twelve times twelve to be one-hundred and forty-
four. We line up a dozen sets of a dozen and always get one-hundred and 
forty-four objects. Surely mathematical propositions are correct because 
they accord with the facts. But this is misguided. The stability of the natural 
world is a precondition for mathematical certainty in the same way this 
precondition operates for our techniques of measurement, our conception 
of time, and our identification of colours. 
If I asked someone to tell me how many seconds there are in a day he 
might, after calculating the result of 24x60x60, respond that there are 86,400 
seconds to every day. This would be correct in one sense and incorrect in 
another. I should think someone was quite mad (In Wittgenstein's sense of 
the term) if he believed that there were 28 hours in every day, so that he 
calculated 28x60x60 and arrived at 100800 seconds. How would I prove 
otherwise, what would convince the person that he was in 'error'? There 
are those who have specialist knowledge of astronomy who will declare 
that there are exactly 24 hours, 3 minutes and 56.59 seconds in every solar 
day. One 'day' according to an astronomer's reckoning is equal to 86636.59 
seconds. 
There are three points from these considerations. Firstly, we might believe 
that it is ridiculous to suppose people could develop a mathematical system 
which did not accord with the facts. The calculation of 12x12=144 is true 
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paradigmatic ally across all space and time (As Russell asserted). But every 
four years we can remind ourselves that the 29th of February has its 
purpose; it is an interca1cation, which serves to adjust our 'inaccurate' 
calendar so it accords with the 'facts'(as determined by astronomers). Our 
concepts of day, minute and second, are as 'wrong' as the tribe that 
calculates 12x12=143 and thanks the Gods for their beneficence. Secondly, an 
astronomer has a different grammar for the word 'day' based on a method 
of calculation which is different from that used, or adopted, by those of us 
who are non-astronomers. Astronomers can assert that there is 86636.59 
seconds in every day because they recognise a different method of 
determining the concept of 'day'. Astronomers agree that fixing a point on 
the horizon, or celestial plane, and waiting until some measuring 
equipment determines that the earth has returned to that exact point, is one 
day. It is only in contrast to this grammar that it makes sense to suppose 
that the everyday use of the word 'day' is 'inaccurate'. It will probably never 
happen that our day is divided into 24hrs 03mins 56.59secs, although 
technology as it stands could accommodate such a change (we might all 
wear digital watches in '24hour-plus' mode). This 24 hour-plus conception 
of day has a technological use reserved for astronomy and leaves the 
everyday use of day just as it stands. The use of the' day' in astronomy runs 
parallel to the everyday use. Finally, the astronomers adopt the convention 
of measuring in seconds. The period of time 86636.59 seconds could be 
divided into units other than seconds, say X's. Such a division might be 
more convenient, such that 100 XiS make up something analogous to an 
hour and 10 of those a day. If this convention was adopted by the 
astronomers and I asked my original question, "How many seconds are 
there in the day?" an astronomer could not enlighten me of my 'mistake' 
in believing that there are 86400 seconds by asserting that there are 10000 
XIs-The reason for this should become apparent soon. 
When Coulter (1973 p. 115) asserts that, 'only a biologist can see a stamen' 
(Chapter Four p. 130) what he really means is that only a biologist, or 
someone trained similarly, knows the criteria (has knowledge of the shared 
grammar) for the use of the word 'stamen' in biology. The criteria for 
demonstrating an understanding of biology might include being able to 
point out (A criterion for ascribing the ability to see) such things as stamen. 
Similarly knowledge of colours might be ascribed to those, say a group of 
artists, who can pick subtle shades of blues and give them names, but this 
does not mean that others cannot see those colours. 
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Wittgenstein concludes that grammatical rules are arbitrary with the 
consequence that their acceptance is groundless; it is only by accepting a 
form of life, a way of acting, that we accept a form of representation. 
Wittgenstein declared: 
One is tempted to justify rules of grammar by sentences like 'But 
there really are four primary colours.' And the saying that the 
rules of grammar are arbitrary is directed against the possibility of 
this justification, which is constructed on the model of justifying 
a sentence by pointing to what verifies it. (Z §331). 
If we carved up nature differently with a different grammar of colour words 
then our concepts would bear only a remote relation to those which we 
currently adopt but this would not make them wrong (As Carroll's 
nonsense bears some relation to our world but cannot be described as 
wrong). Baker and Hacker (1985) footnote an explanation of the inclusion 
of the use of the phrase, "Four primary colours" with: 
It is striking, and amusing, that there is disagreement over this. 
What is the nature of this disagreement? And how would it be 
settled? Not by experiment! Or rather, if by experiment, then we 
have changed the meaning of primary colour and it is an 
empirical truth that could be otherwise, and on Betelgueuse may 
be so. (1985 p. 330). 
Of course if it is a grammatical truth that there really are four primary 
colours then it is a rule used in the measurement of colours. Those who 
would claim that there are only three beg to differ on a grammatical 
classification which allows certain evidence. 
Psychologists really do differ in their grammatical classification of primary 
colours: 450-500nm=blue, 500-570nm=green, and 620-700nm=red. Standard 
textbooks report that in this regard,"The number three .. .is significant" 
(Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, Bern, and Hilgard, 1990 pp. 130-131). What is 
missing is obviously the 570-620nm range which is yellow. But red (650nm) 
in combination with green (500nm) produces the subjective experience of 
yellow. Therefore on this view only red, green and blue are included as 
primary colours. The explanation of this phenomenon has a cautionary 
note: 
.. we are referring to mixing lights, called an additive mixture; we 
are not referring to mixing paints or pigments, a subtractive 
mixture ... The rules of colour mixture are different for mixing 
colours (paints) and mixing lights ... .In mixing paints, the physical 
stimulus is itself altered, the mixture takes place outside the eye, 
and hence is a topic for physics. In contrast, in mixing lights, the 
mixture occurs in the eye itself and thus is a topic for psychology. 
(Atkinson et al , 1990 pp. 130-131). 
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Psychologist beg to differ, like astronomers with their conception of 'day' on 
a method, and therefore what constitutes appropriate evidence for a 
particular grammatical classification of primary colours. While 
philosophers might find such an appeal amusing it is this legitimate 
'move' (To the extent that we can reorganise our grammar and are not 
wrong to do so-it may of course result in nonsense but the 'move' and 
the result should be distinguished). Notwithstanding the legitimacy of the 
move, Wittgenstein regarded such manoeuvres to be symptomatic of the 
deepest problems in the practices we employ in psychology. 
Wittgenstein remarks: 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be 
explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not 
comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. 
(Rather with that of a certain branch of mathematics. Set Theory.) 
For in psychology there are experimental methods and 
conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion 
and methods of proof.) (PI, II p. 232). 
It is Cantor (1845-1918) who is said to be the father of modern set theory. 
Cantor's diagonal procedure demonstrates that the set of all natural 
numbers, N, is not equivalent to the set of all real numbers, and therefore 
there exists more than one infinite set. (Flew, 1979 pp. 50-51). It is the 
diagonal procedure which Wittgenstein refers to as a method of proof 
which brings about conceptual confusion. Wittgenstein believes he cannot 
'turf' anyone out of 'Cantor's paradise', for it is a method which establishes 
a form of representation (LFM, XI p.102). The methods for establishing the 
representation of set theory are internally related to that representation. 
Wittgenstein argues instead that the representation has no use-that it is 
not a paradise. Similarly Szasz (1987) cannot convince us that the 
psychiatrists have the wrong ascription of insanity for 'wrong' and 'false' do 
not apply, and Rosenhan's 'evidence' goes wanting. 
In psychology it is experimental methods which bring about conceptual 
confusion. Cantor's 'paradise' is created by a method of proof. In psychology 
it is the entanglement of language which leads us to develop theoretical 
177 
structures which lead us astray by suggesting an interpretation to our 
experimental results. Kenny (1985 p. 56) explains: 
"I think what he had in mind here is experimental psychologists 
who start from a mythological view of the nature of mental 
processes, which they take from ordinary language, and accept 
unquestioned, as if it were the experimental basis of their 
research." 
Psychological terms derive their meaning through their use within theory. 
Experimental procedures produce evidence within a particular grammar. 
The grammar and the evidence are internally related. The suggestion from 
Wittgenstein is that no amount of empirical investigation will resolve any 
conceptual confusion. Whatever is a legitimate empirical technique is 
already licensed by a grammar. The following section offers an example of 
how these insights apply to psychology. 
Experimental discovery in Psychology 
Schachter (1971) conducted a series of tests on psychopaths to evaluate their 
lack of emotionality and inability to learn avoidance behaviour. A maze 
learning task was reinforced by punishment (an electric shock). 
Psychopaths, despite their ability to learn given positive reinforcement (e.g 
money given for the successful learning), failed (in comparison to normals) 
to learn the avoidance task. When given adrenalin psychopaths learned the 
avoidance task better then the control group of normals. Normals seemed 
unable to learn when injected with adrenalin. Contrary to the obvious 
conclusion, that psychopaths are somehow under-aroused and therefore do 
not exhibit the anxiety assumed to be required for successful avoidance 
learning, psychopaths were found to be highly aroused (i.e high heart-rates 
and GSR's). Troubled by this seemingly paradoxical, and certainly 
unexpected result, Schachter searched the literature for research which 
showed that psychopaths are 'highly-strung' (This is not to say that they are 
highly emotional as one of the diagnostic criteria for psychopathy, or anti-
social personality disorder as it is now classified, is that the person 
concerned has emotional flatness or lack of affect). Schachter summarises: 
From the results of these studies, and of our own results, it 
would appear that high autonomic reactivity characterises those 
who are both extremely high in anxiety and emotionality and 
those who are extremely low in anxiety and emotionality ... (p. 
178). 
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Psychopaths are more sensitive to adrenalin than normals. Their 
autonomic activity increases proportionately more than normals, and they 
are more reactive to a wider range of stimuli than normals. If there was a 
simple relationship between autonomic activity and emotionality then 
psychopaths would be characterised by high emotionality, but we know that 
this not the case. That is to say, we do not characterise psychopaths as 
being highly emotionaL 
To explain these results relating to psychopaths Schachter combines his 
findings with those which he produce with Singer in 1962. The study 
showed that, " ... a state of physiological arousal is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for emotion". (Schachter, 1971 p. 178). One might also 
gain this insight by understanding the grammar of the nature of emotions 
terms by undertaking the kind of analysis provided by Wittgenstein and 
. supported by the social constructionists (see Chapter Three). It seems that 
the 1962 study provides an understanding of the nature of emotion when 
all it really does is illustrate a point relating to the grammar of emotion 
terms. Harre (1989a p. 444) suggests that much of the research conducted in 
emotion studies should be reinterpreted in the light of this conclusion. 
The conclusion of Schachter and Singer's research, regardless of whether it 
is obtained by an analysis of the grammar of emotion terms or through 
research, provides the impetus for Schachter's (1971) conclusions relating to 
the physiological correlates of psychopathy. 
Schachter concludes, by relying on the insight that physiological arousal is 
insufficient to characterise emotionality, that: 
The sociopath reacts sympathetically to events which are labelled 
frightening by others, but he also reacts to events labelled 
relatively harmless by others. Such generalized, relatively 
indiscriminate reactivity is, I would suggest, almost the 
equivalent of no reactivity at alL..Bodily conditions which for 
others are associated with emotionality are, for the sociopath, his 
"normal" state. Given a chronic history of autonomic reactivity, 
only a marked increase in activation will be labelled as an 
emotional state, and perhaps even noticed. (p. 179). 
There is an obvious error in Schachter's conclusion which was examined in 
Chapter Three-it makes no sense to assert that an individual knows what 
his or her emotional state is by pointing inwardly and labelling some inner 
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criteria. Nevertheless before examining the problems of Schachter's 
conclusions it is necessary to add one final comment he offers: 
If an individual can learn not to apply emotional labels to his 
bodily feelings in situations that customary usage defines as 
emotionat it seems equally possible that the opposite will hold; 
that is, that an autonomically hyperactive individual can learn to 
apply emotional labels to his bodily feelings in situations that 
would customarily be defined as nonemotional. (p. 182). 
No explanation of the nature of psychopathy is given by the statement that 
they are 'autonomically reactive'. A psychopath just reacts (physiologically) 
to stimuli. 'Indiscriminate reactivity' is, by definition, not reactivity at all. 
To discriminate is to react in a way to choose between different options. If 
one does not discriminate then 'reaction' is reduced to action. If that action 
is different from normals then all Schachter has described is a physiological 
difference between the 'psychopathic' and 'normals' which can be 
identified under certain conditions (i.e those which the experiment was 
designed to establish). Schachter provides the observation that psychopaths 
are highly aroused all the time whereas the arousal level of normals 
fluctuates according to environmental stimuli. Additionally, and most 
importantly, the identification of psychopaths by describing them as 
'autonomically reactive' relies on there being a difference between these 
two groups which can be ascertained by other means (e.g. Clinical 
diagnosis). Whether Schachter has said anything useful about psychopaths 
with his study relies almost entirely on the selection of his 'psychopathic' 
group from his 'control'. 
Could Schachter's findings relate to other groups of people which we can 
identify independently? Perhaps the creative have the same physiological 
state as the psychopaths. A group of 'non-normal' people can be identified 
by clinical diagnosis, but findings that relate to this group cannot be 
justifiably characteristics of this group only. Schachter cannot assert that he 
has found a characteristic exclusive to psychopaths because the result may 
well obtain in other groups. Our use of the word 'psychopathy' in clinical 
diagnosis, or in psychology generally, (I have deliberately avoided the 
phrase 'everyday language') does not provide the foundation for assertions 
like, IIpsychopaths can be characterised by 'autonomic reactivity"'. Other 
groups may well be included within this description-in particular the 
creative. Furthermore Schachter (1971 p. 182) admits that the conduct of 
other groups, such as anxiety-neurotics, might be explained by the 
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development of inappropriate labelling of high arousal as an emotional 
state in emotion-neutral environments. Thus by inappropriate labelling 
the anxiety neurotic labels his as an emotional state one which is not 
considered by others as appropriately an emotion state. 
Despite the problems produced in Schachter's account of psychopathy he 
has identified a number of interesting points. Psychopaths, characterised by 
emotional flatness, might have a feature of their physiology which will 
provide a useful indicator of the connection to the creative. Schachter is 
quite correct in asserting that 'psychopathy' must be understood in relation 
to environmental and situational variables. Psychopathy is not simply 
'high-autonomic reactivity' or perhaps more correctly 'high sympathetic 
arousal which does not fluctuate according to situational variables'. The 
word 'psychopathic' does not mean 'high autonomic arousal'. 
We rely on our description of psychological terms, like 'psychopathy', or 
'anxiety-neuroticism', as accurately representing concepts and providing the 
basis for experimental research. Is the assumption justified? It has been 
shown that within theoretical perspectives designed to characterise 
psychological terms, like cognitive science, psychological terms are 
misused. Yet the grammar of psychiatric classification is not 'wrong' or 
'false' and licenses certain transactions within the language-game of 
psychiatric diagnosis (In the same way the C-Fibre thesis is not wrong-it is 
nonsense). The grammar of psychiatric diagnosis can be defended against 
claims based on so-called metaphysical impossibilities like failing to 
distinguish between real and feigned insanity, and is invulnerable to 
evidential challenge because of the internal relation between the grammar 
and the evidence. Schachter's research relies on the classification of 
psychopaths by clinical diagnosis. Nevertheless, to give up faith in a 'form 
of representation', a grammar, rule or practice, one cannot embark on 
empirical testing. Schachter is in the same position as a person who 
attempts to test the adequacy of a metre ruler by measuring various objects 
of unknown length or places their hand on top of their head to measure 
their height. 
There are, for now, two related conclusions. Firstly, Schachter's research 
cannot extend our understanding of psychopathy beyond what it is based 
on, viz., psychiatric diagnosis. He cannot offer a new account of 
psychopathy based on his experiment because ultimately his observations 
rely on psychiatric classification: the grammar of psychiatric diagnosis 
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fences him in. Secondly, this does not make his observations ungrounded 
or useless, it does not rule out empirical psychology. The fact that we have 
different units of measurement (imperial, metric, the length of a thumb, 
and the distance of a stride) does not undermine the meaningfulness of the 
practice of measurement. We might create a new measure of time with 
reference to seconds, we are not wrong to do so. Similarly, Schachter can 
describe psychopaths as 'autonomically reactive' but this insight is limited 
in the same way the measurement of time is since it is ultimately reducible 
to the criteria, or method, from which it arose. 
(c) Going behind the phenomenon 
If it is a calculation, we adopt it as a calculation-that is, we make 
a rule of it. We make the description of it the description of a 
norm-we say, "This is what we are going to compare things 
with." It gives us a method of describing experiments, by saying 
they deviate from this by so much ... If we call it a calculation, it's a 
complete picture which now serves as a standard or phraseology 
for the description of an experiment. 
We might have adopted 2 + 2 == 4 because two balls and two balls 
balances four. But now we adopt it, it is aloof from 
experimentation-it is petrified. (LFM, X p. 98). 
Mathematical Archives and Empirical evidence 
Wittgenstein's concerns for the identification of grammar and its role 
within experimentation are helpful in explaining away the confusion as to 
whether or not insanity is related to creativity. Consider: 
This area of inquiry appears more than intriguing. If creativity in 
fact bears some relationship, or relationship in some cases, to 
mental disturbance, it may be of paramount importance to 
uncover its sources. While some of these sources might carry 
relatively little significance, others could help build bridges 
between the normal, the abnormal, and the usefully exceptional. 
At their most helpful, they could perhaps even provide new 
perspectives and approaches to some troubling mental afflictions 
and create in addition, a broader and more accepting climate for 
the spectrum and limits of "normal" human development. 
(Richards 1981 p. 264). 
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But what would establish the desired connection? How would I change the 
conception of 'normal' or 'abnormal' that people adopt? If the concept of 
psychopathology is a rule laid down in the DSM-III-R, used as a description 
in experimentation, then according to Wittgenstein that concept is 
'petrified' and 'aloof from experimentation'. Psychology seems impotent to 
carry out the developments suggested by Richards (1981). No experiment 
will effect the change of a grammar like the one created and maintained by 
psychiatrists, since grammar is not responsible to the facts and indeed 
constitutes what we take to be the facts as a result of experimentation. 
Wittgenstein (in Diamond 1973) describes the rules of a grammar as being 
placed into an archive for future reference. In mathematics it is clear that 
rules are not disputed. No one asserts that 2+3==78, for instance, and no one 
wants to produce a challenge to the rules established in the 'archives of 
mathematics'. How then, given the assumptions that insanity is somehow 
related to creativity and that the established tradition in psychiatry requires 
. some change, is it possible to challenge the established rules set down in 
psychiatry and psychology of their representation of mental illness such 
that it might accord with a representation of creativity and accord with the 
facts? 
Perhaps the connection between insanity and creativity is as Ochse (1990) 
concludes " ... the mediating link between creativity and pathology may be a 
motivational thrust (resulting from emotional insecurity) leading to two 
possible outcomes-intellectual gains and emotional disorder. (p. 119). The 
idea that some motivational factor is responsible for madness and creativity 
. arises within the psycho-analytic tradition directly as a result of Freud. 
Freud held that some developmental process causes conflict within the 
individual which arises in a feeling of guilt, fear of punishment (anxiety), 
or some other undesirable emotional state. As a child the potential creator, 
or neurotic, forces the conflict provoking situation into unconsciousness 
where it remains unresolved. This unresolved conflict causes tension 
which is repressed by self-discipline, and a willingness to undertake risks 
and stresses which the creative must endure to produce the creative 
product. Freud found difficulty in offering an explanation for creativity 
speaking of "the unanalyzable endowment" and the ilriddle of the 
miraculous gift that makes an artist" (cited in Richards, 1981 p. 269). Freud's 
contribution, and the contribution from the psycho-analytic perspective, is 
most worthwhile for maintaining the connection between insanity and 
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creativity which is lost in later approaches contained within humanistic 
psychology and, more recently in theory of cognitivist alliance. 
Wittgenstein criticised Freud, although he admired his work, as he found it 
a good source of philosophical errors (Suter, 1989 p. 39). Wittgenstein 
admired Freud's work because he saw a similarity in purpose with his own; 
he thought that Freud's thought was aimed at converting people to a new 
way of thinking, not by doing science but by offering a different approach 
(Suter, 1989p. 38). Wittgenstein declares that Freud gives us something 
which is untestable. Freud did not offer his thoughts in the form of 
hypotheses, his claims were something prior to hypothesis, he gave us 
specuLation (LC, p. 44). Freud propounds a new mythology, one involving 
new mysterious figures like 'ego' and 'id' which are unverifiable. Freud 
created a 'paradise' for people to work within. Wittgenstein requests a 
critical approach to Freud and offers some piercing criticisms to his general 
approach to psychology (Suter, 1989; Cioffi, 1991). 
Freud's 'speculation' is of interest to this investigation because it can be 
'explained away'-that is that by offering an alternative free of the 
philosophical muddles concerning the nature of the concepts of insanity 
and creativity it is hoped that the Freudian myth will be dissolved while 
the insight gained from Freud's speculation can be preserved. Freud 
suggests two things which are of great interest: The creative have adapted 
in childhood to avoid guilt and anxiety. This capacity somehow facilitates 
the production of creative work. (Notice the similarity to Schachter's 
explanation of psychopaths: they have an absence of guilt and anxiety 
learned in childhood.) 
The grammar of Creativity 
To create a set of propositions (theory) which did not exist before is to adopt 
a use of words which is unintelligible relative to a shared practice (see 
Chapter Four). Wittgenstein comments on this regularly in his Lectures on 
the Foundations of Mathem.atics . 
... suppose that a physicist says, "I have at last discovered how to 
see what people look like in the-which no one had ever before 
known." Suppose Lewy say he is very surprised. I would say, 
"Lewy, don't be surprised", which would be to say, "Don't talk 
bosh." (LFM, I, p. 17). 
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It was seen in Chapter Four that Wittgenstein was quite willing to give the 
ascription of madness or the like to those who deny certain facts or made 
unusual observations. Now he is quite willing to suppose that the physicist 
in his example can combine a group of words into a proposition which is 
unintelligible (to Lewy at least) despite the proposition being quite clearly in 
the category of the denial of a methodological proposition, and be content 
with the idea that the physicist can make his statement intelligible. 
Wittgenstein continues: 
Suppose he goes on to explain that he has discovered how to 
photograph by infra-red rays. Then you have a right to be 
surprised if you feel like it, but about something entirely 
different. It is a different kind of surprise. Before, you felt a kind a 
mental whirl. .. -which whirl is a sign you haven't understood 
something. You shouldn't just gape at him; you should say, "I 
don't know what you are talking about."(LFM, I, p. 17). 
Morawetz offered an explanation for Wittgenstein's use of the concept of 
mental disturbance: "We cannot understand the relation of a speaker to his 
error."(Morawetz, 1978 p. 40). It is clear that someone who ordinarily thinks 
that they can see people in the dark, behind a curtain, or camouflaged in the 
forest, is talking nonsense (you could test their claim if you were in any 
doubt but suppose that you found they were in error). The scientist who 
creates the technique of infra-red photography can explain what he means 
with reference to a context in which it is intelligible (i.e wavelengths of 
light which are imperceptible to the human eye but detectable with 
equipment). In the absence of this explanation the proposition remains 
unintelligible. Wittgenstein remarks: 
He may say, "Don't you understand English? Don't you 
understand 'look like', 'in the dark', etc?" Suppose he shows you 
some infra-red photographs and says, "This is what you look like 
in the dark." This way of expressing what he has discovered is 
sensational, and therefore fishy. It makes it look like a different 
kind of discovery. (LFM, I, p. 17). 
A proposition is intelligible only if its use is shared by the parties involved. 
An unshared rule for the use of a proposition is unintelligible, even if the 
words used are in themselves familiar (cf. Carroll's nonsense & Insanity pp. 
141-142). This explains why Wittgenstein questions the validity of offering 
an unexplained piece of evidence in relation to an unintelligible 
proposition. It simply will not do to make a proposition which is 
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unintelligible, like "This is what people look like in the dark", if the 
explanation for the intelligibility of that proposition is a piece of evidence 
which would not be countenanced (shared as evidence) by the party who is 
subject to the explanation. The different kind of discovery would be the 
acceptance of the photograph as evidence for a particular proposition: when 
on Wittgenstein's view it is the acceptance of the grammar which is 
important. 
Armed with the general principle that a proposition makes sense only by 
demonstrating its use Wittgenstein sets out to isolate those propositions 
which describe the use of empirical statements and empirical statements 
themselves. By examining propositions which seem to be cases which fall 
somewhere in between empirical statements and mathematical statements 
Wittgenstein claims: 
Now what I am driving at is the difference between counting the 
people in this room and counting the points of intersection in 
the pentagram. 
9 7 
8 
liThe pentagram" is the name of this figure. 
Is there a difference between the use of the sentence "There are 
ten people in this room" and "There are ten points of 
intersection in the pentagram"?-The latter is a mathematical 
proposition and the former is not. Why? "Well, the one talks of 
people, the other points and lines." But that is not an essential 
difference .... The word "men" may come in and it may still be 
mathematics; and the word "lines" may come in and it may not 
be mathematics. (LFM, XII p. 115). 
It is this distinction that the following argument explores. It is argued that 
the assumption that insanity is related to creativity is a grammatical claim 
about a relation between the concepts of insanity and creativity (As 
developed in Chapter Four). This is analogous to the view that a 
mathematical proposition has terms which are grammatically connected 
through our acceptance of the practice of mathematics. The suggestion that 
the creative, as a distinct and separate population have a higher incidence 
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of psychopathology from normals, is an empirical claim licensed by the 
above grammatical claim. 
The incidence of Creativity and Insanity: A defence of method 
The conceptual confusions which operate in psychology that Wittgenstein 
identifies come from viewing psychological investigations in a particular 
way. Psychologists often express the view that empirical research is about 
something which can verify the terms of theory. Perhaps some remarkable 
discovery will reveal the nature of creativity and the mysterious 
connection to madness. But what is overlooked is the the way the concepts 
of insanity and creativity are used within psychology. 
Certainly the concepts of insanity and creativity are not held as being 
mutually exclusive. It is possible to establish that creative people are insane. 
Salavador Dali was undoubtedly a candidate for the ascription of madness. 
Lichtenstein (1971 p. 161) lists as senile psychotics: "Kant, Copernicus, 
Faraday, Stendahl" but adds that this condition seemed not to interfere 
with their work. Functional psychotics included "Tasso, Holderlin, 
Strindberg, Van Gogh, Nerval, Maupassant, Schumann, Lamb and Comte" 
(p. 161). Even Freud is included among those considered to have suffered 
from productive neurosis (Lichtenstein 1971 p. 161). It should not be 
overlooked that hundreds of creative people were considered sane and 
healthy. 
It has been suggested that the diagnostic criteria within the DSM-III-R 
operate as a grammar of psychiatric diagnosis and are not therefore 
responsible to evidential challenge. It is not possible for an person to 
challenge the ascription of madness based on other criteria, such as those 
developed by an experiment. Similarly it makes no sense to suppose that I 
could know 1+1=1 by observing the combination of raindrops on a window. 
But a tribe that had a mathematics which had the statement 1+1=1 would 
not be wrong to do so. Surely I could convince this tribe that one apple plus 
one apple means that I have two apples? I could pick up apples and show 
them that I have two. They however need not take this as evidence of 
anything related to their mathematical system which may not extend 
beyond games relating to raindrops on glass. 
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Perhaps the tribe comprehend addition in such a way that all combinations 
result in the loss of recognition of the individual units involved. Marriage 
in the tribe is a conjoining of individuals such that they become one entity 
and children as being absorbed within the population rather than an 
addition of an individual. Their assessment of their system of calculation 
might be based on volume. They might, for example, acknowledge good 
times when their village expanded past a certain point and suggest that 
their principle of addition is verified by observation of the relative size of 
their village in accordance with the number of combinations that occur in a 
year. (They do not have our mathematical system purely because they 
acknowledge that there are, for example, seventy newborns in one year 
since they insist that 1+1=1, which is excluded from our mathematics; they 
have, it is supposed, our concept of counting but not addition.) The tribe 
does not accept my concept of addition nor my proof of this concept since 
they accept that I have two apples but that if I combined the apples by 
addition I would have one set of apples rather than two apples. (They 
might not even accept my demonstration as appropriate as a proof of 
anything in mathematics.) 
Juda (1949) was the first to systematically investigate the relationship 
between the creative and the insane. Without asserting anything like a 
definition of creativity or insanity, which is generally taken as a limitation 
of this research (Richards 1981), Juda describes the incidence of 
psychopathology in 294 "highly gifted" individuals and their families. Juda 
does not base his research on any theory, no Freudian, or neo-Freudian 
position is assumed to be verified on the basis of the research; although it 
may have inspired the mammoth effort to conduct the five thousand 
interviews over twenty-six years of the relatives and descendants of the 
people selected as creative. From a selection of 113 artists and 181 scientists 
Juda gained evaluations, where it was possible, of a psychiatric diagnosis of 
each subject, their parents, siblings, children, and grandchildren. 
Juda (1949) found that 5.3% of the artists and 6.1 % of the scientists could be 
described as psychotic, compared to the general population being 2.0% 
psychotic. Despite the difficulties of assessment it is useful to point out that 
he assessed as psychopathic 27.4% of the artists and 14.4% of the scientists 
compared to an intermediate group (those regarded as 'gifted' but not 
'highly gifted") of gifted individuals who were estimated as containing 
19.1 % psychopaths. Juda's study of the relatives found a higher incidence of 
both psychotic illness and psychopathy in all categories. The results show 
188 
that parents and siblings and children have a higher incidence of 
psychopathology than grandchildren in most cases. 
A study by Karlsson (1970) studied the supposed association between 
insanity and creativity from the opposite perspective from Juda (1949). 
Karlsson studied the incidence of creativity in a population of those 
identified with some psychopathology. Again Karlsson did not assume any 
particular theory but simply set out to describe the incidence of creativity in 
the families of the mentally ill. Karlsson relied on the listing in Iceland's 
Who is Who as indicative of creativity. Richards (1981) describes this 
assumption as; creativity, "leniently defined" (p. 288). Nevertheless, 
Karlsson reports that family members of the mentally ill have roughly 
twice the likelihood of being referenced in the book than normals. 
Andreasen and Canter (1978) found results to support the findings of Juda 
(1949). Relatives of the creative (all writers) and the subjects themselves 
have a higher incidence of mental disorder than a control group and their 
. relatives. Andreasen and Canter conclude that the prevalence of affective 
disorders in their sample indicates that the psychopathology of the creative 
writer is normally an affective disorder and not schizophrenic. In 
particular, Andreasen and Canter offer the observation that the personality 
type is usually cyclothymic rather than schizoid. 
There is a temptation to interpret the findings of the above research as 
indicating that both creativity and insanity have a genetic basis. Ochse 
(1990) reports several attempts to explain this type of research. For example 
Prentky (1980) maintains that the " ... the same neuro-chemical aberration 
that impairs the fragile filtering mechanism in thought disordered patients 
also provides an advantage for creative thinking"(Ochse 1990 p. 116). 
Galton suggested that pathology may result from an over-excited mind. 
There are also a variety of explanations which have a neo-Freudian bent 
which considers creativity to result in anxiety reduction caused by inner 
conflict which may manifest itself in some psychopathology as well as 
creativity, including Storr (1983), Richards (1981), and Lichtenstein (1971). 
The problem here is the same as the problem we would have in 
confronting the tribe who had no concept of addition in their mathematics. 
The same evidence is taken as indicating a different rule of use for the 
concepts of creativity and insanity or alternatively different concepts of 
insanity and creativity are taken to explain the results. 
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There is nothing problematic, so far as can be established from the 
interpretation of Wittgenstein given, with the research which seeks to 
establish that the incidence of creativity in a popUlation of the mentally ill 
is significantly higher than that of a group of normals. Similarly, there is 
nothing problematic about the opposite approach which identifies that the 
creative have a higher incidence of psychopathology. Despite the 
methodological difficulties in identifying the creative and the insane, the 
task of actually measuring the incidence of these characteristics of 
individuals does not offend any grammatical boundaries, and is therefore 
philosophically uninteresting. The task is not analogous to measuring the 
length of a colour, or suggesting that the insane are insane because they 
display thoughts which are not legitimated by society. That we have 
difficulty identifying the insane, because people might, for example feign 
insanity, is not a limitation of our grammar. For all that is assumed is that 
we can count the number of people with a particular set of features which 
we identify. Richards (1990) points out, perhaps the creative desire so much 
to be different from normals that they display deviant behaviour as part of 
a "self-fulfilling prophecy" (p. 322). Perhaps the creative feign insane 
symptoms? But even if such contingencies occur they do not prevent 
psychological inquiry. Empirical research is a legitimate method of 
psychology. If psychology restricted itself to simple descriptions, if the 
problems of psychology were simply stated as in "Are there more people 
classified as insane in a sample of the creative than normals", then 
psychology would offend no grammatical boundaries. Baker and Hacker 
(1985) point out philosophy has the task of relieving us of conceptual 
entanglement, but none is involved here. The problem is that our methods 
of measurement produce information which seems to require 
interpretation. Knowing the incidence of mental illness in the creative 
(however they are defined) is derived from a method of testing which is 
unrelated to the actual problem which is to determine a connection 
between insanity and creativity. 
Wittgenstein is quite clear: 
"20 apples+30 apples=50 apples" may not be a proposition about 
apples. Whether it is depends on its use. It may be a proposition 
of arithmetic-and in this case we could call it a proposition 
about numbers. 
You might ask, "Isn't there something queer about this? How 
could all this have changed what it is about?" But that is how we 
use the phrase "a statement about numbers". As soon as it's 
applied in a certain way, we say it's about numbers. 
And a discovery -"627+324= ... "-could in the one case a 
discovery about apples, in the other case a discovery about 
numbers-according to what we do with it. (LFM, XII p.113-114). 
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Sometimes psychologists make claims about grammar as if an empirical 
discovery somehow penetrates that grammar-as if "627+324 ... " were a 
discovery about mathematics, when, according to Wittgenstein, it is merely 
descriptive of a grammar. Schachter (1971) does this when he suggests that 
his empirical discoveries describe the nature of psychopathy. Similarly the 
evidence provided by Juda (1949), Karlsson (1970) and the others is 
acceptable as a consequence of a grammar which provides an acceptable 
relation between insanity and creativity; the results do not justify that 
relation. If Juda's results, for example, are used to describe that grammar, 
then like the situation in which 20 apples plus 30 apples is taken as being 
about the rule of arithmetic, he could conclude that acceptable practices in 
psychology allow the identification of certain features of one group of 
individuals occurring in another group. The rule stated baldly might be 
that: Features that make up A (Mental illness) occur more often in group B 
(The creative) than in C (Normals). No grammatical rule is breached, 
certainly no rule peculiar to psychology. If used in this way then Juda's 
results amount a mathematical relation. One could even imagine the 
results being used to describe the relative size of sets in a mathematical 
problem. 
But the statement: "The creative have a higher incidence of mental illness 
than the normal population" must surely be about the creative and the 
mentally ill. The empirical investigation of such phenomena is perfectly 
acceptable but it relies on a grammatical association between creativity and 
insanity. Assumed within method adopted by Juda (1949) and others is that 
the relation is an acceptable one licensed by a grammar; that it makes sense 
to investigate the relation between creativity and insanity. The 
mathematical rule of A+B=C licences the relation between objects that can 
be counted. Yellow in combination with blue gives green is licensed by our 
grammar of colour combinations. Excluded from our grammar are 
transformations like red in combination with purple produces bright 
yellow. Excluded from mathematics such as red plus three equals .... since 
stated in this way 'red' cannot be counted. I might count the number of red 
cars but not the number of red. 
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Psychological inquiry relies on a grammar which is less obviously flawed 
than the trivial examples above. Some examples of our conceptual 
confusion have already been offered (see Chapters Two Three and Four). To 
avoid these conceptual confusions we must attend to the way our concepts 
are employed within theory. It is important to note that the preceding 
example relied on the assumption that creativity was related conceptually 
or grammatically to insanity. The problem remains that this assumption 
seems to require some justification within theory. 
Conc1 usions 
By adopting Wittgenstein's position we regard the intelligibility of our 
proposals to derive from a shared practice. Our mutual adherence to certain 
rules constitutes the normative procedures adopted in the use of our 
expressions in relation to the internally related criteria which accord or 
conflict with those expressions. Wittgenstein regards those expressions 
which govern the manipulation of empirical statements to constitute a 
'grammar'. That 'grammar' is comprised of a mutual way of acting. 
Alternative practices may be offered in contrast to an established way of 
acting but they cannot, in principle, determine the falsity of a grammar-
grammar is autonomous. 
The DSM-III-R can be considered, in a limited sense, as providing a 
description of the grammar of the ascription of mental illness. Szasz offers a 
critique of that grammar by relying on a metaphysical impossibility: that 
one cannot feign insanity. Szasz's reliance on this so-called 'impossibility' is 
not unlike that examined in Chapter Three: "That I cannot feel his pains 
nor he mine". We must not present grammatical observations as if they 
established some metaphysical impossibility. Szasz's argument was 
dissolved in a similar way to the argument in Chapter Three by considering 
Szasz's use of the word 'deception'. Despite the poverty of Szasz's argument 
it was left open that psychiatric diagnosis might be improved so that some 
connection between insanity and creativity might become legitimate 
inquiry within psychology. This option followed directly from the 
assumption that the concepts of insanity and creativity have a grammatical 
connection. The assumption is excluded from consideration in psychiatric 
diagnosis-which is not to say that it is excluded from consideration in 
psychiatry or psychology because as we know psychologists have directed 
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theoretical and empirical study towards establishing a connection between 
the concepts. 
Schachter's (1971) work on psychopaths was used as an example to show 
how that in psychology experimental techniques cannot resolve conceptual 
confusion. Schachter's work might be interpreted as producing some 
evidence for a physiological basis for psychopathy, viz., psychopaths are 
'autonomically reactive'. But exactly what is a psychopath? Schachter relies 
on the grammatical distinctions present in the DSM-III-R to provide his 
subjects and controls. Do these distinctions provide the foundation for his 
research? Perhaps other groups, such as the creative are autonomically 
reactive? It is the grammar of the ascription of mental illness that provides 
the basis for his research. That grammar cannot be overturned by empirical 
inquiry, such as Schachter's, for even if it was found that another group of 
individuals were 'autonomically reactive' the problem is displaced. We 
would require the connection between this 'autonomic reactivity' and 
psychopathy? If I randomly tested .people and found many that were 
'autonomically reactive' this would not constitute evidence that they were 
psychopathic. Suppose all judges were found to be autonomically 
reactive-would this change the way psychiatrists considered psychopathy? 
The criteria for what we consider psychopathy to be are not responsible to 
this type of empirical inquiry. Our grammar of psychiatric classification is 
'petrified' in the social practice of ascribing mental illness to others: it 
describes what constitutes the facts and is not responsible to them. 
The conclusion that grammar is autonomous does not preclude empirical 
inquiry. Certainly some types of inquiry are ruled out by the grammar 
which we share. We cannot investigate mythical creations of a confused 
grammar. Hidden causal mechanisms cannot in principal be discovered to 
provide an understanding of the relationship between the creative and the 
insane (Chapter Two). The evidence gathered by Juda and others does not, 
in principle, justify any theoretical assumptions made to link together the 
concepts of insanity and creativity but nevertheless it stands as evidence 
licensed by a grammar which provides a distinction between the creative 
and insane. The problem remains that such evidence seems to require 
some justification within psychological theory. 
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Chapter Six 
Divergent Practices: 
A Conflict of Grammars 
Introduction 
To get a clearer grasp of the connection between the examples in the 
preceding chapter it is useful to examine Shotter's attempt to characterise 
the nature of empirical psychology from a 'Wittgensteinian perspective'. 
Shotter (1991) maintains: 
Words do not in themselves have a meaning, but a use, and 
furthermore, a use only in a context; they are at best thought of, 
not as having already determined meanings, but as means, as 
tools, or as instruments for use in the making of meanings .... (p. 
200). 
and continues 
.. the idea of 'agreement with reality' lacks any clear 
application ... everyday human activities do not just appear vague 
and indefinite because we are still as yet ignorant of their true 
underlying nature, but that they are really vague ... the fact is, 
there is no order, no already predetermined order, just an order 
of possibilities, an order of possible orderings which it is up to us 
to make as we see fit. (p. 202). 
Szasz's conception of insanity as a role played out by persons in relation to 
psychiatrists is a statement about the grammar of the term insanity 
(Chapter Five pp. 165-171). Note that Szasz's conception of insanity does not 
offend against the description of the grammar presented in Chapter Four. 
But Szasz cannot justify his negative thesis which attacks psychiatric 
classifications because he relies on a misuse of the word 'deception'. Szasz's 
conception of insanity is open to philosophical inspection and dismissal. 
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Szasz presents a possible order, but his tools are misused, his structure 
collapses upon philosophical examination. 
Schachter relies on the classification of psychopaths by clinicians in order to 
study their characteristics but his study is entangled within a method 
reliant upon the identification of the very thing he seeks to explain-he 
relies on a pre-determined order. Schachter cannot remove conceptual 
confusion or offer a new rule for the identification of psychopaths on the 
basis of his work. 
Empirical techniques used by psychologists rely upon the grammar of the 
psychological terms employed within that research. This does not mean 
that empirical investigation is useless or nonsensical. Given the 
assumption that insanity is related to creativity-one possible ordering-it 
is possible to describe certain occurrences in which this assumption might 
hold. The problem is then to decide whether these assumptions might be 
useful. The assumption that 'psychological predicates describe brain states 
or functional states' has been shown to be incoherent (Chapter Two). 
Similarly, the assumptions that psychological predicates have their 
meaning determined by society and that 'autonomous individuals' cannot 
have the intentional use of symbols have been shown to lead to conceptual 
confusion (Chapters Three and Four). It was by attention to the use of 
terms within those theories that the confusion was identified. By attending 
to the grammar of the terms of interest, insanity and creativity, it is possible 
(perhaps not actual) to avoid conceptual entanglement and provide an 
understanding of the relationship, and its usefulness, within theory. 
The Grammar of Creativity in relation to the Grammar of Insanity 
A difference in the interpretation of a statement or action ultimately 
depends upon a difference in a practice, context, or custom. Unintelligible 
actions and statements result when two parties do not share common 
practices surrounding the interpretation of an action or statement. If there 
is a genuine practice, or rule for the use of a statement, then that statement 
is potentially intelligible. Insane actions and statements are rule-governed 
but unintelligible; these actions constitute a special type of unintelligibility 
where the unintelligibility is dependent upon a society, or set of shared 
rules and practices. In Chapter Four it was argued that if the insane are 
viewed in any other way, either having no rules for the use of their 
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statements or having rules independently formed which happen to clash 
with those of a society, then either the insane produce the philosophical 
impossibility of having a genuine private language or they are potentially 
intelligible. Both of these consequences were rejected. 
If Wittgenstein's comments on epistemological issues in On Certainty are 
to be understood then it is crucial that his use of terms encompassed by the 
general phrase 'mental disturbance' be clear. It has been argued that context 
changes across time, that the rules of a society are flexible and dynamic. It is 
within the explanation of a change in context that an understanding of the 
grammar of creativity is possible; a society can adjust its practice to 
accommodate initially incomprehensible (unclear) actions or statements. It 
a process in which society learns the rules laid down by creative 
inspiration. 
Wittgenstein (1969) accepted that language and customs change across time. 
He offered an outline in a metaphor of the components of the creative 
process. Morawetz (1978 p. 42) collected these statements and labelled them 
the "Metaphor of the Riverbed". 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of 
empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as 
channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened 
but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid 
propositions hardened and hard ones became fluid.(C. §96). 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed 
of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement 
of the waters on the riverbed and the shift of the bed itself; 
though there is no sharp division of one from the other.(C. §97). 
But if someone were to say, "So logic too is an empirical science" 
he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may 
get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at 
another as a rule of testing.(C. §98). 
And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to 
no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, 
which now in one place now in another gets washed away or 
deposited. (C. §99). 
Wittgenstein's analogy is misleading in some respects. Morawetz (1978 pp. 
43-46) suggests that the imperceptible alteration of the 'hard rock' is 
untenable. Some beliefs which appear to be methodological propositions 
can only be changed dramatically. A proposition like, "Mt Cook is the 
highest mountain in New Zealand" will be removed not imperceptibly but 
by either a fantastic discovery of some higher mountain or dramatic 
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erosion indeed. The point is that the belief is such that its acceptance is not 
gradual or contestable. If the belief is to be removed then its removal will 
not be imperceptible. Nevertheless, if one takes the essential features of 
this example, or Morawetz's that, 'George Washington was the first 
president of the United States', it seems that they are beliefs which rely on 
the use of terms which Wittgenstein might exclude from his analogy. The 
concepts of 'first' and 'highest' operate here like those conventions of 
mathematics or logic. There is no suggestion that the removal of the belief 
that George Washington was the first president of the United States, albeit a 
dramatic change in my understanding, will affect my use of the concept of 
'first'-the concept of 'first' is not subject to alteration (That is not to say 
that the possibility is logically excluded). 
It was argued in Chapter Four that the insane are those individuals who 
maintain, in relation to a society, an unintelligible practice, or set of 
practices. Furthermore, any genuine practice is intelligible. The creative 
were likened to the insane because in order to produce novelty, or novel 
ideas, they, as individuals, must produce an unshared practice (i.e act as 
autonomous individuals, pace the social constructionists). In producing an 
unshared practice the creative produce an initially unintelligible rule or 
practice. The insane were distinguished from the creative on the basis that 
society shifts or adjusts its old practice in favour of that produced by the 
creative-whereas the insane maintain their unintelligibility. Society 
adjusts its practice to accommodate the initially unintelligible practice of 
the creative. 
Chapter Four established the narrow criteria which are required for 
declaring someone unintelligible and therefore insane. Clearly not every 
unshared rule is unintelligible. Bizarre thoughts are not necessarily 
unintelligible, novel thoughts are not incomprehensible, foreign practices 
are not impenetrable to our understanding .. Even within our own practices 
we claim to understand those who we disagree with. There are practices 
which we might not share but yet we claim to understand. Each of these 
possibilities have thus far been labelled 'potentially intelligible', or 'initially 
incomprehensible', indicating that by some process it is possible to 
comprehend those practices which we do not share. The aim here is to 
demonstrate that the grammatical distinction between the insane and the 
creative is that a society accepts, somehow, a new rule presented by a 
creative individual. In this capacity the creative person acts as an 
autonomous individual: in the sense that the creative individual has 
/ 
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abandoned shared practices, and acts individually, to produce novel ones. It 
must be made clear what it is about our shared practices (or society's 
practices generally) which overcomes the difficulty of declaring the creative 
outside, or beyond, the shared practices of society and therefore 
unintelligible. The present thesis holds it must be that the creative are 
autonomous individuals, similar in this sense to the insane, but are 
intelligible (pace Coulter who argues that those who lie outside the social 
system are unintelligible). It has been suggested that the difference between 
the two concepts rests with a social shift-society abandons its rule in 
favour of that which the creative person offers. But if intelligibility is tied to 
shared understanding, and creativity is produced by a non-shared practice, 
how is it possible that individuals who act creatively are ever understood? 
When encountering a foreign practice we must first establish that it is 
indeed a genuine rule-governed practice. Chapter Three dealt with the 
incoherence of the so-called 'private language' which was established to be 
. not a language at all. Rule-governed procedures are normative in the sense 
that they require something public to provide that application of the rule: a 
rule does not contain its own application. Some features of the 
requirements of observed behaviour were identified as indicating rule-
governed procedures: learning by instruction, the correction of mistakes, 
the complexity of the behaviour, etc. Additionally, it has been mentioned 
that in order to comprehend the new language of a neonate Crusoe his 
biological capacities must be similar to our own. That is to say, if we did 
meet an alien culture with really strange ways of going about things, we 
could not comprehend their language: "If a lion could talk, we could not 
understand him." (PI, II, p. 223). 
The suggestion that society abandons its conception of a rule in favour of a 
new rule implies that there is some basis for judging the new rule. The 
reasons why society might abandon a rule in favour of that proposed by a 
creative individual will be dealt with in Chapter Eight. For now the 
primary concern is whether it is possible to evaluate an unshared practice. 
Prior to any acceptance comes some evaluation, or at least understanding. 
The problem is that it is not as yet clear that we can in fact evaluate the new 
rules offered by the creative, since ex hypothesi they are unshared rules 
which are therefore not understood. 
Empirical evidence has been dismissed as criteria for the assessment of the 
adequacy of an unshared rule but the value of empirical inquiry has not 
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been dismissed. We can, it seems, say such things as 'the creative have a 
higher incidence of mental illness than a group of normals'. Nevertheless 
the same 'facts' may constitute the evidence for mutually exclusive 
practices. 
Insofar as psychiatric classification of mental disorders provides a grammar 
for the evaluation of the insane it is possible for alternative explanations of 
the 'facts'. It is possible to produce an alternative grammar (Disregard for 
now that such an achievement might be considered creative-I will return 
to this point later.) Such instances of conflicting grammars occur when we 
meet foreign tribes who explain the various things, like the regular 
flooding of a river, in terms of mythology. Or as offered in Chapter Five 
(pp. 185-187), the tribe that had no concept of addition. Perhaps the foreign 
tribe consider those with blue eyes to be deviant in such a way as to warrant 
the ascription of madness and in contrast to modern psychiatry we want to 
declare such things untenable. Wittgenstein is fond of representing such 
issues by hypothetical encounters with foreign tribes: 
In a court of law the statement of a physicist that water boils at 
about 100°C would be accepted unconditionally as truth. If I 
mistrusted this statement what could I do to undermine it? Set 
up experiments myself? What would they prove? (C §604). 
Supposing we met people who did not regard this as telling 
reason. Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, 
they consult an oracle. (And we consider them primitive.) Is it 
wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it?-If we 
call them wrong aren't we using our language-game as a base 
from which to combat theirs? (C §609). 
We know that what counts as evidence for the physicists statement is tied 
to the practices of physicists in determining what is water, what is 100°C, 
how such things are measured, and so on. We consult physicists in exactly 
the same way the tribe consults the oracle. A tribe of people might suggest 
that their oracle is the only evidence for ascertaining the truth of a certain 
proposition. The evidence that I produce would not be accepted as evidence 
by them. The same situation arose with the tribe with no conception of 
addition. Without a shared understanding of what counts as evidence for a 
proposition acceptance by the formally uninitiated will not be forthcoming. 
But what of those situations in which we maintain to know what the 
disagreement is about and yet wish to reject an alternative practice? Such a 
situation occurs with the prize-winning chemist who is also a devout 
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catholic who holds to the belief that the communion wine is the blood of 
Christ (C. §239, LFM, XI p. 110). The chemist who is a catholic knows the 
argument which support a scientific account of the nature of the 
communal wine but rejects it in favour of his religious beliefs. Or perhaps a 
chemist confronts a catholic on the issue in order to debate its merits. In the 
former case the individual participates in two mutually incompatible 
practices. In the latter, it is assumed that the grounds for believing that the 
wine is the blood of Christ will be known to the chemist, and the grounds 
for claiming otherwise will be known to the catholic. If meaning is 
contained within the use of a term within a practice then surely 
incompatible practices are simply two different meanings which are 
mutually exclusive. Similarly Wittgenstein's dispute with Turing as to 
whether there can be experimentation in mathematics led Turing to 
propose that Wittgenstein merely used the word experimentation 
differently: 
Turing thinks that he and I are using the word "experiment" in 
two different ways. But I want to show that this is wrong. That is 
to say, I think that if I could make myself quite clear, then Turing 
would give up saying that in mathematics we make experiments. 
If I could arrange in their proper order certain well-known facts, 
then it would become clear that Turing and I are not using the 
word "experiment" differently. (LFM, XI, p. 102). 
Morawetz (1978 p. 129) presents the reasons for Wittgenstein's rejection of 
Turing's claim: 
Rejection of another's views presupposes understanding. It 
misrepresents the situation to say that the two mean different 
things by what they say simply because they have different beliefs 
and procedures; they share meanings insofar as they share usages. 
When one affirms and the other denies that this is blood, they 
are using the words in the same way and they mean the same 
things by them. 
Wittgenstein confirms the importance of this insight: 
One of the greatest difficulties I find in explaining what I mean is 
this: You are inclined to put our difference in one way, as a 
difference of opinion. But I am not trying to persuade you to 
change your opinion. I am only trying to recommend a certain 
sort of investigation. If there is an opinion involved, my only 
opinion is that this sort of investigation is immensely important, 
and very much against the grain of some of you. (LFM, XI p. 103). 
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Morawetz's indicates to us that understanding is necessary for the rejection 
of another's beliefs and yet we know already that unless those practices are 
shared there is no intelligibility. Notwithstanding this, both the chemist 
and the catholic share certain concepts (The riverbed of our 
understanding)-the concepts relevant here are 'wine' and 'blood'. The 
disagreement between the chemist and the catholic centres on the denial of 
one anothers' claim to use the terms correctly. This situation is 
fundamentally different from the assessment of a foreign practice. A 
foreign practice cannot be judged as 'wrong' purely because they might 
explain things differently from ourselves, whereas here, as indicated by 
Wittgenstein's insistence that Turing is wrong in expressing the problem as 
a difference of opinion, there is, according to Wittgenstein, a way to assess a 
disagreement and reject a practice.(Think about an everyday explanation of 
a psychological phenomenon and the reasons a psychologist might reject 
that explanation in favour of one informed by the methods of psychology.) 
Where a chemist and catholic choose to reject one anothers' practice they 
do so, it can be assumed, from the position of knowing what one another 
takes to be the way of judging the particular evidence for the respective 
positions. The catholic understands the chemist's commitment to science 
but rejects the application of those practices (What the chemist takes to be 
the 'facts') in this instance because of his belief in Catholicism. The chemist 
might understand the principles of Catholicism but rejects the 'facts' as 
presented by the catholic. These contrasting positions might even reside 
within the same individual. What each party takes to be the facts relevant 
to the issue are known to one another. What is disputed is a method of 
obtaining those facts, not the representation of those facts. Each party shares 
enough common ground (knowledge of blood and wine) to represent their 
dispute and produce arguments to explore the nature and limits of their 
disagreement. (Morawetz 1978 p. 129). Of course, the disagreement is not 
one which can be resolved by empirical inquiry (d. Chapter Five). 
Nevertheless, any change of position, either by the catholic, the chemist, or 
the chemist/catholic who abandons one point of view, involves the 
adoption of the alternative method of representing the facts. For the 
individual these conflicting beliefs made be expressed as two ways of acting 
depending on a surrounding context: whether in church or in a laboratory. 
Surely the catholic means something different by his use of the word 
'blood' from that which the chemist adopts. Surely Turing is entitled to say 
that he simply has a different use of the word 'experiment' than 
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Wittgenstein. But the argument that the two parties to a dispute have 
different, and therefore unresolvable, usages of the terms of the dispute 
involves an ambiguity (The ambiguity must be understood if we are to 
understand the grammar of the concept of creativity). It is true that 
Wittgenstein and Turing disagree about the usage of the word 
'experimentation'. Turing uses it in some circumstances which 
Wittgenstein would not. Insofar as they have different usages they have 
different meanings. Nevertheless, when Wittgenstein affirms what Turing 
denies they both use the term in the same context. The statement, "This is 
blood" when directed towards the communion wine is denied by the 
chemist and affirmed by the catholic but they are both using the word 
'blood' in the same way (Put neutrally the question: "Is the substance in the 
chalice blood?" is denied by the chemist and affirmed by the catholic-their 
usage of the word 'blood' is now forced into being the same usage). 
Similarly, Wittgenstein declares Turing's dismissal of his argument as 
being simply two different ways of talking about experimentation to be 
wrong. In order for Turing to deny what Wittgenstein affirms they must at 
some point be discussing the same thing. 
Disagreement occurs against a shared background of what is being disagreed 
to. Clearly the catholic/chemist, Turing/Wittgenstein and the 
Galileo/ church (From Chapter Four, p. 153) examples occur within a 
framework of shared understandings about such things, respectively, as 
blood, experimentation, earth and sun. If Galileo's eventual success is 
taken as a creative achievement then we have an example of how creativity 
is possible given the thesis that the creative are autonomous individuals 
who participate in contingently unshared language-games. Galileo, putting 
aside the irony of the example, is analogous to the last surviving catholic in 
a society dominated by the views of scientists. It is clear that from the 
background of shared knowledge an individual can present a disagreement 
with the established norms and remain intelligible, despite the fact that 
agreement may not be forthcoming from the stoic. 
Unshared language-games are not clearly represented by the situation in 
which parties simply disagree since often the 'facts' representing a duality of 
representations will not be sh9-red. 'Blood', 'earth', and what constitutes an 
'experiment' are all agreed upon in the above examples despite different 
representations of how those facts are to be considered. There is the 
possibility that the facts will not be agreed upon amongst two contingently 
unshared, and therefore initially mutually unintelligible, practices (suppose 
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the catholic declared the blood of Christ to be fundamentally different from 
the blood that the chemist refers to). Furthermore, it is conceivable that the 
creative exercise their ability by adopting not only a disagreement with 
established tradition but a whole new perspective on the problem and what 
constitutes evidence for that problem. The example already given is that of 
the physicist who presents as evidence of his discovery-of what people 
look like in the dark-a photograph taken with film sensitive to infra-red 
(Chapter Five pp. 183-185). Such cases may result in the position of the 
creative who are only subsequently considered creative or those who 
adhere to the alien practice being unintelligible: "Where two principles 
really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each 
man declares the other a fool and heretic." (c. §611). The artist who presents 
work which is not even accepted as art until a later period has his work 
rejected initially not because people disagree about its worth, but because it 
falls outside what we can consider art at that time. Two things must occur 
for its recognition: A change in society's conception of art and the 
reassessment of the work as good. (Obviously, and not accidentally, the two 
conditions are related). 
The situation in which both parties to a disagreement know the reasons for 
one anothers mutual disagreement is not typical among examples. The 
creative, it has been assumed, present unheard of (unshared) reasonings for 
their disagreement with established tradition. While it is recognised that 
the creative are judged to be creative, in part, because they offer a new rule 
or practice which is adopted by society, there must be a way for we in the 
society to adopt their usage in favour to our own, without assuming that 
we know already the creative person's reasonings and judge them 
acceptable. But herein lies the ambiguity within the, anachronistic, 
Wittgensteinian response: 
What we believe depends on what we learn. We all believe that 
it isn't possible to get to the moon; but there might be people who 
believe that that is possible and that it sometimes happens. We 
say: these people do not know a lot that we know. And, let them 
never be so sure of their belief-they are wrong and we know it. 
If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs 
is evidently the poorer one by far. (c. §286). 
The anachronistic nature of the example is useful. Suppose I meet a group 
of lost soldiers and scientists on a hitherto unvisited island in the pacific. 
They have survived on the island since Wittgenstein's time totally 
203 
unaware of the changes in technology. They might have been a special 
group of scientists and soldiers collected together during World War Two 
for their engineering and research skills into aeronautics and engineering. 
By some oversight of their government they are left abandoned, their 
contact from the outside world cut off to ensure secrecy. Suppose I have just 
plummeted to earth in a space capsule after my mission to survey the lunar 
landscape. I make the claim to these people that I have just visited the 
moon. They suggest that I am mistaken since they claim it is impossible 
and that I must be acting out some deception to serve the purposes of the 
enemy. In such cases I hold that these people do not know a lot that I 
know. I reject their claims because I can encompass them within mine but I 
do not expect that they will be able to comprehend, or encompass, my 
explanation of events within their own representation of the 'facts'. Despite 
their best efforts to convince me of the poverty of my conceptualisation of 
events, that for instance, it is impossible to break the sound barrier without 
an aircraft disintegrating, I hold firm my belief and reject theirs. 
If the scientists met with a group of people from a local tribe who claimed 
to fly to the moon and back in their dreams (c. §106) they would be in a 
position to declare that the tribe has no conception of physics and 
aeronautics (c. §667). They would understand, and reject that practice, 
despite the tribespeople not accepting, or even understanding, their 
explanation of the impossibility of their tribal belief system. Wittgenstein 
insists that "They [ the tribe] are wrong and we know it." (c. §286). Yet, with 
the benefit of knowledge obtained after Wittgenstein wrote this argument, 
we know that Wittgenstein's claim is wrong. I know that it is possible to 
put a man on the moon(Albeit not by dreaming C. §117), that there are men 
who have been there, that there are three golf balls and an American flag 
still there. From this position it is fair to claim that both the scientists on 
the island and the tribe are wrong in their beliefs. I know that both the 
beliefs of the tribe and the beliefs of the scientists are wrong. 
Notwithstanding this, the scientists are still correct in declaring the tribes 
people wrong in their belief, despite wrongly believing that it is impossible 
to reach the moon(Thus the ambiguity). 
Both the scientists in the example and a person with the knowledge that 
mankind has visited the moon are certain that a tribe of people who 
believe that they can fly to the moon and back in their dreams are wrong. 
The examples are not intended to establish a hierarchical ordering of 
knowledge. It may not be the case that unshared, foreign, or ancient beliefs 
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are poorer than our own. The catholic vis-a-vis the chemist may be right 
(Morawetz, 1978 p.132). Each group, the scientists, the tribe, and a person of 
present day knowledge (sayan astronaut), rejects one another's evidential 
claims. The tribe rejects the claim that it is possible to get to the moon 
without being asleep and dreaming, since they suppose, the moon is the 
hole in the night sky where we pass through to the dreamworld. Both the 
scientists and an astronaut claim that the moon is a physical object far away 
and dreaming has nothing to do with transportation of my being. The 
scientists claim that technology has not enabled man to get to the moon, 
nor could it. The astronaut claims that modern technology has enabled 
mankind to get to the moon, so the scientists' claim otherwise is false. 
It has been argued that the relationship between a method of representation 
and evidence is internal. Grammar is autonomous and not responsible to 
the facts. Stated baldly the claim "There is no such thing as a wrong or 
false method of representation" (Baker and Hacker, 1985 p. 293) seems to 
militate against Wittgenstein's insistence that the tribe is wrong, and that 
we know it. Surely the tribe, the scientists, and the astronaut, all have 
different forms of representation. If Baker and Hacker are correct in their 
interpretation of Wittgenstein then there is here a clear contradiction. 
Wittgenstein was aware of this problem: 
Now one can offer counter-examples to all this, which show that 
human beings have held this and that to be certain which later, 
according to our opinion, proved false. But the argument is 
worthless. To say: in the end we can only adduce such grounds as 
we hold to be grounds, is to say nothing at all. 
I believe that at the bottom of this is a misunderstanding of the 
nature of language-games (c. §599). 
My form of representation gives me certain facts about the world. It is, 
trivially, my form of representation and the only thing available for the 
assessment of other practices. An astronaut can use his form of 
representation to explain to himself, and the scientist, why he rejects the 
beliefs the scientists hold. Similarly, the scientists can interpret the beliefs of 
the tribe within their method of representation. But the reverse need not 
apply. The scientists may not accept, understand, or even find intelligible 
the evidence of the astronaut. The tribe may not understand the scientists. 
Surely the scientists have no right to confidently assert that they are correct 
in their belief that it is impossible to get to the moon since as we know it is 
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possible. Are they simply using their language game to combat that of the 
tribe? 
And are we right to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of 
slogans which will be used to support our proceedings. (c. §610). 
I said I would 'combat' the other man,-but wouldn't I give him 
reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons 
comes persuasion (Think what happens when missionaries 
convert natives.)(c. §612). 
The reasons offered to reject another way of thinking go only so far as they 
are understood by the other party. But it has already been established that 
the tribespeople may not understand the reasons of the scientists although 
the scientists can understand the tribe's reasons for their position. But it is 
possible to teach the tribe, just as it is possible for the astronaut to teach the 
scientists (c.§ 111); that is update the scientists about the discoveries which 
led to spaceflight. Why is this method of instruction labelled 'persuasion' by 
Wittgenstein? 
When encountering a divergent practice it is one's own form of 
representation which serves to measure the adequacy of the conflicting 
practice. Practices which are rejected are dismissed on the criteria which are 
held within one's own practice. There is nothing external to one's system of 
representation which is available to measure the adequacy of conflicting 
practices. In earlier chapters the same point was made with respect to any 
individual rule: nothing mediates between a rule and its extension. Whilst 
there is nothing external to one's practice which enables some universal 
comparison of divergent practices it is still possible to represent another's 
position within one's own practice and then subject it to the criteria which 
might establish its adequacy or provides reasons for its dismissal (Examined 
in Chapter Eight). Converting someone to a new position involves 
something more than offering new evidence (c. §130). What is taken as 
evidence may not be shared. The conversion takes place only when the 
method of representing the evidence is adopted by a party-since this 
involves adopting a new form of representing the 'facts' or evidence are 
irrelevant to the change. What is left is something beyond the facts which 
might explain the shift; this something Wittgenstein labels 'persuasion', 
Wittgenstein describes cases in which our certainty is bound by our whole 
method of representation (C. § 117). The veracity of a proposition is related 
206 
to the circumstances of its employment and the method of representation 
which lends it support. 
My name is "L.W." And if someone were to dispute it, I should 
straightaway make connexions with innumerable things which 
make it certain. (c. §594). 
"But I can still imagine someone making all these connexions, 
and none of them corresponding with reality. Why shouldn't I be 
in a similar case?" 
If I imagine such a person I also imagine a reality, a world that 
surrounds him; and I imagine him as thinking and speaking in 
contradiction to this world.(C. §595). 
It was established that a grammar provides the correctness of the 
correspondence between our concepts and the world. Our calendar is 
simply one 'possible-ordering' of time and date calculations. Perhaps it is 
the wrong ordering? But who or what is it to say such? What is 'wrong' and 
'right' is licensed by the grammar. To say of someone else that none of their 
claims match with reality is to imagine, from one's own perspective, what 
it is that this person's representations do not attach to-judge from within 
one's own form of representation what is correct and incorrect. In order to 
comprehend what it is that does not attach itself to reality one must 
interpret or share a grammar which tells one what the facts actually consist 
of. 
I cannot know that I am in a similar situation to the person who makes 
claims which do not correspond to reality, whether or not I interpret their 
claims within my own, since that would involve stepping outside my own 
form of representation. To make the judgement that all of my own 
representations do not connect to reality presupposes that I can doubt all of 
my beliefs. It has been established that in order to assess another's beliefs 
one must already possess some standard in which the interpretation of the 
others beliefs is possible (Otherwise the divergent beliefs would be 
unintelligible). My form of representation is the standard which allows me 
to interpret and reject anothers practices: what is correct and incorrect is 
determined from within my form of representation. As Morawetz points 
out: 
The question whether one's own point of view ought to have 
this role is really the nonsensical question whether what I call 
judgement and evidence are really judgement and evidence (1978 
p.133). 
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It is true that others, such as the scientists, or the tribespeople, might view 
my claims as unintelligible, or not in correspondence with the facts, but this 
does not lead to the consequence that, /II ought to subject my own ways of 
proceeding to the same kind of scrutiny and evaluation as I do the claims of 
others./I (Morawetz, 1978 p. 134). My own form of representation is not 
subject to the same doubt as the claims of others, as a consequence it 
becomes the universal measure of other practices. 
From this position empirical judgements are such that they produce faith 
in the system of representation. Of course evidence can be produced which 
will 'buck the system' but recalcitrant experiences merely diminish faith. To 
abandon a grammar and see the world in a new light is to already adopt a 
new one. 1 cannot say that my system of representation is wrong, or right, (1 
cannot step outside my judgments to make new ones: that would be like 
trying to calibrate a ruler by measuring objects of unknown length.) but I 
can, according to Wittgenstein, use my system of representation to judge 
other practices provided those practices can be interpreted within my 
system of representation. When others adopt my system of representation 
they abandon faith in their own and gradually accept a new way of looking 
at things. Converting someone to adopt a new position is a matter of 
persuasion since the evidence for a grammar is internally related to that 
grammar. I can reject positions which I can encompass within my own 
methods of representation, but I cannot reject my own method of 
representation. Even bizarre experiences such as " .. houses turning into 
steam without any obvious cause"(C. §513) or cattle in the fields standing 
on their heads, men turning in trees and vice-versa, (C. §513) only 
diminish faith in your system of understanding-they might well 
overthrow it but in such an instance you have abandoned your method of 
representation, in the interim you can make no sense of the world, but 
sense returns with a new method of representation. I may come to order 
events myself, as in the case of awaking in strange house confused as to 
your whereabouts, or 1 might rely on the judgement of others. To be turned 
to a new method of representation I must be persuaded to abandon my 
own. I cannot doubt my own representations by stepping outside them. 
Who is it that stands aside (act as autonomous individuals) from what they 
ha ve been taught in order to guide us towards a better method of 
representation?-The creative. The concept of creativity, regarded as 
applying to autonomous individuals, suggests that certain individuals 
abandon a form of representation (as must be possible-see Chapters Two 
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and Three) to form a potentially intelligible representation of the world 
since it can be interpreted within the shared form of representation that a 
community (for example) possesses. While both the concepts of insanity 
and the creativity share the grammatical feature of applying to autonomous 
individuals it is clear that the insane do not produce a novel grammar 
when they abandon a shared practice since it has been argued they break, 
rather than abandon, the shared rules (moral, social, and grammatical, pace 
Morawetz) of a community. 
Any new interpretation of nature, whether a discovery or a 
theory, emerges first in the mind of one or a few individuals. It is 
they who first learn to see science and the world differently, and 
their ability to make the transition is facilitated by two 
circumstances that are not common to most other members of 
their profession. Invariably their attention has been intensely 
concentrated upon the crisis-provoking problems; usually in 
addition, they are men so young or so new to the crisis-ridden 
field that practice has committed them less deeply than most of 
their contemporaries to the world view and rules determined by 
the old paradigm. (Kuhn, 1962 p. 144). 
Individ uals see the world differently. Autonomous individuals, those who 
do not share the standard practices of those whose 'world view' they reject, 
are those who are responsible for creative insight and 'paradigm shifts'. 
Perhaps someone might object that we can, and do, give the ascription to 
more than one person who together make a change in our shared form of 
representation. Surely Watson and Crick discovered the secret of the double 
helix and together provided a new way to view the nature of genetic 
material. But it is irrelevant that such examples can be produced since 
either Watson or Crick first had the idea and converted, easily, the other to 
the new position. Even if by chance both Watson and Crick had been struck 
with the idea at the same time they would together have a novel idea 
which must have then been presented to those unconverted to their way of 
thinking. Relative to the society which eventually accepted their idea they 
had a contingently unshared practice-they would be intelligible to each 
other but, initially, unintelligible to the community that regarded them as 
creative. Philosophically it is irrelevant to the conceptual clarification of 
creativity that such examples occur. 
The claim that individuals are creative is an empirical claim supported by 
the grammar of autonomous individuals developed in Chapter Four. If it 
is correct to regard the concept of creativity as being an encompassed by the 
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notion of autonomous individuals then it follows that it is individuals 
who are subject to the ascription of creativity. From the point of view of 
psychology it is immensely important that creative achievements normally 
are attributed to an individual's effort. 
It is a precondition of the social ascription of creativity that it applies to 
individuals. The explorer who discovers a lost tribe in china who happen 
to have the cure for. cancer does not act creatively when she brings it back to 
our world-she has made a discovery. The medical researcher who expands 
our understanding of the nature of biology which orients us in new ways to 
the functioning of cells and leads to the discovery of a cure of cancer does 
act creatively. In the former condition a group of individuals share 
knowledge which we do not have. In the latter, an individual within a 
shared tradition alters our conception of medicine by first abandoning the 
shared practice which orients her to evidence: the new evidence is gained 
by abandoning the shared considerations of what constitutes the 
functioning of cells. We might, of course, learn the history of the Chinese 
tribes' medical practices and interpret it within our own and then regard 
the Chinese individual responsible for the discovery of the cure for cancer 
as being creative. We do not regard the whole tribe as creative for 
contributing the medical discovery. 
If history had shown us otherwise we would need to engage in a far more 
complex inquiry into the nature of the concept of creativity involving a 
greater influence of social psychology and sociology since the investigation 
would involve some understanding of the relationships between 
discoverers and the society that gives this ascription. This is not to suggest 
that social psychology and sociology are not important but that they offer a 
different sort of investigation. The normal use of the concept of creativity 
applies to individuals. If by 'creativity' we meant something other than 
what has been clarified in this chapter and in Chapter Four we would have 
altered our ordinary conception of creativity: philosophy would have 
interfered with language (Discussed in Chapter Eight). 
Conclusions 
Encountering novel practices, either within a social group or outside, by 
meeting a foreign tribe or assessing someone as creative or insane, occurs 
within practice which has certain logical (not psychological) features. We 
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must orient ourselves to divergent practices using our own form of 
representation. This form of representation is universally applicable to all 
bizarre, novel, creative, irrational, and unshared practices. It is from within 
our form of representation that we make such ascriptions. It is logically 
impossible to step outside one's own form of representation to 
independently assess divergent practices or one's own form of 
representation since the rules for the assessment of practices are internally 
related to the criteria accepted in that assessment. 
The creative abandon a shared practice to produce a novel (relative to the 
shared practice) representation of the world. Ceteris paribus unshared 
practices are unintelligible. The shared practice can use its form of 
representation to interpret and reject, or accept divergent practices. The 
problem of viewing all contingently unshared practices as being uniformly 
unintelligible has been met. Only those practices which cannot be 
interpreted within the shared practices form of representation are 
unintelligible. It was argued in Chapter Four that the concept of insanity 
must be representative of those who break the rules of the shared practice. 
In doing so the insane preclude any chance that the shared practice can 
accommodate their novel acts-The concept of insanity represents those 
who, for whatever reason, undermine the chance of a shared practice using 
its conceptual orientation to interpret the insane person's: by breaking the 
shared rule, rather than abandoning it or being contingently unshared, the 
insane preclude the possibility that a shared practice can use its criteria of 
assessing the intelligibility of the novel act concerned. 
Thus the grammatical distinction between the creative and the insane 
offered at the end of Chapter Four has been explained. The creative can act 
as autonomous individuals and be understood-unlike the insane. The 
adoption of the creative insight by a shared practice is logically equivalent 
to the assessment of all other divergent practices which are contingently 
unshared. A society must be 'persuaded' to change its conceptual 
orientation: that is adopt a new form of representation. The reasons why a 
shared practice might adopt a new practice have not been explained. This is 
largely the task of the following two chapters. One possible reason has been 
dismissed from consideration. Empirical evidence cannot in principle be 
used to assess the adequacy of a divergent practice. 
Chapter Seven 
Conceptual Change in Psychology and the 
Psychology of Conceptual Change 
A Call for Change: The Reinterpretation of Social Psychology 
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Conceptual change (a change in grammar or world view) is grammatically 
connected to the concept of creativity-those who produce conceptual 
change convert us to a new world view and are therefore candidates for the 
ascription of creativity. Psychology does not have a method to produce 
conceptual clarification; no empirical study will reveal a perspicuous 
representation of a conceptual problem. But surely a grammar must be 
formed on the basis of evidence? Surely new evidence, or experiences, will 
produce a new grammar? It has been argued that such questions are 
difficult to answer and rely on much examination of the conditions from 
which it is possible to produce evidence, reject a grammar and accept a new 
method of representation. What I take to be evidence of a particular 
proposition may not be shared, or even intelligible to others who adhere to 
a different form of representation. Others need not share my understanding 
of evidence. My conception of evidence is internally related to my 
grammar, my rules for the use of propositions, my method of 
representation, or as Wittgenstein puts it my 'world view', or 
'weltanshauung'. 
Harre (1989a) calls for a reinterpretation of psychological research within 
cognitive psychology. Unlike Shotter (1991), and Williams (1985), Harre 
recognises that the introduction of Wittgenstein's philosophy into 
psychology need not alter our actual practice of experimentation-except 
for the claim that: "There are not really any psychological experiments, that 
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is manipulations, in controlled conditions, of an autonomous entity, the 
mind." (1989a p. 444). Harre does not repudiate the actual practice of 
experimentation, his aim is to undermine the assumed ontological 
commitments of cognitive psychologists and other programmes in 
psychology. Harre supposes that the experimental results of cognitive 
psychology should be reinterpreted within a dual ontology which 
recognises only social and physical realities and does aside with anything 
which might model the mental: since for Harre the objects of 'mental 
discourse' do not literally exist within the 'mind' of the individual (Where 
'mind' is conceived as some entity). Thus Harre (1989a) declares that: 
... the results of many psychological investigations are a kind of 
muddled melange of the two different kinds of results 
differentiated above ... studies of emotions which purport to give 
us an account of the conditions under which certain kinds of 
emotions can be felt or the way in which the people work to elicit 
the emotions of others, will issue in fragments of physiological 
knowledge, obscurely expressed in psychological terms. Other 
fragments of the results will actually be contributions to our 
grammatical knowledge of how discourses employing emotion 
concepts, in the broadest sense, are put together (p. 444). 
Harre's concerns were illustrated in Chapter Five. The idea that 
psychological experimentation can contribute to the resolution of 
conceptual problems was rejected. Wittgenstein's contribution to this was 
outlined. Psychology, in principle, cannot advance any conceptual 
clarification since experimentation presupposes the adequacy of the 
concepts under investigation. Notwithstanding this, experimentation 
within psychology was accepted as a legitimate practice in psychology: it is 
what distinguishes psychological explanation of events from an everyday 
understanding of the world. 
Williams (1985) maintains that Wittgenstein ruled out the possibility of 
scientific psychology. In particular William's claims: 
Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a scientific psychology; that 
is, any theory that purports to explain behaviour in terms of 
inner mental causes ... causal questions can, of course, be raised, 
but these are not inquiries into the psychological causes of 
behaviour. In other words, on a Wittgensteinian view, there are 
the brain sciences but not the cognitive sciences." (p. 205). 
But Williams relies on a narrow conception of psychology. 'Cognitive 
sciences' were not even fully developed in Wittgenstein's time, and his 
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inquiry into the nature of psychology went further than simply the 
repudiation of the Cartesian doctrine on which cognitivism rests. 
Behavourism would not be covered by Williams' characterisation of 
psychology and yet Wittgenstein thought it also to be thoroughly confused. 
Unlike Harre, Williams suggests that Wittgenstein's considerations for 
psychology are pessimistic (Williams, 1985 p. 203). But what is overlooked 
by Williams are the possibilities apparent within the practices of 
psychology. While it might be accepted that a cognitivist perspective is 
misguided, this conclusion in no way rules out, in principle, the possibility 
of a scientific psychology. Harre demonstrates the possibility of presenting 
alternative conceptual frameworks within which the practices of 
psychology can advance. Williams' mistake is the failure to appreciate 
Wittgenstein's perspective of the nature of philosophy: to regard 
Wittgenstein's position as one which could anticipate every avenue of 
inquiry which a psychologist might turn his or her attention to. Harre 
recognises the importance of adjusting, not our (psychologists') practices 
(For example, the actual act of experimentation) but our orientation to our 
practices. Harre is content to dismiss only some orientations to the study of 
psychological phenomena, not all practices employed within psychology. 
On Wittgenstein's account philosophy does not have a means of conceptual 
development. 'Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of 
language' (PI §109) "Because it is not our business to modify it, to introduce 
(in the way it is done in the sciences) one which is adequate to certain 
purposes; our business is that of coming to understand it, that is, not to 
draw a false picture of it' (MS 137,9.2.48 cited in Schulte, 1993 p.19). The task 
of philosophy is to clarify conceptual problems. 
Wittgenstein came to view philosophy as descriptive rather than 
explanatory with the recognition that such a view established a break from 
traditional conceptions of the nature and purpose of philosophy, and that 
his view, " ... was not merely a stage in the continuous development of the 
subject, but a new subject." (M, p. 322 cited in Hacker, 1986 p. 146). Of 
particular importance here is the conception of philosophy as continuous 
with that of the natural sciences. It was held by Russell that philosophy's 
task was to build and, " ... construct theories which described the most 
general features of the universe." (Hacker 1986 p. 147). Wittgenstein's view 
of philosophy opposes the view that philosophy can provide a foundation 
for any other discipline since it cannot produce fundamental truths, for this 
would involve the construction of something about the nature of the 
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concepts employed within the practice of science. Consequently, according 
to Wittgenstein, philosophy is no closer to mathematics than it is to 
psychology, physics or any other discipline. 
Wittgenstein's early work, The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, was an 
attempt to establish a conception of language as a calculus. Wittgenstein 
always maintained, pace Russell, that philosophy is not continuous with 
science, that philosophy could not construct theories or refute hypothetical 
claims made by scientists (Hacker 1986). Wittgenstein viewed his early work 
as laying bare the logical requirements of any possible language. 
Philosophical confusions arise out of our misunderstanding the reality of 
our language as it is expressed in science and philosophy. Philosophers 
assert nonsense because they fail to command view of the logic of our 
language. Wittgenstein took from Hertz (1899) the view that science, in this 
case physics, produces a picture of the world which is simply a possible 
ordering of the facts. Scientific conjecture was merely a possible-ordering of 
events. Philosophy, however, cannot allow hypotheses or probabilistic 
statements, since this would defeat the task of producing the one ideal 
form which is required for any language. The result is that science and 
philosophy are different. 
We know that Wittgenstein abandoned his attempt to articulate the logical 
essence of language. Wittgenstein found increasing difficulty in 
establishing his distinction between names having meaning and 
propositions having sense. (Finch 1977 pp. 5-6). He found an increasing 
need to place the context in which words were used into their sense. He was 
forced to broaden his conception of sense until the notion of an elementary 
proposition (A naming relation between object in the world and that name) 
was itself abandoned. Thus the meaning-sense distinction evaporated and 
the purpose of laying bare the logical relation between the sense of language 
and the underlying meaningfulness of names representing objects in the 
world was lost. 
Russell misinterpreted Wittgenstein's Tractatus as an attempt to elucidate 
the structure of a 'logically perfect language' (Monk, 1990 p. 216). One of the 
central tenets in both Wittgenstein's 'early work' and his, so-called 'later 
work' is that: 
... thought, language and the world must, in some way or another, 
go together at the very outset...There must be something which, 
in some way, belongs to all three; and this is logical structure in 
the Tractatus and grammatical criteria in the Investigations . 
(Finch, 1977 p. 4). 
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Rather than viewing ordinary language as vague and inadequate, 
Wittgenstein contends that it is perfectly acceptable for its purpose of 
conveying thought and meaning. The task of philosophy, from this early 
viewpoint, was to, " ... make explicit what is actually present in ordinary 
language" (Hacker, 1986 p. 22). Wittgenstein conceived his task as 
reconciling how it is that language is at all possible, if ordinary language 
were imperfect-not capable of expressing thought or conveying 
meaning-then Wittgenstein's purpose would have been defeated from 
the outset. 
The original plan of devising the structural form of language in the 
Tractatus was intended for philosophical purposes (Hacker, 1986 p. 17). The 
task might be summarised as a plan to offer the limits of sense-what is, 
and is not, a legitimate proposition within a language. The rationale of 
providing such a structure in the Tractatus comes from dealing with all 
possibilities . But possibility was limited to the conditions in which it could 
be said that any proposition (or its constituent parts) could be said to be true 
or false. A proposition acquired meaning by mirroring possible facts 
(Worthington 1988). Statements of logic acquired no meaning, since they 
say nothing about the world but, despite lacking meaning were not 
nonsense, since they demonstrate a structure for legitimate combinatorial 
possibilities of meaningful statements; they provided the sense of 
meaningful propositions. Thus there was a distinction between sense and 
meaning. Propositions make sense if they accord with the logical 
possibilities. Philosophy, on this early view, outlined frameworks devised 
to elucidate the structure of any possible language-such as Frege's and 
Russell attempts, found inadequate by Wittgenstein and replaced by the 
Tractatus (Hacker 1986). 
The completion of the task, if it had been successful (Wittgenstein thought 
he was successful, that he had solved all philosophical problems, and 
subsequently quit philosophy) would have enabled philosophers to clarify 
the problems of philosophy which Wittgenstein contended arose from 
trying to say what can only be shown. (Hacker, 1986 p. 22). Since a 'clear 
conceptual notation' (Later the desired goal was considered to be a 
'perspicuous representation' PI §122) would describe all those things which 
can be legitimately stated about the world, when philosophers tried to assert 
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propositions which violated the bounds of sense laid down in the 
conceptual notation, they did so by asserting that parts of the conceptual 
notation were in themselves meaningful. Genuine proposition assert 
something about the world, and fall into the realm of natural science, but 
the questions of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics provide no propositions 
to match to reality, they are therefore, on this view, nonsensical questions. 
Hacker (1986 p. 24) argues from this position: 
If someone, trying to describe essences, endeavours to use 'is a 
number' or 'is an object' as predicate expressions, one must point 
out that as substitution-instances of predicate variables, these 
signs have been given no meanings. They are signs for variables, 
not names. 
What 'is an object' is revealed by the combinatorial relations of the 
conceptual notation. Genuine propositions reveal their logical character 
along with what they claim about the world. The task then, on this view of 
the philosophers role, is to lay down the structure of language which 
describes the world, then the proper conceptual notation will reveal 
perspicuously the true nature, the essence, of the world. 
Shotter (1991) contends that mainstream modern psychology, and he picks 
out cognitive science as his target, still views the nature of language from a 
Tractarian-type perspective: " ... we always think that words must have 
stable, unequivocat already determined meanings. But in the openness of 
ordinary everyday life, in comparison with the world of logic, this is 
precisely not the case." (p. 200). Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers an 
alternative view of language, already presented throughout this thesis but 
specifically in Chapter Two, summarised nicely by Shotter as acquiring its 
character through, 11 ... its role in communication-it is used within certain, 
circumscribed ways, within the confines of certain language-games" (1991 p. 
193). Shotter presents the arguments, in broad agreement with this thesis, 
that Wittgenstein's arguments offer, "good reasons for thinking that the 
current 'cognitive' orientation in psychology is radically misconceived ... " 
(p. 194) but concludes: 
... that understanding the nature of mind is not simply a 
'scientific' matter of I discovering' its properties, but is a moral 
and a political problem, to do with how we should relate 
ourselves to one another ... (p. 207). 
Furthermore, the conclusion above is: 
a radically shocking claim and ul1assimilable to psychology in its 
current guise as a modern science (p. 207). (Emphasis mine). 
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But what is 'modern scientific psychology'? Is current mainstream 
psychology really characterised by 'cognitive psychology' or is this a 
description we (and here I mean philosophers) give to certain practices 
which occur within the practice of psychology? Does it follow from the 
rejection of those practices which we describe as 'cognitive oriented 
psychology', that all of the practices of psychology need to be rejected, or 
radically altered? Philosophers and psychologists who have adopted 
Wittgenstein's arguments and perspectives on the nature of language in 
the Philosophophical Investigations seem always to overlook the fact that 
Wittgenstein offered similar arguments to reject particular perspectives on 
the nature of mathematics, but did not radically alter mathematics, or 
change it in any way. There is no new Wittgensteinian mathematics, why 
should anyone suppose that there is a new radically altered psychology in 
. the light of Wittgenstein's investigations? What is confused within 
Shotter's account of 'psychology-after-Wittgenstein' is the relationship 
between psychology and philosophy. Such attempts to reject modern 
psychology occur primarily because one adopts a particular view of 
psychology, without incorporating the possibilities already present within 
the practice. (d. Williams, 1985). Thus Shotter presupposes that the 
practices of cognitive psychology exhaust modern psychology neglecting the 
purpose of Wittgenstein's method: to relieve us of our entanglement in 
language so that we might proceed unhindered. 
Psychological theory often becomes entangled within language: as has been 
argued with reference to the explanation of psychological predicates within 
the cognitivism and more specifically the concept of insanity within social 
constructionism. But the clarification of a problem, a clear view of 
language, is not the solution to the problems which confront psychology; it 
is merely the beginning. Philosophy, it is meant here Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy, allows an arrangement of language so that 
everything becomes clear so that some problems disappear within this 
ordering. Knowing the grammar of creativity does not resolve important 
issues as to how it might be studied. Although we know creativity can be 
studied. The gathering of empirical evidence is not problematic 
grammatically-there is no philosophical objection to claims such as:/lThe 
creative, as a group, have a higher number of reported instances of mental 
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illness, amongst themselves and their relatives, than normals." (Chapter 
Five pp. 185-192). 
Wittgenstein admits that in science grammar is "modified, or 
introduced, .... [for] certain purposes." (MS 137, cited in Schulte, 1993 p.19). 
Since psychology is not involved purely in the clarification of conceptual 
issues it has, on Wittgenstein's account, the option of developing theory, or 
grammars, which can account for empirical regularities of our 
(psychologists') world view. Even theoretical psychology is not simply 
grammatical clarification, since theoretical psychology involves the 
development of conceptual structures within which evidence and 
empirical regularities are explained. Theoretical psychology is not 
philosophy. Theoretical psychology undertakes conceptual development, 
philosophy undertakes conceptual clarification. 
When theoretical psychology makes so-called conceptual developments, 
they are open to philosophical inspection on the basis of how the terms of 
the theory are used and whether or not they are used in ways which accord 
with the way they are described by the theory. Chapter Two dealt with this 
problem. It was argued that cognitivists could rightly declare that thinking 
does not mean "a causal process in the head" but might do in the future. 'C-
Fibre firings' might be what we use to describe 'thinking' in the future. 
They might insist that any Wittgensteinian attack about how language 
operates in a context now cannot predict future use-indeed their proposed 
future use is invulnerable from Wittgensteinian critique since 
Wittgenstein declares that his brand of philosophy deals with conceptual 
clarification of actual use. But while a change in the grammar, which is 
unpredictable (Hacker, 1986 p. 178) must be accepted as possible, the 
possibility cannot be used to dismiss the Wittgensteinian arguments which 
deal with the actual use of terms within theory as they are presented-in 
the case of the cognitivists it was their conception of rule-following and 
calculation which offends actual use. Calculation does not mean some 
mechanical or causal process, to suggest that meaning might change is to 
accept the normative nature of the meaning of terms, thus contradicting 
their own thesis and leaving the onus of establishing why the 
Wittgensteinian objections to their thesis do not stand. 
Although cognitivists cannot dismiss the Wittgensteinian arguments with 
the claim that actual use of terms may change (Note the similarity to the 
situation in which Turing declares he and Wittgenstein are using the word 
219 
'experiment' differently16), it is conceded that language-games, grammar, or 
in a limited sense of what Wittgenstein addresses, theory, change across 
time. Psychology, and in particular here I mean theoretical formulations 
within psychology, can produce new terms which account for particular 
problems. Philosophy, on Wittgenstein's view cannot build conceptual 
structures, because: 
To come to understand our most basic concepts, which in 
Wittgenstein's view is an important part of the philosopher's 
task, is possible only if the concepts to be understood are not 
modified, For otherwise one would no longer be dealing with the 
concepts originally intended. (Shulte, 1993 p. 19). 
But is psychology in a similar position to philosophy? After all 
Wittgenstein is quite clear when he states: 
Psychological concepts are just everyday concepts. They are not 
concepts newly fashioned by science for its own purpose, as are 
the concepts of physics and chemistry. Psychological concepts are 
related to those of the exact sciences as the concepts of the science 
of medicine are to those of the old women who spend their time 
nursing the sick. (RPP, II, §62). 
Budd (1991) draws from the above the conclusion that Wittgenstein 
thought all psychological terms are strictly everyday terms. However, the 
point overlooked by Budd is that what is important for theoretical 
psychology is not the use of psychological concepts in everyday language 
but their use within psychology (This is further explained in Chapter Eight 
pp. 240-258). The point Wittgenstein is trying to get at is that psychological 
concepts have a complexity and ambiguity which cannot be removed by 
operationalising them. But operationalising a concept and imparting a 
technical use are two different types of adjustment to ordinary language. In 
physics, a concept can capture the circumstances in which it is employed. 
The use of psychological terms cannot be described easily, whereas in 
physics, the use of a technical term may be surveyed and its limited use 
revealed. Psychological concepts are vague and ambiguous like the 
concepts of everyday language, any attempt to provide a clear definition of 
their use in psychology would be to rob these concepts of their ability to 
capture the variety of situations in which they are used. 
16 The suggestion that the meaning of psychological predicates 
will change across time is the same as the claim that 
cognitivists are simply using the terms differently from those 
Wittgensteinians who attack their use of terms in comparison to 
present usage. 
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Wittgenstein comments that if it were the case that instead of using an 
everyday term in psychology we employed a variety of technical terms to 
replace all uses of one psychological term then: 
Perhaps the concepts of such a language would be more suitable 
for understanding psychology than the concepts of our language. 
(PI §577). 
Budd (1991 p. 7) suggests that Wittgenstein seemed to hold no interest in 
this task. This can be of no surprise. The task is not the job of a philosopher 
but of a theoretical psychologist: On Wittgenstein's view, at least, 
psychology advances conceptual development; philosophy is involved in 
conceptual clarification. 
Physicists and chemists do not normally check their use of terms with 
philosophers in order to make sure their theory does not offend any 
grammatical boundaries. Physicists have a clear view, a perspicuous 
representation, of the concepts they employ; they forge those concepts 
within theory for restricted purposes. Suter (1989) points out: 
Someone may object: But what about terms like "electron," 
"atom"? Don't we have to look to science instead of examining 
our language to increase our understanding of such notions? 
Wittgenstein might answer that if we want to get clear about 
these words and concepts, we have to examine their use in 
language. But that, of course, means seeing how they are used in 
the sciences, since that is where these terms are mainly used. So 
technical terms do not constitute a counterexample to his 
[Wittgenstein's] approach. (Suter, 1989 p. 15). 
Social Constructionists who wish to examine language in social acts seem 
to confuse the role of technical terms and everyday terms. Consider Harre's 
proposal for social psychology: 
The centrality of language-games in the living out of a form of 
life implies that we manage our lives relative to certain linguistic 
resources. The job of psychology oriented in the way social 
constructionism goes is to try to discover what those linguistic 
resources are and how they are deployed. (Harre, 1989 p. 170). 
But what is overlooked here is the fact that psychologists may impart a 
technical significance to an everyday term. The way a neurophysiologist 
uses the term 'addiction' may be very different from the way a layman 
might use the term. Similarly the concept of 'insanity' is used differently in 
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psychology, law, and in everyday exposition. The problem is not particular 
to psychology: 
... "force," "energy," "charge," "space," "time," "particle," 
"attraction," "motion," "spin," and so on. despite the fact that 
these words are drawn from everyday language, Wittgenstein 
does not criticize physicists fbr misusing them because their use 
of them diverges from the way these words are used outside of 
physics. Why then does he insist that "Philosophy may in no way 
interfere with the actual use of language" (PI,§124) and that 
philosophers should attend only to the actual use of such words 
outside philosophy?(Suter, 1989 p. 17). 
The answer to Suter's questions has already been partly explained-
Wittgenstein ventured that philosophical questions arise out of the 
misunderstanding of our language (Chapter Six pp. 193-211). Although in 
answering his own question Suter makes an important error: 
... there is no standard agreed-upon philosophical use of words 
like "good," "know,''' "experience," "guilt," and so on. The 
situation is quite different for corresponding terms in physics that 
are drawn from everyday language. Words like "force," "energy," 
"charge," and so on have agreed upon-upon technical uses; 
physicists don't argue with each other on how these terms 
function in physics. They also know that their technical uses of 
these terms differ from their ordinary uses outside physics. (p. 
17). 
While it is accepted that in physics there is a technical use of everyday 
terms there need not necessarily be any widespread agreement in technical 
usage. There have been times when the technical usage of terms in physics 
has promoted widespread disagreement. Nevertheless, the relative stability 
of physics to other disciplines may tempt us to believe that it is this general 
agreement over technical usage makes these terms somehow immune 
from philosophical inspection. And in disciplines like psychology where 
disagreement over the technical use of everyday terms is common, that 
this disagreement can be removed by a conceptual clarification of these 
terms as they are used in everyday language. Nobody, for example, would 
try to determine a physicist's notion of time by asking people in the street 
what they consider time to be (One would probably get different answers as 
the day progressed). But we are tempted by the variety of technical uses of 
terms in psychology to seek clarification in our everyday language. 
The fact that people in everyday life use concepts differently from that used 
in science is irrelevant (Chapter Eight explores this further). The 
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astronomer's concept of day is different from my own. 'Addiction' in 
psychology is distinguished from compulsion to do an action habitually. 
Neurophysiologists refer to such things as receptors to describe what they 
mean by 'addictive' in respect of some psycho trophic drug. Perhaps, it could 
be argued, then 'addiction' belongs to the science of medicine and not 
psychology. Psychology is left the impossible task of explaining the vague 
an indefinite concepts of everyday language: a task made impossible by the 
arguments which repudiate the view that there is any essence to the terms 
of language (The Tractarian view) and seemingly impossible under 
Wittgenstein's characterisation of meaning being derived through practices 
which are vague and indefinite. As Shotter (1991) argues: " ... everyday 
human activities do not just appear vague and indefinite because we are 
still as yet ignorant of their true underlying nature, but... they are really 
vague." (p. 202). 
If psychology really is analogous to the' old women nursing the sick' then it 
is because its methods cannot provide conceptual clarification and relies on 
everyday exposition of terms to found its research-in the same way the 
methods of the nurse do not diagnose the sickness. An example of this 
problem has already been given. Schachter's work on psychopaths relies on 
a conceptualisation of psychopathy drawn from psychiatric diagnosis 
(Chapter Five pp. 177-181). Hacker (1986 p. 157) states the problem clearly: 
Advances in science cannot in principle resolve philosophical 
problems, for the sciences either employ, and hence presuppose 
an understanding of, the very concepts that give rise to 
philosophical perplexity; or they employ different concepts in 
which case they bypass what puzzles us (and even cheat us out of 
our puzzlement) and, in some cases generate fresh conceptual 
problems. 
If the problem which puzzles us philosophically is that which Szasz (1987) 
raises, whether or not the term 'mental illness' (More appropriately here 
'psychopathy') has any clear application, then Schachter's attempts to find 
some basis for a particular disorder will not resolve any conceptual 
problems. Schachter relies on the conceptual articulation of psychopathy to 
found his research, and this presupposes what it is that worries us 
philosophically. Suppose psychiatry adopted Schachter's work and 
proclaimed all psychopaths to be simply 'autonomically reactive', then we 
have been cheated of the philosophical concern. Now there really is a clear 
application of the term psychopathy: it means that an individual is 
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'autonomically reactive', Szasz would be cheated of his concern since now 
there is no way to feign the criteria of psychopathy and yet the malingerers 
can be distinguished from the real psychopaths. But fresh problems would 
arise from the so-called 'scientific discovery', such as whether the practice of 
diagnosing 'autonomically reactivity' addresses the context in which we 
normally ascribe the label psychopath (What would make someone 
suspicious enough to test for 'autonomic reactivity'? The practice of testing 
for 'autonomic reactivity' then presupposes the concept of psychopathy). 
Psychology need not, despite its apparent lack of a clear view of its language 
use, suffer from from conceptual poverty (If indeed psychological concepts 
draw from everyday language are conceptually impoverish). A clear view 
of language, in particular psychological concepts, arises from a grammatical 
analysis of the use of terms; that is by doing philosophy. Building 
conceptual structures, like those presented by cognitive science, or social 
constructionism-theoretical psychology-is a way of producing conceptual 
. development, but such development will always be open to philosophical 
inspection and dismissal. 
It is not inherently wrong to develop meanings (uses) of concepts drawn 
from everyday language, which are different from ordinary language, for 
such uses are a different method of representation (like the Astronomer 
and the everyday person). Philosophy exposes our conceptual 
entanglement when our terms are used in ways which do not accord with 
the way the terms are expressed in theory. If I assert that I know what anger 
is by pointing inwardly to the object of my anger, Wittgensteinians will 
object that my claim to knowledge is conceptually awry and show me 
otherwise. If I assert that calculation occurs through information processing 
in the brain, Wittgensteinians will remind me that a rule does not contain 
its own application, and that an endless regress occurs when I try to account 
for how an information processing system operates. 
Psychology and philosophy (Wittgensteinian style) are in a symbiotic 
relationship with psychology developing theory and philosophy tearing 
down that theory which results from conceptual entanglement. 
Philosophical clarity will have the same effect on the growth of 
mathematics [or psychology] as sunlight has on the growth of 
potato shoots. (In a dark cellar they grow yards long.) (PC p. 381). 
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Nevertheless, the acid test for psychology is the development of theory 
which accords with grammar, since philosophical problems, according to 
Wittgenstein, only arise from grammatical confusion, a clear view of the 
grammar of psychological terms allows psychology to advance its 
representation (theory) without philosophical criticism. Kenny (1984) 
suggests that Wittgenstein viewed philosophy as a kind of therapy which 
relieved us of the burden of entanglement in our language. If we are 
infected by conceptual entanglement at present then philosophy rescues us 
with treatment. If we are to continue to make conceptual development in 
psychology then it is only by having the benefit of philosophical 
inoculation, studying the grammar of terms, that we can avoid what 
Hacker (1986) calls the' disease of the intellect'. 
Psychology seems unduly restricted by philosophy on this view. Why do 
other disciplines seem to get away without 'treatment'? Medical research 
appears to avoid criticism, physics and chemistry are left to form their 
concepts freely, seemingly without philosophical intervention. In truth 
they do not avoid attention from a Wittgensteinian analysis (Hacker, 1986 
p. 157 offers two examples). The point is that psychology is a much harder 
discipline than any other because its concepts, drawn from everyday 
language use, are used in many ways (RPP, II, §20). Psychologists are prone 
to error because of the complexity of the uses of language they employ. 
Physicists and medical researchers are still very capable of error-perhaps 
less frequently than in psychology. 
The Scientific study of Scientific Creativity 
There is no singular definition of the word 'creativity'. I can judge someone 
creative, they may judge themselves to be creative. 'Creative' may be used 
to describe the individual or a group. An individual's product may be 
viewed as creative: a work of art, an argument, a scientific theory. To say 'X' 
is creative could mean many different things. 'X' could be an object, an 
argument, a method, a person, a group of individuals, or a society. 
Indeed without this flexibility it would be circular to state one can be 
creative about creativity, or perhaps less obviously, that one can describe 
conceptual development in psychology in relation to the concept of 
creativity. But from the Wittgensteinian perspective a term's meaning is 
internally related to its use. To argue that psychology cannot turn its 
225 
methods to study creativity without being in itself a creative achievement, 
is to overlook the importance of Wittgenstein's insight. To argue the above 
is to adopt a view of the nature of the meaning of the term creativity which 
is rejected: the view adopted in the Tractatus that the terms of language 
have an 'essence'. Furthermore, it has been argued that the methods of 
psychology, in themselves, do not produce conceptual development, so if 
by Ipsychology' one means lempirical psychology' there is no circularity 
involved-applying established empirical techniques is, in itself, not 
creative. That is not to say empirical research in psychology could not be 
creative. One could develop a new method of researching a particular 
problem, as, for example, Sperling (1960) did, or investigate phenomena in 
ways which leads to a new way of looking at things (cf. Schachter's study of 
psychopaths). An investigation may lead to the abandonment of and old 
conceptualisation and bring about a new one. But it is the shift in 
representations that is creative not the identification of the phenomena 
which brought the shift about, since, it has been argued, evidence is 
internally related to a grammar (A representation of the world). 
The argument that the scientific study of scientific creativity is circular 
would need, given the above, to be directed at theoretical psychology. 
Theoretical psychology, it is contended, is capable of conceptual 
development. Conceptual development enables a change in our 'world 
view' therefore theoretical psychology, given that it is capable of conceptual 
development, has the capacity to be creative. The argument is avoided 
because the proposition, liThe scientific study of scientific creativity" has a 
different use of the word 'scientificl from that expressed by the phrase 
"scientific creativity". In the former what is described is a method, in the 
latter an object. Given that the terms of the argument which superficially 
appear to have the same meaning, do indeed have different meanings 
(uses), there is no logical compulsion to attend to the charge of circularity. 
Even if theoretical psychology developed an account of the practices of 
creative psychologists it would be no more problematic than historians 
studying the history of history as a discipline. (One might even replace the 
one of the terms with a synonym to avoid the attractiveness of falling into 
this pit of misunderstanding. Consider PI §577, and PI §121). 
Despite Wittgenstein/s view that there can be no conceptual development 
in philosophy, and the concomitant view that philosophers and scientists 
will keep falling into the same misunderstandings provided they do not 
have a clear view of language (PI§ 115), it does not follow that philosophy 
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makes no progress. Philosophy is not trapped on a treadmill pacing out the 
puzzlements of language without any advance. There are two ways in 
which philosophy advances. Borrowing Kenny's analogy, philosophical 
progress is like medical progress. As society advances old medical problems 
have solutions and rarer and more difficult conditions are turned to by 
medical researchers. (Kenny 1984 p. 58). The negative function of 
philosophy adopted by Wittgenstein allows progress by the elimination of 
puzzlements. The elimination of a problem is an advance. The positive 
aspect of philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, is the development of an 
overview of the way language is used. We must become familiar with the 
way we use the terms of our language to avoid philosophical confusion. 
Wittgenstein even offers a treatment for psychological concepts (Z. §472 and 
RPP II, §63). To gain an overview is an advance. This achievement can be 
systematic but never complete since one can never anticipate all sources of 
confusion and unclarity (Hacker, 1986 p. 178). 
The separation of philosophy from science for the purpose of studying 
creativity threatens to make creativity in philosophy logically impossible. 
Creativity is thought to be exercised in the conversion of a shared practice 
to a new world view by an individual exercising the ability to break from 
established tradition and develop new concepts which describe the world 
differently. Since the development of new concepts within philosophy is 
excluded it would seem that creativity in philosophy is impossible. But 
what is excluded is not creativity in philosophy but scientific creativity 
within philosophy. The grammar of creativity, the rules we used for the 
ascription of creativity, is undoubtedly similar in the case of philosophical 
progress with that of scientific progress. Both the philosopher and the 
scientist may offer a new perspective on a problem but the scientist does so 
by discovery and invention and the philosopher by clarification and 
prescription. In the same way a contribution to science is not an artistic 
achievement, philosophical progress is not an exercise in scientific 
creativity. 
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Conc1 usions 
Shotter (1991) claims that Wittgenstein's philosophy should be interpreted 
as offering 'radical and assimilable' conclusions to the practice of modern 
day psychology. But in the light Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy 
one can now dismantle Shotter's claim. A criticism of psychology from the 
Wittgensteinian perspective relies on there being some grammatical 
confusion expressed within the terms of the theories generated by the 
discipline. These confusions are present, and some have been offered as 
examples of how Wittgenstein's arguments can be used to address the 
problems within theoretical psychology. The negative aspect of 
Wittgenstein's thesis allows for the production of arguments, which if 
correct, repudiate the 'cognitivist programme' within psychology. There is 
no argument offered here againstShotter's conclusions in this regard. 
However, the positive aspect of Wittgenstein's thesis, the idea that we fall 
into error because we do not have an overview of language, that we should 
describe the features of our language and not try to explain the nature of 
its essence, does not radically alter psychology in any way, except one. 
Philosophy acts like the sunlight on potato shoots: without philosophical 
inspection the theoretical psychologist is likely to fall error to the 
complexity of our language. But it does not follow from the acceptance of 
this that psychology must reorganise itself around some Wittgensteinian 
framework. For indeed, it was lWittgenstein's long held belief that 
philosophy cannot provide a basis for any other discipline. While 
philosophy can map the way, it is the decision of the scientist to risk the 
peril of journeying forward. 
Shotter (1991) may still be correct that Wittgenstein offers arguments for the 
radical alteration of psychology, but only in the sense that Wittgenstein's 
arguments might be used to destroy all that is useful within current 
psychology so that nothing is left. It would then be Shotter's view that 
psychology should advance in a particular direction, involving the study of 
the moral· and political consequences of our interactions, not 
Wittgenstein's. It would certainly not follow from the elimination of 
particular alternatives within psychology, like cognitivism, that psychology 
should advance in the direction Shotter suggests-one does not know 
which way to go ahead simply because someone points out that you are 
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lost. Chapter Two demonstrates a commitment to Shotter's criticisms of 
cognitivism, and Chapters Three and Four offer some sympathy for the 
social constructionist position adopted by Harre (1988, 1989, 1989a and 
Coulter 1973). However, the next chapter is designed to demonstrate how 
that grammatical clarification of psychological concepts enables the 
development of theory within psychology, which avoids the pitfalls of 
grammatical error, and establishes, desp~te claims to contrary (Williams 
1985), that some current theorising and empirical work in psychology is 
acceptable, and unaltered by Wittgenstein's insights. 
229 
Chapter Eigl1-t 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Method: 
A Process of Conversion 
Introduction 
Chapter Five clarified Wittgenstein's position in relation to the results of 
science being adopted by philosophy. The results of science, in particular 
psychology, do not solve conceptual problems. Conceptual clarity, or the 
resolution of conceptual problems remains the task of philosophy in 
Wittgenstein's account. But since we are unclear as yet how this might be 
achieved it remains the purpose of this chapter to describe Wittgenstein's 
method of producing conceptual clarity. Until now the only aspect of 
Wittgenstein's method that has been adopted, and discussed, is what is 
called the 'negative function' (Genova 1993). The negative function 
involves pointing out the errors in philosophical theorising or theorising 
in science by establishing, for example, that a theoretical position 
characterises its terms in one way and uses them in another. 
Conceptual problems arise, it has been argued only when grammatical 
boundaries are broken. 
Just as many rules of law are only of interest to us when we are 
tempted to break them, so too certain grammatical rules only 
become philosophically interesting when philosophers are 
tempted to violate them. (Baker and Hacker, 1980 p. 281). 
This perspective characterises the relationship between philosophy and 
science like the relationship between a legal system and the citizens in its 
jurisdiction. The legal system only reacts against breaches of laws and 
regulation and offers no prescription as to how one should act within that 
community. But if our interest lies in understanding how it is that we can 
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make changes to a shared social practice, or how others do make changes to 
the shared practice of science, such as those we regard as creative, then we 
must look to understand the relationship between ways of acting in science 
and the regulatory role which Wittgenstein has given to philosophy. 
Further to this we must establish the status of this philosophical position, 
that is, why we should accept Wittgenstein's suggestion that philosophy 
serves, what can be called a regulatory function. 
The legal system reacts to, and changes as a result of, apparent breaches of 
the rules embodied in precedent and statutory provisions. When a person's 
actions are clearly covered by a law nothing upsets the system. If I fail to 
stop at a compulsory stop sign and I am caught then there is a rule in law 
which will inform others of the illegality of my actions. Philosophy, 
conceived as having a regulatory function also reacts only to breaches of 
'the rules'. But 'the rules' here are the rules of grammar. We are all aware 
of the rules of grammar in the same sense that we are aware of the law. We 
know how to use the terms of our language appropriately. But using the 
terms of a language does not entail knowing the rules for the use of a 
language and accessing those rules is not as convenient as legal study. In 
the same sense, acting in accordance with the law does not entail knowing 
the law. (Imagine that you are in some foreign country and unsure whether 
your actions are legal but coincidentally are-see Chapter Two pp. 51-61). 
It was once asked in introductory law class whether or not a section fenced 
on three sides constituted for the purposes of a particular act an 'enclosed 
yard'. The class was evenly divided on the issue. Few were willing to 
venture that there was no answer to the question. Those who are familiar 
with legal practice appreciate that much more is involved in giving an 
'opinion' (I mean a legal opinion). One must analyse the purpose of the act, 
how it was intended to be used, in order to resolve the conceptual 
difficulties involved in its application. Similarly, the rules of grammar are 
breached when their application is stretched beyond their intended 
purpose. Wittgenstein requests that we seek clarification by understanding 
the use of our terms. 
It is convenient at this point to draw out two aspects of the analogy. Those 
who do not break the law do not come before the courts-in both senses: to 
plead guilty or defend one's actions. Theorists who do not breach rules of 
grammar are immune from the negative function of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy-philosophy must remain silent. And one does not need to 
231 
study the rules of grammar to accord with them (albeit perhaps accidentally 
since one is unsure). Psychological theory is not necessarily entangled 
within language (Chapter Seven). This last point is important. It will be 
argued that Wittgenstein provides us only with a resource which enables 
us (psychologists) to accord with the rules of our own inquiryp; he neither 
does the inquiry himself, nor offers a new way for it to be done. 
Conceptual Change Revisited 
Wittgenstein insists that my perspective on what counts as evidence is 
derived from my world-view. A shift in my world-view, the form of 
representation I give the problem, will produce an new account of what 
constitutes evidence (see the examples and elaboration offered in Chapter 
Six). This argument can be derived simply from the original supposition 
that a rule is internally related to what accords and conflicts with it 
(Chapter Two). Hacker (1986 p. 252) summarises: 
.. .it is a consequence of the reflections on rules that a common 
understanding of a rule for the use of an expression is manifest 
in a common technique of application. That you and I both 
understand the ostensive definition 'This t is red' in the same 
way is manifest in our calling (by and large) the same things 
red .... widespread ramifying disagreements over judgements 
[What constitutes evidence] (the application of concepts) would 
betoken disagreements over definitions (explanations) inasmuch 
as it would signify disagreement over the technique of 
application of expressions in accord with those explanations. 
That we encounter a multiplicity of representations of the world, 
representations which promote disagreement, has been the subject under 
discussion throughout this thesis. We encounter bizarre, insane, alien, 
deviant, novel and creative practices as measured by our own form of 
representation. Our form of representation gives meaning and 
intelligibility, or unintelligibility, to the multiplicity of arrangements we 
encounter. 
But this might leave one questioning what stands to give our form of 
representation its intelligibility as anything other than an arbitrary 
representation of the world. In comparison to other forms of 
representation, say those of a primitive tribe, we can use our method of 
representation as a measure of the adequacy of the tribe's representation, 
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and declare that theirs is 'poorer by far'. When we give up our own 
representation (not our opinion) and come to accept the form offered by 
another, perhaps an individual which we then describe as creative, we 
think we ought to do so because of some compelling reasons, some force of 
reasoning; perhaps some social processes, as in the case of propaganda. In 
such circumstances it is thought to be possible to lay down the rules by 
which we make such a transition-Thus by this procedure justifying the 
adherence to our particular form of representation and blocking the charge 
of arbitrariness. 
Traditionally it has been the task of the philosophy of science to reveal 
these rules: the character, or structure of a theory, or argument, which 
forces us to give up our previously held beliefs and adopt new ones. The 
task of philosophy is conceived as laying bare the ways we should act when 
confronted with divergent practices, competing theories, and novel 
argument. On this view philosophy regards psychology or sociology as 
irrelevant since these disciplines tell us how we do act. Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy and its relationship to psychology, or any other 
science, is profoundly different from this traditional conception of the role 
of the philosophy of science. His view of philosophy does away with the 
above distinction altogether to leaving a middle-ground which is not 
aligned with either the traditional role of the philosophy of science, nor 
contemporary naturalised versions of the philosophy of science (see 
Chapter One, pp. 24-27). 
The examples in Chapter Six of the catholic and the chemist, Galileo and 
the church, the astronaut, the scientists and the tribe of dream-travellers, 
serve to illustrate the complexity surrounding a transition from one world-
view to another. Brute reason alone will not persuade the catholic to 
abandon his view on communal wine. If we give Wittgenstein the premiss 
that our form of representation is not justified by the evidence but 
constitutes the evidence then the arguments derived on the basis of the 
'evidence' can be equally forceful for both the catholic and the chemist. 
Indeed, an alternative form of representation, it has been conceded, cannot 
be judged wrong or right, only dismissed when measured against our own 
form of representation, and our own conception of evidence, as perhaps 
'poorer by far'. 
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The Role of Values and Metatheoretic Functions in the study of Science. 
The idea that the acceptance of a theory is based on something other than 
its empirical adequacy, or logical criteria, is not foreign to the philosophy of 
science. McMullin (1983) presents the argument, adopted by a larger 
following, that: 
... the appraisal of theory is in important respects closer in 
structure to value-judgement than it is to the rule-governed 
inference that the classic tradition in philosophy of science took 
for granted. (pp. 6-7). 
By 'value-judgement' McMullin does not mean, "a cognitive act" (p. 4) nor 
"emotive values" (p. 4) or "ethical values" (p. 7) but "characteristic 
epistemic values (p. 6), which are identifiable features of scientific theories. 
Following from Kuhn (1977), McMullin lists five characteristic values of a 
good scientific theory: Predictive accuracy, internal coherence, external 
consistency, unifying power and fertility. He adds one more, simplicity, and 
warns: 
Even though we cannot definitely establish the values 
appropriate to the assessment of theory ... we can provide a 
tentative list of criteria that have gradually been shaped over the 
experience of many centuries ... (p. 18). 
The exact nature of the values is not important, they will be dealt with 
shortly. McMullin (1983) is unhelpful in his characterisation in any case, 
saying of predictive accuracy, that after an initial period of probation that 
" ... a high degree of predictive accuracy is in the long run something a 
theory must have if it is to be acceptable." Other commentators are equally 
unhelpful with Howard (1984) following McMullin to say " . .in the long run 
a theory must demonstrate predictive accuracy if it is to be acceptable" (p. 
257). The focus of this "middle of the road position" (Howard, 1984) is a 
description of what actually occurs in scientific enterprise and not an 
attempt to provide the rationale for the adoption of theory by the scientific 
community. 
Kuhn (1977), who is partly responsible for this line of thought, is quite 
explicit in his denial that any algorithmic procedure, which employs the 
criteria mentioned or any other combination of any other criteria, can 
provide the basis for theory evaluation. He maintains that his criteria 
merely serve to describe: 
As description, furthermore, it has not been challenged by my 
critics, who reject instead my claim that these facts of scientific 
life have philosophic import. (1977 p. 325) (Emphasis mine). 
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Kuhn's rejection of the attempt to turn description into prescription by 
adopting some algorithm or other is based on two arguments. He argues, as 
a matter of fact, two scientists armed with the same set of criteria, and 
confronted with two competing theories " ... may nevertheless reach 
different conclusions."(p. 324) and continues: 
With respect to divergences of this sort, no set of choice criteria 
yet proposed is of any use. One can explain, as the historian 
characteristically does, why particular men[or women] made 
particular choices at particular times. But for that purpose one 
must go beyond the list of shared criteria to characteristics of the 
individuals who make the choice. (p. 324). 
Since, as a 'matter of fact', scientists may have different reasons, that is, 
apply the criteria of theory appraisal differently, and yet derive the same, or 
different, result, only some explanation derived from psychology, or 
something external to the criteria will suffice as an account of theory 
evaluation. Kuhn's second argument is not fully developed, but is 
obviously related: "Even an ideal [Algorithm], however, if it is to remain 
credible, requires some demonstrated relevance to the situations in which 
it is supposed to apply" (p. 326). But Kuhn's well known, and influential, 
plea that the philosophy of science accord with the history of science is the 
point at which it is necessary to depart from his important observations. 
Since it has been accepted that Wittgenstein rejects the idea that conceptual 
problems can be resolved by empirical investigation, the claim that " .. .these 
facts of scientific life have philosophic import . II (1977 p. 325) must be 
rejected in order to accommodate Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy 
and understand the relation of philosophy to psychology. 
The point to be gained from this, for now, is simply that the criteria of 
theory appraisal presented by Kuhn (1977) are descriptive of events in 
history, they were not intended for the purposes about to be examined, and 
rely on independent verification in science, or history. The criteria of 
theory appraisal derive their philosophical importance from a particular 
view of the philosophy of science, the naturalised view of science 
(Introduced in Chapter One), which it has been suggested does not accord 
with Wittgenstein's view of the relationship between science and 
philosophy. Consequently, and more importantly, this view does not 
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accord with Wittgenstein's view of the relationship between his 
philosophy and the science of psychology, and in turn here, the 
relationship between the philosophy of science and the scientific study of 
creativity. 
Thagard's Computational Account of Scientific Theory Choice 
Thagard (1989) adopts from the philosophical literature the notion of 
'Inference to the best explanation' (p. 435) to describe the acceptance of an 
explanatory hypothesis. He seeks to offer an account of explanatory 
coherence which adopts principles similar to those which Kuhn offers as 
descriptive of the practice of theory appraisal by scientists. He further 
contends to demonstrate, "Their sufficiency ... by the implementation of the 
theory in a connectionist computer program called ECHO ... "(p. 435) 
(Emphasis mine). The argument to be presented here is intended to 
address the confusion entailed by conflating philosophy with psychology, 
and theory with grammatical analysis, it is not intended to undermine the 
contribution, and possible practical applications, Thagard has produced. 
Thagard refers to everyday decision making, such as medical diagnosis, 
legal decision making, and scientific theory acceptance, but makes no 
attempt to distinguish those situations which present a range of 
alternatives which promote disagreement and those which if accepted 
require conceptual reorientation. The range of divergent practices we might 
encounter has already been at discussed at length. However, it is necessary 
to reinforce the point already made (Chapter Five pp. 199-204) that 
disagreement occurs within a shared practice (The catholic/chemist type 
situation) whereas conceptual reorientation comes from the adoption of a 
hitherto contingently unshared (novel) practice (The conversion of the 
tribespeople, or the scientists, to the astronaut's form of representation). 
Thagard regards the acceptability of a proposition to be dependent upon its 
coherence with other propositions which we believe. He offers seven 
principles of explanatory coherence which he instantiates into the ECHO 
algorithm. The principles can be regarded in the same way as the criteria of 
theory appraisal posited by Kuhn (1977) and are similar, incorporating such 
things as internal consistency, explanatory breadth, and simplicity. Again, it 
is not so important how ECHO operates, or what criteria it uses, except to 
say this: ECHO uses a set of decision procedures which operate on inputs to 
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make an evaluation of the acceptability of competing theories and produce 
an output. That output is recognised as a judgement of the acceptability of a 
hypothesis, or theory, based on those decision criteria. ECHO may 
determine from the evaluation of two competing hypotheses that neither is 
acceptable, or that one is more acceptable than the other. 
One might be greatly suspicious of entertaining such a device for the 
purposes of legal decision making but when applied to historical examples 
the efficacy of the design seems compelling. ECHO appears to decide 
amongst competing alternatives when given an outline of the theories and 
their relation to the agreed upon evidence. Thagard has applied ECHO to a 
whole range of historical examples of scientific debate which eventually 
produced a settled outcome (1989 p. 444). Nevertheless it is sufficient to take 
the example of the Phlogiston/Oxygen debate (pp. 444-446) concerning the 
nature of combustion to assess whether the algorithm actually presents the 
decision criteria we might actually use in the adoption of a divergent 
practice. 
Throughout this thesis it has been maintained that the relation between a 
rule and what accords with the rule is internal. The related Wittgensteinian 
point is that evidence is internally related to a form of representation (for 
our purposes here a theory). ECHO requires inputs as to what constitutes 
the evidence which is debated by competing theories. Thagard chooses, 
amongst other things, "In combustion, heat and light are given off" (p. 444) 
as something both the oxygen theory and the phlogiston theory explain, 
and "In calcination, bodies increase in weight" (p. 444) as something which 
only the oxygen theory explains. 
It has also been argued that the methods of evidence gathering can be non-
controversial, in particular such a claim as "The creative have a higher 
incidence of mental illness than normals" was regarded as a relatively 
uncontroversial piece of evidence which relies only on there being an 
identifiable difference between the mentally ill, the creative, and normals. I 
can imagine circumstances in which the assumed differences are not given 
as a matter of course: someone might argue that the insane really are the 
creative in our society and there really is no discernible difference between 
the two ascriptions. Since the present argument seeks to establish that 
difference it is a point which will be returned to shortly. Nevertheless, the 
general point remains that what constitutes evidence, even if there is an 
agreed upon method of collecting it, is not uncontroversial. A person 
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inclined to view creativity and insanity as synonymous ascriptions would 
reject the claim made above as nonsense-similarly we might question the 
evidence gathered to establish a relation between crime and narcotic abuse 
when narcotic abuse is considered a crime. When Thagard lays down the 
'evidence' for the theories which ECHO evaluates he treats the relationship 
between evidence and theories as uncontroversial, like in the 
catholic/ chemist example of Chapter Five, and ignores the possibility that 
the so-called 'evidence' of one theory may not be regarded as evidence at all 
by a competitor. 
With the benefit of hindsight it is appropriate to declare that the inputs of 
evidence for the oxygen/phlogiston theories to be uncontroversial, 
analogous to the uncontroversial concessions made by the catholic to the 
chemist (i.e agreement over what 'blood' and 'wine' are, or the situation in 
which we declare a rival explanation "poorer by far"). But when such 
things as negative weights, or the existence of God are included the 
discussions break down (see Zytkow (1989) for a discussion concerning 
Phlogiston.) One could not automate the inputs according to the rules 
Thagard proposes: "(I) If a proposition is a piece of evidence, then accept it." 
(p. 455) since it is not clear, when encountering an unshared practice, what 
constitutes the actual evidence. Notwithstanding this, ECHO still provides 
a description of the features of a theory which may be influential in 
producing social acceptance of a divergent practice-in the same way Kuhn 
(1977) recommends we treat such criteria. There is nothing wrong with 
using the criteria as the historian does to describe instances in history. 
What is not clear is whether Thagard's theory has any prescriptive value, 
whether ECHO's success in describing such historical examples establishes 
the sufficiency of the criteria it employs to evaluate new divergent practices. 
In a new situation what counts as evidence may be controversial, and 
indeed not even seen as evidence until the conversion to the new view has 
occurred-ECHO's application would be redundant (see Chapter Five). 
Commenting on the ECHO programme Dietrich (1989) queries: 
I am not sure what his theory of explanatory coherence is a 
theory of. Viewing his theory as philosophy of science required a 
conscious choice on my part, because there is at least one other 
way of viewing his theory: as psychology. (p. 473). 
In response Thagard (1989a p. 491) declares that he intended ECHO to 
contribute to both fields. He justifies his claim with the following: 
[l] ... post positivist philosophy of science should be psychologistic, 
not in the strong sense that supposes that however scientists 
think is rational, but in the weak sense that judgements of 
rationality take actual thought processes as their starting points. 
[2]The investigation of those processes then becomes part of the 
philosophy of science. [3]The best current method for 
psychological theorizing comes from computational modeling. 
(1989a p. 491). 
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Thagard's overall theory might be dismissed by adopting the arguments 
already raised in Chapter Two which present some obstacles to the 
cognitivist approach. He does not go so far as to commit himself to a 
functionalist account of psychology in the above. But taken baldly his third 
claim is at best an empirical claim about the frequency of using computer 
models in psychology, and at worst, the expression of an opinion. Thus his 
third claim might be dismissed. His second claim that science can 
illuminate the problems of philosophy might also be dismissed using the 
objections raised in Chapter Five which argue that conceptual problems are 
not resolved empirically. And his first claim summarily dismissed as being 
encompassed within his second. But it will be argued that there is 
something correct in Thagard's claim that his investigations contribute to 
both philosophy and psychology. But in order to see the correctness of his 
view it is necessary to re-orient our conception of the relationship between 
philosophy and psychology. In this regard Wittgenstein's comments on the 
nature of philosophy are of paramount importance for they will enable us 
to interpret Thagard's work in relation to the concept of creativity. And 
from this perspective understand how the study of creativity in psychology 
can, and in what way, contribute to our understanding of science. 
The problem is this: What contribution, if any, does the introduction of a 
theory of epistemic values, like those included in the ECHO algorithm, 
have for our understanding of the practice of science? We want to know 
what it is that makes good science and contributes to conceptual change vis-
a-vis the ramblings of the insane. It has been accepted that there is 
something correct in introducing the idea that conceptual change occurs 
through the evaluation of theory on such criteria as are instantiated in 
ECHO but what is unclear is whether such proposals, Kuhn (1977), 
McMullin (1983), or Thagard (1989), belong to philosophy or social science. 
Are the sets of criteria for the evaluation of theory provided by Kuhn, and 
others, to be understood as philosophical theses or theories belonging to 
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social science? As theses of philosophy there is the risk of producing an 
infinite regress. Conceptualised as theories of theory appraisal a further 
theory is needed to assess whether, for example, Kuhn's theory of theory 
appraisal is to be accepted in competition with Thagard's, or some future 
competitor. Some further theory is needed to decide between competing 
alternatives-such concerns underlie the claim that the philosophy of 
science needs to accord with the history of science (Kuhn 1962). As theories 
in social science it is prima facie justified that the adequacy of the theory 
might be demonstrated by its success on evaluating historical examples. 
However, since adherents to the construction of these criteria for theory 
evaluation accept that the same facts can be explained by many theories 
there can be no recourse to history to evaluate the alternatives. Some 
future theory may repeat the successes of ECHO, or fare worse, or better at 
evaluating historical examples. Despite Thagard's claim that the 
'sufficiency' of the criteria instantiated in ECHO is demonstrated by its 
success with historical examples, this attempt to provide some justification 
for his thesis is self-defeating. Such arguments underlie Kuhn's (1977 p. 
326) insistence that the criteria he posited could never be instantiated in an 
algorithm for the purpose of deciding between alternative theories in 
science in the present or future. 
The question addressed here represents a broader issue. The contribution of 
philosophy to psychology, or the philosophy of science to science, 
represents a growing concern to those taken by the 'naturalistic turn' 
discussed in Chapter One. Dedrick (1993) concerned with the confusion on 
the matter in the literature of the philosophy of mind asserts: 
Either the concepts are scientific ones and therefore purely 
empiricaL.or they are concepts which we can access in terms of 
some metatheory ... The non-naturalist will never allow this 
distinction to be collapsed for he or she sees it as crucial to the 
existence of a proper "philosophical" level of inquiry. (pp. 392-
393). 
Phillips (1977) recognises the wider implication of this problem. In relation 
to criticism of Kuhn (1962) he points out that the sociology of knowledge is 
not a distinct or unique approach to the study of social phenomena. While 
there may be some concern regarding whether or not 'knowledge', in the 
sense accessible to philosophy, really is a social phenomenon, it is clear, 
that: 
.. some of the criticisms launched against the new image of 
science are criticisms resulting from taking seriously the 
implications of a fully sociological approach to scientific practice. 
(p.74). 
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The same commitment underlies Dedrick's (1993) conclusion that " ... there 
has in fact been a naturalistic turn ... " (p. 395) and concerns over the status 
of naturalised contributions to the philosophy of science should be halted 
and this 'method' be judged on its product. He states, ", .. the proof of this 
philosophical method (a term I use advisedly) will be found in its results." 
(p. 398). But this really avoids the issue, since, as Dedrick points out, his is a 
philosophical thesis. He well advises caution over the status of whether or 
not the term 'philosophical' applies to naturalised methods of inquiry, 
since this is the point in issue. 
The adoption of the naturalised approach to the philosophy of science 
threatens to undermine metatheoretical approaches to the study of 
conceptual change and yet some meta theoretical approach seems necessary 
to establish the validity of the naturalised perspective. If criticism of the 
'naturalistic turn' is successful it threatens to undermine not only an 
approach to the study of the development of knowledge, but also, perhaps, 
a wider range of inquiry since as Phillips (1977) points out, the scientific, or 
sociological approach to the study knowledge is not a unique approach to 
the study of social phenomena. There are of course ways to avoid the 
'problem' (It will be argued that it is not really a problem at all) as it has 
been presented. One could argue that knowledge is not really a social 
phenomenon and therefore successful criticism of the sociological approach 
to the study of knowledge does not rule out other legitimate area of 
sociological inquiry-arguments of this kind were presented in Chapter 
One. This move is described in Chapter One as the 'common expedient' 
adopted by Frege in his programme to defend the purity of logic from all 
matters psychological. Philosophy then prohibits certain forms of inquiry in 
psychology: the study of knowledge, rationality, intentionality, meaning, or 
science. 
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Re-orientation: 
Surviews and the Positive aspect of Wittgensteinian philosophy. 
Wittgenstein seems, at first sight, to characterise the position represented 
above. Wittgenstein rules out the 'naturalistic turn', "The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the 
problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another 
by" (PI. II p. 232). Yet he also clearly prohibits theory building in philosophy: 
and: 
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific 
ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out 
empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible 
to think such-and-such-whatever that may mean. (The 
conception of thought as a gaseous medium.) And we may not 
advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all 
explanation, and description alone must take its place. (PI §109). 
If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be 
possible to debate them, because everyone would agree with 
them. (PI §128). 
It has been suggested that Thagard's approach to the study of scientific 
creativity provides something philosophical and something psychological. 
But there are positions in the philosophy of science which will not allow 
such an interpretation. As Dedrick (1993) asser~s either the concepts are 
scientific, or they represent some metatheoretical position. Thagard's 
position is considered to be either justified by empirical means and 
therefore descriptive of the scientific enterprise or it is justified from some 
meta-metatheorical position which he has not established. Wittgenstein 
rules out both alternatives but seems, he denies it (PI§ 121), to be stuck in 
the position which Dedrick (1993) exemplifies since he wants to assert a 
position in philosophy which, to be consistent, must be shown not to be a 
thesis. Wittgenstein's escape from this position provides us with the way 
to interpret Thagard in the way desired. 
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(a)The prohibition against theorising 
The first task is to establish why Wittgenstein insists that there can be no 
theorising in philosophy (No recourse to some metaphysical plane) and 
what the status of this position is. Barnett (1990) usefully places the 
argument into context: 
With few exceptions, this claim is greeted with disbelief. How, it 
is asked, can Wittgenstein avoid philosophical theories or 
theses? Isn't the denial of a thesis itself a thesis, even if merely 
negative? ... Wittgenstein' s grammatical descriptions sometimes 
do allow us to see the falsehood of a philosophical thesis. But to 
arrive at the falsehood of a specific thesis is very far indeed from 
Wittgenstein's final objective. (p. 51) (Emphasis mine). 
Barnett footnotes an explanation of his use of the word Ifalsehood', 
recognising that it promotes criticism. In Chapter Five it was argued that 
Wittgenstein's position recognises the impossibility of establishing the 
falsehood of certain divergent practices or even our own practice. Recall the 
response to Turing objection to Wittgenstein's use of the word 
'experiment'. Wittgenstein states: 
But I want to show that this is wrong. That is to say, I think that if 
I could make myself quite clear, then Turing would give up 
saying that in mathematics we make experiments. If I could 
arrange in their proper order certain well-known facts, then it 
would become clear that Turing and I are not using the word 
"experiment" differently. (LFM, XI, p. 102). 
Wittgenstein does not adopt a position where it is possible to assert that 
another position is simply wrong or false. His approach to philosophy is 
more subtle. He does not tackle his opposition head on, to dispute concepts 
from some meta-theoretical position, nor argue over the facts that might 
support, or not support a theoretical position (Baker and Hacker, 1980 p. 
287). Similarly Barnett comments: 
.. .it is difficult to see that over the long run Wittgenstein's way of 
undermining a philosophical position is not to attack it directly, 
but to bring its partisans to see for themselves its roots in 
grammar. (1990 p. 63). 
Wittgenstein places himself in the position like that of the astronaut who 
confronts the tribespeople who travel to the moon and back in their 
dreams. 
I would say, "I wouldn't dream of trying to drive anyone out of 
this paradise." I would try to do something quite different: I 
would try to show you that it is not a paradise-so that you'll 
leave on your own accord. I would say, "You're welcome to this; 
just look about you." (LFM, XI p. 103). 
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Similarly the arguments presented in chapters Two, Three and Four against 
various conceptual orientations do not establish the falsity of cognitive 
science nor social constructionism-The arguments sought to undermine 
the implication that the basic assumptions of the positions addressed make 
sense. Some of the claims made by these positions from Wittgenstein's 
perspective are not false but nonsense. In Zettel Wittgenstein remarks: 
On mathematics: "Your concept is wrong.-However, I cannot 
illumine the matter by fighting your words, but only by trying to 
turn your attention away from certain expressions, illustrations, 
images and towards the employment of words." (Z. §463). 
It is misleading to interpret Wittgenstein's 'negative function' as if it 
established the falsity of other positions; as if Wittgenstein's philosophical 
position occupies a privileged position from which to judge other 
philosophical theorising. Barnett (1990) argues that Wittgenstein's 
characterisation of philosophy is incomplete when only the negative 
function is appreciated. As Genova (1993) points out, "Many including 
Wittgenstein's admirers have misjudged or under-estimated his project, 
granting only a negative or critical (limiting) function to his avowed goals 
of clarification and the avoidance of theory." (p. 328). Baker and Hacker 
(1980 p. 279 and p. 308) similarly interpret Wittgenstein's position as 
providing a positive function. The 'positive function' within 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy needs to be understood so that it is 
clear that Wittgenstein sees his position and alternatives, like that offered 
by Turing, as arising from a common position; it is from this common 
position which enables him to say that another position is wrong. 
Similarly, we can only dismiss another form of representation as 'poorer by 
far' when we can interpret the claims made by others within our form of 
representation. In the case of the catholic and chemist the concepts 
representing the debate are shared. In the case of the tribespeople who fly to 
the moon and back in their dreams the concept of 'moon' (Our 
understanding and use of the concept) may not be understood by them (i.e 
contingently not shared) but this does not interfere with my representing 
their position to myself in order to dismiss it. Wittgenstein characterises 
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philosophy as being grounded in our shared practices. It is our shared uses 
of terms which gets distorted and requires clarification. 
Our misunderstanding and confusion comes from our inability to survey 
the use of our language (PI§ 123). In Chapter Three the possibilities 
concerning language and rule following were examined. There it was 
conceded that rule-following activity requires a practice. A corollary of this 
conception of rule-following was that a rule is internally related to what 
accords and conflicts with it. Furthermore, to judge that an action is indeed 
rule-governed, as opposed to a regularity upon which we impose a rule, it 
was argued that certain preconditions must obtain. A rule-follower who 
understands the rule must be able to demonstrate the rule and recognise 
mistakes. Failure to demonstrate the rule would exclude the possibility that 
one was actively following a rule-one cannot obey a rule that one cannot 
demonstrate else thinking one was following a rule and following a rule 
would amount to the same thing. And similarly, failure to recognise any 
mistakes would preclude any understanding manifest in the application of 
the rule. If any action would accord with the rule then no action would be 
an instance of following the rule. On Wittgenstein's view we need an 
understanding of the rules we adopt when we use the terms of our 
language, the achievement of which is the goal of his positive function. Yet 
curiously he maintains that we do not have an understanding of the 
grammar of our language use and this is what leads us to error: 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not 
command a clear view of the use of our words.-Our grammar 
is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation 
produces just that understanding which consist in 'seeing 
connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing 
intermediate cases. 
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental 
significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the 
way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanshauug'?) (PI§ 122). 
It is curious that Wittgenstein makes such assertions about the sources of 
philosophical confusion since as a language-user Wittgenstein insists I 
must have the potential to identify the criteria for the application, the use, 
of terms. It follows from Wittgenstein's conception of rule-following that it 
is logically possible to obtain a 'clear view' of the use of our words. 
(Henceforth the notions of 'clear view' and 'perspicuous representation' 
will be replaced with Baker and Hacker's term 'surview'-see 1980 p. 295 for 
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a justification.) Nevertheless, developing a surview involves describing the 
use of our terms, not merely using them. Barnett (1990) points out: 
Knowing how to use a word does not entail knowing how to 
describe its use. Describing the circumstances of use is omitted 
from learning or practicing the use of an expression. We simply 
learn to use the expression in those circumstances. (p. 52). 
The example offered in Chapter Two was that of acting in accord with the 
rule displayed by a sign at the entrance to a park. In the example it was 
illustrated that an interpretation of the rule does not constitute the 
meaning of the terms displayed by the sign. Despite honest intention to 
accord with 'the rule', my interpretation of the rule may differ with 
another's interpretation of the rule. The reasons I produce to defend my 
interpretation (my understanding) go only so far as to defend the 
interpretation of the sign which I adhere to (My way of acting). In terms of 
the analogy to the practice of law: acting in accordance with the law does 
not entail knowing the law. I learn to act in certain ways, perhaps 
appropriately, and that is all. There may be reasons, which I adopt, given by 
others for my adherence to particular actions, such as: "Thieving is illegal". 
The analogy holds when one considers that certain grammatical errors of 
children are similarly sanctioned with remarks from adults that such and 
such an expression "Does not make sense!/I The fact that I learn how to use 
an expression from others does not place the correctness of the use of an 
expression in the hands of the community (see Chapter Four). Knowing all 
the rules which I adopt in order to use an expression, all the rules taught to 
me by a community, parents, teachers etc, does not entail having the ability 
to describe the correct use of a concept. I might have good reasons for my 
actions, perhaps some moral system as guidance, and still fail to know, or 
have the ability to describe, my accordance with the actual practices 
prescribed by law, or the actual prescriptions of grammar. It is the task of 
philosophy to reveal the perspicuous representation for the use of 
language-it is a different and immensely more complicated task than 
actually using or describing a language. 
In summary, we lack a surview of our language use and this, it is suggested, 
leads us to philosophical error. Knowing how to use a language does not 
entail knowing how to describe its use, although it must be possible to 
describe the use of language given an adherence to the conception of rule-
following offered by Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, offering the reasons I 
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adhere to a particular use of an expression, even if such an examination is 
thorough, does not encompass a description of the use of the concept. 
(b) Surviews and the study of Everyday Language. 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is a little discussed aspect of 
Wittgenstein's legacy. When attention is drawn to his conception of 
philosophy commentators are inclined to focus on the negative function 
Wittgenstein attributed to philosophy (Genova 1993). Bold metaphors are 
invoked to encapsulate the spirit of Wittgenstein's concerns about the 
nature of philosophy, such as the comparison of the philosopher with the 
therapist or destroyer of misunderstanding. Chapter Seven ended with a 
discussion of progress in philosophy which recognised that Wittgenstein· 
saw a positive aspect to philosophy. Perhaps the most well recognised of all 
Wittgenstein's comments on these matters is: 
What is the aim in philosophy?-To show the fly the way out of 
the fly-bottle. (PI §309). 
Although the claim has been variously interpreted, one aspect is clear: the 
achievement of Wittgenstein's philosophical aim is positive; he releases us 
from our cage of misunderstanding. 
Chapter Four examined in detail the position which suggests that I acquire 
and maintain the correct use of expressions by adhering to social 
conventions. It was argued that community agreement over a rule does not 
establish the correctness of that rule. It was accepted that community 
agreement over the application of rules is a necessary precondition for 
shared practices rather than a contingent feature of them. A surview is not 
obtained by recounting all of the rules by which we learn the use of an 
expression. This view is justified only by the further assumption that the 
community from which the practice is learnt exhausted all possible uses of 
the expression. Furthermore, it overlooks the importance of the role of 
philosophy in clarifying the sources of our misunderstanding-the study of 
actual use of language independent of some philosophical problem (i.e the 
symptom of misunderstanding) could not possible anticipate the variety of 
future misuse of language. 
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Harre (1989) introduces the importance of not confusing linguistic analysis 
with a surview: 
In psychology we are not concerned with the dissolution of 
philosophical problems, though we should be aware of their 
seductive character. We are interested in the revelation of basic 
psychological controls, in the normative structure of a social 
milieu. This kind of analysis includes the use of speech-act 
categories, an approach to language in which the analysis is 
directed to identifying the social force of different kinds of 
utterances, classified not by their traditional grammatical and 
semantic aspects but by reference to their character as social acts. 
(pp.I71-172). 
This view recognises the importance of Wittgenstein's positive function-
the endeavour of producing a surview to avoid conceptual confusion: not 
being seduced by their seductive character. Harre (1989) recognises that 
conceptual confusion arises from entanglement in our language (PI. II, p. 
232). Theoretical psychology benefits from a surview of the concepts it 
employs. A surview precludes conceptual confusion and therefore avoids 
Wittgenstein's negative function. A surview is obtained by describing the 
criteria for the use of an expression. But treating those criteria as a 
contingent feature of a shared social practice fundamentally distorts 
Wittgenstein's arguments (As it was argued in Chapter Four) it leads to the 
conclusion in psychology (Often represented as Wittgenstein's) that one can 
obtain a surview of grammar by examining, in a quasi-empirical way, 
everyday uses (At least actual uses) of language. The problem with 
interpreting Wittgenstein in this way, notwithstanding that it is not 
Wittgenstein's position, is that it commits the Wittgensteinian position to 
be one built upon and defending actual everyday use of language: 
Wittgenstein's philosophical position is one that is justified by recourse to 
actual language use. This conception of the development of a surview must 
be dismantled before it is possible to offer Wittgenstein's position on the 
status of his philosophy and the relationship it has to theorising in 
psychology. 
There are temptations within Wittgenstein to seek out a surview by an 
empirical inquiry of actual everyday uses. This arises, in part, because of 
Wittgenstein's prohibition on theorising in philosophy. Wittgenstein tells 
us that: 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither 
explains nor deduces anything.-Since everything lies open to 
view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, 
is of no interest to us. (PI §126). 
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'Everything lies open to view' not because we can examine actual practices 
empirically, but because it must, as a logical consequence of being able to 
follow a rule within a shared practice, be possible, albeit perhaps not actual, 
to describe the employment of the rule. If something were to operate which 
is unknown to us, say the causal processes inside our head, alongside 
following a rule, it would be irrelevant. (PI§ 304) To be said to be 
understanding the employment of a rule one must be able to distinguish 
mistakes and demonstrate the rule. The rule must be known. "For by token 
of being unknown, it can have no role in our rule-governed practice of 
using language." (Baker and Hacker, 1980 p. 280). It follows that everything 
we need to know about the employment of rules, and hence the grammar 
of our language use, is contained in our practices. What is missing when 
we fall prey to the complexities of our language is not some hidden rule 
which philosophy needs to discover. We lack an understanding of the rules 
we adhere to. Our philosophical puzzlement (our misunderstanding) arises 
from our lack of understanding of our own shared practices. Consequently, 
the achievement of a surview in philosophy is not the production of new 
discoveries. A description of language use is not a discovery of any kind. 
Baker and Hacker (1980 p. 280) point out "We could not discover a new rule 
of chess, we could invent one, or discover that some other people playa 
game similar to chess but with slightly different rules." All philosophical 
achievement is the production of a clear view of our misunderstanding, 
not the discovery of rules of which we were unaware. 
The sense in which we can discover a surview is akin to the discovery of a 
legal defence we were unaware of. Perhaps it might come as some surprise, 
like that which accompanies a discovery of any sort, that unbeknown to us 
we have a defence in law of being too drunk to have the intention of 
driving with excess blood alcohol. But the' discovery' rest on the precedent 
alread y being set in law-nothing new is added to the law by your 
'discovery'. One cannot discover defences in law which do not have some 
precedent, one can only invent them; in this case they would not be the law 
at all-an invented defence might become law but then the 'game' has been 
changed. The discovery is analogous to the conversion that may be 
undertaken by the catholic to the chemist's perspective. What constitutes 
'the facts' comes from within a form of representation, by converting to a 
new form of representation, new 'facts' are 'discovered'. There are, on 
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Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy no discoveries: everything about 
the correct use of language is open to view in the employment of our 
linguistic practices. Philosophy, in seeking out a surview to censure 
conceptual confusion, does not discover anything not already present (PI§ 
128). 
To argue that Wittgenstein defended actual everyday language use commits 
Wittgenstein to the assumption that naive language use is the ultimate 
source of conceptual understanding-this would be a thesis Wittgenstein 
would have to defend but would be contradictory to his argument that in 
philosophy there is no theorising. It is similar to the view that a question of 
law is somehow resolved by seeking out all the cases that bear some 
relevance to a case not clearly covered by the law (One might forget that 'the 
law' is created through a social practice). One would then have to theorise 
that every conceivable future event has some precedent in case law. Or 
roughly, that every conceivable future action is either sanctioned or 
prescribed by current legal precedent-albeit that those prescriptions, for 
example, are hidden within old cases and must be found. One only needs to 
consider a technological advance (a new way of acting), say in genetic 
engineering or embryology, to appreciate how the law often lags behind its 
social function-There are always new legal questions to be answered, such 
as, whether or not a yard fenced on three sides is an 'enclosed yard'. There 
are always new laws being created to cover new ways of acting-that is the 
function of parliament. 
There are, in the context of the present argument, three consequences of 
regarding Wittgenstein's philosophy as being ultimately justified by 
recourse to a conception that everyday language embodies a theory of 
meaning from which all other theorising can be assessed, or perhaps 
derived. Firstly, by regarding only the negative function of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy one can arrive at the position which was rejected in Chapter 
Two. One can claim, for example, that 'thinking' does not mean literally 'C-
fibre firing' since this is not the way the concept is used in everyday 
exposition. Adherents of the Ie-fibre thesis' claim, correctly, that reference 
to IC-Fibre firing' might not represent the way the concept of 'thinking' is 
used presently but might be used in the future (is not logically prevented 
from such a use) in everyday discourse to refer to 'thinking'. One cannot 
show the inadequacy of such arguments if one represents Wittgenstein's 
position as defending actual language use. Regarding Wittgenstein's 
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instruction in this way misrepresents, and undermines, Wittgenstein 
conception of philosophy's negative function: its regulatory role. 
Secondly, and relatedly, when confronted with the rejection of the notion 
that everyday language use provides an adequate representation of the 
reference of .our concepts, as in the above example, one is forced to a 
metalinguistic plane which Wittgenstein rejects. Baker and Hacker (1980) 
point out the reasons for Wittgenstein's rejection of this metalinguistic 
level of argument comes from the Tractatus: 
The bounds of sense cannot be described, for there is nothing 
beyond the bounds of sense to be described. If they could be 
described, then there negation of their description would make 
sense, but if it did then that description would not describe the 
bounds of sense. A statement that something cannot be, i.e is 
logically impossible, is not a description that is impossible-but 
nonsense. (Baker and Hacker, 1980 p. 282). 
When forced to justify an adherence to the ultimate sense of actual 
everyday language use one is forced to regard as nonsense everything 
which is not actually present in actual language use. Someone inclined to 
view the 'C-fibre firing thesis' as nonsense, on this view, must assert that 
the 'C-fibre firing thesis' has the sense of being nonsense. This position, 
while it seems attractive, is not compelling since it is self-defeating in the 
same way the Tractatus' conception of meaning was self-defeating-there 
is, on this view something beyond ordinary language which represents the 
limits of sense. Philosophy then cannot represent the bounds of sense by 
reference to ordinary language, since this would require the ability to stand 
on the outside of ordinary language to judge what does and what does not 
actually represent ordinary language (what does and does not make sense). 
If recourse to ordinary language is viewed as a contingent fact about what it 
is that we are capable of comprehending (A matter of psychological 
theorising), that anything beyond our ordinary language would make no 
sense (see Chapter Four for the argument against Frege and Coulter who 
represent this position), then as has been argued in Chapter Four," ... this at 
best merely describes the wholly contingent and alterable bounds of (say) 
English, not the necessary bounds of sense./I (Baker and Hacker, 1980 p. 282). 
It is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy that people do 
speak and refer in particular ways and his position is not reliant on any 
special knowledge of actual language use (PI§ 128). 
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Thirdly, regarding everyday language as a complete representation of the 
world, and accepting thatWittgenstein's method is descriptive (i.e accept 
the prohibition on theorising-as Shotter (1991) does, see Chapter Seven p. 
211) tempts the confusion of Wittgenstein's method with its product (Baker 
and Hacker, 1980 p. 281). One is tempted into believing that an analysis of 
the grammar of everyday terms, a description of that grammar, will solve 
conceptual problems. Wittgenstein regarded everyday language as complete 
and adequate for the purpose of conveying the meaning of a proposition; 
there is no philosophical difficulty with our everyday language. However 
Wittgenstein did not regard it as a complete and adequate description of the 
world. Hence: 
For "naive language", that is to say our naive, normal way of 
expressing ourselves, does not contain any theory of seeing-
does not show you a theory but only a concept of seeing (Z §223). 
By regarding our talk of 'seeing' as containing a complete theory of seeing, 
and accepting that we are led astray when building scientific theory by an 
entanglement within language, one might conclude that an empirical 
investigation of the use of the word 'seeing' might provide a surview, a 
description, which is a theory of the world and free from philosophical 
confusion which arises from an entanglement in everyday language. This 
would distort Wittgenstein's conception of how it is that philosophical 
problems arise and conflate the resolution of philosophical problems 
(Wittgenstein's method) with the resolution of theoretical problems within 
science (Psychology particularly). Baker and Hacker (1980) recommend that 
the example of 'seeing' be generalised. Everyday language tells us only what 
our concepts are not the way the world is. 
Regarding the attainment of philosophical clarity as being an empirical 
investigation of grammar correctly identifies that Wittgenstein regarded 
everyday language as complete and adequate in itself but fails to distinguish 
the roles of philosophy and its relation to empirical investigations in 
psychology and other social sciences. It also correctly establishes where it is 
that we must look to resolve our conceptual problems. But by regarding 
everyday language as a theory of the world which is the ultimate measure 
of the adequacy of other theorising, say in philosophy or psychology, 
commits Wittgenstein to a position which he would not defend-it distorts 
his philosophical method by modelling it on the physical sciences. 
Wittgenstein's philosophical method does not tell us the actual ordering of 
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language. The method is constrained by the misuse of our language which 
promotes philosophical perplexity: 
We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of 
language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of 
many possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall 
constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our 
ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook. This may 
make it look as if we saw it as our task to reform language. (PI§ 
132). 
The achievement of a surview is not a theory about language. A surview is 
not the correct ordering or use of language-it is not a theory about the way 
we do or should use language. Wittgenstein does not claim to offer a theory 
about anything. Wittgenstein once stated in a lecture: "All I can give you is 
a method; I cannot give you any new truths." (WLA, p. 97). His position on 
his own philosophy, and the description he offers of the philosophical 
method, are entirely consistent. He seeks only to remove our 
misunderstandings by directing us towards our employment of terms 
within our shared practices. 
Wittgenstein regarded the attainment of a surview as a technique to 
dissolve conceptual confusion. The attainment of a surview itself was not 
the achievement but merely the signal, or criterion, which indicates that 
the philosopher's task is complete. For instance, at PI§ 133: 
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. 
But this simply means that the philosophical problems should 
completely disappear. 
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping 
doing philosophy when I want to.-The one that gives 
philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions 
which bring itself in question. 
Philosophy produces 'understanding' by removing the misunderstanding 
which is apparent when philosophical questions are raised. In the same 
way that grasping an everyday rule has criteria for demonstrating that the 
rule is understood (see Chapter Two pp. 48-61) so too in philosophy there is 
a final point at which our understanding is demonstrated by the criterion of 
no longer wishing to raise the question. This conception of the nature of 
philosophy regards philosophy as an activity which has a method which 
should be contrasted with other activities, like science. The notion of a 
surview should be restricted to its function in philosophy. It is by confusing 
theoretical psychology with philosophy that one is tempted to seek out a 
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surview through the empirical study of actual language uses. The methods 
employed in psychology and· the methods employed in philosophy are 
entirely different. They are tWb different practices. 
Conflating of the Practices of Social Science with Philosophy 
There are two ways of interpreting Thagard's work as Dietrich (1989) 
suggests. ECHO is either a contribution to philosophy or it contributes to 
psychology. But there seem to be insurmountable problems in regarding 
these interpretations which have been presented above. Thagard's work 
with ECHO provides the example to complete the account of the nature of 
philosophy and its relation to psychology. Thagard's (1989) work on ECHO 
presents a theory and studies grammar, by representing the possibilities, 
. differences, relations and intermediate cases of a theory of scientific theory 
appraisal. According to Wittgenstein. 
You want to straighten out a knot by pulling at the ends of the 
string-And as long as you pull, the knot can't come undone. 
You feel there is still a knot, so you pull. And the knot becomes 
smaller and harder. 
One way of solving a philosophical problem is to tell yourself:it is 
insoluble. It isn't answerable or it would have been answered, 
you would have answered long ago. It's not a kink, it's a knot. 
Don't look for an answer, look for a cure. Don't try to pull it 
straight, try to unravel it (MS. 158, 33 f (in English) cited in Baker 
and Hacker, 1980 p. 288). 
And in a similar tone: 
Philosophy is like a ball of wool. It's no use pulling at it. And I 
am apt to pull. (LFM, XXIII p. 220). 
The knot we try to need to untangle is the relationship between the 
philosophy of science and psychology. 
Wittgenstein separates philosophical problems from those of psychology, of 
science generally. Baker and Hacker summarise: " ... philosophical questions 
are not questions in search of an answer, but questions in search of a sense. 
(1980 p. 280). Philosophical problems arise because we are confused by the 
rules by which we adopt in engaging in our shared practices. Wittgenstein 
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insists that philosophy merely points out the rules to us when we go 
wrong-it gives them sense. 
The question that puzzles us is why a shared practice might adopt a 
contingently unshared, initially incomprehensible, practice presented by an 
autonomous individual. Another representation of the question might be: 
'How it is that we can distinguish between the assertions of the creative and 
the assertions of the insane?' Traditionally we have looked to the 
philosophy of science to resolve such questions. There have been attempts 
to keep such questions purely part of the realm of the philosophy of science 
(Chapter One). These attempts have been undermined by a tradition which 
accepts the 'naturalistic turn' to philosophy. But Wittgenstein's method of 
producing a philosophical understanding conflicts with the method 
implicit in naturalised versions of the philosophy of science. Surrounding 
the above question is the more important question of whether such a 
proposal is a philosophical question or one that belongs to psychology. 
It has been argued in Chapter Five that philosophical clarity cannot, in 
principle, be resolved by empirical inqUiry. Regarding Thagard's work as a 
contribution to psychology then, from Wittgenstein's perspective, Thagard 
presupposes the adequacy of his concepts for their employment within a 
theory of scientific creativity-This might be problematic in the same way 
that Schachter's work was considered to have difficulties. However, there 
need be no presumption that psychological theory necessarily involves 
conceptual entanglement-see Chapter Seven. Nevertheless, considered as 
a contribution to philosophy Thagard's proposal conflicts with 
Wittgenstein's method for obtaining philosophical clarity. 
From the perspective of Thagard's philosophical contribution the ECHO 
programme instantiates the grammatical rules which constitute the 
normative practice of appraising theory. From Wittgenstein's perspective, 
Thagard's theory of theory appraisal instantiated in the ECHO programme 
is really just an analogy of the scientific process: it provides an overview of 
certain grammatical rules but does not tell us what rules we actually follow 
when we adopt a novel practice: ECHO describes the' game' it neither plays 
it, nor offers the way it should be played. Thagard's ECHO programme 
simulates the practice of accepting a divergent practice; it does not 
demonstrate the rules we follow when we assimilate a novel practice-nor 
does it demonstrate, by it proficiency with historical examples, the reasons 
why we might assimilate a divergent practice. 
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The debate concerning whether Thagard's work is a contribution to 
philosophy or -psychology is fueled by the weak psychologism which 
Thagard concedes to. Like Frege, discussed in Chapter One, Thagard 
concedes to the Cartesian ontology by asserting the Functionalist account of 
the mind: regarding 'thinking' to be some mental process. In seeking to 
give priority to one form of inquiry Thagard, or at least critics of the 
approach(e.g Dietrich 1989) require some criterion to distinguish the two 
approaches. But in seeking out such criteria one moves to yet another 
position (A theory of theories of theory appraisal). To dissolve all such 
attempts to adopt this form of Platonistic reasoning (The building of 
theories in philosophy) Wittgenstein typically requests that all that is 
needed is: " ... to identify the ultimate criteria of correctness that we find 
acceptable when actually using language rather than theorising about it. 
(Pears 1988). And as might be apparent by now those criteria are manifest in 
a practice (PI §217). 
_ Wittgenstein's attack on the Platonistic accounts apparent in Frege's 
account of logic are no less valid when applied to any other theory building 
enterprises in philosophy. Hence, instead of discussing a single rule of, for 
example, a law of logic, we encounter a set of rules which are thought to 
describe, somehow, our ability to discriminate between good and bad 
science, or creative and insane acts. The problem according to Wittgenstein 
IS: 
1/ All the steps are really already taken" means: I no longer have 
any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, 
traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the 
whole of space.--But if something of this sort really were the 
case, how would it help?(PI §218). 
Frege could not adequately account for an individual's grasping of a mind-
independent sense. Here Wittgenstein points out that a rule laid down in 
philosophical theory sacrifices an individual's role in grasping that rule. 
Thagard also confronts this with respect to his 'philosophical theory' of 
grasping the rules in orienting ourselves to divergent practices-which was 
obviously what Kuhn also recognised. Thagard's theory of theory appraisal 
gives theory appraisal meaning independent of those who actually are 
engaged in the practice of appraising theory. Thagard gives priority to the 
contents of the theories of history, not the reasons they were accepted-
since this is what he is trying to determine by implementing the criteria of 
theory appraisal within ECHO. The whole point of the ECHO programme is 
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to establish the 'sufficiency' of the criteria in operation according to the 
algorithm. But this fixes the meaning of what is considered' good science' 
or 'good theory' to those criteria. 
Pears (1988 p. 466) points out: 
Rails laid down to infinity would be useless unless the traveller 
were locked on to them, and similarly, complete guidance by 
rules already laid down in reality would be useless unless there 
were something in the rule-follower's mind that latches him on 
to them infallibly. 
Both these options have been dismissed under different guises in earlier 
chapters. The investigation of rules and rule-following in Chapter Two 
revealed that rules are not to be considered as the the causes of human 
action. More importantly, the relationship between a rule and its extension 
is internal-nothing else mediates between the rule and it criteria: not 
society, not mental processes, not some locking device onto rails stretching 
to infinity. 
But what of ECHO's actual success? We might concede that as a 
philosophical theory Thagard's work produces an incoherent account of 
rules and rule-following, but does it not actually work? ECHO's quite good 
at sorting out historical examples. But this line of reasoning, if continued, 
would overlook the purpose of the use of the historical examples-they 
were used as the measure to establish the 'sufficiency' of the arrangement of 
the criteria instantiated in the programme. It has been argued (Chapter 
Five, pp. 164-183) more generally that evidence does not stand as an 
independent measure of the adequacy of a grammar. 
We must put an individual's 'choice' back into the relationship between 
language and meaning (restore the internal relation). The rules we follow 
within a practice determine what is to count as an action of a certain kind-
we orient ourselves to this conception by following Wittgenstein's 
philosophy. When judging two competing theoretical orientations, such as 
the competing alternatives of the oxygen/phlogiston debate we engage in a 
particular practice. Like any other social practice assessing the merits of 
competing theories is governed by certain normative conventions which 
describe what are legitimate and illegitimate moves within that practice. 
What Thagard describes with his arrangement of those criteria is the 
normative criteria involved in assessing a creative act. He describes one 
aspect, for the purposes of a scientific investigation, (The final component 
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in this consideration of the concept of creativity), of the practice of giving 
an ascription of scientific creativity-that is the acceptance of a novel or 
divergent scientific practice. We are socialised as participants of academie 
study to orient ourselves to divergent practices in particular ways. 
Philosophy's role in Changing our Conceptual Orientation 
Implicit within Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy is the notion of 
changing an orientation and coming to see things 'right'. The primary 
purpose of philosophy is to adjust our conceptual orientation. 
We are caught in a fly-bottle and find ourselves denying or 
affirming things we never intended. The only way out of this is 
to change the terms used to express the problem, the language, 
and thus the pictures that hold us captive. Philosophy's job is to 
effect this liberation by changing a way of 
seeing/speaking.(Genova, 1993 pp. 329). 
But what of science? Surely science alters our orientation to the world. One 
might say that Galileo discovered that the earth goes around the sun. On 
this Wittgenstein remarks that the real achievement of a Copernicus or a 
Darwin is the discovery not of a true theory, but a fruitful new aspect. We 
might forget that it was Copernicus who presented the conceptual 
orientation for Galileo's observations (Baker and Hacker, 1980 p. 300). 
Similarly we can interpret Thagard as producing a new representation of 
our conception of appraising theory: he provides a certain representation of 
the grammar of creativity and uses it to represent certain historical 
events-an altered perception of philosophy's contribution to such a task, 
in the light of Wittgenstein's method, negates the compulsion to suppose 
that philosophy's role is undermined by this interpretation. 
Philosophical developments, through the study of grammar and 
grammatical errors in theory provide conceptual orientations-not 
discoveries about the world. Wittgenstein remarks (PI §401): 
You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new 
object. You interpret a grammatical movement made by yourself 
as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you are observing. 
(Think for example of the question: "Are sense-data that material 
of which the universe is made?") 
But there is an objection to my saying that you have made a 
'grammatical movement'. What you have primarily discovered 
is a new way of looking at things. As if you had invented a new 
way of painting; or again, a new metre, or a new kind of song. 
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The objection is that, strictly speaking, science does not involve the study of 
grammar-philosophy does. This, of course, is not meant to preclude the 
scientist philosophising. Thagard's work can be considered both a 
philosophical achievement: since he carefully organises the relations 
between certain aspects of the grammar of theory appraisal; and it is a 
contribution to social science: since it provides a 'new' way to evaluate 
historical movements in science. Nevertheless, at first sight, the separation 
of science and philosophy by Wittgenstein, seems to be undermined by the 
above claims. Wittgenstein dispels confusion at PI§ 126: 
One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions. 
This does not place philosophy in a privileged position of 'Queen of the 
sciences' or imply that philosophy provides the foundation for science. 
Philosophical clarity merely provides a working space for actions within 
science. In science grammatical possibilities fence in inquiry-we should 
not ask illegitimate questions which breach our grammatical rules and the 
attempt to answer them empirically (see Chapter Five, pp. 171-183). In the 
same way, the laws of a country do not tell a citizen how he or she should 
act they merely operate to inform which actions are inappropriate. Seeking 
out conceptual clarity prepares the scientist for an investigation 
unburdened, or at least assured with a level of confiderice, that one is not 
pursuing the nonsensicaL 
Thus Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy provides us only with a 
method for exposing conceptual confusion in our actual practices. 
Philosophical clarity does not relieve us of the burden of theorising, it 
merely provides a space for us to work within. Philosophical clarity 
precedes scientific inquiry in the sense that it provides the clear 
interpretation of the rules which constitute our use of linguistic 
expressions in the practices of presenting questions and explanations. 
Philosophy is not prescriptive in the sense in which we look to philosophy 
to tell us how we should engage in scientific practice-it is normative: it 
tell us only when we have gone wrong. And a study of grammar, like the 
study of the law, will only tell a scientist how not to act, not how to proceed. 
Commenting on the status of his own' philosophy, Wittgenstein states: 
My 'achievement' is very much like that of a mathematician who 
invents a calculus. (C.V p. 50). 
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The invention of infinitesimal calculus enabled the calculation of 
functions. In the physical world many of the relationships between 
quantities can be expressed by continuous and differentiable functions. 
Thus only differential calculus makes it possible in the natural sciences to 
to express mathematically not only states but also processes. (Gellert, 
Kiistner, Hellwich & Kastner, 1975 p. 406). In the same way the invention of 
calculus preceded and was necessary to the development of certain 
discoveries in physics, so too the recognition of Wittgenstein's 
philosophical method precedes our investigations in psychology. Since 
Wittgenstein offers a way to examine our concepts, point out the 
senselessness of certain tasks, and so on, we are in a position to examine the 
connections and differences between concepts and their employment 
within certain practices. Thus, by examining these concepts we obtain a 
conceptual overview. 
These conclusions led Russell to remark: 
It positive doctrines seem to me trivial and its negative doctrines 
unfounded. I have not found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations anything that seemed to me interesting ... [I]f it is 
true, philosophy is, at best, a slight help to lexicophers, and at 
worst, an idle tea-table amusement. (Russell, p. 217 cited in Baker 
and Hacker, 1980 p. 287). 
Baker and Hacker reply: 
Russell is like a man groping in a dark room who, when the light 
is switched on, complains that there is nothing interesting to see, 
forgetting that the achievement was to find the switch. (Baker 
and Hacker 1980 p. 287). 
If one really does hanker after the interesting things in the world then 
Russell is correct with his interpretation that Wittgenstein's philosophy 
will not reveal them. Philosophy reveals only the. conceptual space for 
investigation: by turning on the light switch and enabling us the resource 
of using our eyes. We must develop theory, or a conceptual orientation to 
the world, if we are to find those things which Russell requests. 
Wittgenstein provides a method which justifies our selection of one of the 
myriad of uses of our conceptual language. The theory is not justified by 
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that method: it is merely a resource, like any other resource, say those of 
mathematics for the physicists, which enables us to change our 
representation of the world. 
Conclusions 
From Wittgenstein's philosophical orientation we must regard the criteria 
of theory appraisal instantiated in the ECHO programme as being 
constitutive of a grammar which surrounds the practice of accepting 
divergent, or novel practices. It is an illegitimate move to regard the 
description of a grammar as the representation of the actual practice-in 
the same way that we study everyday language to gain the concept of 
'seeing' not a theory of seeing. Philosophy does not study actually practices 
for the purpose of developing theory. The division between philosophy 
and science within Wittgenstein's philosophical perspective requires an 
extra step to introduce his philosophical method to theoretical psychology. 
Genova (1993 p. 328) points out: 
The very style of the Investigations mirrors his goal and 
argument procedure precisely: the possible declamatory contents 
of the remarks is sacrificed to the deed, to the illocutory act they 
perform, to change a way of seeing. 
If we are to concede to Wittgenstein's philosophical method then, in 
relation to Thagard's proposals, we must sacrifice the content of Thagard's 
structure to its philosophical force: it acts to remind us that theory cannot 
be assessed according to the evidence alone. It offers a perspective on the 
practice of theory appraisal, it does not tell us how it is actually carried out. 
The criteria incorporated within the ECHO programme describe what is 
constitutive of a scientific orientation to divergent practices vis-a-vis some 
other 'game' such as accepting a religious belief. We regard those people 
who offer such reasons as those contained within ECHO to be properly 
orienting themselves to theory. In the same way we regard those people 
who act in accord with logical reasoning to be acting rationally (Chapter 
One pp. 27-34). But those who have some alternative practice, or some 
alternative logic, are not insane or irrational (as Frege suggests) but simply 
not acting in accord with what we call science, or logic. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
The study of Grammar and 
the Scientific investigation of Creativity 
The only task that remains is to provide a demonstration, an example, of 
how Wittgenstein's philosophical method might be applied in relation to 
the practices of psychology. This thesis has relied on the concepts of insanity 
and creativity to illustrate the inadequacy of other attempts to theorise 
within psychology, establish a philosophical foundation for psychology, and 
demonstrate the importance of Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology. 
There is a duty to attempt to provide an approach to the study of these 
phenomena in the light of the conclusions already obtained. Nevertheless, 
it should not be overlooked, that the following is an argument which 
serves only to demonstrate, by example, how Wittgenstein can be 
introduced into psychology-it would be a mistake, and contradictory to the 
conclusion above, to interpret this argument as being derived from 
Wittgenstein or, more broadly, Wittgenstein's method. 
Neonate Crusoes, the last of the Mohicans, and the like, present no 
conceptual problems within Wittgenstein's account of philosophy. It 
misrepresents Wittgenstein's private language argument to suppose that it 
rules out the possibility of an autonomous individual, who as a genius 
child, invents a language in total isolation from any society. We can then, 
without conceptual error in psychology, regard certain concepts as being 
subsumed by the more general notion of 'autonomous individuals': 
individuals who develop practices not shared by any social practice. 
The removal of the idea of a social determination of an individual's 
conceptual orientation to the world enables the conceptualisation that an 
individual can represent the world in ways which are contingently 
unshared. It is not a logically necessary feature of an individual's form of 
representation that it is obtained through learning-it may be a contingent 
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truth since wolf-children appear not to develop a language. Nevertheless, 
there is no logical requirement that an individual must learn a language, or 
a conceptual orientation, from within a society. 
It is legitimate in psychology to theorise about the capacities of 
'autonomous individuals'. No grammatical boundary is breached. 
However, further issues are raised within the conceptual articulation of 
autonomous individuals. One might be too quick in exploring the 
grammatical space provided by removing the illusory requirement that 
practices be learnt from others. We might for instance regard all creative 
acts to be contingently unshared-there is something true in this but it does 
not help us in any way; it does no work. It is by contrast to other concepts, 
in this example the concept of 'insanity', that our conceptual confusions are 
removed. Both the concepts of insanity and creativity were argued to be 
ascriptions given to those who have contingently unshared practices. 
The range of contingently unshared practices which autonomous 
individuals can logically engage in is constrained only by certain 
preconditions which must obtain for any practice at all to occur. If a practice 
is a genuine practice (d. The private language argument, see Chapter Three 
p. 68) then it must be governed by public criteria which exploit the stability 
of the natural world. The practice of measuring for instance, requires that 
the objects measured do not shrink and grow in dimensions at random 
intervals (see Chapter Four pp. 141-143). And relatedly, our biological 
capacities (which are part of the physical world) constrain our practices. We 
do not claim to see beyond a certain wavelengths of light, or hear beyond a 
certain pitch since we are constrained in our colour and sound language to 
those stable features of the natural world which our biological capacities can 
exploit. But within these broad constraints occurs a range of actual practices 
which are logically possible. When we (Psychologists) orient ourselves to 
these practices we can identify that divergent practices fall along a 
continuum. The insane we regard as unintelligible and the creative we 
regard as intelligible. In between these ascriptions is a range of other 
ascriptions for describing those which do not conform to, or share, a social 
practice: they might be considered criminal, delinquent, deviant, bizarre, 
eccentric, and so on. 
Thus certain aspects of the grammar of the concepts of creativity and 
insanity are revealed by contrasting them against one another revealing 
some similarities and some differences. Both the creative and the insane 
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produce unshared (novel) practices in relation to a shared social practice 
(Chapter Four). The insane can only be regarded as insane if the practice 
they engage in is unshared, and furthermore unshareable. Since if a practice 
is shareable then it is potentially intelligible. If a practice is potentially 
intelligible then it cannot be an action which we describe as insane. A 
creative act must be one which is relative to the shared practices of a social 
group. It is the group, the society, that gives the ascription of creativity. A 
community can do so, it has been argued, by exploiting a shared practice 
which enables the assessment of divergent practices (Chapter Six). 
Nevertheless the dismissal of a contingently unshared practice is 
fundamentally different from the assessment of a practice as being 
unintelligible. In the former one can exploit one's form of representation to 
measure the adequacy of the other person's form of representation, in the 
latter such a process is logically impossible. One cannot even represent to 
oneself what the insane person is on about. 
The conclusion of this grammatical investigation IS that there is a 
similarity between the insane and the creative which, because of the 
grammar of the concepts, conceals a feature of the creative which produces 
conceptual confusion. The use of the concepts of insanity and creativity in 
psychological research 111.Ust regard these ascriptions as applying to 
'autonomous individuals' relative to a social context. Understanding the 
distinction between the concept of 'creativity' and other concepts to which it 
is related, like 'insanity', rests in understanding the effect creative 
individuals have on a social practice. 
One cannot, in principle, reveal the conceptual structure of the relationship 
between insanity and creativity by engaging in empirical research. 
Empirical research presupposes the criteria for the identification of 
phenomena and therefore cannot expand, or contribute, to our conceptual 
understanding. Nevertheless, empirical research can, reliant upon gaining 
a clear view of conceptual confusions, (i.e removing confusion by doing 
philosophy) contribute to our understanding of the world. 
With these general clarifications revealed let us suppose that we are 
interested to find out the connection between the insane and the creative. 
How might a grammatical investigation of the type employed within this 
thesis be of any help to our theorising? 
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A logical requirement of the grammar of creativity requires that we regard 
the creative as 'autonomous individuals'. It is then possible to theorise that 
such a position is a stressful one as Maddi (1975) and also Lichtenstein 
(1971) suggest. Whether there is evidence to support this conceptual 
orientation becomes a problem for psychology, not a conceptual problem, 
an empirical one which rests on a conceptual understanding of what 
criteria are involved in identifying stress and anxiety. Certain theoretical 
orientations to such a problem have already been removed from 
consideration-that anxiety might be described in purely causal terms. It is 
simply suggested here that the criteria for being anxious might extend to 
presenting novel ideas which are contingently unshared and therefore 
open to rejection since they are only potentially intelligible, not readily 
intelligible. (Think of the example of the physicist who presented his 
photograph of what people look like in the dark.) 
It has been argued that Schachter's work on psychopaths has major 
conceptual difficulties. Schachter's method of inquiry presupposed the 
adequacy of certain concepts-like psychopathy. The problem which he 
wished to solve, 'what is psychopathy', is really a conceptual one, and 
therefore, it has been argued, cannot be achieved, in principle, by empirical 
investigation: his problem and his method pass one another by. But if one 
starts with a clear view of the concepts one might normally presuppose 
within empirical research then it is possible to reveal, without grammatical 
error, certain evidence which is supported by a conceptual orientation (or 
form of representation). Thus one produces knowledge (not trivial 
knowledge but scientific knowledge) about the world without asserting 
nonsense: breaching grammatical rules. 
Certain evidence presents itself immediately within even a cursory 
examination of the literature on creativity. The work of Juda (1949) and 
others (Chapter Five pp. 185-192), for example, describes the incidence of 
psychopathology in relatives of the creative as being significantly higher 
than that of normals. The inference drawn from this material normally 
concerns some underlying genetic or motivational factor which contributes 
to both insanity and creativity. Yet, it has been argued (In chapters Two and 
Three) that it is a mistake to posit some hidden entity which is responsible 
for the characteristics of our psychological predicates. Despite this, it is a 
mistake to dismiss the findings of such research since once we engage in 
science it is such things which we are required to make sense of. Juda's 
results are those interesting things which Russell complains are lacking 
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when one adopts Wittgenstein's philosophy. A legitimate inference is that 
there is some biological capacity (A feature of the physical world) which is 
common to both the creative and those who suffer some psychopathology. 
Goertzel and Goertzel (1962) report that from a sample of 400 eminent 
scientists, artists, philosophers and so on, 75 per cent came from troubled or 
broken homes. The childhood environment of the creative was 
characterised by rejecting or estranged parents. Almost 50 per cent of their 
sample came from homes marked by major financial fluctuations. The task 
was repeated in 1978 where further study revealed that 85 per cent of 
twentieth century creative persons came from broken homes. Novelists 
and playwrights being more likely than scientists to come from a stressful 
home environment. Eisenstadt reveals that the creative seem more likely 
than others to endure bereavement of a parent at a young age with 25 per 
cent (n=699) of the creative in his sample losing a parent before the age of 10 
years. Ochse (1990) offers: "The only other subgroup with approximately the 
same proportion of childhood bereavement are delinquents and the 
suicidal depressives." (p. 75). Therefore there is some evidence to support 
the notion that the creative are raised in stressful conditions: a requirement 
for psychopathy on Schachter's view. 
According to Schachter's (1971) method, adopted for the study of adrenalin 
sensitivity in psychopaths, the avoidance learning task is assumed to 
produce anxiety in the subject. The fear of the electric shock induced by 
error on the maze learning task is thought to reinforce learning. 
Psychopaths scored poorly compared to normals and the inference drawn 
was that psychopaths lacked the requisite anxiety (They do not get stressed). 
Other alternatives were dismissed or controlled for, such as, the possibility 
that psychopaths were just poor at learning or under-aroused. 
Suppose that in Schachter's study the independent variable of 
psychopathology is replaced by giftedness. Instead of comparing normals 
with psychopaths, a group of creative individuals is compared with a group 
of normals according to the same method used in Schachter's (1971) study. 
The reason one might adopt such a line of inquiry is that one is aware of 
the grammatical connection between the concept of insanity and the 
concept of creativity (one has an altered form of representation). Instead of 
presupposing the adequacy of terms to reveal their conceptual relations 
through empirical inquiry one starts with an overview of the similarities 
and differences between the concepts. The intention of this research would 
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not be to advance any conceptual understanding. Our conceptual 
understanding is advanced by doing philosophy. The purpose would be to 
test some theoretical assumption-in this case that the creative have a 
physiological capacity which, like that of the psychopath, facilitates dealing 
with stressful situations. We want to make sense of two findings which are 
revealed by empirical study. Firstly, that the creative and their relatives, as a 
group, have a higher incidence of mental illness than normals. Secondly, 
that the creative have a higher incidence of childhood trauma than others. 
There are a number of possible outcomes of the experiment. It might be 
found that, like psychopaths, the creative are poor at avoidance learning 
tasks (while not being poorer at learning in other situations), and sensitive 
to adrenalin. If this result was obtained then the experiment would have 
identified a feature of the physiological nature of the creative which is the 
same as that of psychopaths and different from that of normals-both 
psychopaths and the creative are sensitive to adrenalin and do not fluctuate 
from a high level of arousal (essentially the conclusion of Schachter's 
research applied to both the creative and the psychopathic). We could not 
conclude that adrenalin sensitivity causes both psychopathy and creativity. 
Furthermore, no conceptual connection is established by such an inquiry. 
We would not need to postulate some third entity to explain these research 
findings. The conceptual connection is revealed in the grammar of the 
concepts of insanity and creativity which facilitates such a line of research. 
Of course the result of this hypothetical experiment may turn out 
otherwise. It is not the purpose here to presuppose the result of an 
experiment which has not performed (The effort required to perform such 
an experiment would be enormous since the creative are less likely than 
the prisoners used in Schachter's study to be willing to participate in such 
an experiment). If the result could be determined from some philosophical 
standpoint the point of experimentation would be lost. 
In summary, by working within an understanding of the grammar of 
creativity which is revealed by Wittgenstein's philosophical method, it is 
legitimate to make, for example, two theoretical assumptions. The creative 
being 'autonomous individuals' occupy, from the standpoint of a normal 
person, a stressful environment which they endure by exploiting a 
physiological capacity, similar to that of the psychopathic, to ignore stress 
and anxiety. Such assumptions can be tested empirically. Revealing the 
grammatical connection between insanity and creativity (i.e that both 
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concepts apply to individuals who do not participate in some relevant 
shared social practice) does not tell us anything about the actual features of 
the creative and the insane-it merely facilitates research which might do 
so. By introducing the added assumption that autonomous individuals 
place themselves in stressful conditions, a line of inquiry has been offered 
which supports a reinterpretation of past psychological experimentation-
such is the task of the theoretical psychologist, not the philosopher of 
psychology. 
Conclusions 
They sought it with thimbles, they sought it with care; 
They pursued it with forks and hope; 
They threatened its life with a railway-share; 
They charmed it with smiles and soap. 
And the Banker, inspired with courage so new 
It was matter for general remark, 
Rushed madly ahead and was lost to their view 
In his zeal to discover the Snark. 
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Lewis Carroll 'The hunting of the snark' 
Wittgenstein has offered psychologists a method to pursue the interesting 
things in the world without the stultifying effects of an entanglement 
within language. His legacy is lost to those who ignore the warnings which 
accompany the method. There is no one philosophical cure for the 
misunderstandings which arise within a misuse of language. Each 
misunderstanding is resolved by a careful considerations of the sources of 
confusion-since the sources of confusion will vary and are unpredictable, 
so too the techniques required to remove the confusion must vary. There 
can be no one Wittgensteinian method for psychology, no new 
Wittgensteinian ontology, no new method for gathering information in 
the light of Wittgenstein's philosophical insights. To forge a new 
psychology from Wittgenstein's philosophy is to ignore what is the most 
crucial feature of his legacy-we rush forward with new methods, like the 
banker, forgetting that the real achievement is to recognise that the task is 
nonsensical. Wittgenstein does not offer a new psychology, he only offers a 
way to scrutinise the nature of our inquiry so that we might recognise not 
that our methods are primitive but that sometimes the those methods are 
employed in the pursuit of chimeras. 
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